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Preface
The articles collected in this volume were presented at the 7th Annual Asian
Studies Symposium, held in September 2016 at Leiden University. This confer-
ence brought together young scholars interested in developing new and inte-
grative approaches to the study of primary historical sources from South Asia.
The studies in this volume were presented at two different panels, which ad-
dressed material culture and philosophy, respectively. Papers were presented
by Elizabeth A. Cecil, Sanne Dokter-Mersch, Divya Kumar-Dumas, Mirjam Westra,
Laxshmi Greaves, Lewis Doney, Himal Trikha, Evgeniya Desnitskaya, Ana
Bajželj, Gregory Forgues, Marie-Hélène Gorisse, Jonathan Duquette, and Lucas
den Boer. We are pleased to also include Peter Bisschop’s article within the Text,
Image, and Material section.
The current volume was supported by the ERC Synergy project ‘Asia Beyond
Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State’, with which both editors
were affiliated. This interdisciplinary research project was hosted by the British
Museum, the British Library, SOAS, and Leiden University from 2014 – 2020.
The project aimed to improve our understanding of the Gupta Period (4th–7th
century CE) and its legacy in South and Southeast Asia by working across disci-
plinary boundaries and regions. This interdisciplinary approach also character-
ises the contributions in this book. As a volume in the Beyond Boundaries series,
this work contains a collection of studies that work across geographical, chrono-
logical, disciplinary, and historiographical boundaries. The contributions are
linked by a shared emphasis on engagement with primary sources and methodo-
logical innovation that participates in broader trends currently animating the
study of Asian history and religions.
In addition to thanking all of the authors and the anonymous reviewers
who have helped to create this book, we would like to recognize the following
people and organizations: Lewis Doney and Michael Willis as editors of the
Beyond Boundaries series; Kristen De Joseph for valuable editorial assistance;
the International Institute for Asian Studies, the J. Gonda Fund Foundation,
and the Society of Friends of the Kern Institute for funding the conference that
occasioned this volume.
Open Access. ©2020 Lucas den Boer and Elizabeth A. Cecil, published by De Gruyter. This
work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110557176-202
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Introduction
The contributions to this book address a series of ‘confrontations’ – for exam-
ple, debates between intellectual communities, the interplay of texts and im-
ages, and texts and objects – and explore the ways in which the legacy of these
encounters, and the human responses to them, inspired cultural production
in early South Asia. The book employs the idea of ‘confrontation’ as a lens
through which to examine historical moments in which individuals and com-
munities were confronted with new ideas, ideologies, and material expressions.
Some of these encounters could be qualified as agonistic, as expressions of
community identity and practice vied for normative status. Yet this active term
also describes occasions of dynamic exchange and interaction between histori-
cal agents and the social and material contexts that defined the lived and intel-
lectual spaces in which they operated. While the legacy of cultural production
in the Gupta Period is often categorized as canonical, and thus suggests a fixity
of form and idea, the studies included in this volume draw attention to the pro-
cesses and contexts in which the ‘classical’ took shape and the subsequent re-
ception and revision of its cultural forms.
1 Intellectual and Lived Spaces
The confrontations that this book presents originated in intellectual and lived
spaces that were mutually influential. The different chapters explore how the
lived spaces of writers and artists influenced their ideas and creations, and
how texts, objects, and images reflect the identities of their makers. Instead of
studying the primary sources as ends in themselves, the authors use these
sources as the means to investigate the lived context of their creators. By looking
at the materials from this perspective, the sources reveal how philosophical, reli-
gious, and artistic activities contributed to processes of identity formation and
the negotiation of boundaries between communities. In addition to contributing
new perspectives on the development of intellectual communities and the ideo-
logical parameters of philosophical traditions, this volume works to situate these
cultural developments in their social and historical contexts.
We use the term “lived space” to refer to the sociocultural worlds in which
the authors, thinkers, and artists, whose works are discussed in the following
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chapters, operated. Adopted from the work of Henri Lefebvre,1 “lived space” is
part of a conceptual triad that also includes “conceived” and “perceived” space.
Whereas the latter two operate in largely ideational realms, lived space is the
locus of culture and social activity and provides a productive frame for the pa-
pers included in the first section of the book. While the highly theoretical world
of philosophy may appear to map most closely on the similarly abstract category
of “conceived space”, we have chosen the term ‘intellectual space’ instead. This
term recognizes the notional spheres in which philosophical discourses work to
locate themselves while, at the same time, it draws attention to the social em-
beddedness of the philosophers and schools that the authors examine. Even in
the case of doctrinal differences and opposing philosophical traditions, the con-
tributors show that individual thinkers occupied a shared ‘intellectual space’ in
which they investigated a common set of questions concerning the formation and
expression of authoritative knowledge and the manner in which that knowl-
edge could be embodied by human (or more-than-human) agents. To begin to
access these intellectual and lived spaces in the premodern world requires situ-
ating not only text, but other forms of religious media and cultural production
in their shared contexts. Although addressed to discrete cases and places, each
of the chapters that follow proceed from this shared perspective.
2 Sources and Boundaries
The individual contributions to the volume address a wide range of material
and textual sources and cultural contexts – from Tibetan bells and Jaina teach-
ers, to traditions of Sun worship and the poetics of argumentation. Given the
variety represented, the question naturally arises regarding what ties these discus-
sions productively together? The answer is the use of primary source materials to
explore the shaping of cultural and intellectual communities. A close engagement
with primary sources underpins each of the discussions in the book. Engaging
with both textual and material evidence, in their work the contributors also trou-
ble the persistent binary that often separates these bodies of historical evidence
by showing how premodern cultural agents negotiated and synthesized their
sources. Moreover, by tracing patterns of bi-directional influence it becomes
evident that using one body of evidence to corroborate the claims of another
(i.e. simply looking for a textual precedent for an image or vice-versa) is far
1 Henri Lefebvre. The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1991.
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too simple and minimizes the innovative and imaginative ways in which cul-
tural producers made use of the materials at their disposal.
In addition to questioning persistent binaries in the classification of source
materials, the contributions included in the first section work to complicate the
very categories of ‘text’ and ‘material’ by tracing the historical development of
particular practices through different modes of cultural production. The practice
of Sun worship, for example, is shown to have been shaped by a rich legacy of
purāṇic narrative in conversation with traditions of ritual rules and prescriptions
(i.e. śāstra) popularized by competing religious communities. Material pro-
duction, too, is a multi-faceted category. By including monumental sculptures
for worship, ritual objects, temple adornments, and the frame for inscriptions,
the category of ‘material’ is shown to be as complex and varied as that of ‘text’.
The studies included in the second section trace the development of knowl-
edge communities in ways that challenge the idea of fixed boundaries between
intellectual traditions. These traditions, in fact, are shown to be the work of en-
terprising thinkers who borrowed, responded to, and refined the ideas of their
interlocutors from across Brahmanical, Jain, and Buddhist lineages. In addition
to recovering dialogue between communities often held to be distinct, estab-
lished forms of argumentation, too, are not restricted to the category of śāśtra
as ‘knowledge system’, but worked across literary genres and were influenced
by poetic works, prose ritual manuals, and epic exemplars.
3 Overview of Contents
The articles in the first half of the volume address the intersections of textual,
material, and visual forms of cultural production. These contributions focus on
three primary modes of confrontation: the relation of inscribed texts to material
media, the visual articulation of literary images and, finally, the literary inter-
pretation and reception of material religious media. Discussions of the relation
of text and material culture have tended to privilege literary semantics and
imagine a unidirectional pattern of interaction, whereby textual forms inspired
images and guided material production. These articles aim to re-describe these
interactions through focused case studies that incorporate a variety of media,
ranging from individual objects and monuments, to sanctified spaces and reli-
gious landscapes.
The second part of the volume focuses on confrontations both within and
between intellectual communities. The articles in this section address the dy-
namics between peripheral and dominant movements in the history of Indian
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philosophy. Texts belonging to peripheral movements, such as the Jaina tradi-
tion, often apply creative strategies to position themselves in relation to their
intellectual rivals. This process of boundary formation is a driving force behind
philosophical developments and ideological changes. Instead of solely focusing
on the philosophical merit of specific positions, the contributions in the second
part of the book explore the relation between philosophical texts and the ideo-
logical and social realms in which these works evolved.
4 Text, Image & Lived Spaces
The articles of the first half of the volume are in dialogue with current works
that examine religious centers and built landscapes as sites of community build-
ing and which emphasize the strategic use of images and inscriptions to ma-
terialize social affiliations. These essays are also influenced by studies that
emphasize the effective agency of architecture, objects, and images in shaping
South Asian history. Recent examples include F.B. Flood, Objects in Translation:
Material Culture and Medieval ‘Hindu-Muslim’ Encounter (2009) and R. Eaton
and P. Wagoner, Power, Memory, Architecture: Contested Sites on India’s Deccan
Plateau, 1300–1600 (2014). While working to situate and contextualize the crea-
tion of material religious media within the social and geographic contexts in
which it was produced, the contributions are also attuned to the reception and
legacy of particular objects and images. They consider how images may have
been explained by later viewers, how objects were made meaningful, and the
ways in which the memory of a historical moment could be received via mate-
rial forms.
In “The Enigma of the Centauress and her Lover”, Laxshmi Greaves explores
an enigmatic, yet important, iconographic topos found in the art of the Kuṣāṇas,
Kṣatrapas and Guptas; namely, a centauress (that is, a figure with the torso of a
woman and the lower half of a horse) bearing on her back a human male in regal
attire. The pair are sometimes joined by a devotee or a celestial being such as a
vidyādhara. This type of image has been found at several sites including Sāñcī,
Bādāmi, Rājghāṭ, Lakha-Dhora and Mathurā, with undoubtedly the most mag-
nificent example hailing from the stepped pyramidal brick monument known
as ACI, located at the heart of the ancient city of Ahichhatrā in Uttar Pradesh.
Readings of this fantastic figure have tended to rely on the identification of a
textual source to explain the unique image: ranging from it being simply an em-
blematic representation of a kinnara-mithuna dallying in the hills; to the celes-
tial nymph Urvaśī, with her husband; or Manu Vaivasvata (Prajāpati) on the
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back of the Earth Goddess who has temporarily assumed a half-mare/half-woman
form. All of these interpretations are problematic in one way or another. By mov-
ing beyond a textual explanation for the identity and popularity of a visual form,
Greaves considers how the image may have functioned within the structural con-
texts and broader visual programs of the monuments and landscapes in which it
was encountered and viewed.
With her study, “Visual Story-Telling in Text and Image: The Nāga as
Inhabitant of the Ocean and the Netherworld”, Sanne Dokter-Mersch address
the intersections of narrative and image. As in the study of Greaves, Dokter-
Mersch also works to explain the features of an iconographic form. But in this
case, the image itself it not obscure; rather, it depicts one of the most widely
known moments from early Vaiṣṇava mythology. From the Kuṣāṇa period on-
wards, stone images of Viṣṇu in his boar manifestation (varāha) appear across
India. Most elements in these material representations of the myth can be ex-
plained from an iconographic or textual point of view. One ubiquitous element
of the images, however, cannot be explained by recourse to the textual sources
that recount the manifestation of the boar avatāra: namely, the presence of one
or two nāgas, or mythical serpents, coiling under Viṣṇu’s foot. Reading text and
image together, Dokter-Mersch argues that the artists’ imaginings of the nāgas
expresses a cosmological vision that, while also present in the literary narratives,
takes on an innovative form in sculpture.
Both Greaves and Dokter-Mersch take as their respective foci the material
and visual expression of narratives. For Greaves, the connection between text
and image is not straightforward, and her analysis points to spaces of material
production and uses of images without a clear literary parallel. For Dokter-Mersch,
the early Indic literary and visual sources are rich sources for representations of
the varāha myth. But popularity does not equate to uniformity. Even within the
parameters of a well-known narrative, authors and artisans found space for inno-
vative modes of expression.
This question about the possibility of innovation within established cultural
parameters is addressed in an engaging way in the contribution of Peter Bisschop,
“Vyoman: The Sky is the Limit. On the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s Reworking of the
Liṅgodbhava Myth.” While the Liṅgodbhava myth is well known and tells of
the origins of Śiva’s worship in material form, specifically the liṅga that
serves as his emblem, Bisschop draws attention to a remarkable adaptation
of this myth in the context of Sūrya worship recorded in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa.
The Bhaviṣyapurāṇa authors revised the Liṅgodbhava myth told in chapter 3 of
the Śivadharmaśāstra and turned it into a myth about the manifestation and
worship of Sūrya’s vyoman, a mysterious object presented as the supreme
form of the Sun god. While the Liṅgodbhava narrative describes the origins of a
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familiar object of devotion (i.e. the Śiva liṅga), the identity of the vyoman as
an object of worship is more difficult to trace. Does the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s de-
scription of the Saura emblem represent a textual innovation, or does it de-
scribe an actual object? By reexamining these narratives alongside ritual
objects typically known as saurapīṭhas in art-historical literature, Bisschop
shows how the authors of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa used a familiar narrative to
reinterpret a comparatively abstract ritual object as an iconic form of the
Sun.
Part one concludes with Lewis Doney’s work on “Temple Bells from the
Tibetan Imperial Period: Buddhist Material Culture in Context.” This contribu-
tion outlines how the tradition of bells and gongs in monasteries along the Silk
Road, focusing on Khotan, met Chinese bell-casting technology. Then what the
design of extant imperial Tibetan bells and their epigraphy tell us about their
form and function, their links with songs and praise, and their relation with
Buddhism and power in Tibet. Like the contribution of Bisschop, Doney also
takes as his focus the evolution of the visual and ritual functions of an object.
He, too, considers the integration of text alongside the development of iconic
bell ‘types’. But in this case, the materiality of text is expressed in a different
way, since the bells themselves function as text bearing objects. And in ways
that participate with the other three essays in this section, Doney offers some
glimpses into how these bells were remembered in Tibetan Buddhist historiog-
raphy and art of the post-imperial period. This consideration of ‘reception his-
tory’ is an aspect that parallels Bisschop’s study of textual reworking. In both
cases, a formal template is adapted and reworked to develop a new mode of
expression within the framework of ‘tradition’.
5 Philosophy & Intellectual Spaces
The articles in the second half of the volume address different sorts of philo-
sophical confrontations. Even though the history of philosophy is often presented
as a series of ideas that evolve independently from their wider socio-historical
setting, scholars are becoming increasingly attuned to the ways in which phil-
osophical developments have been influenced by the historical contexts of
particular thinkers. Important recent studies in this respect are V. Eltschinger,
Buddhist Epistemology as Apologetics: Studies on the History, Self-understanding
and Dogmatic Foundations of Late Indian Buddhist Philosophy (2014) and
J. Bronkhorst, How the Brahmins Won: From Alexander to the Guptas (2016). The
authors in this part of the book explore how specific philosophical standpoints
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can be situated in a wider temporal and cultural framework. Their work demon-
strates the methodological value of analyzing philosophical views as elements
within a multi-dimensional historical setting. On the one hand, this facilitates a
better understanding of the historical texts. On the other, it turns the philosophical
texts into relevant sources for an investigation of their socio-historical contexts.
In the chapter “Nonagonistic Discourse in the Early History of Indian
Philosophical Debates: From Brahmodyas to the Mahābhāṣya” Evgeniya
Desnitskaya investigates the continuity between the ancestral ritualistic ver-
bal contests (brahmodya) as attested in the Vedas, and later forms of debate
and dialogical textual structures. For this purpose, she focuses on the instan-
ces of nonagonistic argumentation in the brahmodyas, the Upaniṣads, and the
Mahābhāṣya with the aim of revealing shared patterns and identifying possible
affinities between ritual debates, the philosophical strategies of the Upaniṣadic
thinkers, and those of the ancient grammarians. Desnitskaya’s study shows that
discussions that predate the period of classical philosophical debate (vāda) do not
fit the agonistic pattern that later became normative. In the first section of her arti-
cle, she discusses the classical brahmodyas that are found in the Ṛgveda and the
Brāhmaṇas. In the second section, the author analyses the development of the
brahmodyas and the early philosophical debates in the Upaniṣads. The third part
of her article deals with nonagonistic discussions in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. The
article offers several novel interpretations of the primary sources and provides a
stimulating account of the early development of philosophical debates.
The two chapters by Marie-Hélène Gorisse and Ana Bajželj deal with Jaina
philosophy. This topic is particularly relevant for an exploration of philosophical
confrontations since the Jains have a long history of negotiating their space as a
minority tradition within the wider cultural environment. Their well-known theory
of ‘non-one-sidedness’ (anekāntavāda) is an important element in their attempt
to distinguish themselves by creating a model that accommodates the views of
others. This perspectivist model provided the Jains with a tool with which to
incorporate aspects of rival views within their own theories while, at the same
time, claiming intellectual superiority over their opponents. This dynamic is clearly
visible in Marie-Hélène Gorisse’s study, “The Legitimation of an Authoritative
Discourse in Jainism”. This chapter analyses the strategies employed by Jaina
thinkers to establish the authority of the Jaina scriptural corpus. The first sec-
tions of her study provide an overview of seminal accounts on verbal or scrip-
tural authority (āptatva), which is based on key passages in texts such as the
Tattvārthasūtra and the Nyāyāvatāra. Gorisse shows how this debate was
strongly influenced by the view on verbal testimony (āgama) that was upheld
by the Naiyāyikas. After providing a general overview of the development of
this debate, Gorisse provides an in-depth analysis of the discussion on authority
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in Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā. This work establishes the superiority of the
Jaina perspective by pointing out the inadequacy of the one-sided views of the
rival movements. Gorisse’s study shows that the development of Jaina philoso-
phy has to be studied in tandem with the developments in their wider intellec-
tual environment and that the Jains represent a unique voice in the Indian
philosophical landscape.
The chapter “Clay Pots, Golden Rings, and Clean Upper Garments: Causality
in Jaina Philosophy” by Ana Bajželj investigates the philosophical merit of the
Jaina view on causality. In previous studies, the Jaina view has been described as
a middle ground between two rival theories. On the one hand, there is the view
that an effect is pre-existent in its cause (satkāryavāda), which can be found
in the Sāṃkhya tradition. On the other, there is the idea that the effect radi-
cally differs from the cause (asatkāryavāda), as defended by the Nyāya-Vai
śeṣika tradition. Other scholars have labelled the Jaina view on causality as
‘sadasatkāryavāda’, since it combines aspects of both positions. Even though
such a position might seem attractive at first sight, some scholars have ques-
tioned whether the Jaina solution provides a persuasive philosophical alterna-
tive or whether the Jains simply refuse to choose sides. In her study, Bajželj
addresses this question by analysing important primary sources on the Jaina
theory of knowledge. To this end, she focuses on Amṛtacandra Sūri’s Tattvadīpikā.
The chapter contains a large number of translated passages from Amṛtacandra’s
work and provides a rigorous analysis of his ideas on causality. The author demon-
strates that the Jaina theory was not an ad hoc solution but that it offers a genuine
philosophical alternative to the views of the other movements.
Gregory Forgues’ study, “Charting the Geographies of ’Ju Mi pham rNam
rgyal rGya mtsho’s Perspectivist Approach to the Two Truths”, shows how an
early medieval Buddhist debate continued in the writings of the 19th century
Tibetan scholar Mi pham. In this chapter, Forgues focuses on Mi pham’s pre-
sentation of the relation between the concealing truth (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) and
the ultimate truth (don dam pa, paramārtha). Previous scholarship has charac-
terised Mi pham’s views on this subject as ambiguous or even inconsistent.
However, the author argues that Mi pham uses several models that relate to dif-
ferent stages of understanding and that his account as a whole provides a co-
herent theory. Based on a careful reading of the primary sources, Forgues
analyses the different perspectives that can be distinguished in Mi pham’s
work. This analysis reveals that Mi pham teaches Madhyamaka through a series
of ascending views. These views correspond to (i.) the views of beginners who
distinguish between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, (ii.) Svātantrika Madhyamaka, and
(iii.) Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. The corresponding goals of these three perspec-
tives are (i.) to introduce beginners to two truths, (ii.) explain the nominal
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ultimate, and (iii.) point to the actual ultimate. As such, Forgues demonstrates
that Mi pham’s inclusivist account provides a hierarchical soteriology that skil-
fully combines several opposing views on the nature of the two truths.
The contributors to this volume address a wide range of historical confron-
tations that shaped intellectual and lived spaces in early South Asia. We hope
that the topics and disciplinary approaches in this book offer a stimulating con-
frontation which will facilitate a fruitful dialogue across the different disciplin-
ary boundaries in the field of South Asian studies.
Introduction 9

Part I: Text, Image & Lived Spaces

Laxshmi Rose Greaves
1 The Enigma of the Centauress and Her
Lover: Investigating a Fifth-century
Terracotta Panel from Ahichhatrā
1 Introduction
Among these lesser gods that keep their place on the fringes of the orthodox are to be
found spirits of the Earth and of the Mountain; the Four Guardian Gods of the Quarters
with Vessavana-Kuvera at their head; Gandharvas, heavenly musicians; Nagas, the
snake-people who have their world beneath the waters of streams and tanks, but who
sometimes are identified with the tree spirits; and Garudas, half men, half birds who by
kind are deadly foes of the Nagas. These diminished godlings must be regarded as the
last remnant of a whole host of forgotten powers, once mighty and to be placated, each in
its own place. Strange beings of another sphere, they could not wholly be passed over
either by Brahman or Buddhist.1
The race of kinnaras – divine composite-creatures usually with human heads
and torsos, and the lower bodies of animals, often horses, or birds2 – can
be added to this eclectic group of celestial beings or ‘godlings’ described
by Vincent A. Smith. This paper is concerned with early visual depictions of
1 Vincent Arthur Smith, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1930), 7.
2 Half-human and half-equine creatures are sometimes called kimpuruṣa. Panchamukhi
writes: “Though the lexicons equate kinnara with kimpurusha, the Vāchaspatya draws a dis-
tinction between the two on the basis of literary evidence . . . the [19th century] Vāchaspatya
adds: -kimpurusha has the hips of a horse and the face of a man, while kinnara has the horse
face and human body.” See Panchamukhi, Raghavendra Swamirayacharya, Gandharvas &
Kinnaras in Indian Iconography (Dharwar: Kannada Research Institute, 1951), 25–26; The
Viṣnụdharmottarapuran̄ạ, on the other hand, describes two types of kinnara, the first with a
human body and horse head and the second with a human head and horse body. See
Panchamukhi, 27. The earliest known centaur images (kéntauros in Ancient Greek) date as far
back as the Late Bronze Age. See, for example, terracotta figurines from Ras Shamra-Ugarit,
Minet el Beidha and Ras ibn Hani in northern Syria (Ione Mylonas Shear, “Mycenaean
Centaurs at Ugarit,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 122 (2002), 147–153). A striking terracotta
sculpture from Lefkandi in Euboea, Greece, which dates to the tenth century BCE, is often con-
sidered the earliest centaur image but post-dates the aforementioned figurines. Though male
centaurs predominate in Greek art and mythology, centauresses are also represented and be-
come increasingly commonplace after the fifth century BCE (see D.E. Strong, “A Lady Centaur,”
The British Museum Quarterly, 30.1/2 (1965): 36–40 (38)). As with their Indian counterparts,
Greek centaurs are associated with forests and mountains.
Open Access. ©2020 Laxshmi Rose Greaves, published by De Gruyter. This work is
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110557176-002
equine kinnarīs (centauresses), and particularly those in the company of a male
with human form.3 Generally speaking, we find two major iconographic depic-
tions involving centauresses in India (Figure 1).4 The earlier, predominant type
shows a centauress carrying a regal-looking male on her back. Between the
third century BCE and the sixth century CE this image appears to have held a
degree of popularity and we find it adorning Hindu and Buddhist monuments
alike and on small portable terracotta discs. The second type, which emerged
at the start of the eighth century, portrays a male figure in the act of subduing
a small centauress. Both of these iconographic types appear to have fallen into
obscurity after the early medieval period and the original identity of these
flamboyant pairs have since been lost to collective memory. The aim of this
Figure 1: Map showing location of known centauress images in India.
3 This paper has developed from a subchapter of my doctoral thesis: Laxshmi Greaves, Brick
Foundations: North Indian Brick Temple Architecture and Terracotta Art of the Fourth to Sixth
Centuries CE (Cardiff University: PhD thesis, 2015), 455–466.
4 Centaurs and centauresses also featured in the art of Gandhara. Here they are depicted with
the head, body and legs of a human and the rear and hind legs of a horse. See, for example, a
small Kusāna period centauress from Dera Ismail Khan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan)
at the British Museum (Museum number: 1888, 1115.1); and a schist centauress from the same pe-
riod in the Chandigarh Museum. The images from Gandhara will not be explored here as this
paper is primarily concerned with cenaturess with male rider/ male oppressor scenes.
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paper, then, is to attempt to determine what these images might have signified or
represented, taking into account the possibility that their meaning may have
evolved or even transformed over the eleven–hundred years in which they were
being produced. It is plausible that the surviving centauress sculptures could illus-
trate a variety of myths or possibly even different episodes of the same myth.
The methodological approach taken in this paper involves analysing text and
image in conjunction. That is to say, since the types of images in question ceased
to be produced after the early medieval period, and their architectural and archae-
ological contexts are, for the most part, lost, unknown, or in a severely ruined
state, parallels or clues to the identity of the centauress and her companion have
been sought in religious texts. Consonant with the antiquity of centaur(ess) imag-
ery, most of the texts which refer to this breed of mythical creature were composed
at an early date, with some texts post-dating the most ancient of the images.
While it is essential that art historians in the field of South Asian studies
actively engage with textual sources, and vice versa, this approach inevitably
throws up a number of searching questions, pitfalls and challenges. In other
words, we face confrontations when merging the two disciplines. By identifying an
image, it becomes imbued with meaning, significance and context, and thus the
stakes are high. To quote Donald Preziosi, “. . . the principal aim of all art histori-
cal study has been to make artworks more fully legible in and to the present.”5 It is
not uncommon, then, for images to be wrongly affiliated with specific textual nar-
ratives in order to satisfy the need for a solution. Occasionally, obscure or diver-
gent details present in an image are ignored. This tendency to bypass or hurry
over inconvenient details or nuances undermines the evidence that points to a
complex, hugely diverse and creative artistic culture in early India, teeming with
singularity, non-conformity and place-specificity. This is especially the case for im-
agery produced before the mid-fifth century CE, because after this point in time
Hindu temple iconography becomes increasingly formalised. Minor irregularities
in early imagery include details such as attributes held by a deity which find no
mention in the texts, while more significant ‘deviations’ take a radical departure
from mainstream iconographic conventions. In addition, many unique deity im-
ages survive, some of which may have depicted local gods. A fifth century image
recently found at Ahichhatrā, for example, portrays a three-headed, six-armed
ithyphallic Śaiva deity, each of the heads sporting a third eye, a flaming head of
hair, and a trifurcated tongue with an eye. This fearsome deity wields a trident and
is possibly in the act of stamping on a demon (the image has suffered damage).
5 Donald Preziosi, “Art as History,” in The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology, edited by
Donald Preziosi (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 21–30 (14).
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Since a deity of this description does not feature in the texts, we can only make an
educated guess as to his identity. A possible interpretation is that he represents a
composite form of Rudra and Agni.6
Occasionally, a confrontation between textual studies and art history mani-
fests itself when the dates of comparative visual and textual material do not
correspond. Thus, it has sometimes been argued that an image cannot be a re-
presentation of a well-known myth embodied in the texts, despite visual evi-
dence to the contrary, because the earliest known textual account of the myth
post-dates the image. A story, however, might be in circulation orally (perhaps
in a variety of different tellings) for a considerable length of time before being
absorbed into a Puran̄ạ, an epic, or into another branch of literature.7
This paper, then, begins with the premise that there are traditions, divini-
ties, or myths that have not survived in writing, or indeed, may never have
been written down in the first place, with the only relics surviving in a visual
medium. Sometimes, to the frustration of the art historian, these visual relics
6 Greaves, “Brick Foundations,” 2015, 432–435.
7 This subject has also been explored by Shonaleeka Kaul in her article on “Early Mathurā:
Sacred Imagination and Diverse Traditions,” Indian Historical Review 42.1 (2015): 1–16 (9); and
by Upinder Singh, who writes:
The History of Hinduism has generally been constructed on the basis of frameworks pro-
vided by religious texts, which are not always accurately reflective of popular practice.
Apart from their elite authorship and the notorious problem of dating, Brahmanical texts
reflect a phase when the practices they mention have been accorded brahmanical sanc-
tion, and hence conceal their much earlier origin. Further, traditions seeking to attain or
having attained the position of cultural dominance try to marginalize other traditions
that may have been very important at the time and in the process give us a distorted im-
pression of prevailing religious practice.
See Upinder Singh, “Cults and Shrines in Early Historical Mathura (c. 200 BC–AD 200),” World
Archaeology 36.3 (2004): 378–398 (378).
Likewise, Richard Mann writes:
Recent scholarship illustrates significant gaps between the ideologies propounded in tex-
tual sources and the world of material evidence. [Gregory] Schopen has observed, for in-
stance, that western scholars often had access to the archaeological record produced by
the ASI but chose to ignore or undermine it when it appeared to question what textual
sources claimed. He repeatedly highlights a bias in the study of Indian Buddhism where
‘[t]extuality overrides actuality’.
See Richard D. Mann, “Material Culture and the Study of Hinduism and Buddhism,” Religion
Compass 8.8 (2014): 264–273 (269). Mann references Gregory Schopen. “Archaeology and
Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism,” in Bones, Stones, and Buddhist
Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in
India, edited by Gregory Schopen (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 1–22 (7).
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refuse to relinquish their secrets. As will shortly become evident, the images
that concern us in this paper, do not explicitly recall a known textual narrative.
As a result, the discourse here will necessarily be of a somewhat tentative na-
ture. This paper will nevertheless seek to demonstrate a more enquiring, thor-
ough approach towards the type of complex, obscure imagery that is often paid
little attention in literature on ancient or early South Asian art.
The paper will focus chiefly on the most spectacular surviving image de-
picting a centauress and a male with human form: a terracotta plaque hailing
from the ancient city of Ahichhatrā in the Bareilly District of Uttar Pradesh.
This plaque was one of several recovered from the upper terrace of the largest
of Ahichhatrā’s many temples; a stepped pyramidal brick monument known as
ACI or Bhimgaja, situated at the very centre of the fortress city (Figure 2).8
8 ACI was excavated under the direction of K.N. Diksit and A. Ghosh between 1940 and
1944. The Ahichhatrā plaque might belong to the reign of the mahārājādhirāja Kumāragupta
I (c. 415–447) based on the similarity in composition and style between the image of the cen-
tauress and rider in the terracotta panel to that of horse and rider which appears on some of
Figure 2: The pyramidal brick temple structure known as ACI or Bhimgaja, located at the heart
of the fortress city of Ahichhatrā in the Bareilly district of Uttar Pradesh. Photograph courtesy
of the Archaeological Survey of India.
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The Śiva temple which once crowned the monumental terraces of ACI is no
longer extant, but owing to the vast scale of the square platforms the structure
still dominates the surrounding landscape for quite some distance. The form
of ACI recalls to some extent the great stu ̄pas and sanctuaries built under the
Kuṣāṇa kings, such as the breath-taking Kaneśko-oanindo-bagolaggo (Sanctuary
of Victorious Kanis ̣ka), a monument built in terraces carved out of a hill in
Surkh-Kotal in the Baglan province of Afghanistan (ancient Bactria). Such
monuments might be considered as awe-inspiring, magnificent statements of
dynastic power, markers of territorial ownership, and tangible manifestations
of religious devotion.
ACI probably dates to the Gupta period, circa 450 CE, although the struc-
ture continued to be expanded, altered and renovated up until the eleventh
century CE.9 Upon approaching the monument, steps on either the east or west
(the front entrance) would have been ascended, and the dark corridors of the
platforms circumambulated. The walls of the penultimate terrace were adorned
with large terracotta relief plaques, many of which depicted manifest forms of
Śiva, or myths involving the god.10 The subject matter of the surviving panels
would appear to focus overwhelmingly on self-mastery and the overcoming of
sin, with fierce forms of Śiva or Rudra being most prevalent.11 After observing
these powerful images, the devotees would then proceed to the surmounting
temple (now lost), enshrining the monumental liṅga: the potent “sign” of the
unmanifest Śiva.12 Moreover, they would have been greeted with arresting
views of the surrounding city through the doorways of the porches, or from
the external pradakṣiṇa-patha (circumambulatory walkway), as though stand-
ing at the summit of a mountain. It should be noted here that there may have
been restrictions over who had access to the temple, or even to different levels
of the monument. There might have also been a protocol attached to who
could ascend which flight of steps.
The characters depicted on the Ahichhatrā panel have previously been in-
terpreted as representing a nameless kinnara-mithuna dallying in the hills; the
the coins of the aforementioned ruler (personal communication with Ellen Raven, 2016).
Most of the panels from ACI are now in the National Museum, New Delhi.
9 ACI is built over the ruins of an apsidal or circular Kuṣāṇa brick structure.
10 For the most part, the order and placement of the images was not reported by the
excavators.
11 Subject matter includes, for example, the destruction of Dakṣa’s sacrifice, a character who
might represent the gaṇa Nīlalohita (a form of Rudra), Caṇḍeśvara and Bhairava.
12 The stone liṅga which still balances precariously on the uppermost platform of ACI meas-
ures 2.4 m in height and 1.1 m in width.
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celestial nymph Urvaśī with her husband Purūravas – a subject popular in
early Indian texts; and Manu Vaivasvata (Prajāpati) seated on the earth god-
dess who has temporarily assumed a mare form. Each of these readings is prob-
lematic in one way or another and will be explored in this paper.
2 The Panel
The Ahichhatrā panel survives in its entirety and depicts a kinnarī with a male fig-
ure of smaller proportions seated on her back (Figure 3). In the upper-right hand
corner of the plaque hovers a vidyādhara (celestial being) carrying a garland. A
tree with bowed branches against a background of hilly or mountainous terrain is
depicted in the lower register.13 The square face of the kinnarī is strikingly similar
to that of the nude female in another panel from ACI. Elsewhere I have very tenta-
tively identified the latter character as the apsarā (celestial nymph) Urvaśī, stand-
ing before Sage Nārāyaṇa, although there is a strong possibility that she instead
represents the goddess Pārvatī in the presence of Śiva (Figure 4).14
Like the latter female, the centauress also wears large hooped-earrings and
has a comparable though considerably more elaborate hairstyle in a trefoil ar-
rangement. No doubt this gorgeous hair-arrangement ornamented with beads and
a lotus flower is supposed to indicate her extraordinary beauty and elevated status.
She holds her right hand up in the tripatāka gesture while she places her left hand
with seeming affection over the left shoulder of the male rider.15 Interestingly, her
male companion also makes the tripatāka mudrā with his right hand, the same
hand which he uses to tenderly caress her chin (Figure 5). The tripatāka gesture is
a fascinating detail since it generally indicates speech or dialogue; the pair then,
13 The nineteenth–century encyclopaedic Sanskrit dictionary, the Śabdakalpadruma, locates
the land of the kimpuruṣas in the mountainous regions between Mount Meru and the Himalayas.
See Panchamukhi, Gandharvas & Kinnaras, 11.
14 This interpretation of the plaque is tentative and is explored in Laxshmi Rose Greaves. “Śiva
Dakṣiṇāmūrti or Sage Nārāyaṇa? Reconsidering an Early Terracotta Panel from Ahichhatrā,” in
South Asian Archaeology and Art 2014. Papers Presented at the Twenty-Second International
Conference of the European Association for South Asian Archaeology and Art held at the Museum
of Far Eastern Antiquities/National Museums of World Culture, Stockholm, Sweden, 30th of June
to 4th of July 2014, edited by Eva Myrdal (New Delhi: Dev, 2020), 135–152.
15 V.S. Agrawala, Terracotta Figurines of Ahichchhatrā (District Bareilly, U.P.), 2nd ed. (Varanasi:
Prithivi Prakashan, 1985, 1st ed. 1948), 66.
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are engaged in conversation.16 Both wear a ring on their little fingers. The breasts
of the centauress are bare though her décolletage is adorned with two necklaces,
one an ekāvalī (single strand of pearls), and a long scarf that flutters in the wind
behind her. Between her breasts hangs a sacred thread (yajñopavīta). On the lower
half of her body sits a saddle (paryāṇapaṭṭa) with a tassel dangling from its hem.
Figure 3: Terracotta plaque from Ahichhatrā ACI, measuring 64 x 64 x 9 cm. National Museum,
New Delhi.
16 The tripatāka mudrā involves the raising of the middle and index fingers, while the thumb
and other fingers are folded into the palm of the hand. This gesture is common in Buddhist
art, including in the art of Gandhara, and interpretations of the meaning of this mudrā have
been offered by numerous scholars such as John Marshall, H.P. Francfort, M.L Carter and most
recently by Tadashi Tanabe. Tanabe concludes that this gesture, which had its naissance in
Hellenistic Greek art, signifies the act of speaking, conversation, praising or other types of ver-
bal communication, such as singing (as kinnarīs are famed for doing). See Tadashi Tanabe.
“The Gesture of Raising Two Fingers Depicted on Gandharan Sculpture.” In Religion, Society,
Trade and Kingship: Archaeology and Art in South Asia and along the Silk Road, 5500 BCE-
5th Century CE, edited by Laxshmi Rose Greaves and Adam Hardy (New Delhi: Dev, 2020),
209–222.
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Figure 4: Terracotta plaque from Ahichhatra ̄ ACI, measuring 65 x 73 x 9 cm. National Museum,
New Delhi.
Figure 5: Detail of the centauress plaque from Ahichhatrā ACI. Note the tripatāka mudrā made
by both characters.
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Running under her tail is a band (kakṣyābandha) with a zigzag design and an
ornate medallion at the centre (cakraka). The kinnarī has two hind legs but no
front legs and her tail and hoofs have been finely executed.17 The male is be-
decked in finery including a crested-turban, earrings and, across his chest, a
channavīra ornament with an embossed disc at the centre. He holds a bow in his
left hand and is clothed in a striped dhotī. The foot and lower leg of the man
have been naturalistically modelled with the foot having a delicate arch. The
scarf of the kinnarī blows against his chest and flaps behind him in a delightful
attempt to convey a sense of movement.
3 Further Centauress/Rider Images
Two further terracottas depicting so-called kinnara-mithuna were found at
Ahichhatrā. The first is a simple disc produced from a single mould showing a
kinnara pair. This was found at ACVII to the west of the ancient fortress
(Figure 6).18 The second fragmented plaque, which comes from ACIII located a
few hundred metres southwest of ACI, has a flat base (possibly free-standing
or part of an architectural element) and possesses relief depictions on both
faces of a centauress with rider.19 Only a leg of each rider has survived but
Agrawala asserts that anklets were worn. Based on this detail, Agrawala iden-
tified the riders as female. Several male deities in plaques from ACI, however,
wear anklets and such might be the situation here. Rare examples do exist,
though, of male kinnaras carrying women. Indeed, an unusual relief on the
Great Stūpa at Sāñcī depicts a pregnant female seated on the back of a centaur;
while an intriguing fragmented Gupta period terracotta plaque from Nachar
Khera in Haryana, portrays a centaur carrying a slumped figure with human
form (Figure 7).20
17 As an aside, until circa 600 BCE, centaurs in Greek art were usually depicted with only
hind legs like many of the South Asian examples (see Strong, “A Lady Centaur,” 36).
18 Agrawala, Terracotta Figurines, 58.
19 Agrawala, Terracotta Figurines, Fig. A. Agrawala dates this plaque to 550–650 CE. It could,
however, be earlier than his estimate, especially since he describes it as very similar to the
Kusāna period plaque from the Jamalpur Mound in Mathurā (Fig. 8).
20 The Gupta period plaque from Nachar Khera is housed in the Gurukul Museum in Jhajjar. It
depicts a multi-armed male figure (six arms are extant, it is not clear whether there were more)
seated on a bench or possibly on a chariot. In one of his right hands he holds a sword. Beneath
him is a centaur either galloping or in flight. The arms of the centaur are folded across his chest
and his now fragmented head is thrown backwards. The head and neck of a goose is visible
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Figure 6: Alexander Cunningham’s plan of Ahichhatra ̄ published in Four Reports Made During
the Years 1862–63–64–65 (Simla: Archaeological Survey of India, 1871), Plate XLIII.
behind the centaur. Notably, a goose is often depicted pulling Rāvaṇa’s aerial chariot and thus it
is plausible that the multi-armed figure pictured here is a representation of Rāvaṇa. Lastly, the
remnants of a human figure can be seen seated on the back of the centaur. Though the figure is
severely eroded, it might be suggested that the back of the figure is facing towards us, while the
head is resting on the lap of the multi-armed male. The Gurukul Museum believes the six-armed
figure to be a depiction of the demon Triśira, but this is rather speculative, and more research
on this image is needed (see Virjanand Devakarni, Prachin Bharat Main Rāmāyaṇ Ke Mandir
(Gurukul Jhajjar: Haryana Pranttiya Puratattva Sangrahalaya, 2007), plate 3). John and Mary
Brockington suggested that the centaur could depict the rākṣasa Mārīca, an ally of Rāvaṇa,
who took the form of a golden deer in the Rāmāyaṇa in order to lure Rāma away from Sītā (per-
sonal communication, 2018). As Mārīca is dying after being struck by one of Rāma’s arrows, he
begins to morph back into his original form (3.42.10–20). Given that the other panels from
Nachar Khera depict scenes from the Rāmāyaṇa (including one with the golden deer), this is
certainly possible. If this panel does indeed depict Rāvana with a part-zoomorphic Mārīca carry-
ing Sītā on his back, then it would represent a version of the abduction episode not preserved in
the texts.
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Agrawala likens the ACI panel to a Kuṣāṇa period red-sandstone depiction
from the Jamalpur Mound, Mathurā, housed in the Government Museum in
Mathurā (Figure 8).21 This temple bracket is carved on each face with a composi-
tion remarkably close – though less ornate – to that of the former plaque, indicat-
ing that the artists at Ahichhatrā were following an iconographic model already
Figure 7: Gupta period fragmented terracotta plaque from Nachar Khera, Haryana, in the
collections of the Jhajjar Museum, Haryana.
21 Agrawala, Terracotta Figurines, 58. The current state of the Jamalpur Mound is described by
Vinay Kumar Gupta in his survey of archaeological sites in and around Mathurā. He describes
this site, located along the ancient highway nearly two miles from the city, as once being home
to two monasteries of the Kuṣāṇa and Gupta periods – the former built by the Kusāna king
Huviṣka – and the find spot of exquisite sculptures, including of the Saptamātṛkās and Lakṣmī.
The site has now been levelled and only brickbats and potsherds remain. See Vinay Kumar
Gupta, “Archaeological Landscape of Ancient Mathura in Relation to its Art Workshops,” Indian
Historical Review 42 (2015): 189–209 (195).
24 Laxshmi Rose Greaves
established by or during the Kuṣāṇa period. The heads of the relief figures on
both sides are lost which suggests that they may have been deliberately defaced.
On both faces a male figure is portrayed seated on the back of a kinnarī who has
a nude torso. As in the Ahichhatrā relief, she wears a kakṣyābandha with a medal-
lion at the centre, located horizontally across her lower body. She also wears a
large band or necklace which she takes hold of with her right hand as though
trying to detach it. This act does not necessarily have a negative connotation.
Indeed, it is a relatively common gesture in Kuṣāṇa period art and may even have
a suggestive meaning.
On one face of each of the three masterful pillars from Bhuteśvara, Mathurā,
on display at the Indian Museum in Kolkata, is sculpted a voluptuous, smiling
yakṣiṇī standing on a prostrate dwarf. The yakṣiṇī depicted on the central pillar
wears a very large and no doubt weighty, multi-strand necklace which she takes
hold of with her right hand. In her left hand she holds a swag of fabric which
hangs sensuously from her girdle. There is no indication here that the yakṣiṇī is
distressed; quite the contrary, she is cheerfully subduing a dwarf beneath her feet.
The male figure in the Jamalpur bracket is holding an article in one hand. The han-
dle looks somewhat like the hilt of a knife, but the upper part of the object is ovoid
Figure 8: Kuṣānạ period stone relief carving of a centauress with a male rider from Jamalpur
Mound, Mathura.̄ Photograph courtesy of the American Institute of Indian Studies.
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in shape and therefore not typically blade-like. Indeed, it resembles a mirror held
by a seated female figure carved on a Kusāna period ivory panel from Begram in
Afghanistan. And compellingly, the centauress in Figure 10 holds a mirror.22 The
kinnarī is galloping across a mountainous terrain and, as with the Ahichhatrā de-
piction, her upper body is twisted awkwardly towards the male figure. Again,
movement has been expressed through a shawl fluttering behind the man.23
Agrawala also informs us that, aside from at Mathurā and Ahichhatrā, images
of kinnara-mithuna were found at Sāñcī, Bādāmi and at Rājghāṭ.24 The small
Śuṅga period terracotta hollow disc from Rājghāṭ, housed in the Bharat Kala
Bhavan in Varanasi, and described by T.K. Biswas as a rattle, depicts a centauress
turning her head to face the male seated on her back.25 He holds leaves and fruits
in his right hand perhaps indicative of fertility.26 Another terracotta roundel be-
lieved to date to the Śuṅga period is housed in the Government Museum, Mathurā.
It is in a fragmented state but depicts a centauress and male rider embracing.
Again the kinnarī turns to face her companion. A worn roundel from Kauśāmbī
dating to the Śuṅga or Kuṣāṇa period, on display at the National Museum in New
Delhi, portrays a kinnarī with a male rider (Figure 9). The kinnarī twists her body to
face her male lover. The pair seem to be holding hands, or at least touching each
other affectionately. Behind the rider stands a male attendant or devotee. A Gupta
period terracotta moulded-disc from Lakha-Dhora near Raṅgamahal in Rajasthan
illustrates a loving kinnarī with male-rider scene on one face, while the reverse is
ornamental. A male devotee with his hands held together in añjalimudrā joins the
couple, suggesting that this is an auspicious scene.27 It seems somewhat unlikely,
though not impossible, that a nameless kinnara-mithuna would be the object of
22 See Elizabeth Rosen Stone. “Some Begram Ivories and the South Indian Narrative Tradition:
New Evidence.” Journal of Inner Asian Art and Archaeology, 3.
23 A first century CE red sandstone tympanum (a vertical recessed triangular architectural ele-
ment, usually placed above a door or window) from Mathurā depicts across two registers on
each face, devotees wearing various styles of dress, deer, and winged kinnarīs processing to-
wards Buddhist places of worship, including a caitya, a tree shrine and a pillar surmounted by
the wheel of law. The kinnarīs are part human, part horse and part bird. One of the kinnarīs
holds her palms together in añjalimudrā, while the other carries offerings. Here the kinnarīs
represent auspicious creatures and are not accompanied by partners. The tympanum is on dis-
play at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, and can be viewed on their digital database: http://
www.mfa.org/collections/object/tympanum-from-a-buddhist-structure-16991.
24 Agrawala, Terracotta Figurines, 59.
25 T.K. Biswas, “Kinnara–Kinnarī,” in Chhavi-2: Rai Krishnadasa Felicitation Volume, edited
by Krishna Anand (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1981), 266–69 (268).
26 Parmeshwar Lal Gupta, Gangetic Valley Terracotta Art (Varanasi: Prithivi Prakashan, 1972),
96, Plate 212; and Biswas, “Kinnara–Kinnarī.” Plate 565.
27 See Urmila Sant, Terracotta Art of Rajasthan (Delhi: Aryan Books International, 1997), 179.
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worship and adoration. Likewise, K.N. Sastri highlights the irregularity of the pres-
ence of the garland-bearing vidyādhara in the Ahichhatrā ACI plaque.28 These
examples suggest that the characters represented here are probably not
merely emblematic.
To the best of my knowledge, the earliest surviving depiction of this type of
image is that carved on a stone pillar – part of the railing surrounding the Great
Stūpa at Sāñcī, dating to circa the Śuṅga period (Figure 10).29 This carving in
low-relief is situated within a roundel and shows a centauress with her body
twisted to face the viewer rather than her male companion. She holds a garland
in her right hand, and a round object with a handle – possibly a mirror – in her
left hand. The handsomely dressed male rider rests his right hand on the left
Figure 9: A hollow terracotta disc from Kauśāmbī housed in the National Museum, New Delhi.
28 Cited in K. M. Shrimali, History of Pañcāla (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers,
1983), 129.
29 This stūpa was commissioned by Emperor Aśoka (reigned circa 268–232 BCE) and later
expanded.
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shoulder of the kinnarī. His scarf flaps in the wind behind him conveying move-
ment and reminding us that these characters are not intended to be thought of as
static. Floral confetti surround the couple lending the image a joyous ambience.
Attention might be drawn here to the garland which is also a feature of the
Ahichhatrā ACI panel. In the Sāñcī image, however, the garland is held by the
kinnarī, while in the latter image it is held by a subordinate celestial being.
Centauresses also found favour with the Early Cālukyas in northern Karnataka.
One such image survives in situ at the Mālegitti Śivālaya Temple (c. 700 CE) on
the outskirts of ancient Vātāpi (modern-day Bādāmi, Bagalkot district, Karnataka)
(Figure 11).30 Perpendicular to the lower left-hand side of the ornately carved
Figure 10: A roundel carved onto a railing pillar at the Great Stūpa, Sāñcī.
30 Differing views exist on the age of the Mālegitti Śivālaya Temple. Adam Hardy believes it
to date to around 700 CE since, on the basis of style, it is not as old as the Upper Śivālaya
Temple at Bādāmi (personal communication, 2017).
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entrance leading through to the garbhagṛha, is a surprising relief of a large-scale
crowned male figure with a small centauress standing upright on her hind legs.
As with the centauress in the Ahichhatrā panel, she does not possess forelegs
but has human arms. In her lowered right-hand the centauress clutches onto a
Figure 11: Centauress sculpture next to the entrance to the inner sanctum of the Mālegitti
Śivālaya Temple at Bādāmi.
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rope-like article that hangs over her bare left shoulder. Her left-arm is raised above
her head. The crowned, two-armed male figure holds a large club with a conch-
like hilt in his right hand. A description in the museum at Bādāmi alleges that the
male figure is tugging at the hair of the crowned centauress with his right hand.
Interestingly, in the same hand the male figure holds an item that could potentially
represent a noose (pāśa). Both characters in the Bādāmi image have a serene and
somewhat detached countenance but this does not necessarily carry much meaning
since such expressions are quite commonplace in early Indian sculpture, even in
scenes of violent conflict. Significantly, the male figure places his left foot on the
arched rear of the centauress – a pose which is typically one of subjugation or even
of vanquishment. This composition has markedly little in common with the cen-
tauress images already described and it is possible that a different myth or scene is
being represented here. Though the inner sanctum of the temple enshrines a liṅga,
Michael Meister and M.A. Dhaky assert that the temple was originally consecrated
to Sūrya or Āditya since the sun god, flanked by the two goddesses of dawn, is de-
picted in pride of place at the centre of the door lintel above the entrance to the
garbhagṛha.Moreover, Garuḍa or Daṇḍi, and Piṅgala act as door guardians.31
The final centauress image to be explored in this paper is one that adorns a
pillar on the eastern side of the entrance to the honey-coloured-stone apsidal
Durgā Temple (c. 700 CE) at Aihole, fifteen miles northeast of Bādāmi (Figure 12).
An inscription on the gateway to the temple tells us that the monument was orig-
inally dedicated to Āditya (Sūrya). The damaged sculpture has much in common
with the image from Bādāmi. It portrays a large-scale crowned male figure resting
one knee on the rear of a small centauress who stands to his left. As with all the
centauresses featured in this paper, the Aihole kinnarī is unclothed on her
upper-half but wears jewellery, in this instance, two beaded necklaces and a
snake armlet. The face of the centauress is missing (possibly having been de-
liberately vandalised). She places a hand on the left thigh of the male figure.
His hands are lost, but his left arm rests above the head of the centauress
and it is possible that he was portrayed pulling her hair or harming her in
some way. This hypothesis is strengthened by the sculpture on one of the
adjoining faces of the same pillar. This image depicts a large-scale crowned
female tugging at the hair of a subjugated kneeling male figure, his head
pulled backwards.32 The Bādāmi museum describes the centauress reliefs
31 Michael Meister and M.A. Dhaky, Encyclopaedia of Indian Temple Architecture, South India
Upper Drāviḍaseśa Early Phase, A.D. 550–1075 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1986), 40.
32 Another image type features on both the Lāḍ Khān Temple and the Hucchappaya Maṭha
at Aihole, depicting a voluptuous nude horse-headed woman (Aśvamukhī) with a styled
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from Aihole and Bādāmi as each depicting a dvārapāla (door guardian) pre-
venting Chāyā (Savarnā) from entering the shrine and casting a shadow
across it.33 This myth will be examined below.
mane, forcibly taking hold of a male ascetic. In both images the subjects stand in the shade
of a tree. In the Lāḍ Khān bas-relief the woman holds a rope around the neck of her captive,
while he holds something in his raised left hand, possibly a water bottle (kamaṇḍalu). In the
Hucchappaya Maṭha image the open-mouthed ascetic is holding a rosary (mālā). Is he crying
out for help, or praying/ chanting aloud while moving the beads of his mālā? Surprisingly,
James Harle describes the Aśvamukhī yakṣiṇī as having a demure character and as being ap-
proached by excitable men (see James C. Harle, The Art and Architecture of the Indian
Subcontinent (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994, 2nd revised edition, 1st
edition 1986), 178). Monika Zin describes the man with the rosary as having a satisfied ex-
pression (see Monika Zin. Ajanta. Handbuch der Malereien/ Handbook of the Paintings 2
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003), 231). Like me, Chiara Policardi thinks he looks terrified
(see “The Case of the Yakṣiṇī Aśvamukhī: Remarks between Jātaka and Art,” Rivista degli
Studi Orientali. Nuova Serie 91.1–4 (2018): 137–162 (150)). As an aside, this difference in per-
ception brings to mind James Elkins work on seeing (James Elkins, “The Object Stares Back:
On the Nature of Seeing,” in Religion, Art and Visual Culture: A Cross-cultural Reader, edited
by S. Brent Plate (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 40–45 (45). He writes:
No two people will see the same object: that’s a truism that is proved each time two artists
try to draw the same object and end up with two irreconcilable versions of it. What makes
it more than a common truth is that it applies just as well within a single person. I am
divided, and at times my modes of seeing are so distinct from one another that they could
belong to different people.
In the Buddhist Padukasalamāṇava-jātaka (number 432 of the Pāli Jātakatthavaṇṇanā) the horse-
headed yakṣiṇī is described as capturing and eating men; when she falls in love with a victim – an
unfortunate young brahmin – he is forced to cohabit with her in captivity (Policardi, “Yakṣiṇī
Aśvamukhī,” 138–9, and Wendy Doniger, On Hinduism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014), 459. Policardi hypothesises that the Padukasalamāṇava-jātaka might have its origins
in non-Buddhist folklore (Policardi, “Yakṣiṇī Aśvamukhī,” 139). Aśvamukhī yakṣiṇī are also de-
picted in the painted murals at Ajantā. An example in Cave 17 depicts a horse-headed woman ap-
proaching a male ascetic or mendicant from behind. See Benoy K. Behl, The Ajanta Caves: Ancient
Paintings of Buddhist India (London: Thames and Hudson, 2005), 177; Policardi has located four-
teen examples of Aśvamukhī yakṣiṇīs in the art historical corpus of South Asia, she notes five fur-
ther examples reported but not furnished with photographs. To this I add another example on a
sixth century CE Rāmāyaṇa frieze from Rājaona in Lakhisarai district, Bihar.
33 Carol Radcliffe Bolon has accepted this identification in her paper: “The Durga Temple,
Aihole, and the Saṅgameśvara Temple, Kūḍavelli: A Sculptural Review,” Ars Orientalis 15
(1985): 47–64 (48). Aschwin Lippe describes both the Mālegitti Śivālaya Temple sculpture and
the Durgā Temple sculpture as depicting a dvārapāla subduing a kinnarī. See: Aschwin Lippe,
“Some Sculptural Motifs on Early Cālukya Temples,” Artibus Asiae 29 (1967): 5–24 (10).
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4 Myths Associated with the ACI Panel Depiction
Before exploring the various textual narratives involving kinnarīs, it might be
proposed that since the centauress with male rider images are found not only in
temple or stūpa contexts but also on portable terracotta medallions, this image
Figure 12: Centauress sculpture on a pillar of the Durgā Temple at Aihole. Photograph courtesy
of Elizabeth A. Cecil.
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type might have been regarded as possessing talismanic powers, quite possibly
for aiding strength and fertility – qualities commonly associated with horses in
South Asia.
Returning now to the Ahichhatrā ACI plaque, Agrawala writes:
The kinnara-mithuna was a popular motif in the time of Bāṇabhaṭṭa, who refers to it as
being pursued by prince Chandrapida and then disappearing on a hill-top (achala-tunga-
sikharam=aruroha). It is stated that Śiva as Dakṣiṇāmūrti should be the object of special
adoration by kinnaras, devas and others. This plaque may, therefore, have been juxta-
posed with . . . [the Dakṣiṇāmūrti plaque], in the frieze of the temple.34
Mythical kinnaras feature in Bāṇabhaṭṭa’s seventh century play, Kādambarī.35
The story narrates that while out hunting on his horse, prince Candrāpīḍa spies
a pair of kinnaras in a forest. He wishes to capture them but as he approaches
they flee.36 He follows, chasing them for miles until they disappear over the top
of a mountain. Aside from its later date, other aspects of the play assure us that
this is not the story depicted in our plaque. Not once does Candrāpīḍa alight
upon a kinnarī, nor does he have any dalliance with one – the object of his af-
fections being the heroine of the tale, Kādambarī.
Agrawala believes the plaque to be depicting a fleeting reference in the
Rāmāyaṇa to a kinnara-dvandva (a kinnara couple) frolicking on the hillside, a
theory also supported by K.M. Shrimali.37 However, only one of the figures on
the ACI plaque can be described as a kinnara, thus this is not a representation
of a kinnara-dvandva.
K.N. Sastri suggests that the panel depicts Prajāpati (Manu Vaivasvata) riding
to the heavens seated on the back of the earth goddess who has temporarily
assumed the form of a mare.38 This scene occurs in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
14.1.3.25 which reads: “Thou (Earth) are Manu’s Mare, for, having become a mare,
34 Agrawala, 66. The plaque identified as depicting Dakṣiṇāmūrti by Agrawala has been ten-
tatively re-interpreted by myself. Greaves, “Śiva Dakṣiṇāmūrti or Sage Nārāyaṇa?” Hans
Bakker and Peter Bisschop have the following to say on the subject of this plaque: “It has been
described by Agrawala and Banerjee as a panel depicting a Śiva Dakṣiṇāmūrti, an identifica-
tion that is, however, untenable in our understanding of a Dakṣiṇāmūrti.” See Hans T. Bakker
and Peter C. Bisschop, “The Quest for the Pāśupata Weapon: The Gateway of the Mahādeva
Temple at Madhyamikā (Nagarī),” Indo-Iranian Journal 59 (2016): 217–258 (232).
35 A kinnara is a male centaur, while kinnaras can mean a male and female pair, or a male pair.
36 The Kādambarī of Bāṇa, trans. by C.M. Ridding (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1896), 90–91.
37 Agrawala: 59; Kinnaras are mentioned in passing frequently in the Rāmāyaṇa, along with
gandharvas and other celestials; Shrimali, History of Pañcāla, 129.
38 K.N. Sastri, “Some Unidentified Rare Sculptures from Ahicchatra (Now in the National
Museum, New Delhi),” Indian Historical Quarterly 37 (1961): 225–239 (229).
1 The Enigma of the Centauress and Her Lover 33
she (Earth) indeed, carried Manu, and he is her lord, Prajāpati.”39 Moreover, the
passage is elaborated upon by its commentator, Harisvāmin, who notes that:
In the course of performing this particular ceremony, the ritual of solemnly touching the
earth and inaudibly whispering the incantation was extraordinarily auspicious and bene-
ficial to the performer (Yajamāna). In times gone by this Earth converted herself into a
mare and carried her lord Manu Vaivasvata (to heaven), because he (Manu) was her hus-
band etc.40
Sastri argues that a passage in the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa which describes
Prajāpati leaving the city of Ayodhyā for heaven in his corporeal frame, adds
weight to his theory.41 However, no mention of a mare, or indeed any vehicle,
is made in this latter tale. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.4 describes a less
savoury story in which Prajāpati in the form of a stallion pursues his daughter
Uṣas in the form of a mare. From their coupling humans and animals were cre-
ated.42 Some of the Brāhmaṇas instead narrate that Uṣas morphed into a deer
and Prajāpati a buck.43 The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa myth corresponds well with
the iconography of the Ahichhatrā panel except for the earth goddess being de-
scribed as a mare and not as a centauress. It is imperative, though, that we
query the popularity, or lack thereof, of this story in the Gupta period. To the
best of my knowledge, this brief episode does not feature in another extant
text, suggesting that it was not well-known to the general populace, making it
an unlikely choice to adorn a fifth century CE temple, unless the story had en-
dured in oral tradition or in texts that have not survived.
Few tales survive which speak of a kinnarī and a human or divine lover, al-
though one of the most popular Buddhist jātakas (tales) from the Divyāvadāna
(also found in other Buddhist texts) tells of the rescue of the kinnarī Manoharā by
Prince Sudhana.44 In this story, though, the kinnarī is described as a human-
like woman and not as a composite creature.45 Another Buddhist story in the
39 Sastri, “Sculptures from Ahicchatra,” 228.
40 Sastri, “Sculptures from Ahicchatra,” 228.
41 Sastri, “Sculptures from Ahicchatra,” 228.
42 See Wendy Doniger’s discussion of this myth in On Hinduism (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 459.
43 Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 3.262; Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 3.33.1 as explored in Catherine Ludvik,
Sarasvatī: Riverine Goddess of Knowledge: From the Manuscript-carrying Vīṇā-player to the
Buddhist Weapon-wielding Defender of the Dharma (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 66–72.
44 Padmanabh S. Jaini, Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
2001), 297; 299.
45 See Monika Zin, “Sábaras, the Vile Hunters in Heavenly Spheres. The Inhabitants of the
Jungle in Indian Art, Especially in the Ajanta Paintings,” in South Asian Archaeology 1999,
Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference of the European Association of South
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Mahāvaṁsa 10.53.88 (c. fifth century CE) centres on a beautiful equine yakṣinī
called Cetiyā and a Sri Lankan prince (and later king), Paṇḍukābhaya. Cetiyā
roams around the Dhūmarakka Mountain. She is described sometimes as
vaḷavarūpa (with a mare form) and sometimes as vaḷavamukha (with the face
of a mare). The prince spies her and goes in pursuit. She flees and renders
herself invisible. Eventually Paṇḍukābhaya threatens Cetiyā with his sword
and she surrenders. She becomes advisor to Paṇḍukābhaya, who bridles her
and takes her into battle.46 The presence of a Buddhist narrative on the Śaiva
temple at Ahichhatrā is, however, highly unlikely. Moreover, the tale is not a
romantic one and no suggestion is made of a loving or passionate relationship
between Paṇḍukābhaya and Cetiyā.
The text accompanying the Ahichhatrā ACI plaque at the National Museum
in New Delhi describes the image as portraying King Vikrama (elsewhere known
as Purūravas) with his lover, the celestial nymph Urvaśī. This interpretation ini-
tially appears convincing, in part because the myth of Urvaśī and Purūravas was
popular in early India, and certainly so during the Gupta period. Secondly, the
terracotta plaque appears to represent a loving scene between an exquisitely
beautiful celestial being and a regal or god-like warrior figure. A dialogue of eigh-
teen verses in the Ṛgveda (10.95. 1–18) is the first recorded version of the
Purūravas-Urvaśīmyth, but as Barbara Stoler Miller writes:
The Vedic hymn presupposes a floating body of stories about the pair, suggested by scat-
tered references elsewhere in the Veda, and by the hymn’s own vagueness: the author
appears to have written a dialogue epitomizing events with which he assumes his audi-
ence to be familiar.47
The obscure conversation in the Ṛgveda takes place between the mortal but
mighty king Purūravas – who we are informed was nurtured from birth by the
gods so that he would later fight the dasyus (enemies) – and the celestial water
nymph Urvaśī who has been married to the king for four years. Urvaśī has
abandoned her husband because he has not kept to certain conditions. The nar-
rative consists of his desperate pleas for her to stay, and Urvaśī’s persistent re-
fusal. During their conversation she recalls how they used to make love three
times daily although reluctantly on her part. In addition, we are told that eating
Asian Archaeologists, Held at the Universiteit Leiden, 5–9 July, 1999,” edited by Ellen Raven
(Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2008), 375–394 (384–385).
46 Mahanama, The Mahāvaṃsa, translated from Pali by Ananda W.P. Guruge (Pondicherry:
The M.P. Birla Foundation, 1990), 70; and Policardi, “Yakṣiṇī Aśvamukhī,” 140.
47 Barbara Stoler Miller, Theatre of Memory: The Plays of Kālidāsa (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984), 348.
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only a drop of ghee a day satisfied her hunger. Urvaśī reveals that she is preg-
nant (or has already had a son) and agrees to send Purūravas the child. Finally,
she promises that after his death he will rejoice (with her?) in heaven.
Lightning and the bleating of lambs are mentioned, and both feature centrally
in later variations of the myth. The story is further developed in the Śatapatha
Brāhmaṇa (11.5.1.1–17). Here, Urvaśī is said to adore Purūravas and allows him
to make love to her three times daily but never against her will. She sets further
conditions for their marriage including that he must never let her see his nu-
dity. They live happily together and have a child. The gandharvas, however,
long for her to return to the heavens and so they formulate a plan; they steal
the beloved lambs (who Urvaśī calls her sons) from her bedside and Purūravas,
wishing to prove his manliness, leaps out of bed in a bid to rescue them. At that
moment the gandharvas dispatch a flash of lightning, illuminating Purūravas’s
naked form. Immediately Urvaśī leaves him. Sometime later Purūravas chances
upon Urvaśī bathing in a lake with her companions and begs her to return.
Urvaśī promises to spend one night with the king. In an unexpected twist of
fate, the following morning the gandharvas offer Purūravas a boon; he asks to
become one of them.
Variations of the myth are also found in the Baudhāyana-Śrautasūtra,
Mahābhārata, Matsya Purāṇa, Viṣṇu Purāṇa, Harivaṃśa and elsewhere. During
the Gupta period, Kālidāsa adapted the story for a play entitled Vikramorvaśīyam.
Briefly, Kālidāsa’s version of the story unfolds as follows.48 King Vikrama
(Purūravas) rescues the celestial nymph Urvaśī from the clutches of the demon
Keśin and they fall in love (significantly Keśin is a horse demon). At one point
the king muses about how impossible it seems that an old sage (Nārāyaṇa)
could have created such an astounding beauty.49 Indra allows her to marry
Vikrama on one condition: that she must return to the celestial realms once
the king sees the face of their first-born child. Despite a few misadventures,
the couple live happily for many years until their son Ayus, whom Urvaśī had
hidden away in a hermitage in order to prolong her marriage, is brought to
Vikrama. When Vikrama sees the face of Ayus, Urvaśī laments that she must
return to the heavens. Happily, at that moment Sage Nārada arrives with a
message from Indra and announces that Urvaśī may remain with Vikrama
48 Vikrama and Urvasi, or the Hero and the Nymph, trans. Harold Hayman Wilson (Calcutta:
V. Holcroft, 1826), 14–104.
49 Vikrama and Urvasi, 20.
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until his death.50 Interestingly, neither the Purāṇas nor the Vikramorvaśīyam
describe Urvaśī as equine, or part equine. In both the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and
the Ṛgveda, Urvaśī is a water nymph (possibly a bird); however, the Ṛgveda
also alludes to her being horse-like, but whether these musings are metaphori-
cal or not is unclear. Purūravas, for instance, “says that immortal women who
shy away from mortal men are like horses grazed by a chariot” (10. 95. 8).51
Moreover, “he also says that Urvaśī is as hard to catch as a winning race-
horse (10. 95. 3), and Urvaśī admits that immortal women, when they re-
spond to a mortal’s caresses, are like water birds or like horses who bite in
their love play (10. 95. 9) . . .”52 Doniger takes this to mean that Urvaśī is
equine.53 Interestingly, according to J.C. Wright, Purūravas is described as a
bird in the Ṛgveda and has the ability to fly, while Urvaśī walks and is “de-
scribed as constantly subject to metamorphosis (virūpā).”54 Wright further sug-
gests that Kālidāsa “completes the humanisation of Purūravas.”55 If, however,
the Ahichhatrā ACI plaque is a visual manifestation of the Urvaśī Purūravas
myth then the comparable images discussed in this paper would indicate that
the heroic king was already depicted with human form by the Śuṅga period or
the Kuṣāṇa period at the very latest, long before Kālidas̄a’s Vikramorvaśīyam
was composed , unless the ACI panel is not related to the earlier images in
terms of the story it represents. The inexplicit nature of the textual sources in
relation to Urvaśī’s appearance, aside from her being unequivocally beautiful,
50 The version in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa for the most part is quite close to the Śatapatha
Brāhmaṇa; after the couple fall in love, Urvaśī outlines three conditions for their marriage.
Firstly, Purūravas must protect her two rams whom she loves as her children; secondly, he
must not let her see him naked; and lastly, he must feed her only clarified butter. Their mar-
riage is a happy one until the celestial gandharvas begin to resent the absence of their friend
and arrange to have Urvaśī’s rams stolen in the night. Misfortune occurs when as Purūravas
leaps out of bed to try and save the animals, the gandharvas illuminate the sky with lightning
and Urvaśī sees the naked form of her husband. She instantly returns to the celestial realms.
After a number of years apart, the continued devotion of Purūravas for his wife is rewarded
with a boon. He is to perform a fire sacrifice after which he is permitted to join Urvaśī in the
heavens. See, The Viṣṇu Purāṇa, trans. Horace Hayman Wilson (London: Trub̈ner, 1840),
394–397.
51 Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, Women, Androgynes, and Other Mythical Beasts (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980), 181.
52 Doniger O’Flaherty,Women, Androgynes, and Other Mythical Beasts, 181.
53 Wendy Doniger, The Hindus, an Alternative History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
230.
54 J.C. Wright, “Purūravas and Urvaśī,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
30 (1967): 526–547 (528).
55 Wright, “Purūravas and Urvaśī,” 528.
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raises questions about whether the centauress in the Ahichhatrā plaque is a
representation of the celestial nymph or not. We must take into account that
the oral telling of myths would have sometimes deviated or at least differed
from the narratives recorded in the texts. This brings us to question whether
the sources used by artists were always textual ones. Arguing along the same
lines, though on a separate topic, Richard D. Mann writes about his approach
to the study of the early history of Kārttikeya:
The two sources, textual and material, often appear to narrate differing characterizations
of Kārttikeya, and we need to appreciate that the perspective of these sources and the
stories they attempt to narrate differ, at times considerably. While we might hope that
these various sources will help us uncover ‘the’ story of Skanda, they instead demonstrate
that there were several competing versions of the deity during the period of study exam-
ined here.56
Notably, the celestial nymphs (including Urvaśī) depicted in a Nara Nārāyaṇa
plaque on the śikhara of the Gupta period brick temple at Bhītargāon.
We turn now to a different myth with an equine element. An episode in the
Harivaṃśa (8)57 tells the complicated tale of the union, separation and reunion of
Vivasvat or Sūrya (the grandson of Dakṣa), and his consort Saṃjñā (also known
as Sureṇu), daughter of Tvaṣṭṛ.58 Owing to his extraordinary fiery energy
Vivasvat was born without limbs and was dark in colour. After giving birth to
three children (Manu Vaivasvata, Yama and Yamunā), Saṃjñā could no longer
endure Vivasvat’s unattractive appearance. Her solution was to secretly create an
identical but mortal replica of herself from her own shadow to replace her in the
household; this replica was named Savarṇā. Savarṇā promised Saṃjñā that she
would keep her secret with the proviso that no one grab her hair or curse her.
Saṃjñā then disguised herself by taking the form of a mare and left her home to
graze in the fields. Vivasvat, believing Savarṇā to be his wife, had a child with
her called Manu whom Savarṇā showed favouritism towards. Yama not realising
that Savarṇā was only the shadow of his mother was deeply upset by the prefer-
ence shown towards his youngest brother. He confronted Savarṇā, threatening
her with his foot. In retaliation she cursed Yama that he would lose his foot. Her
‘husband’ Vivasvat responded by threatening to curse her. With the hope of
56 Richard D. Mann, The Rise of Mahāsena, The Transformation of Skanda-Kārttikeya in North
India from the Kuṣāṇa to Gupta Empires (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 3.
57 The Harivaṃśa is believed to date between the first and third centuries CE.
58 I have used the critical translation by Simon Brodbeck: Krishna’s Lineage, The Harivamsha
of Vyāsa’s Mahābhārata (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 25–28. I am grateful to
Simon for sharing his manuscript with me before publication.
38 Laxshmi Rose Greaves
avoiding this curse Savarṇā confessed to the deception. In a raging fury Vivasvat
visited his father-in-law, Tvaṣṭṛ. The latter told Vivasvat that Saṃjñā had not been
able to bear his appearance but had remained faithful to him. Tvaṣṭṛ proceeded to
make Vivasvat handsome by removing his excessive fiery energy. Disguised as a
stallion, the sun god approached his wife who was practising yoga in a field. The
mare Saṃjñā rejected his advances but turned her head towards him. As she did
so she inhaled his semen and subsequently blew it out of her nostrils and the
Aśvin twins were born.59 Importantly, the turned head is one of the most salient
features of many of the centauress/ male rider plaques explored in this paper.
Saṃjñā is overjoyed when Vivasvat reveals his true, and much improved godly
form and the story ends happily with the birth of their equine sons.
Many variations on this myth are told, for example, in the Ṛgveda 10.17.1–2,
in which Vivasvat’s wife is not described as morphing into a mare but does give
birth to the Aśvins;60 and in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa 103–105,61 which does not
drift far from the telling in the earlier Harivaṃśa, but differs in certain aspects,
for instance, Saṃjñā abandons Vivasvat not because of his unattractive appear-
ance but because she cannot bear his fiery splendour or his anger.62
Finally, we turn to an interesting and potentially unique myth embodied in
the Skandapurāṇa 116.92–128.63 This story has yet to be translated into English and
has not yet been critically edited.64 The episode occurs during a pilgrimage taken
by Viṣṇu following a series of battles involving his various avatāras. The beginning
59 Brodbeck notes that: “In vedic literature the Ashvins are called the Nāsatyas, a name
whose oft-cited connection with the nose (nās) could explain some details of the present
story.” Brodbeck, Krishna’s Lineage, 27.
60 Doniger refers to the following version of the Ṛgveda: Rig Veda, with the commentary of
Sāyaṇa, 6 vols. (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series no.99, 1966).
61 Doniger refers to the following version of the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa: Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa
(Bombay: Biblioteca Indica, 1890).
62 Wendy Doniger, “Saraṇyū / Saṃjñā, The Sun and the Shadow,” in Devī, Goddesses of
India, ed. by John S. Hawley and Donna M. Wulff (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
University of California Press, 1996), 155–172 (163).
63 There is a myth involving Vāmadeva, a dynasty of kings and a pair of stolen horses in the
Mahābhārata 3.441. The story differs considerably from the Skandapurāṇamyth, however, and
does not involve a centauress.
64 This episode from the Skandapurāṇa is found in the earliest surviving recension of the
text, a Nepalese version edited by Bhaṭṭarāī. I am indebted to Elizabeth Cecil for drawing my
attention to this myth after a talk I gave on the ACI terracotta panel at the Seventh Coffee
Break Conference at Leiden University (September 2016). She also sought out the Early
Cālukyan centauress sculptures on my behalf during a recent trip to Karnataka (which I have
since visited). Sanne Mersch who is currently working on a PhD at Leiden University on
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of the myth is narrated by the demon king Bali, who himself was vanquished by
Viṣṇu in the latter’s form as Vāmana, the dwarf.65 Incidentally, Bali is depicted on
Gupta period temples at Pawāyā and Deogaṛh. Bali begins the story by telling how
there was once a contented sage called Vāmadeva, who, having laid eyes on the
nymph Urvaśī, through a state of delusion emitted his seed. A mare ate that fallen
seed and subsequently gave birth to Aśvatarī. Although no description of her is
forthcoming it would make sense that she has the appearance of a centauress. The
sage was very fond of his child and brought her up for many years until one day a
strong daitya king called Aṣṭaka arrived at Vāmadeva’s āśrama. As soon as he laid
eyes on the beautiful Aśvatarī he wanted her as his wife. Aṣṭaka decided that he
would deceive the sage if the latter would not part from his daughter. The sage
Sanatkumāra then narrates how the deceitful king bowed to Vāmadeva showing a
false veneer of respect. Bali continues the narrative: Aṣṭaka told the sage that he
needed Aśvatarī for an unspecified purpose or task for one year. Vāmadeva gave
his consent. The king left with Aśvatarī, happily believing her to be his for time
ever after. At the end of the year, however, the sage asked the king for his daughter
back and was refused. In a fit of rage Vāmadeva killed Aṣṭaka. Aṣṭaka’s son then
became king. He too refused to return Aśvatarī and so too was slain by Sage
Vāmadeva. Likewise, this king’s son described as “best of the sons of Diti” also
held on to Aśvatarī, saying that he would not give her to the wicked slayer of his
father. Thus, he met with the same fate shared by his forefathers. Finally, his
very luminous son Bāla became king.66 Sage Vāmadeva warned the new king
that he would slay the entire family of the wicked Aṣṭaka. Having listened to
Vāmadeva’s speech Bāla informed him that he would consult his ministers.
They narrate to Bāla how Aṣṭaka, after refusing to return Aśvatarī met with a
cruel fate at the hands of Vāmadeva whom they describe as a wicked mortal
in the guise of a sage, and how his father and grandfather also met with this
terrible end. The ministers stress that it would be wrong under these circumstan-
ces to return Aśvatarī to Sage Vāmadeva. After hearing their speech, Bāla who
had performed great tapas, informed them that he would no longer listen to their
stupidity as he had done in the past, and to their unlawful, dishonourable advice
which no good person should follow. Instead, he vowed to save his forefathers –
“Counter-Narratives: Parallel Themes in Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Mythology” has very generously
shared her draft translation and her thoughts on the myth with me.
65 It is plausible that Bali likens himself to Bāla as the similarity in names might suggest.
Likewise, the similarity between the names Vāmana and Vāmadeva are unlikely to be
accidental.
66 Instead of being a name, Bāla could simply mean ‘the boy.’ For the sake of clarity, how-
ever, I have kept it as a name here.
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a common theme in Indian mythology. He approached Sage Vāmadeva and after
respectfully garlanding him and worshipping him with incense etc., he returned
Aśvatarī. Vāmadeva told Bāla that because of the latter’s goodness, his forefa-
thers would be saved from hell. Indeed, so pleased was the sage that he gifted
Aśvatarī to the king and retired to the forest. Aśvatarī and Bāla then roamed to-
gether in perfect happiness. The tale comes to a close with the moral that all
twice-borns and other dharma-knowers do not approve the deeds of their forefa-
thers if they were without dharma.
If this is the myth depicted on the ACI panel then we might conclude that it
is the righteous King Bāla shown with Aśvatarī, rather than any of his forefa-
thers, since the plaque seems to be representing an auspicious and love-filled
scene.
5 Conclusions
Below, the competing myths and readings will be evaluated, and those which
are a better fit with the images explored in this paper will be highlighted.
1) Firstly, there is a chance that this image is an auspicious subject popular in
early India and not illustrating a specific myth. In this instance, such an
image would play a role similar to that of the nameless mithuna couples with
human form. Moreover, it may indeed illustrate a passing reference in the
Rāmāyaṇa to a kinnara mithuna, as Agrawala asserts. The male figure, though,
is definitely not a kinnara – and moreover, the presence of the vidyādhara calls
Agrawala’s interpretation into question since the latter character would seem to
raise the importance of these figures beyond being simply emblematic. One of
the reliefs explored in this paper, however, might possibly fall into the cate-
gory of “auspicious image,” namely, the third century BCE carving at Sāñcī.
K. Krishna Murthi describes kinnaras in the Buddhist context (more often than
not half-bird, half-human) as being harmless, kind, loving and musical, and
adorned with flowers; creatures sometimes captured for the delight of kings.67
2) The tale in the Buddhist Mahāvaṁsa (10.53.88) about the equine yakṣinī Cetiyā
who eventually surrenders to the sword-wielding prince, Paṇḍukābhaya, is com-
pelling in light of the iconography of the ACI plaque. Here we have a story
67 K. Krishna Murthy, Mythical Animals in Indian Art (Abhinav Publications: New Delhi,
1985), 14–15.
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which involves a male warrior and an equine female. It is also stated that the
male bridles the equine yakṣinī and rides her into battle. The love and tender-
ness clearly demonstrated by the pair in the ACI panel, however, is not mir-
rored in the text. Moreover, it would be surprising to find a Buddhist tale on a
Hindu temple, though, it is quite possible that a no-longer extant version of this
story circulated in the Hindu domain.
3) K.N. Sastri’s identification of the couple in the Ahichhatrā panel as Prajāpati
(Manu Vaivasvata) riding on the back of the earth goddess in the guise of a
mare is rather persuasive. It is, however, likely to be a misleading interpretation
since the episode in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa does not appear in later texts. If
the story were well-known we would expect it to have undergone many retell-
ings over the centuries. There is nevertheless a small possibility that this story
was still being transmitted orally during the period when our images were
being produced, or that it featured in a no-longer extant text from the early cen-
turies CE.
4) Arguments in support of the Urvaśī and Purūravas interpretation are as fol-
lows: the Ahichhatrā panel depicts a celestial being and a royal personage or
deva and this couple show signs of being in love. The unusually elaborate
coiffure and jewellery of the kinnarī indicates that we are supposed to think of
this creature as especially beautiful as we know Urvaśī is. The male figure wears
a channavīra and carries a bow and textual sources emphasise that Purūravas
was a great warrior. We know that this myth was popular during the Gupta pe-
riod because Kālidāsa adapted it for a play, and even before this point in time
the popularity of the myth was well-established. In addition, in Kālidāsa’s telling,
Urvaśī is kidnapped by the horse demon Keśin. This could be an indication that
she is also equine, or part-equine, but this is rather tenuous suggestion. Since
another panel from Ahichhatrā ACI might potentially depict Sage Nārāyaṇa after
having created Urvaśī from a drawing on his thigh, identifying the kinnarī as
Urvaśī is tempting, but not necessarily accurate. The arguments against this attri-
bution are equally as compelling. Most importantly, the texts do not conclusively
describe Urvaśī as half-woman, half-horse, although we do know that she is ca-
pable of metamorphosis. Likewise, to the best of my knowledge, the texts do not
describe a moment when Urvaśī carries Purūravas on her back. Indeed, in some
versions of the story, such as in the Vikramorvaśīyam, Purūravas rescues a faint-
ing Urvaśī and carries her away in his chariot. It is possible that there was a ver-
sion of this myth in circulation between the Śuṅga and Gupta periods in which
Urvaśī was characterised as a centauress who bore her lover upon her back.
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5) Next we come to the tale of Vivasvat and Saṃjñā – a myth describing the
turbulent marriage of the couple and the births of their children. The iconogra-
phy of the plaque arguably fits more easily with this myth than with the Urvaśī
Purūravas tale, largely because Saṃjñā is known to have transformed herself
into a mare, yet she is never described as having a human upper body. Though
perhaps a rather far-fetched hypothesis, Saṃjñā could be portrayed in the mo-
ment of transforming back into her original form. Alternatively, she might be
depicted as half-goddess, half-mare in order to identify her as Saṃjñā rather
than just as a regular horse. The manner in which the kinnarī twists her head
awkwardly towards the male rider in all the visual examples discussed in this
paper, with the exception of those at Sāñcī and in Karnataka, might possibly
allude to the moment when Saṃjñā turns her head to look at Vivasvat after he
approaches her at her grazing spot. As described earlier in the paper, Sūrya
(Vivasvat) is represented in several fragmentary plaques at Ahichhatrā and was
evidently popular in the ancient city.68 As compelling as this identification
might seem, nevertheless, the warrior paraphernalia of the male character in
the ACI plaque is not a feature of known versions of this myth.
As touched upon earlier in the paper, the centauress images at Bādāmi and
Aihole have previously been interpreted as depicting Savarṇā (Chāyā), Saṃjñā’s
shadow, being forcibly prevented from entering the garbhagṛha of the temple by a
dvārapāla. One anomaly that cannot be overlooked, however, is that Savarṇā is
not described in the texts as having a half-woman, half-horse form. In point of
fact, we would expect her to be the exact replica of the goddess Saṃjñā before she
morphs into a mare. On the other hand, we must allow for artistic license, after
all, the myths do not furnish either Savarṇā or Saṃjñā with any defining charac-
teristics aside from the latter being beautiful and fair-complexioned prior to taking
the form of a mare. That the two temples were both likely to have been dedicated
to the sun god Āditya (Sūrya/Vivasvat) undoubtedly makes this hypothesis more
persuasive. There is another tentative possibility worth noting; that the male fig-
ure could represent Yama, who is usually depicted carrying a club and a noose.
After all, it is Yama who threatens Savarṇā with his foot, and both of the Early
Cālukya images show the male character subduing the centauress, in one instance
with his knee, and in the other, with his foot. Moreover, if the relief carvings do
depict the male grabbing the hair of the centauress this might also allude to the
moment in the myth when Savarṇā tells Saṃjñā that she will reveal her true
68 The significant of this is unclear, however, since representations of Sūrya are ubiquitous
across South Asia.
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identity if her hair is grabbed. Lastly, the Bādāmi image portrays the male charac-
ter holding a small loop-shaped article which might represent a noose.
6) Of all the myths explored here, the episode in the Skandapurāṇa describing
the conflict between the flawed Sage Vāmadeva and the wicked King Aṣṭaka
and his descendants, is the first to involve a female character who, as daughter
of a sage and a mare, can confidently be imagined as half-horse, half-woman.
Furthermore, if a second panel from ACI does indeed depict Sage Nārāyaṇa and
Urvaśī, which is open to debate, then the Vāmadeva myth would be a very fit-
ting accompaniment as Aśvatarī is conceived after the latter sage observes
Urvaśī. In some ways the dispositions of the two sages are wholly antithetical.
Sage Nārāyaṇa personifies creative power, absolute detachment and mastery
over his senses. His creation of the lovely nymph Urvaśī from his thigh is evi-
dence of these qualities. In stark contrast, Sage Vāmadeva lusts after Urvaśī
which then leads to the birth of Aśvatarī. He also exhibits a deadly temper.
Thirdly, in spite of the fact that we are never acquainted with Aśvatarī’s side of the
story, we might assume that she is kept captive until she is freely given to Bāla.
Lastly, I have tentatively interpreted a fearsome character in another terracotta pla-
que from ACI as representing Rudra Ni ̄lalohita after he has slain the buf-
falo demon Hālāhala – a story which features in the Skandapurāṇa 7.69 Hence,
the Skandapurāṇa might well have been the source of a number of the myths de-
picted on the walls of ACI at Ahichhatrā.
Bāla and Aśvatarī are described as roaming together happily so we can as-
sume that this tale concludes as a love story. A potential problem with this in-
terpretation, however, is that the couple depicted on the Ahichhatrā panel had
seemingly been depicted on medallions and on architectural elements from
circa the Śuṅga period. The iconography might represent a well-established
and popular story. In contrast, the myth narrated in the Skandapurāṇa stands
alone, and in addition post-dates (at least in its textual form) most of the images.
As explored at the start of this paper, however, a story could potentially exist in
oral form for a considerable length of time before being absorbed into the texts.
As such the Vāmadeva/Aśvatarīmyth should not be ruled out as a possible read-
ing for the North Indian centauress images, but it should be treated with consid-
erable caution.
Ultimately, a cast-iron identification of the characters in the Ahichhatrā
ACI plaque is not achievable at present because of the paucity or absence of
familiar attributes, signs and additional dramatis personae and because of the
existence of many celestial or deific mares in Indian mythology. From this we
69 See my thesis pp. 435–439; the panel is on display at the National Museum, New Delhi.
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can surmise that during the lengthy period in which they were being illustrated
on temples and portable medallions, the colourful duo would have been in-
stantly recognisable without the need for additional details which might have
been considered superfluous in the visual context. All of these factors have con-
tributed towards the difficulty in confidently pairing the images with a text or a
specific version of a myth.70
It needs to be stressed that of all the images depicting a centauress with
male rider, only the Ahichhatrā ACI panel can be confidently assigned a Hindu
affiliation. Because of the uncertain religious affiliation of the other panels and
portable discs, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this. But notably
Ahichhatrā had a large and thriving Buddhist community who had been erect-
ing sacred monuments from the third century BCE onwards. Thus, there is
every possibility that iconographic influences were exchanged, borrowed,
adapted or even appropriated.
Having come to the close of this study, Vincent Smith’s reflections on minor
divinities and semi-zoomorphic celestials in ancient India quoted at the start of
this paper, seem all the more pertinent. I finish with his words: “these dimin-
ished godlings must be regarded as the last remnant of a whole host of forgotten
powers, once mighty and to be placated, each in its own place.”71
Glossary Of Sanskrit Terms
añjalimudrā: holding the palms of the hands together in a gesture of reverence
apsaras: a celestial nymph
āśrama: the rural/ forested dwelling of a sage
avatāra: the incarnation of a deity
cakraka: medallion
channavīra: cross belt
daityas: a race of asuras (demons)
deva: a god
70 About the Aśvamukhī yakṣiṇī depictions, whose iconography does not neatly align with the
Padukasalamāṇava-jātaka, Policardi concludes: . . . “we cannot exclude beyond doubt that a
literary narrative, circulating also in Hindu contexts, was transmitted, maybe for a certain pe-
riod, but has not survived, as is unfortunately the case for much of the ancient Indian litera-
ture. At the same time, we cannot exclude the possibility that the story may somehow lie
concealed under different appearances or in unsuspected texts, and waits further research to
be identified.”
71 Smith, History of Fine Art, 7.
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dharma: there are multiple meanings, but generally speaking it means path of
righteousness
dhotī: lower garment worn by men (a long length of cloth wrapped around the
legs and tied at the waist)
dvārapāla: door guardian
ekāvalī: a necklace made of a single strand of beads or pearls
gandharva: celestial musician
garbhagṛha: the sanctum sanctorum of a temple
jātaka: Buddhist tale
kakṣyābandha: band worn horizontally around the body of the horse
kamaṇḍalu: water vessel
kinnarī/kinnara: a divine composite-creature with a human head and torso and
the lower body of an animal or bird
kinnara-dvandva: a kinnara couple
mithuna: an amorous couple
pāśa: noose
paryāṇapaṭṭa: saddle
pradakṣiṇa-patha: circumambulatory path
śikhara: temple tower
tapas: austerities for a spiritual purpose
tripatāka: a gesture which involves raising the middle and index fingers, while
the thumb and other fingers are folded into the palm of the hand
vidyādhara: celestial being
yajñopavīta: sacred thread
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2 Visual Story-Telling in Text and Image:
The Nāga as Inhabitant of the Cosmic
Ocean and the Netherworld
Just like many other ancient myths, the myth of the manifestation of the boar
(varāha) has been reworked numerous times. It is retold in many texts, starting as
early as the Vedas.1 It is the story of a god, first identified with Prajāpati2 and
later with Viṣṇu,3 who becomes a boar in order to rescue the earth from the
subterranean regions. He dives into the cosmic ocean, lifts the earth with his
tusk,4 and brings her back to her original spot. The myth is often told in a cos-
mogonical narrative framework and introduces the creation of the universe.5
The boar manifestation is also visualized in material art from at least the
fifth century and possibly even earlier. Many of these Varāha images do not
simply depict the god in his boar aspect, but provide a visual narration of
the myth’s climactic moment of Varāha lifting the earth. In this article, I ex-
plore the use of both text and image as means to narrate the Varāha myth.
After providing an overview of relevant Varāha iconography, I focus on
one particular element that is present in almost all images, but appears to
have no textual counterpart: the inclusion of one or more Nāgas,6 mythical
1 For an overview of Sanskrit sources narrating the myth, see for example R. C. Agrawala,
Solar Symbolism of the Boar: Yajña-varāha, an Interpretation (Varanasi: Devkumar, Prithivi
Prakashan, 1963); Jan Gonda, Aspects of Early Viṣṇuism, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1969); Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1976); Dokter-Mersch, “Counter-Narratives: Parallel Themes in Śaiva and
Vaiṣṇava Mythology” (PhD diss., Leiden University, forthcoming).
2 Prajāpati is the main character in the Vedic texts and in the Rāmāyaṇa.
3 Viṣṇu is the main character in the Mahābhārata, Harivaṃśa, and the Purāṇas.
4 This narrative component is relatively new, and the Harivaṃśa is one of the first available
texts that incudes it as a standard element.
5 In the earliest sources, the universe is created for the first time (an event known as sarga,
“creation”), whereas in the epics and the Purāṇas, the universe is recreated at the beginning
of a new time cycle (known as pratisarga, “recreation”). The era of the manifestation of the
boar is called Varāhakalpa; see Thomas Kintaert, “On the Role of the Lotus Leaf in South
Asian Cosmography,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 54 (2011–2012): 92.
6 The number of Nāgas varies per image. For brevity’s sake, I generally do not specify the
number, only when I deal with a particular image.
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110557176-003
serpents7 that live in the Nāgaloka (“world of the Nāgas”), a subterranean,
underwater world.8
For this, I include a text that heretofore has not been used in secondary lit-
erature: the Skandapurāṇa.9 It is a Śaiva Purāṇa, ascribed to the sixth to sev-
enth century10 and centering on Śiva and his wife Pārvatī. It also incorporates a
few Vaiṣṇava myths that have been reworked into a Śaiva framework. The
Varāha myth, with Viṣṇu as the main character, has undergone several sub-
stantial changes as well. For example, the Skandapurāṇa version of the myth
contains long battle descriptions, lively characterizations of the scenery, and
an entirely new ending.11 Thanks to some of these additions and alterations,
the Skandapurāṇa can shed new light on the presence of the Nāga in Varāha
images. With the Skandapurāṇa in mind, I discuss some interpretations of the
7 For a study on Nāgas and references to other secondary literature, see Laurie Ann Cozad,
“Nāgas,” in Brill’s Encyclopedia of Hinduism, vol. 6, Index, eds. Knut A. Jacobsen, Helene Basu,
Angelika Malinar, and Vasudha Narayanan (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 72–80; Knut A. Jacobsen,
“Sacred Animals,” in Brill’s Encyclopedia of Hinduism, vol. 1, Regions, Pilgrimages, Deities,
eds. Knut A. Jacobsen, Helene Basu, Angelika Malinar, and Vasudha Narayanan (Leiden:
Brill, 2009), 711–13.
8 The Nāgaloka is associated both with water and with the netherworld. For example, Cozad
describes the Mahābhārata interpretation of the Nāgaloka as “a beautiful, bejeweled, under-
water kingdom” (Cozad, “Nāgas,” 78). Vogel and Kirfel rather situate (the world of) the Nāgas
in the netherworld (pātāla), based on the Purāṇas; see J. Ph. Vogel, Indian Serpent-Lore or the
Nāgas in Hindu Legend and Art (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1926), 30 and W. Kirfel, Die
Kosmographie der Inder nach den Quellen dargestellt (Bonn: Kurt Schröder, 1920), 143–47.
9 Approximately half of the text (95 out of 183 chapters) has now been edited and the editing
process is still ongoing. The entire Sanskrit text can be found in Bhaṭṭarāī’s editio princeps:
Kṛṣṇaprasāda Bhaṭṭarāī, ed., Skandapurāṇasya Ambikākhaṇḍaḥ, Mahendraratnagranthamālā
2 (Kathmandu: Mahendrasaṃskrṭaviśvavidyālayaḥ, 1988).
10 Yuko Yokochi, The Skandapurāṇa, vol. 3, Adhyāyas 34.1–61, 53–69. The Vindhyavāsinī
Cycle: Critical Edition with an Introduction & Annotated English Synopsis (Brill: Leiden, 2013),
57–58.
11 The Skandapurāṇa version of the myth tells how Viṣṇu becomes a boar in order to save the
earth from the hands of the evil Hiraṇyākṣa. Hiraṇyākṣa is the king of the Daityas, who are the
enemies of the gods, living in the netherworld called Rasātala. After a long fight, Viṣṇu con-
quers Hiraṇyākṣa and finds the earth kept hostage in Rasātala. He brings her back to her own
abode, and his task is completed. Viṣṇu would then normally leave his manifestation and re-
sume his own form. However, in the Skandapurāṇa, he continues to live as a boar and it is
Śiva’s son Skanda, with the help of Śiva, who makes him return to his own body. As a reward,
Śiva teaches Viṣṇu the Pāśupatavrata, the highest Śaiva teaching. For a summary and study of
this newly added part, see Phyllis Granoff, “Saving the Saviour: Śiva and the Vaiṣṇava
Avatāras in the Early Skandapurāṇa,” in Origin and Growth of the Purāṇic Text Corpus: With
Special Reference to the Skandapurāṇa, ed. Hans T. Bakker (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004),
111–138; Dokter-Mersch, “Counter-Narratives: Parallel Themes in Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Mythology.”
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Nāga suggested in previous studies, reexamine some Varāha images, and dem-
onstrate how limited textual sources can still support the study of material art.
1 Material Representation of the Varāha Myth
There are two types of Varāha images: the zoomorphic boar, which is a depiction
of Varāha in his animal form, and the anthropomorphic boar, which shows the
deity with the head of a boar and the body of a man. Whether zoomorphic or
anthropomorphic, the boar carries the earth, personified as a woman, and he is
usually accompanied by a Nāga. The depiction is highly standardized, and only
the details develop through time. For the present article, two phases in the devel-
opment of Varāha iconography are worth highlighting: the Gupta-Vākāṭaka pe-
riod (fifth to early sixth century) and the period in which the Rāṣṭrakūṭas,
Cāḷukyas, and Pallavas were in power (mid-sixth to ninth century).12
Most Varāha images from the Gupta-Vākāṭaka period were produced in
Madhya Pradesh.13 The boar has two arms and wears a necklace and a rope
12 In “Viṣṇu als Eber in Mythos und Bild,” Gail identifies four phases of the development of
Varāha images, with the Gupta-Vākāṭaka period being preceded by the Kuṣāṇa period, when the
production of Varāha images took place in and around Mathurā, Uttar Pradesh (second/third cen-
tury). Gail discusses a rather exceptional exemplar from the Government Museum of Mathurā, ear-
lier studied by Joshi; see Adalbert Gail, “Viṣṇu als Eber in Mythos und Bild,” in Beiträge zur
Indienforschung: Ernst Waldschmidt zum 80. Geburtstag gewidmet, ed. H. Hartel (Berlin: Museum
für Indische Kunst, 1977), 147–48 and Nilakanth Purushottam Joshi, “Kuṣāṇa Varāha Sculpture,”
Arts Asiatiques 12 (1965): 113–19. It concerns a panel with various figures, the one in the center
having four arms, a thick neck, a necklace, and a rope around the waist, but his head is missing.
To his right, there is a female figure draped on his shoulder. Based on a comparison with Varāha
images, this indeed seems to be a depiction of Varāha. However, the fact that the figure has four
arms appears exceptional for this period, for this detail only emerges in the period under the
Rāṣṭrakūṭas, Cāḷukyas, and Pallavas (see below). The dating is based on an inscription at the bot-
tom of the slab, identified by Joshi as second-century Brāhmī script (Joshi, “Kuṣāṇa Varāha
Sculpture,” 115). Another Varāha image that is assigned to the Kuṣāṇa period (third century) is
kept at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. Its head and other features are remarkably similar
to the Udayagiri Varāha panel from the Gupta period, discussed below, so perhaps the dating
should be slightly later. For the fourth phase in Gail’s article, see note 25. Other studies on Varāha
images, besides those mentioned below are Frederick M. Asher, The Art of Eastern India, 300–800
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Shanti Lal Nagar, Varāha in Indian Art,
Culture and Literature (New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 1993); and Alexandra van der Geer,
Animals in Stone: Indian Mammals Sculptured through Time (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
13 Gail, “Viṣṇu als Eber in Mythos und Bild,” 148 enumerates Badoh, Bhitargaon, Eran, Kutari,
and Udayagiri. Joanna Gottfried Williams, The Art of Gupta India: Empire and Province (Princeton:
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around his waist. He stands in ālīḍha position: one leg stretched behind and
the other leg bent in front.14 This position is commonly used for figures with
a bow and arrow, but can be applied more generally to heroic figures to ex-
press power. He generally stands on a Nāga with one foot. The earth, person-
ified as a woman, clings to his right tusk and is sometimes supported by a
lotus under her feet. One of the prime examples of this iconographical type
is the Varāha panel in Udayagiri Cave 5, Madhya Pradesh, from the early
fifth century (Figure 1).15 It is an impressive image, showing Varāha sur-
rounded by dozens of gods, sages, and other beings.16
In the Gupta-Vākāṭaka period, the first zoomorphic exemplars appear as well.
The boar stands on his four legs and his body is often covered with figures, which
are probably deities and sages. The earth, personified as a woman, hangs from his
tusk. The boar does not stand on a Nāga. Rather, if a Nāga is present, it coils freely
between the boar’s legs. Among the most impressive examples of this type is the
zoomorphic boar from Eran, Madhya Pradesh.17 The image is decorated in an ex-
tremely detailed fashion. Numerous rows of small figures are shown. These are
“sages (all bearded, with matted locks, holding holy-water jars)”18 and some may
Princeton University Press, 1982) adds Rājghat (p. 81), Nāchnā (p. 112), Pipariya (p. 116), and
Gaḍhwa (p. 154). For Gaḍhwa, I have only found one Varāha image from the tenth century though;
see, for instance, Stella Snead, Animals in four worlds: Sculptures from India (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1989), 38 and 144, plate 122. An overview of Varāha images in Madhya Pradesh
is given in Haripriya Rangarajan, Varāha Images in Madhya Pradesh: An Iconographic Study
(Mumbai: Somaiya Publications, 1997).
14 On this position, see, for example, Jitendra Nath Banerjea, The Development of Hindu
Iconography, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1956), 266–67; and V. Ganapati
Sthapati, Indian Sculptures & Iconography: Forms & Measurements (Pondicherry: Sri
Aurobindo Society, 2002), 64–65.
15 J. C. Harle, Gupta Sculpture: Indian Sculpture of the Fourth to the Sixth Centuries A.D. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974), 35; Williams, The Art of Gupta India, 43; Michael Willis, The Archaeology
of Hindu Ritual: Temples and the Establishment of the Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 41.
16 Several attempts have been made in identifying the figures. See, for example, Debala
Mitra, “Varāha-Cave of Udayagiri: An Iconographic Study,” Journal of the Asiatic Society 5,
nos. 3–4 (1963): 99–103; and Williams, The Art of Gupta India, 44. For an overview of studies
on the Udayagiri panel, see Willis, The Archaeology of Hindu Ritual, 46–55.
17 According to Williams, the image is “executed close to 490 [. . .] or in 510” (Williams, The
Art of Gupta India, 129). An extensive study of the Eran boar has been done in Catherine
Becker, “Not Your Average Boar: The Colossal Varāha at Erāṇ, an Iconographic Innovation,”
Artibus Asiae 70, no. 1 (2010): 123–49.
18 Williams, The Art of Gupta India, 130.
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be identified as particular gods.19 Between the legs of the boar on the base, two
Nāgas are sculpted.20
Although the production of Varāha images still continued in North India
after the Gupta-Vākāṭaka period,21 most images from the mid-sixth to the ninth
century come from the area below the Narmadā River and were produced under
the dynasties of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas, Cāḷukyas, and Pallavas.22 The anthropomorphic
Figure 1: Varāha at Udayagiri Cave 5. Photo: Sanne Dokter-Mersch.
19 For example, Williams identifies Sūrya at the front, and the “small female figure above the
tongue may aptly represent the personification of speech, Vāc” (Williams, The Art of Gupta India,
130).
20 According to Harle, Gupta Sculpture, 38, however, there are three serpents: one male and two
females.
21 For instance, Rao describes an exemplar from Phalodi (Rajasthan); see T. A. Gopinatha
Rao, Elements of Hindu Iconography, vol. 1, part 1 (Madras: The Law Printing House, 1914), 141.
22 For studies on Southern (Varāha) art and architecture from this period, see Aschwin Lippe,
“Early Chālukya Icons,” Artibus Asiae 34, no. 4 (1972): 273–330 and Indian Medieval Sculpture
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978); K. V. Soundara Rajan, Cave Temples
of the Deccan (New Delhi: Director General, Archaeological Survey of India, 1981); and George
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boars of this period23 can be recognized by their more explicit association
with Viṣṇu. Varāha is now depicted with four arms, two of them carrying a
conch and a discus (cakra), Viṣṇu’s attributes.24 He stands in ālīḍha position,
often with his foot placed on one or two Nāgas. The position of the earth
varies, but she is no longer clinging to the boar’s tusk. Instead, she sits, for
example, on the boar’s elbow (Aihole Rāvaṇaphadi Temple) or stands on a
lotus held in his hand (Bādāmi Cave 2).25
To summarize, there are several standard elements in the iconography of
Varāha. The anthropomorphic boar is distinguished by the following elements:
1. The earth is personified as a woman;
2. She holds on to the boar’s tusk in the Gupta-Vākāṭaka period and has a dif-
ferent, varying position in the next phase;
3. The boar stands in ālīḍha position like a man; and
4. He generally stands on one or more Nāgas.
Zoomorphic boars can be recognized by the following standardized elements:
1. The earth is personified as a woman;
2. She holds on to the boar’s tusk;
3. The boar stands on his four feet; and
4. One or more Nāgas coil freely between his legs.
Michell, Temple Architecture and Art of the Early Chalukyas: Badami, Mahakuta, Aihole,
Pattadakal (New Delhi: Niyogi Books, 2014). Examples come from Ellora (Ravana ka Khai,
Daśāvatara, Kailasa, and Milkmaid’s Cave), Bādāmi (Caves 2 and 3), Aihole (Rāvaṇaphadi and
Durgā Temple), Paṭṭadakal (Virupakṣa Temple), and Māmallapuram (Varāha Cave).
23 Eliky Zannas, Khajuraho (’s-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co Publishers, 1960), 132 notes that the
production of zoomorphic boars appears only to have taken place in North India and never
reached the Southern part.
24 This is not to say that the boar in the preceding phase cannot be identified with Viṣṇu.
Varāha images often appear in a Vaiṣṇava context, such as a Viṣṇu temple or in the vicinity of
other Viṣṇu images. For example, the Udayagiri Varāha panel is surrounded by other represen-
tations of Viṣṇu.
25 Gail, “Viṣṇu als Eber in Mythos und Bild,” 150 has identified one more phase after this pe-
riod, in which the boar can have more than four arms and carries at least one additional attri-
bute of Viṣṇu, the club. The earth has various positions, although she usually sits on his
elbow. Varāha stands in ālīḍha position, placing his foot on one or two Nāgas or in some cases
on a pedestal made of or held by Nāgas.
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2 Text and Image
Most of the standard iconographical components also appear in textual sour-
ces. The earth is often described as a woman,26 and even the detail that she
holds on to the boar’s tusk when he rescues her becomes a standard textual ele-
ment.27 The description of the Skandapurāṇa in particular is remarkably similar
to the way she is depicted in the Udayagiri panel. The text compares the earth
hanging from the boar’s tusk to dangling lotus fiber clinging to an elephant’s
tusk.28 This is highly comparable to the loosely hanging earth in Udayagiri. The
similarities between text and image suggest that the authors and sculptors
were aware of the same notion of how Varāha lifted the earth.
The possibility to portray Varāha as either anthropomorphic or zoomorphic
is also available in both media. Whereas the anthropomorphic boar is preferred
over the zoomorphic type for visual images, almost all texts describe the boar
in his zoomorphic aspect as having four legs, a tail, and other animal character-
istics. His limbs are usually inhabited by sacrificial elements and sacrificial dei-
ties, and sages reside between his hairs.29 Only a small number of texts depicts
the boar as semihuman, semianimal, with Varāha having two arms, two feet,
and the head of a boar.30
26 For example, the Viṣṇupurāṇa qualifies the earth as a goddess: devī [. . .] vasuṃdharā,
“goddess earth” (ViP 1.4.11a, d). The Harivaṃśa reports that the goddess earth is lifted by the
boar: uddhṛtā pṛthivī devī, “the goddess earth is lifted” (HV app.1.42.188a).
27 For example, HV 31.29:
daṃṣṭrayā yaḥ samuddhṛtya lokānāṃ hitakāmyayā |
sahasraśīrṣo devādiś cakāra jagatīṃ punaḥ || 29 ||
“Having lifted up [the earth (mahīṃ in HV 31.28a)] with his tusk, for the welfare of the worlds,
the thousand-headed one, who is the first of [all] gods, created the world again.”
28 SP 108.14:
sa tāṃ daṃṣṭrāṅkure lagnāṃ vahan bhāti mṛgeśvaraḥ |
viṣāṇalagnāṃ lambantīṃ mṛṇālīṃ gajarāḍ iva || 14 ||
“The lord of animals, carrying her, who had clung to the sprout of his tusk, was like a king of
elephants [carrying] a dangling lotus fibre clinging to his tusk.”
29 For a study on this “sacrificial boar” (yajñavarāha), see Agrawala, Solar Symbolism of the Boar,
1963.
30 The Skandapurāṇa is probably the first text that uses the term naravarāha, “man-boar.”
SP 97.11:
vārāhaṃ rūpam āsthāya na devatvaṃ na mānuṣam |
na ca tiryakṣu taj jātaṃ naravārāham asti vai || 11 ||
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The only standard iconographical component that is usually not reflected
in the textual versions of the Varāha myth is the Nāga. From the Mahābhārata
to the Purāṇas, neither Nāgas in general nor one particular Nāga king appear at
the moment that Varāha rescues the earth, nor in the Varāha myth as a whole.
There is one exception, however: the Skandapurāṇa.
There are three references to Nāgas in the Skandapurāṇa. Two refer to
Nāgas as a class of beings, and a third to Śeṣa and other Nāga kings. The first
reference is in the preamble of the myth. It is said that after a long battle with
the gods, Hiraṇyākṣa, the king of the Daityas, wins and conquers the Triple
World. He takes the earth with him to the pātāla (“netherworld”) called Rasātala,
where she is kept hostage. She is guarded by thousands of Daityas and is bound
with nāgapāśas, “ropes that are Nāgas” (SP 95.13).31
This theme is again taken up at the conclusion of the myth, which is the
second reference. As soon as Varāha kills Hiraṇyākṣa, he goes out to find the
earth. He discovers her in Rasātala, being tied down by Nāga lords, and re-
leases her from them (SP 108.13).32 In neither passage are the Nāgas actual
characters, but rather tools for Hiraṇyākṣa to shackle the earth. Since Nāgas are
known to live in pātāla, they are an understandable choice for this scene.
The third relevant passage explicitly mentions Śeṣa and other Nāga kings.
When the gods ask Viṣṇu to kill Hiraṇyākṣa, he takes on the form of a boar and
dives into the ocean toward Rasātala. During his descent, Varāha passes fabulous
“Having established a boar form that is neither divine, nor human, nor born among animals,
he [i.e. Viṣṇu] indeed becomes a man-boar.”
The same idea is found in the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, VDhP 1.53.14:
nṛvarāho bhaviṣyāmi na devo na ca mānuṣaḥ |
tiryagrūpeṇa caivāhaṃ ghātayiṣyāmi taṃ tataḥ || 14 ||
“I will become a man-boar, [which is] not a god, nor a human being, but [joined] with an ani-
mal body; I will kill him then.”
31 SP 95.13:
tato rasātalaṃ gatvā svapurasya samīpataḥ |
babandha nāgapāśais tāṃ duṣṭām iva yathāṅganām || 13 ||
“Then, having gone to Rasātala, which is near his [i.e. Hiraṇyākṣa’s] own city, he [i.e. Hiraṇyākṣa]
bound her [i.e. the earth] with ropes that are Nāgas, as if she were a sinful woman.”
32 SP 108.13:
tato vidrāvya nāgendrān pragṛhya pṛthivīṃ balāt |
jagāma daityān saṃdṛśya ratnāny ādāya sarvaśaḥ || 13 ||
“Having rushed upon the Nāga lords, having forcefully taken the earth [from them], he [i.e.
Varāha] went along, after seeing the Daityas and taking jewels from everywhere.”
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water creatures and places (SP 99.9ff.), like Hayaśiras (SP 99.13b), Bhogavatī
(SP 99.13d), and the Milk Ocean (SP 99.16a). Then he passes the cities of sev-
eral Nāga kings, such as those of Vāsuki, Takṣaka, and Śeṣa, the last called
Ramaṇā, where he pauses for a short conversation (SP 99.17–22ab).33 Śeṣa is
one of the primary kings of Nāgas and, in various other myths, one of Viṣṇu’s
attendants.34 Varāha asks Śeṣa not to pose any obstacles to what needs to be
done for the world (SP 99.20cd). Śeṣa replies that if Varāha wants, he could
even do the task together with him (SP 99.21cd). However, Śeṣa does not reap-
pear in the myth, and Viṣṇu is able to complete the task himself.
This means that even in the Skandapurāṇa, where both Nāgas in general
and Śeṣa in particular are mentioned, the mythical serpents do not play an es-
sential role either in the story or at the moment that Varāha lifts the earth.
Rather, they are introduced by the authors in order to enliven the scene. It is a
narrative technique to textually visualize the place where the story is set at that
33 SP 99.18—23ab:
uṣitvā tatra so ’gacchat kaṅkasya puram avyayam |
vāsukeś ca puraṃ prāpya takṣakasya ca dhīmataḥ || 18 ||
tataḥ śeṣasya deveśo viditāṃ ramaṇām iti |
ramyāṃ manojñāṃ divyāṃ ca svargād api ca tāṃ varām || 19 ||
śrutvānantaś ca taṃ rājā argheṇa ca sa pūjayat |
praṇamya bahumānāc ca upāmantrayad avyayaḥ || 20 ||
mahat kāryam idaṃ deva kartavyaṃ tridivaukasām |
bhūyo vayaṃ tvayā sārdhaṃ kariṣyāma yadīcchasi || 21 ||
taṃ pūjayānaṃ madhuhā prītyā paramayā yutaḥ |
uvāca lokakāryasya na vighnaṃ kartum arhasi |
mā ca kālo ’yam udyukto daityasya na bhaved iti || 22 ||
sanatkumāra uvāca |
tato visṛjya taṃ nāgaṃ rasātalam upāgamat |
“18: Having spent the night there [i.e. at the lake Kṣīroda], he [i.e. Varāha] went to the imper-
ishable city of Kaṅka. Having reached the city of Vāsuki and of the wise Takṣaka, 19: he then
[reached the city] of Śeṣa, called Ramaṇā, which is beautiful, charming, divine and even better
than heaven. 20: Having heard [about Varāha’s arrival], king Ananta [“the one without end”,
i.e. Śeṣa] honoured him with a guest-water. Having bowed down out of great respect, the im-
perishable one [i.e. Śeṣa] addressed [Varāha]. 21: ‘This is a big task, oh god, that needs to be
done by the heaven-dwellers. If you want, I can do it together with you. 22: The slayer of
Madhu, filled with great affection, said to the worshipping one: ‘Please do not create an obsta-
cle for what needs to be done for the world. The Daitya’s death should be undertaken.’ 23:
Sanatkumāra said: Having dismissed the Nāga then, he [i.e. Varāha] reached Rasātala.”
34 For example, Viṣṇu sleeps on Śeṣa before the universe is recreated (see Gonda, Aspects of
Early Viṣṇuism, 89ff. and 151).
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moment, viz. in or near Rasātala. Since Nāgas are known to live in the subterra-
nean regions, they are included as exemplary of pātāla. In other words, if we are
looking for a Nāga as an active player in the story, then even the Skandapurāṇa
cannot serve as the textual counterpart of the Nāga in the Varāha images.35 How
should the iconographical Nāga then be interpreted?
3 Alternative Interpretations
One possibility is that the presence of a Nāga is only a convention among sculptors
and not among authors. According to the iconographic sections (pratimālakṣaṇa,
“characteristics of images”) of several Sanskrit sources, a Nāga is indeed required.
For example, the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa has a long passage on what Varāha im-
ages should look like,36 and the Nāga king Śeṣa is to be included.37 The author of
this part of the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa does not explain why he understands the
Nāga to be Śeṣa, and this is probably his own interpretation. Since Viṣṇu is associ-
ated with Śeṣa and a Nāga is present in almost all Varāha images, it would seem
logical to identify the Nāga as Śeṣa. Although this association could have been the
reasoning of the sculptors as well, there is no textual evidence for this.
Still, the Nāga is often taken to be Śeṣa in the secondary literature as well.38
The fact that Śeṣa does not play a role in the Varāha myth is usually neglected,
35 An instance in which this is the case is the story of the churning of the Milk Ocean. When
Viṣṇu manifests himself as a turtle (kūrma) to help the gods churn nectar from the Milk Ocean,
the Nāga king Vāsuki assists them. He has a key role in the story and is visualized as such in
material art (for example, in Pāwāya; Williams, The Art of Gupta India, 53–55).
36 The Agnipurāṇa (AgP 1.49.2–3) and the Matsyapurāṇa (MtP 260.28–30ab) have similar
descriptions.
37 VDhP 3.79.2ab, 4cd:
nṛvarāho ’thavā kāryaḥ śeṣoparigataḥ prabhuḥ | 2 |
[. . .] ālīḍhasthānasaṃsthānas tatpṛṣṭhe bhagavān bhavet || 4 ||
“Alternatively, a man-boar should be made. The lord should stand on Śeṣa. [. . .] The lord
should be standing on his back in ālīḍha position.”
38 For example, Banerjea writes about the Varāha image in Udayagiri: “The colossal two-
armed Varāha Avatāra treads with his left foot on the coils of Ādiśeṣa” (Banerjea, The
Development of Hindu Iconography, 414). As Rao remarks on a Varāha image in Bādāmi, “At
the foot of Varāha is Ādiśēsha’s wife; on the proper left is standing erect Ādiśēsha himself”
(Rao, Elements of Hindu Iconography, 140). Lippe discusses the Dūrga temple at Aihole as fol-
lows: “Varāha once more steps on the coil of the adoring king of the ocean who is placed to
the right, with his queen” (Lippe “Early Chālukya Icons,” 281).
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and an alternative explanation for his presence is not provided. However, there
are a few exceptions to this.
The first is Bakker’s study on the fifth-century zoomorphic boar from Rāmagiri
(Ramtek Hill), Mahārāṣṭra. Between the legs of the boar, a Nāga is freely moving
around. According to Bakker, the Nāga is “the cosmic serpent Śeṣa, who supports
the universe and serves as a prop for Varāha.”39 This refers to a story in the
Mahābhārata (MBh 1.32), in which Brahmā assigns the task of always carrying the
earth to Śeṣa. This is why Śeṣa lives in the subterranean regions, with the earth on
top of him.40 If we take Śeṣa to represent the earth’s base, then the place to which
Varāha brings the earth back – svasthāna, “her own abode” – could possibly refer
to Śeṣa.41 From the perspective of the position of the Nāga in this and other zoo-
morphic Varāha images, the interpretation seems fitting. However, the position of
the Nāga in the anthropomorphic images is significantly different: instead of coil-
ing around freely, the mythical serpent is stepped upon by Varāha, which suggests
that Varāha suppresses the animal. Since the anthropomorphic type outnumbers
39 Hans T. Bakker, The Vākāṭakas: An Essay in Hindu Iconology (Groningen: Egbert Forsten,
1997), 138.
40 MBh 1.32.24:
adho bhūmer vasaty evaṃ nāgo ’nantaḥ pratāpavān |
dhārayan vasudhām ekaḥ śāsanād brahmaṇo vibhuḥ || 24 ||
“So the majestic Snake Ananta dwells underneath the ground, ubiquitous, holding good earth
up at the bidding of Brahmā”; translation from J. A. B. van Buitenen. The Mahābhārata: 1. The
Book of the Beginning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 93.
41 Usually, only the word svasthāna is used (MBh 12.326.71cd–72, HV app.1.42.183–84, VāP
6.25, and SP 108.16). The Viṣṇupurāṇa, however, makes explicit that the earth is put on the
great ocean, mahārṇava (ViP 1.4.45). To the best of my knowledge, the Padmapurāṇa is the
only text that, in the Varāha myth, qualifies Śeṣa as the place to which the earth is returned.
PdP Uttarakhaṇḍa 264.18:
patitāṃ dharaṇīṃ dṛṣṭvā daṃṣṭrayoddhṛtya pūrvavat |
saṃsthāpya dhārayāmāsa śeṣe kūrmavapus tadā || 18 ||
“Having seen the earth fallen down, having lifted [her] up with his tusk like before, having
raised [her], he, having the form of a turtle, then carried [her] on Śeṣa.”
The passage tells us that Viṣṇu raised the earth in the form of a boar, and in the form of a
turtle, he put her back on Śeṣa. If the Nāga in the Varāha images would indeed be Śeṣa as the
home of the earth, then the Padmapurāṇa would still not be a textual parallel, because it is
Viṣṇu in the form of Kūrma who puts the earth back. The combination of the two animals is in
any case “rather confusing. As is well known, Viṣṇu assumed the form of the tortoise in
the second incarnation to give support to the mountain Mandara which served as a churning
rod for gods who wanted to acquire Amṛta from the Milky Ocean”; see N. A. Deshpande, The
Padmapurāṇa, part 9 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991), 3197.
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the zoomorphic one, there appears still to be a discrepancy between text and
image.42
Another interpretation worth mentioning is Willis’s study of the Udayagiri
Varāha panel. He describes the boar as “in triumphant control of the waters for
he holds down their personification, the serpent king, with his foot.”43 He later
specifies the waters as ekārṇava, “single ocean.”44 In other words, according to
Willis, the Nāga, identified as Śeṣa, does not refer to an idea in a different myth,
but rather to a metaphorical idea: the Nāga as a representative of the cosmic
ocean.45
A similar approach to the Nāga has been suggested by Gail. Without speci-
fying the Nāga by name, he argues that the mythical being is a representative
of the netherworld.46
This interpretation brings us back to the Skandapurāṇa. After all, as dem-
onstrated above, the insertion of the scenes with Nāgas in this text is a narra-
tive technique to visualize the place where the scene takes place. The Nāgas are
added as representatives of the netherworld. If Nāgas can indeed stand for a
particular cosmic realm (whether it be the cosmic ocean or the netherworld),
both in texts and in iconography, let us revisit the textual description of the mo-
ment that Varāha lifts the earth from the subterranean regions and see whether
the place of rescue found in the texts corresponds to the place where the Nāgas
live and thus to the Nāga in Varāha images.
42 Additionally, the Rāmagiri boar and its accompanying Nāga can be interpreted as a politi-
cal allegory. Rudrasena II, who erected the image, was married to Prabhāvatī Guptā, affiliated
with the Gupta kingdom and the Nāga kingdom (Bakker, The Vākāṭakas, 15–16). The Rāmagiri
Varāha then stands for the Vākāṭaka rulers and the Nāga for their special relationship with the
Nāga court. The image celebrates the union of these two royal families.
43 Willis, The Archaeology of Hindu Ritual, 45.
44 Willis, The Archaeology of Hindu Ritual, 59.
45 Śeṣa as the personification of the cosmic ocean is mentioned earlier by Zimmer: “Shesha,
the serpent Endless, representative of the cosmic waters, who is the source of all water what-
soever, is his [i.e. Viṣṇu’s] animal representative”; see Heinrich Zimmer, Myths and Symbols in
Indian Art and Civilization (New York: Pantheon Books, 1946), 76.
Additionally, the Udayagiri Varāha panel is probably also a political allegory. According to
Willis and several scholars before him (for an overview, see Willis, The Archaeology of Hindu
Ritual, 46–55), Varāha stands for Samudragupta and “the prominent nāga figure on which the
Varāha places his foot [. . .] is a justification for Samudragupta’s well-known suppression of
the Nāga kings who rose up against him in the fourth century” (Willis, The Archaeology of
Hindu Ritual, 59).
46 “Ein Nāga oder Nāgapaar als Vertreter der Unterwelt zu Füßen des Mannebers oder Ebers
gehört [. . .] zu den charakteristischen Bestandteilen späteren Kompositionen” (Gail, “Viṣṇu
als Eber in Mythos und Bild,” 174).
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4 Place of Rescue
The place of rescue does not remain the same place over time, and a development
in two phases can be observed. First, in the Vedic sources, the Mahābhārata,
and one early Harivaṃśa passage,47 Varāha rescues the earth from water. For
example, the Taittirīya Saṃhita reads in its Varāha episode āpo [. . .] salilam,
“water [. . .] ocean” (TS 7.1.5.1.1);48 the Mahābhārata reads samudrāt, “from
the ocean” (MBh 3.100.19b);49 and in the main text of the critical edition of the
Harivaṃśa, the term ekārṇava, “single ocean” is used.50 In each example, the
47 The critical edition of the Harivaṃśa is divided into two parts: the “critical text,” in
Parashuram Lakshman Vaidya, The Harivamsa, Being the Khila or Supplement to the
Mahābhārata, vol. 1, Critical Text (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969);
and the “appendices,” considered to have been added later, in Parashuram Lakshman Vaidya,
The Harivamsa, Being the Khila or Supplement to the Mahābhārata, vol. 2, Appendices (Poona:
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1971). The division is based on manuscript evidence. If a
passage is found in “the extremes” (Vaidya, The Harivamsa, 1:xxiv), i.e. the most divergent
manuscripts from the northwestern, northeastern, and southern manuscript groups, then it is
placed in the “critical text.” Although this division and difference in dating may be true for a
number of the appendices, there is reasonable doubt whether this also holds for three manifesta-
tion myths of Viṣṇu: Varāha (appendix 1.42), Narasiṃha (“man-lion,” appendix 1.42A), and
Vāmana (“dwarf,” appendix 1.42B). For a discussion on this topic, see Vaidya, The Harivamsa, 1:
xxxiv; John Brockington, The Sanskrit Epics (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 320; Marcelle Saindon, Trois
Manifestations de Vishnu, le Sanglier, l’Homme-Lion, le Nain: Les récits du Harivamsha (Paris:
Presses de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2009), 22ff.
48 TS 7.1.5.1.1–5:
ā́po vā́ idám ágre salilám āsīt | tásmin prajāṕatir vāyúr bhūtvā́carat | sá imā́m apaśyat | tā́ṃ
varāhó bhūtvā́harat | tā́ṃ viśvákarmā bhūtvā́ vyàmārṭ |
“This was in the beginning the waters, the ocean. In it Prajāpati becoming the wind moved.
He saw her, and becoming a boar he seized her. Her, becoming Viçvakarma, he wiped”; trans-
lation from Arthur Berriedale Keith, trans., The Veda of the Black Yajus School, Entitled
Taittiriya Sanhita, part 2, Kāṇḍas IV–VII (Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), 560.
49 MBh 3.100.19:
tvayā bhūmiḥ purā naṣṭā samudrāt puṣkarekṣaṇa |
vārāhaṃ rūpam āsthāya jagadarthe samuddhṛtā || 19 ||
“When of yore the earth was lost, lotus-eyed God, thou didst rescue it from the ocean, assum-
ing the form of a boar, for the sake of the world”; translation from J. A. B. van Buitenen, The
Mahābhārata: 2. The Book of the Assembly Hall, 3. The Book of the Forest (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1975), 420.
50 HV 31.HV 31.28–29:
mahīṃ sāgaraparyantāṃ saśailavanakānanām |
ekārṇavajale bhraṣṭām ekārṇavagatiḥ prabhuḥ || 28 ||
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water should be understood as cosmic or primordial water because these ver-
sions of the myth appear in cosmogonical sections dealing with the creation
of the universe.51
The term ekārṇava continues to be used in later versions of the myths –
the second phase – but the Rasātala is added as the final place of rescue. The
Harivaṃśa appears to be right at the intersection of this development, for in the
long version of the Varāha myth, relegated to the appendix of the critical edi-
tion (HV app.1.42), a combination of both elements is found.52 The boar first
dives into the ocean and then continues his journey down to Rasātala, to which
the earth had sunk and where the actual rescue takes place. This combination
becomes the standard in various Purāṇas.53
daṃṣṭrayā yaḥ samuddhṛtya lokānāṃ hitakāmyayā |
sahasraśīrṣo devādiś cakāra jagatīṃ punaḥ || 29 ||
“The lord, going to the single ocean, having lifted up the earth, who is surrounded by the
oceans [and covered] with mountains, forests and groves, who had fallen into the water of the
single ocean, with his fang for the welfare of the worlds, the thousand-headed one, who is the
first of [all] gods, created the world again.”
51 Slaje shows that a combination of salila and agre in Vedic sources indicates the primordial
salt water; see Walter Slaje, “Water and Salt (III): An Analysis and New Translation of the
Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī Dialogue,” Indo-Iranian Journal 45 (2002): 218, n. 38.
52 HV app.1.42.150–52 (water):
tato mahātmā manasā divyaṃ rūpam acintayat | 150 |
kiṃ nu rūpam ahaṃ kṛtvā uddharāmi vasuṃdharām || 151 ||
jale nimagnāṃ dharaṇīṃ yenāhaṃ vai samuddhare | 152 |
“Then the great soul thought about a divine body with his mind: ‘What kind of body shall I
make, with which I will raise the earth, the world, who had sunk into the water [and with
which] I shall lift [her]?’”
HV app.1.42.181–82 (Rasātala):
rasātalatale magnāṃ rasātalatalaṃ gataḥ | 181 |
prabhur lokahitārthāya daṃṣṭrāgreṇojjahāra gām || 182 ||
“The lord, who had gone to the bottom of Rasātala, lifted up the earth, who had sunk to the
bottom of Rasātala, with his tusk for the welfare of the world.”
53 The combination is found, for example, in the Vāyupurāṇa.
VāP 6.2 (single ocean):
ekārṇave tadā tasmin naṣṭe sthāvarajaṅgame |
tadā samabhavad brahma sahasrākṣaḥ sahasrapāt || 2 ||
“When [the earth with] the moving and unmoving had disappeared into that single ocean,
then Brahmā, the thousand-eyed, the thousand-footed, arose.”
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A comparison between the Harivaṃśa passage in the first phase (HV 31.28–29)
and the texts of the second phase shows that often the same standardized verse is
used. It reports that Viṣṇu lifts the earth, who “has sunk” or “is lost,” with his tusk
for the sake of the world. The only element that changes structurally from the first
Harivaṃśa passage in the former phase to the Purāṇas and the Harivaṃśa passage
in the latter phase is the place of rescue: from ekārṇava to Rasātala.54
5 The Cosmos Visualized
Is this development also visible in the iconography of Varāha? Does the Nāga
represent the cosmic ocean in one image (as proposed by Willis) and Rasātala
in the other (as proposed in more general terms by Gail)? To answer this ques-
tion, I have chosen anthropomorphic boar images – because the element of
suppression is absent in the zoomorphic exemplars – which moreover have
enough additional details that can show in which realm the Nāga and the rest
of the image are located.
The first relevant image is the anthropomorphic boar of Udayagiri Cave 5
(See Figure 1). The panel is divided into two parts, each representing a different
realm. The lower half shows various traces of the ocean. The rippling, horizon-
tal carvings are waves, and a few lotuses are still visible. The upper part is
carved with numerous gods, who represent heaven. The Udayagiri panel hence
depicts a division between heaven and the cosmic ocean.
The other relevant images appear in cave temples sponsored by the
Rāṣṭrakūṭas, Cāḷukyas, and Pallavas. At least five panels from this period display
many details of the setting of Varāha’s heroic deed. The first is the Māmallapuram
Varāha Cave panel, which is divided into two parts (Figure 2). In the lower part,
we find the Nāga under the foot of Varāha, surrounded by swirls and lotuses,
which suggest the ocean. The figures surrounding Varāha on the upper part of the
VāP 6.24 (Rasātala):
rasātalatale magnāṃ rasātalatale gatām |
prabhur lokahitārtāya daṃṣṭrayābhyujjahāra gām || 24 ||
“The lord lifted up the earth, who had sunk to the bottom of Rasātala, who had gone to the
bottom of Rasātala, with his tusk for the welfare of the world.”
54 Compare ekārṇavajale bhraṣṭām ekārṇavagatiḥ prabhuḥ (HV 31.28cd) and rasātalatale
magnāṃ rasātalatalaṃ gataḥ (HV app.1.42.181).
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panel are celestial beings,55 representing heaven. The Māmallapuram panel there-
fore also visualizes a division between heaven and the cosmic ocean.
The distribution is less clear in the case of Bādāmi Cave 2 (Figure 3). The only
element that could indicate the ocean is the lotus on which Varāha puts his foot
and which rests on the coil of a Nāga. However, according to Boner, it is significant
that the Nāgas’ tails are not coiled: “This may be another way of signifying
Figure 2: Varāha at Māmallapuram Varāha Cave. Photo: American Institute of Indian Studies.
55 Boner identifies the celestial beings as the sun and the moon, Brahmā, and the Yogins
from the Janaloka; see Alice Boner, Principles of Composition in Hindu Sculpture (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1962), 132. She concludes that “Varāha lifts Bhūdevī from the depth of the abyss to
the regions of Sun and Moon” (Boner, Principles of Composition, 138).
66 Sanne Dokter-Mersch
the horizontal extension of the Waters.”56 The upper part is probably heaven,
suggested by the flying couples above Varāha’s head, usually interpreted as
vidyādharas.57 These “wisdom carriers,” however, may also function as wor-
shippers of Viṣṇu.
The bottom part of the Varāha panel at Ellora Cave 14 (Ravana ka Khai,
Figure 4) shows no sign of either the cosmic ocean or the netherworld. The
upper part, on the other hand, has several elements pointing to heaven.
Figure 3: Varāha at Bādāmi Cave 2. Photo: Elizabeth A. Cecil.
56 Boner, Principles of Composition, 124.
57 For a definition of vidyādhara, see, for example, Boner, Principles of Composition in Hindu
Sculpture, 259; Sthapati, Indian Sculptures & Iconography, 435–36. Compare Banerjea’s identi-
fying the flying beings in Bādāmi Cave 2 as “gandharvas” (Banerjea, The Development of Hindu
Iconography, 16).
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There are flying figures in the upper corners, and above Varāha’s head there
are “conventional representations of the heavens in the form of semi-circular
cloud patterns.”58 Although there are indications that the upper part is heaven, it
is not possible to identify the lower part.59
The final two panels are Bādāmi Cave 3 (Figure 5) and Ellora Cave 16 (Kailasa,
Figure 6). These however show details on the lower part of the panel. The upper
part of Bādāmi Cave 3 merely shows two pairs of flying celestials above Varāha’s
head, and there is no further indication of heaven. At the bottom of the panel,
there are two Nāgas and a male figure between the legs of Varāha. His lower
left arm rests on the tip of the Nāga’s coil and his right hand holds on to
Figure 4: Ellora Cave 14 (Ravana ka Khai). Photo: Elizabeth A. Cecil.
58 Soundara Rajan, Cave Temples of the Deccan, 110.
59 According to Boner, however, the lower part can be classified as the ocean. The madhyap-
rastha, the “central horizontal middle-line in a diagram” (Boner, Principles of Composition,
253), “divides the lower worlds of the waters from the upper worlds of earth and heaven,” and
the goddess earth “carries her head victoriously in the region of the clouds, which represent
Svārloka [“heaven”]” (Boner, Principles of Composition, 114).
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Varāha’s sacrificial cord. He has no coils, so it cannot be a Nāga.60 Several
other interpretations have been given, such as a “figure of a dwarf, lying on
the ground,”61 “a gaṇa in the nether waters,”62 or “a dwarf between the legs”;
in fact, “Hiraṇyākṣa is caught in the flowing wash of nāgas and garlands.”63
Although the figure resembles the gaṇas in the frieze below the Varāha panel,
Figure 5: Bādāmi Cave 3. Photo: Elizabeth A. Cecil.
60 According to Boner, the figure is, in fact, a “small Nāga floating between his [i.e. the
boar’s] legs.” She takes this lower space to be “the Nāga-world, the Primordial Waters,” with
two realms on top of it. One of these “is the middle region, the antarikṣa, which, in contrast to
the nether worlds, has an atmosphere and breathing space, and in which the sight becomes
free to the heavenly regions, where the Vidyādharas, the holders of divine knowledge, dwell”
(Boner, Principles of Composition, 116; 119).
61 R. D. Banerji, Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, no. 25, Basreliefs of Badami
(Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1928), 36.
62 Soundara Rajan, Cave Temples of the Deccan, 68.
63 Preeti Sharma, “The Meaning and Symbolism of Varāha Motif: With Special Reference to
the Chālukyan Rock-cut Caves at Bādāmī,” Journal of History & Social Sciences 1, no. 1
(July–December 2010), http://jhss.org/archivearticleview.php?artid=94.
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the ocean is not a common place for a gaṇa. I am not convinced by the identifi-
cation of Hiraṇyākṣa either, for, although the Daitya king is closely related to
the Varāha myth, the figure does not display any signs of Hiraṇyākṣa in partic-
ular. Despite the fact that the panel has various figures in the bottom part, it is
not possible to determine where they are located because it is not clear who
they are.
The Varāha image in Ellora Cave 16 is partly damaged, which complicates
its interpretation. However, it may be the first sculpture showing heaven and
the netherworld. Heaven appears to be intended through the presence of the
celestial beings flying above Varāha’s head, but there are no further details re-
ferring to heaven. In the lower part of the image, a Nāga is present, but he is
not stepped upon by Varāha. Instead, Varāha places his foot on a pedestal,
which is made clearly distinct from the rest of the image by the coarse line
under the right foot of Varāha. The pedestal is decorated with at least eight fig-
ures. Due to damage to this section, it is difficult to identify them. The two crea-
tures on the left may be Nāgas, if the halolike circles behind their heads are
snake hoods and if the elongated bodies flowing below their torsos are their
Figure 6: Ellora Cave 16 (Kailasa). Photo: Elizabeth A. Cecil.
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coils. There is one figure next to them that has a similar shape in head and
torso. The figures on the right seem to be kneeling before the three on the left.
Since the pedestal is separated from the rest of the image, it looks like a sepa-
rate world, from which Varāha arises and which he presses down with his foot.
If the artist had the ocean in mind, then he would probably have sculpted the
bottom part differently, namely more clearly as water. The artist instead seems
to have had another realm in mind, which by the time of this Ellora cave
(eighth century)64 could very well have been pātāla.
6 Conclusion
I began this study by showing that there is great correspondence between, on
the one hand, the textual description of the Varāha myth in general and the
moment that Varāha rescues the earth in particular, and their iconographic
representation on the other hand. I have noted one exception. Whereas one of
the standard elements of the Varāha images is the presence of a Nāga, there is no
mention of any Nāga in most of the texts. The Skandapurāṇa is probably the only
text that mentions Nāgas in general and some Nāga kings in particular (espe-
cially Śeṣa), but it does not ascribe the mythical serpents any particular role in
the story. The text, therefore, does not provide a textual counterpart of the Nāga
in the Varāha images. However, what the Skandapurāṇa does demonstrate is
that Nāgas can represent a certain realm of the cosmos, viz. a part of the nether-
world, (near) the pātāla called Rasātala. Taking Nāgas as exemplary of a part of
the cosmos has helped in identifying the Nāga in Varāha iconography, as well as
in finding a textual counterpart after all: the place from which Varāha rescues
the earth.
In almost all the texts, the description of the moment that Varāha lifts the
earth contains several standard elements, including the place of rescue. The
place develops from the cosmic ocean (in Vedic sources and early epic-Purāṇic
texts) to Rasātala (in later epic and Purāṇic texts). If we take the Nāga to repre-
sent one of these two places in Varāha iconography, the place of rescue is then
visualized. In material art, there appears to be a clear preference for the cosmic
ocean, for the images showing water greatly outnumber the instances in which
64 “The Kailāsa temple was the result of the munificence of Rāṣṭrakūṭa Kṛṣṇa I (A.D. 756–773)
and was named after him as Kṛṣṇēśvara.” Michael Meister, Encyclopaedia of Indian Temple
Architecture: South India – Upper Drāviḍadēśa – Early Phase, A.D. 550 – 1075 (New Delhi:
American Institute of Indian Studies, 1986), 111.
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the netherworld is depicted. In fact, only Ellora Cave 16 seems to represent
pātāla, for it is clearly distinct from the other images in the way it depicts its
bottom part. If the sculptor would have wanted to show an underwater world,
he would probably have done this differently.
To conclude, even though the depiction of a Nāga seemed to point to a dis-
crepancy with the textual version of the Varāha myth, this problem is solved
when we construe the Nāga as a representative of a cosmic realm. This appears
to have been a cultural idiom in both text and image; the two forms of media
therefore do not seem so different after all.
Abbreviations
AgP Agnipurāṇa
HV Harivaṃśa
MBh Mahābhārata
MtP Matsyapurāṇa
PdP Padmapurāṇa
SP Skandapurāṇa
TS Taittirīya Saṃhitā
VāP Vāyupurāṇa
VDhP Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa
ViP Viṣṇupurāṇa
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3 Vyoman: The Sky is the Limit.
On the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s Reworking
of the LiṅgodbhavaMyth
1 Introduction
One of the most celebrated myths of Śiva tells about “The Origin of the Liṅga”
(Liṅgodbhava), the material icon that is the central object of Śiva worship. Once, as
the story goes, Brahmā and Viṣṇu were quarrelling with each other about who was
the greatest god of all, each claiming to be the primary creative agent that anima-
tes the world. To dispel their pride, a massive liṅga appears in between them.
Brahmā travels upwards in order to find its end, while Viṣṇu goes down, but to no
avail: neither can find the end of the liṅga. Through this experience, they realize
that Śiva, the lord of the liṅga, is, in fact, the supreme god. The narrative concludes
with Viṣṇu and Brahmā praising Śiva and worshiping him in the form of the liṅga.1
This popular etiological myth stands at the intersection of text and material
culture, recounting the mythical origin of the material object of devotion. Textual
accounts of the Liṅgodbhava myth are found in the Śaiva Purāṇas in particular,
but one of the earliest versions may be the one told in the Śivadharmaśāstra (ca.
sixth to seventh century CE), a foundational work of Śaiva devotionalism that ad-
vocates liṅga worship as the means of salvation.2 The image has also found ex-
pression in narrative tableaux decorating the walls of Śiva temples, most notably
in the Tamil South, but also in North India, as illustrated by this magnificent
panel from Mount Harṣa in Rajasthan, now in the Ajmer Museum (Figure 1).3
1 For studies of different versions of the Liṅgodbhava myth, see Raju Kalidos, “Liṅgodbhavamūrti
in Early Medieval Art and Literature,” Acta Orientalia 64 (2003): 77–136; Nirajan Kafle, “The
Liṅgodbhava Myth in Early Śaiva Sources,” in Puṣpikā. Tracing Ancient India Through Texts and
Traditions. Contributions to Current Research in Indology I, eds. Nina Mirnig, Péter-Dániel Szántó,
and Michael Williams (Oxford: Oxbow, 2013), 241–263; Angela Wagner-Hohenberger, “On the
Composition of Parallel Versions of the Story ‘The Appearance of the Liṅga (Liṅgodbhava)’ in the
Purāṇas,” Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 68, no. 3 (2014): 831–848.
2 See Kafle, “The Liṅgodbhava Myth in Early Śaiva Sources” for a first edition and study of the
Liṅgodbhavamyth in the Śivadharmaśāstra. On the question of the time and place of composition of
the Śivadharmaśāstra, see the introduction in Peter C. Bisschop, Universal Śaivism. The Appeasement
of All Gods and Powers in the Śāntyadhyāya of the Śivadharmaśāstra (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
3 On the liṅgodbhavamūrti in Pallava art, see Valérie Gillet, La creation d’une iconographie
śivaïte narrative. Incarnations du dieu dans les temples pallava construits (Pondicherry: IFP/
Open Access. ©2020 Peter C. Bisschop, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110557176-004
The Liṅgodbhava myth is well known and has received much attention.
However, a remarkable adaptation of this myth in the context of Sūrya worship,
recorded in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa (BhavP 1.153–156), has gone unnoticed.4 In this
text, Śiva’s liṅga has been replaced by Sūrya’s vyoman, a mysterious object pre-
sented as the supreme form of the Sun god. As I have argued elsewhere, the
Figure 1: Liṅgodbhava panel. Mount Harṣa (Rajasthan), now in the Ajmer Government
Museum. Photo: author.
EFEO, 2010), 173–186. On the archaeological remains of Mount Harṣa, see Elizabeth A. Cecil,
“The Medieval Temple as Material Archive. Historical Preservation and the Production of
Knowledge at Mount Harṣa,” Archive Journal (August 2017), https://www.archivejournal.net/
essays/the-medieval-temple-as-material-archive/.
4 The Epic and Purāṇic Bibliography does not list any publication referring to the relevant chap-
ters of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa; cf. Heinrich von Stietencron, ed., Epic and Purāṇic Bibliography (up to
1985) Annotated and with Indexes, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992).
76 Peter C. Bisschop
Bhaviṣyapurāṇa has incorporated and revised large parts of the Śivadharmaśāstra
and the Śivadharmottara, the two texts that make up the earliest part of the
Śivadharma corpus, and transformed them into the teachings of “Sauradharma.”5
As part of this Saura adaptation, the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa has also revised the
Liṅgodbhava myth told in chapter 3 of the Śivadharmaśāstra and turned it
into a myth about the manifestation and worship of Sūrya’s vyoman. But what
is this vyoman? While the Liṅgodbhava narrative describes the origins of a fa-
miliar object of devotion (i.e. the Śiva liṅga), the identity of the vyoman as an
object of worship is more difficult to trace. Does the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s descrip-
tion of the Saura emblem represent a textual innovation, or does it describe
an actual object?
With these questions in mind, the first part of the present paper introduces the
Vyomodbhavamyth of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa, with reference to the underlying paral-
lels with the Liṅgodbhava myth of the Śivadharmaśāstra. The second part exam-
ines the possible identity of the vyoman as an object of worship in medieval India
in relation to the surviving material evidence as well as other textual descriptions.
2 The Vyomodbhava Myth of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa
The Vyomodbhava myth covers chapters 153 to 156 of the Brāhmaparvan of the
Bhaviṣyapurāṇa. The Brāhmaparvan is generally considered to be the oldest part
of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa, as suggested by R. C. Hazra’s study of quotations from
the text in medieval Dharmanibandha literature.6 Although the precise date of
composition of the Brāhmaparvan remains uncertain, it seems likely that a large
part of it was composed sometime during the second half of the first millennium
CE. This part of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa is primarily concerned with teachings about
Sun worship. While worship of the Sun has been part and parcel of the Vedic
tradition from a very early period,7 the type of cultic Sun worship taught in the
Bhaviṣyapurāṇa is markedly different, in that it presents Sun worship as a dis-
tinct religion centered on a single supreme deity, with its own class of priests
5 Bisschop, Universal Śaivism, 21–25; Peter C. Bisschop, “Vyāsa’s Palimpsest. Tracking
Processes of Transmission and Re-creation in Anonymous Sanskrit Literature,” in Perspectives
on Lived Religion: Practices – Transmission – Landscape, eds. N. Staring, H. Twiston Davies,
and L. Weiss (Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2019), 165–172.
6 R. C. Hazra, Studies in the Purāṇic Records on Hindu Rites and Customs, 2nd ed. (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), 167–173.
7 The Ṛgveda’s Sāvitrī or Gāyatrī mantra, dedicated to the Sun, is regarded as the quintes-
sence of the Vedas to the present day.
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(Māghas and Bhojakas), its own community of worshippers, and its own form
of ritual practice. The text reflects on and engages with the traditions of Sun
worship, strongly rooted in ancient Iran, that had spread to northern India
during the first millennium CE.8 The Bhaviṣyapurāṇa presents Sun worship in
accordance with a Brahmanic model of worship and teaches that the sun is
the highest and ultimate Lord (īśvara), encompassing and ruling over all other
deities.9
At the beginning of a kalpa, as the story goes, Brahmā, who was creating the
world, became arrogant, thinking, “There is no one in the world who is superior
to me.” Likewise, Viṣṇu became arrogant while he was protecting the world, and
Śiva while he was destroying it.10 They start quarrelling with each other,
each claiming to be the one who creates, preserves, and destroys the universe.11
As they are quarrelling, the darkness of ignorance enters them and they can no
8 On the history and incorporation of Iranian traditions of sun worship in the formation of
the Saura religion, see François Chenet, “Les Sauras de l’Inde: Le brilliant échec d’une
identité religieuse inclusiviste?” Journal Asiatique 281 (1993): 317–392; Adalbert J. Gail,
“Der Sonnenkult im alten Indien – Eigenwächs oder Import?” Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 128 (1978): 333–348; H. Humbach, “Mithra in India and the
Hinduized Magi,” in Études Mithriaques. Actes de Congrès 4 (Tehran: Bibliothèque Pahlavi,
1978), 229–253; Michael Stausberg, “Hinduism and Zoroastrianism,” in Brill’s Encyclopedia
of Hinduism, vol. 4, eds. Knut Jacobsen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 605–616; and Heinrich
von Stietencron, Indische Sonnenpriester. Sāmba und die Śākadvīpīya-Brāhmaṇa (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1966).
9 This paragraph reproduces some information from Bisschop, “Vyāsa’s Palimpsest,” 167.
10 BhavP 1.153.2–3:
kalpādau sṛjato vīra brahmaṇo vividhāḥ prajāḥ |
ahaṃkāro mahān āsīn nāsti loke maduttamaḥ || 2||
tathā pālayato vīra keśavasya dharāpate |
tathā saṃharato jajñe ’haṃkāras tryambakasya ca || 3||
Compare ŚiDhŚ 3.2:
pūrvam ekārṇave ghore naṣṭe sthāvarajaṅgame |
vivādaḥ sumahān āsīd brahmaviṣṇoḥ parasparam ||
All references to the Śivadharmaśāstra in this paper are to my draft edition of chapter 3.
11 BhavP 1.152.6–8:
ahaṃ kartā vikartāhaṃ pālako ’haṃ jagatprabhuḥ |
ity āha bhagavān brahmā kṛṣṇabhīmau samarcitau || 6||
tathaitya śaṃkaraḥ kruddhaḥ kaḥ śakto madṛte bhuvi |
saṃhartuṃ jagad etad dhi sraṣṭuṃ pālayituṃ tathā || 7||
nārāyaṇo ’py evam eva manākkrodhasamanvitaḥ |
na vā śakto jagat sraṣṭuṃ saṃhartuṃ rakṣituṃ tathā || 8||
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longer see anything.12 They do know what to do, however, and cry out for each
other in despair:
Mahādeva said:
“Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa! Great-armed one! Where have you gone, great-minded one? And where
has Brahmā gone, hero? I don’t see the two of you anywhere! [15]
I am truly bewildered by great delusion and darkness. What can I do? Where can I go?
And where can I stay now? [16]
For not at all do I see the mountain, the earth, the trees, Devas, Gandharvas, or Dānavas,
the broad ocean, the rivers! [17]
How can I see the world, both stationary and nonstationary? Tell me, best of gods, I am
overcome with shame!” [18]
On hearing Śaṃkara’s words, Hari replied in a voice stammering with misery, deluded by
darkness, o king. [19]
Viṣṇu said:
“Bhīma, Bhīma! I do not know where you are now! My mind is also greatly deluded by
darkness, Śaṁkara! [20]
Where do I go, where do I stand, how can one gain comfort? For the entire world is filled
with darkness, Parameśvara! [21]
If that god, the best of the gods, the one arisen from the lotus, is seen, let us ask him, the
great soul, if you agree, o Hara, [22]
abandoning arrogance, pride, remaining even, alone, the lotus-faced one, he who origi-
nates from the lotus, whose eyes are like lotus petals.” [23]
On hearing the words of Viṣṇu of immeasurable splendor, who was speaking thus,
Lord Brahmā spoke to the Bearer of the Gaṅgā (Śiva) and the Bearer of the Earth
(Viṣṇu): [24]
“Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa! Great-armed one! Bhīma, Bhīma! Great-minded one! Where are you two?
Say something! What were you two saying to each other? [25]
Compare ŚiDhŚ 3.3:
ahaṃ kartā hy ahaṃ kartā na madanyo jagatpatiḥ |
evam āha hariṃ brahmā brahmāṇaṃ ca haris tathā ||
12 BhavP 1.152.9–10:
evaṃ teṣāṃ pravadatāṃ kruddhānāṃ ca parasparam |
samāviśat tadājñānaṃ tamo mohātmakaṃ vibho || 9||
tena krāntadhiyaḥ sarve na paśyanti parasparam |
atyarthaṃ moham āpannā na jānantīha kiṃcana || 10||
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My mind and intellect are greatly subjugated by darkness! I do not hear, I do not see,
being subjugated by sleep and delusion! [26]
Alas! The entire world, with its gods, demons, and men, is struck by darkness, you two
gods! I do not know where the light has gone!” [27]13
Following this lively exchange, which pokes fun at the three gods who find
themselves in the pitch-black darkness of ignorance, the vyoman makes its
appearance:
As the gods, headed by Brahmā, were speaking like this, afflicted by pride, anger, and
fear, with their minds overcome by darkness, [28]
13 BhavP 1.153.15–27:
mahādeva uvāca |
kṛṣna kṛṣṇa mahābāho kva gatas tvaṃ mahāmate |
brahmā ca kva gato vīra nāhaṃ paśyāmi vāṃ kvacit || 15||
mohena mahatāhaṃ vai tamasā ca vimohitaḥ |
kiṃ karomi kva gacchāmi kva cāham adhunā sthitaḥ || 16||
kṣmādharaṃ pṛthivīṃ vṛkṣān devagandharvadānavān |
vipulaṃ sāgaraṃ sindhūn na hi paśyāmi kiṃcana || 17||
kenopāyena paśyeyaṃ jagat sthāvarajaṅgamam |
brūhi me devaśārdūla vrīḍā me ’tīva jāyate || 18||
śaṃkarasya vacaḥ śrutvā harir vacanam abravīt |
śokagadgadayā vācā tamasā mohito nṛpa || 19||
viṣṇur uvāca |
bhīma bhīma na jāne ’haṃ kva bhavān vartate ’dhunā |
mamāpi mohitaṃ cetas tamasātīva śaṃkara || 20||
kva gacchāmi kva tiṣṭhāmi kathaṃ tat svasthatāṃ vrajet |
tamasā pūritaṃ sarvaṃ jagad dhi parameśvara || 21||
yady asau dṛśyate devaḥ surajyeṣṭho ’mbujodbhavaḥ |
pṛcchāvas taṃ mahātmānaṃ yadi te rocate hara || 23||
hitvā darpam ahaṃkāraṃ samam āsthāya kevalam |
padmānanaṃ padmayoniṃ padmapatranibhekṣaṇam || 24||
ity evaṃ gadato vākyaṃ viṣṇor amitatejasaḥ |
śrutvovāca vibhur brahmā gaṅgādharamahīdharau || 25||
kṛṣṇa kṛṣṇa mahābāho bhīma bhīma mahāmate |
kva bhavantau brūta kiṃ ca kiṃ yuvām ūcathur mithaḥ || 26||
mamātīva manobuddhī tamasā vaśam āgate |
na śṛṇomi na paśyāmi nidrāmohavaśaṃ gataḥ || 27||
aho bata jagat sarvaṃ sadevāsuramānuṣam |
tamasā vyāhataṃ [corr.; vyāṣṭataṃ Ed.] devau na jāne kva gataṃ mahaḥ || 28||
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in order to remove their pride and to teach them, the luminous form of Gopati (Sūrya)
appeared, with eight projections,14 unparalleled, [29]
unmarked by evil or darkness, o king. It shone, covered in a wreath of flames, o hero, and
with many forms, [30]
one hundred yojanas in extent, rising upwards and flickering, in the midst of the stars, o
great king, like the pericarp of a lotus. [31]15
This passage clearly models its account of Sūrya’s material epiphany on the de-
scription of the appearance of the liṅga in Śivadharmaśāstra 3.4–5, even includ-
ing some of the same vocabulary:
In order to remove their pride and to teach them, the mighty liṅga, consisting entirely of
fire, appeared in the middle of the two gods, [4]
covered in a wreath of flames, divine, endowed with immeasurable qualities, ten thou-
sand yojanas in extent, it stood in the pure water. [5]16
Astonished by the sight of the vyoman, Brahmā travels upwards, Śiva goes down,
and Viṣṇu goes crosswise, but they are unable to measure it.17 The passage is a
14 The meaning of aṣṭaśṛṅga will be discussed in the second part of this paper.
15 BhavP 1.153.28–31:
atha teṣāṃ pravadatāṃ brahmādīnāṃ divaukasām |
darpakrodhabhayārtānāṃ tamasākrāntacetasām || 28||
teṣāṃ darpāpahārāya prabhodhārthaṃ ca gopateḥ |
tejorūpaṃ samudbhūtam aṣṭaśṛṅgam anaupamam || 29||
alakṣyaṃ pāpatamasā mahadvyoma narādhipa |
jvālāmālāvṛtaṃ vīra bahurūpaṃ ca bhāsate || 30||
śatayojanavistīrṇaṃ gatam ūrdhvaṃ bhramat tathā |
gomadhyato mahārāja karṇikevāmbujasya tu || 31||
16 ŚiDhŚ 3.4–5:
tayor darpāpahārāya prabodhārthaṃ ca devayoḥ |
madhye samutthitaṃ liṅgam aiśvaryaṃ tejasaḥ param || 4||
jvālāmālāvṛtaṃ divyam aprameyaguṇoditam |
yojanāyutavistīrṇaṃ sthitaṃ tad vimale ’mbhasi || 5||
17 BhavP 1.153.34–37:
tejasā mohitaṃ tasya mahadvyoma narādhipa |
tato vismayam āsīnā dṛṣṭagopatayo nṛpa || 34||
paśyamānā maho vyomni mitho vacanam abruvan |
aho tejaḥ samudbhūtam asmākaṃ śreyase nṛpa || 35||
3 Vyoman: The Sky is the Limit 81
logical adaptation of the Liṅgodbhavamyth in which Brahmā travels up and Viṣṇu
goes down to find the end of the liṅga.18 In the Vyomodbhavamyth, there are three
gods involved and the object is the disk of the sky (vyoman), so they each have to
go up, down, and crosswise. The outcome, however, is the same: they are unable
to find the end of the vyoman and all the gods start reciting praise. Sūrya appears
and shows himself to the gods in the vyoman as the supreme lord.19 Brahmā,
Viṣṇu, and Śiva each praise Sūrya individually.20 There follows an extensive ex-
change between Sūrya and the gods, in which Sūrya offers each of them boons.
Brahmā requests to have devotion, while Śiva asks to be instructed about his true
form, which Sūrya does in extenso. He teaches them about his own four forms: the
rajas form of Brahmā, the sattva form of Viṣṇu, the tamas form of Śiva, and the
fourth supreme form, which is free from guṇas.21 They cannot experience it with-
out worshiping him in the form of the vyoman:22
prakāśāya ca lokānāṃ sarve paśyāma kiṃ nv idam |
jñānāyordhvaṃ gato brahmā cādhastāt tripurāntakaḥ || 36||
tiryag jagāma deveśaś cakrāmbujagadādharaḥ |
alabdhvā tasya te sarve pramāṇaṃ gairikādhipāḥ || 37||
18 ŚiDhŚ 3.7:
gatāv ūrdhvam adhas tasya saṃpradhārya parasparam |
adho ’valambayad viṣṇur agād ūrdhvaṃ pitāmahaḥ || 7||
19 BhavP 1.153.41–42:
stuvatām apy athaiteṣāṃ sahasrakiraṇo raviḥ |
ātmānaṃ darśayām āsa kṛpayā parayā vṛtaḥ || 41||
jñātvā bhaktiṃ mahābāho brahmādīnāṃ mahopamām |
atha te vyomni deveśaṃ dadṛśuḥ parameśvaram || 42||
20 BhavP 1.153.50–80.
21 BhavP 1.154.15–19:
caturmūrtir ahaṃ deva jagad vyāpya vyavasthitaḥ |
śreyase sarvalokānām ādimadhyāntakṛt sadā || 15||
ekā me rājasī mūrtir brahmeti parikīrtitā |
sṛṣṭiṃ karoti sā nityaṃ kalpādau jagatāṃ vibho || 16||
dvitīyā sāttvikī proktā yā parā parikīrtitā |
jagat sā pālayen nityaṃ duṣṭadaityavināśinī || 17||
tṛtīyā tāmasī jñeyā īśeti parikīrtitā |
trailokyaṃ saṃharet sā tu kalpānte śūlapāṇinī || 18||
caturthī tu guṇair hīnā satyādibhir anuttamā |
sā cāśakyā kvacid draṣṭuṃ sthitā sā cābhavat sadā || 19||
22 BhavP 1.154.23:
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That which is known as the Primeval Lord, that is praised as the vyoman. For at the end
of a kalpa, all gods are dissolved in this vyoman. [28]
Brahmā is dissolved in the right side, Janārdana in the left, and you, Tripurāntaka, are
dissolved in the top. [29]
Gāyatrī, mother of the world, is dissolved in its heart; the Veda, along with the six aṅgas,
the pada[pāṭha], and the krama[pāṭha], is dissolved in its head. [30]
The entire world, both moving and unmoving, is dissolved in the belly. From it again arises
Brahmā, etc., and all that is moving and unmoving. [31]
Space, they say, is vyoman; the earth is held to be nikṣubhā (unshakable). I am space, the
most excellent of beings, and Nikṣubhā is my wife. [32]
By me and Nikṣubhā all the world is pervaded, Three-eyed One. Therefore you, Brahmā,
and Keśava should worship the vyoman. [33]23
This passage draws directly upon ŚiDh 3.14–18:
At the end of a kalpa all the gods are dissolved in this liṅga. Brahmā is dissolved in the
right [side], the eternal Viṣṇu in the left. [14]
And Gāyatrī, the most supreme of all the gods, in the heart. The Vedas, along with the six
aṅgas, the pada[pāṭha], and the krama[pāṭha], reside in the head. [15]
The entire world, both moving and unmoving, is dissolved in the belly. From it again arises
Brahmā, etc., and all that is moving and unmoving. [16]
Space, they say, is the liṅga; the earth, its pedestal. It is the dwelling (ālaya) of all beings.
Due to dissolving (līyanāt) into it, it is called liṅga. [17]
na sā spraṣṭuṃ tvayā śakyā hariṇā brahmaṇā na ca |
mām anārādhya bhūteśa vyomarūpaṃ kadācana ||
23 BhavP 1.154.28–33:
yat tv ādyam īśvaraṃ jajñe tad vyoma parikīrtitam |
kalpānte hy atra vai vyomni līyante sarvadevatāḥ || 28||
dakṣiṇe līyate brahmā vāme tasya janārdanaḥ |
tvaṃ sadā kacadeśe tu līyase tripurāntaka || 29||
gāyatrī līyate tasya hṛdaye lokamātaraḥ |
līyate [corr.; līyante Ed.] mūrdhni vai vedaḥ saṣaḍaṅgapadakramaḥ || 30||
jaṭhare līyate sarvaṃ jagat sthāvarajaṅgamam |
punar utpadyate hy asmād brahmādyaṃ sacarācaram || 31||
ākāśaṃ vyoma ity āhuḥ pṛthivī nikṣubhā matā |
bhūtaśreyo ’ham ākāśo nikṣubhā dayitā mama || 32||
mayā nikṣubhayā sarvaṃ jagad vyāptaṃ trilocana |
tasmād ārādhaya vyoma tvaṃ brahma keśavas tathā || 33||
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Therefore, the one who installs a liṅga, the origin of all the gods, has thereby installed
and worshiped everything, without a doubt! [18]24
In this part of the text, the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa stays relatively close to the text of
the Śivadharmaśāstra, yet introduces some significant changes in order to ac-
commodate the new context of the origin of the vyoman. Most significant is the
adaptation of the mystical identification of the liṅga in ŚiDhŚ 3.17. This verse
identifies the liṅga with space and the earth with its pedestal (pīṭhikā), and pro-
vides a nirukti of the word liṅga that derives it from the root “dissolve” (√lī).25
In BhavP 1.153.32, the vyoman is identified with space, while nikṣubhā (the un-
shakable) is identified with the earth. Nikṣubhā is the name of one of the
wives of the sun and plays a key role in the legendary ancestry of the Magas.
According to BhavP 1.139.33–43, the Magas are the descendants of Jaraśastra
(i.e. Zaraθuštra), the son of the Sun and the goddess Nikṣubhā.26 This state-
ment should therefore also be read in the light of the legendary ancestry
of the Maga priests, who are portrayed as the ideal Sun worshippers in the
Bhaviṣyapurāṇa.
The text then introduces a new element into the narrative. After he explains
the nature of the vyoman to Śiva, Sūrya instructs Śiva to worship his vyoman on
Mt. Gandhamādana; furthermore, Viṣṇu should worship it at Kalāpagrāma, and
Brahmā at Puṣkara.27 Viṣṇu asks Sūrya to instruct them on the precise form of
24 ŚiDhŚ 3.14–17:
kalpānte tasya liṅgasya līyante sarvadevatāḥ |
dakṣiṇe līyate brahmā vāme viṣṇuḥ sanātanaḥ || 14||
hṛdaye caiva gāyatrī sarvadevottamottamā |
mūrdhni tiṣṭhanti vai vedāḥ saṣaḍaṅgapadakramāḥ || 15||
jaṭhare līyate sarvaṃ jagat sthāvarajaṅgamam |
punar utpadyate tasmād brahmādyaṃ sacarācaram || 16||
ākāśaṃ liṅgam ity āhuḥ pṛthivī tasya pīṭhikā |
ālayaḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ līyanāl liṅgam ucyate || 17||
tasmāl liṅgaṃ pratiṣṭhāpya sarvadevabhavodbhavam |
sthāpitaṃ tena sarvaṃ syāt pūjitaṃ na saṃśayaḥ || 18||
25 On this verse, see Peter C. Bisschop, “Buddhist and Śaiva Interactions in the Kali Age. The
Śivadharmaśāstra as a Source of the Kāraṇḍavyūhasūtra,” Indo-Iranian Journal 61 (2018):
396–410.
26 Edition and translation in von Stietencron, Indische Sonnenpriester. See also Humbach,
“Mithra in India and the Hinduized Magi,” 250.
27 These three places each have a traditional connection with the three deities. Kalāpagrāma
is also referred to as Śālagrāma later on in the text.
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the vyoman that they should worship.28 In the subsequent chapter, Sūrya
tells him that Brahmā should worship a quadrangular vyoman at daybreak;
Viṣṇu, a discus-shaped vyoman at noon; and Śiva, a round vyoman in the
evening.29 This additional episode may have been inspired by the outcome
of the Liṅgodbhava myth in the Śivadharmaśāstra: there, all the gods each
install and worship their own liṅga made of different material. According to
the Śivadharmaśāstra, they gain their divine positions because of this:
Brahmā acquires the status of Brahmā by worshiping a stone liṅga; Indra,
the state of Indra by worshiping a crystal liṅga; Kubera, the state of Kubera
by worshiping a golden liṅga, etc.30
tan me rūpaṃ mahadvyoma pūjayitvā trilocana |
divyaṃ varṣasahasraṃ hi girau tvaṃ gandhamādane |
tato yāsyasi saṃsiddhiṃ ṣaḍaṅgāṃ paramāṃ śubhām || 34||
kalāpagrāmam āśritya śaṅkhacakragadādharaḥ |
ārādhayatu māṃ bhaktyā vyomarūpaṃ janārdanaḥ || 35||
antarikṣagataṃ tīrthaṃ puṣkaraṃ lokapāvanam |
tatra gatvā viriñco me vyomarūpaṃ sadārcatu || 36||
28 BhavP 1.154.41:
kīdṛgvyoma tv ahaṃ brahmā haraś ca tripurāntakaḥ |
ārādhayāmahe deva bhaktyā śreyo’rtham ātmanaḥ ||
29 BhavP 1.155.2–4:
ārādhayatv ayaṃ devo mama rūpam anaupamam |
catuṣkoṇaṃ paraṃ vyoma adbhutaṃ gairikojjvalam || 2||
tvam ārādhya ca cakrāṅkaṃ śaṃkaro vṛttam ādarāt |
śabdādau satataṃ brahmā sagarādau trilocanaḥ || 3||
madhyāhne tvaṃ sadā deva bhaktyā mām arcayasva vai |
yatheṣṭam ṛbhavaḥ sarve bhaktyā māṃ pūjayantu vai || 4||
30 ŚiDhŚ 3.20–22:
brahmā pūjayate nityaṃ liṅgaṃ śailamayaṃ śubham |
tasya saṃpūjanāt tena prāptaṃ brahmatvam uttamam || 20||
śakro ’pi devarājendro liṅgaṃ maṇimayaṃ śubham |
bhaktyā pūjayate nityaṃ tenendratvaṃ avāpa saḥ || 21||
liṅgaṃ hemamayaṃ kāntaṃ dhanado ’rcayate sadā |
tenāsau dhanado devo dhanadatvam avāpa saḥ || 22||
The verses that follow (23–39) also mention the Viśvedevas, Vāyu, Viṣṇu, the Vasus, the two
Aśvins, Varuṇa, Agni, Sūrya, Buddha, Arhat, Soma, the Nāgas, the Rākṣasas, the Piśācas, the
Guhyakas, and the Mātṛs. For a discussion of this passage, see Peter C. Bisschop, “Inclusivism
Revisited. The Worship of Other Gods in the Śivadharmaśāstra, the Skandapurāṇa and the
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In the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa, the three gods follow the advice of Sūrya and set
out for Puṣkara, Śālagrāma, and Gandhamādana, each to worship their own
vyoman in accordance with Sūrya’s instructions.31 After a thousand divine
years have passed, the sun is satisfied and manifests himself to them.32 First he
goes to Brahmā, who bows down and praises him as the lord of the gods.33
Sūrya addresses him as his “first-born son” and offers him a boon.34 Brahmā
asks for his creation to be successful, whereupon Sūrya informs him that he
will take up birth as his son in the line of Marīci,35 which will make his creation
Niśvāsamukha,” in Tantric Communities in Context, eds. Nina Mirnig, Marion Rastelli, and
Vincent Eltschinger (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie für Wissenschaften, 2019), 511–537.
31 BhavP 1.155.24–27:
jagāma puṣkaraṃ brahmā śālagrāmaṃ janārdanaḥ |
vṛṣabhadhvajo gato vīra parvataṃ gandhamādanam || 24||
tyaktvā mānam ahaṃkāraṃ kurvantas tapa uttamam |
ārādhayanti taṃ devaṃ bhāskaraṃ vāritaskaram || 25||
vyomni kṛtvā catuṣkoṇaṃ brahmā nityam apūjayat |
cakrāṅkitaṃ harir nityaṃ samyag vyoma tv apūjayat || 26||
haro ’pi satataṃ vīra tejasā vahnisaṃnibham |
apūjayat sadā vṛttaṃ vyoma bhaktyā samanvitaḥ || 27||
32 BhavP 1.155.28–30:
divyavarṣasahasrānte pūjayanto divākaram |
gandhamālyopahārais tu nṛtyagītapravāditaiḥ || 28||
atoṣayan mahātmānaṃ kurvāṇas tapa uttamam |
bhaktyācalena manasā vivasvantam anuttamam || 29||
atha teṣāṃ mahārāja prasanno bhuvanādhipaḥ |
darśayām āsa lokātmā yugapad vai vibhāvasuḥ || 30||
33 BhavP 1.155.37:
namas te devadeveśa namas te timirāpaha |
namas te bhūtabhavyeśa bhūtāde bhūtabhāvana ||
34 BhavP 1.155.39cd–40:
tvaṃ me prathamajaḥ putraḥ saṃbhūtaḥ kāraṇāt purā || 39||
varaṃ varaya bhadraṃ te varado ’smi tavāgrataḥ |
yam icchasi surajyeṣṭha mā tvaṃ śaṅkāṃ kuru prabho || 40||
35 BhavP 1.155.42–43:
na putratvam ahaṃ prāptas tava deva caturmukha |
tavānvaye gamiṣyāmi putratvaṃ hi marīcaye || 42||
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thrive. Brahmā thereupon asks him where his abode shall be and Sūrya assigns
him a place in the vyoman:
You shall always dwell together with the multitudes of gods in the great vyoman, which is
my form, with projections on the surface, most supreme: [46]
Indra in the eastern corner, the son of Śāṇḍilī (Agni) in the southeast, Yama always in the
south, Nirṛti in the southwest, [47]
Varuṇa in the west, the one who constantly moves (Vāyu) in the northwest; the granter of
wealth (Kubera) shall dwell in the northern part, [48]
the god Śaṅkara in the northeast. You, together with Viṣṇu, [shall dwell] in the center.
[49ab]36
In other words, the vyoman with its eight projections is the abode of the eight
deities of the directions (Lokapālas), while Brahmā and Viṣṇu together occupy
the center.
Next, Sūrya proceeds to Mount Gandhamādana, where he finds Śiva engaged
in the act of worshiping the vyoman.37 He offers a boon to Śiva, who prostrates
himself and requests that Sūrya “do that which a father does for his son.”38 He
tato yāsyati te siddhiṃ kṛtṣnā sṛṣṭiś caturmukha |
bhavitaivaṃ na saṃdeho matprasādāj jagatpate || 43||
36 BhavP 1.155.46–49ab:
yan me rūpaṃ mahad vyoma pṛṣṭhaśṛṅgam anuttamam |
tatra devakadambais bhavān nityaṃ nivatsyati || 46||
indraḥ pūrvadiśo bhāge āgneyyāṃ śāṇḍilīsutaḥ |
dakṣiṇasyāṃ yamo nityaṃ nairṛtyām atha nirṛtiḥ || 47||
paścimāyāṃ tu varuṇo vāyavyāṃ tu sadāgatiḥ ||
uttare tu diśo bhāge nivased dhanadas tataḥ || 48||
aiśānyāṃ śaṃkaro devo madhye tvaṃ viṣṇunā saha |
37 BhavP 1.155.51cd–53:
ādityo ’pi varaṃ dattvā brahmaṇyo brahmaṇe ’nagha || 53cd||
jagāma saha devena parvataṃ gandhamādanam |
dadarśa tatra bhūteśaṃ tapas tīvraṃ samāśritam || 54||
kapardinaṃ śūladharaṃ candrārdha[corr.; candrārka- Ed.]kṛtaśekharam |
pūjayantaṃ paraṃ vyoma suvrataṃ tejasānvitam || 55||
38 BhavP 1.155.60:
tavāṅgasaṃbhavo deva putro ’haṃ vallabhas tava |
yat karoti mahādeva pitā putrasya tat kuru ||
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then asks him for “unwavering devotion,” which will help him destroy the uni-
verse at the end of time, and “a supreme place,” which will help him conquer all
weapons.39 Sūrya grants him this boon and tells him that the vyoman that he has
worshiped shall be his supreme weapon, the trident (triśūla), while his place
shall be in the northwestern part of the vyoman.40
In the final chapter, Sūrya proceeds to Śālagrāma to give a boon to Viṣṇu.
He finds him worshiping the vyoman in the shape of a discus.41 After Viṣṇu
has paid homage to Sūrya, saying that he is his “second son” (after Brahmā), he
requests that he grant him his wishes, “like a father to his son.”42 Sūrya grants
him a boon and Viṣṇu requests “unwavering devotion,” which will allow him to
conquer the enemy, as well as “a supreme place, skill in the protection of the
39 BhavP 1.155.63–65:
yadi tuṣṭo ’si me deva anugrāhyo ’smi te yadi |
prayaccha me varaṃ bhāno dehi bhaktiṃ mamācalām || 63||
devadānavagandharvayakṣarakṣogaṇāṃs tathā |
nirjityāhaṃ yathā deva yugānte saṃhare prajām || 64||
tathā prayaccha me deva sthānaṃ ca paramaṃ vibho |
yenāhaṃ heti sarvaṃ ca jaye deva jagatprabho || 65||
40 BhavP 1.155.67:
yad etat pūjitaṃ nityaṃ madrūpaṃ vyoma cottamam |
etat triśūlaṃ paramaṃ tava śastraṃ bhaviṣyati |
īśāne ca tathā bhāge vyomno vāso bhaviṣyati ||
41 BhavP 1.156.1–3:
itthaṃ dattvā varaṃ bhānur īśvarāya viśāṃ pate |
śālagrāmaṃ jagāmāśu varaṃ dātuṃ harer nṛpa || 1||
dadarśa sa hariṃ tatra tapantaṃ paramaṃ tapaḥ |
kṛṣṇājinadharaṃ śāntaṃ prajvalantaṃ svatejasā || 2||
pūjayantaṃ mahad vyoma cakrākāram anaupamam |
gandhamālyopahāraiś ca nṛtyagītapravāditaiḥ || 3||
42 BhavP 1.156.10:
putro ’haṃ tava deveśa dvitīyo brāhmaṇo ’nagha |
piteva putrasya rave dehi kāmāñ jagatpate || 10||
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worlds, power, heroism, glory, and pleasure.”43 Sūrya grants him all this and
tells him:
This great vyoman shall become your discus, the best of all weapons, o hero, destroying
all enemies, and [it shall be] your supreme place, worshiped by all the worlds.44
After he has given Viṣṇu this final boon, Sūrya returns home.45
3 The Form and Material Shape of the Vyoman
The Vyomodbhava myth summarized above clearly builds on the model articu-
lated in the Liṅgodbhava myth of the Śivadharmaśāstra, but includes several
important additions and elaborations. In replacing the liṅga with the vyoman,
the authors of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa have significantly expanded upon the narra-
tive, providing more detail and context. The three gods of creation (sṛṣṭi), pres-
ervation (sthiti), and destruction (saṃhāra) are granted their cosmic tasks along
with their weapons on account of their worship of Sūrya’s vyoman. The main
question raised by the Vyomodbhava myth concerns the identity of the object
at the heart of the story. While the liṅga is well known from material culture
as the phallic icon installed in the Śiva temple, no object corresponding to the
vyoman appears to be known from the tradition of Sūrya worship. The icon in-
stalled and worshiped in a Sūrya temple is typically the anthropomorphic form
of the deity, not an abstract emblem. Are we confronted here with a textual in-
vention that was designed to furnish a corresponding Saura parallel for the
43 BhavP 1.156.16–17:
yadi tuṣṭo mama vibhur bhaktyā krīto mayā yadi |
prayaccha tv acalāṃ bhaktiṃ yathā śatruṃ parājaye |
tathā mama varaṃ dehi sarvārātivināśanam || 16||
mama sthānaṃ ca paramaṃ sarvalokanamaskṛtam |
lokānāṃ pālane yuktiṃ balaṃ vīryaṃ yaśaḥ sukham || 17||
44 BhavP 1.156.21:
etad eva mahad vyoma cakraṃ te prabhaviṣyati |
sarvāyudhavaraṃ vīra sarvārātivināśanam |
tathā sthānaṃ ca paramaṃ sarvalokanamaskṛtam ||
45 BhavP 1.156.23:
bhāskaro ’pi varaṃ dattvā keśavāyāmitaujase |
jagāmāśu mahārāja svapuraṃ vibudhādhipaḥ || 23||
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liṅga in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s telling of the story, or does this narrative describe
an actual object venerated by devotees of the sun? The remainder of this paper
is dedicated to addressing this question.
From the Vyomodbhava myth itself, we can discern the following. The
most concrete piece of information is that it has “eight projections” (aṣṭaśṛṅga
[BhavP 1.153.29d]). This description matches Sūrya’s subsequent teaching to
Brahmā that the eight Lokapālas each take up one of its eight corners (BhavP
1.155.46–49ab). Moreover, the vyoman has a center, for this is declared to be
the space occupied by Brahmā and Viṣṇu. In contrast to the liṅga, the vyoman is
not a vertical object (whose top and bottom Brahmā and Viṣṇu seek to find), but
spreads in all directions, like the expanse of the “sky” (vyoman) that gives it its
name. The fact that Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva each worship the vyoman in a dif-
ferent form (quadrangular, discus-shaped, and round) may either be a narrative
trope to account for the receipt of their individual weapons (taught to derive
from their worship of the vyoman), or it could indicate that these are the three
elements that jointly make up the three parts of the full form of the vyoman.
But the conceptualization of the vyoman in the Vyomodbhava myth is
not a mere textual invention born of the need to retell the Liṅgodbhava myth
in a Saura setting; this is evinced by the presence of other passages in the
Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s Brāhmaparvan that likewise give instructions on the wor-
ship of the vyoman. These passages provide further details, some of which
match the above.46 Thus, for example, BhavP 1.203.2–3, the opening of the
chapter on the Vyomapūjāvidhi, confirms that the vyoman has eight projec-
tions (Brahmā speaking):
Learn from me, o Kṛṣṇa, the procedure for the worship of the vyoman, the way in which
men worship the vyoman of eight projections. [2]
After making a golden, silver, copper, or stone [vyoman] with eight projections, o great-
armed one, he should worship [it] according to this procedure. [3]47
46 The following survey is by no means complete, but should give an impression of the prom-
inence of the vyoman teachings in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa.
47 BhavP 1.120.2–3:
vyomapūjāvidhiṃ kṛṣṇa nibodha gadato mama |
aṣṭaśṛṅgaṃ yathā vyoma pūjayanti manīṣiṇaḥ || 2||
sauvarṇaṃ rājataṃ tāmraṃ kṛtvā cāśmamayaṃ tathā |
aṣṭaśṛṅgaṃ mahābāho anena vidhinārcayet || 3||
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Other passages in the text speak of the vyoman as having “four projections”
(catuḥśṛṅga)48 or “four corners” (catuṣkoṇa, caturasra).49 This would seem to cor-
respond to the form of the vyoman worshiped by Brahmā in the Vyomodbhava
myth,50 but it is possible that it rather represents a different layer of the same
object.51 In the remainder of the Vyomapūjāvidhi, Brahmā teaches the various
mantras to be used in the worship of the different parts that make up the vyoman.
The passage quoted above includes the important detail that, like the liṅga, the
vyomanmay be made of different types of durable material. This further makes it
clear that the author intended to refer to an actual material object of worship.
One passage identifies the vyoman as the “weapon of Sūrya” (sūryapraharaṇa).52
This may come as a surprise, since a lotus does not immediately suggest a
48 BhavP 1.67.14a; 1.124.3a; 1.124.3c; 1.130.59a.
49 BhavP 1.101.13b; 1.155.2c; 1.130.59a.
50 Compare also BhavP 1.68.2, according to which Brahmā worships a lotus-shaped vyoman:
padmākṛtiṃ sadā brahmā nalinair guggulena tu |
vyomarūpaṃ sadā devaṃ mahādevo ’rcate ravim ||
51 Note that the Devyāmata, an early Śaiva Pratiṣṭhātantra, likewise refers to the vyoman
“with four or eight projections.” Cf. Devyāmata 266cd–267ab:
atha vā vyomarūpaṃ tu caturśṛṅgaṃ tu kārayet ||
atha vā cāṣṭaśṛṅgaṃ tu ata ūrddhvaṃ na kārayet |
Edited in Anna Ślączka, “The Iconography of the Hindu Deities in the Devyāmata, an Early
Śaiva Pratiṣṭhātantra,” in Interrelations of Indian Literature and Arts, ed. Lidia Sudyka (Kraków:
Księgarnia Akademicka, 2011), 181–261. See Ślączka, 213–218 for a discussion of this passage.
Furthermore, a verse from the Tantric compendium the Pratiṣṭhālakṣaṇasārasamuccaya
states that the vyoman may have “twelve, four, or eight projections” (PLSS 6.276):
vyomaṃ sūryāgrataḥ kuryāc chṛṅgair dvādaśabhir yutam |
caturbhir aṣṭābhir vāpi madhye ’bje ’ṣṭadalānvitam ||
Edited in Gudrun Bühnemann, The Hindu Pantheon in Nepalese Line Drawings. Two
Manuscripts of the Pratiṣṭhālakṣaṇasārasamuccaya (Varanasi: Indica Books, 2003). The two
seventeenth-century Nepalese manuscripts with line drawings depict the vyoman as a cow
with four horns (Bühnemann, fig. 105). This certainly does not conform to the icon described
by the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa, and may be the later invention of the Nepalese artist.
52 BhavP 1.125.2:
hanta vyoma pravakṣyāmi sūryapraharaṇaṃ śubham |
yadātmakaṃ hi yatproktaṃ yathā vasanti devatāḥ ||
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weapon, but it was probably considered to be a weapon modeled on the shape
of a lotus:
Just as Varuṇa has the noose, just as Vedhas has the huṅkāra, just as Viṣṇu has the dis-
cus, just as Tryambaka has the trident, and just as Indra has the thunderbolt, so is Sūrya
known to have the vyoman.53
This verse suggests that the vyoman has the form of a lotus, being identified
with the lotus(es) that Sūrya holds in his hands. Read together with the pas-
sages mentioning the vyoman’s eight projections, we can conjecture that
these represent the eight petals of the lotus. Such an identification receives
support from an important passage in the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, whose
Pratimālakṣaṇa section includes a brief chapter laying out the form of the vyo-
man (ViDhP 3.75: Vyomarūpanirmāṇam). It provides the most concrete de-
scription of the vyoman and matches some of what we have learned so far
from the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa:
It should be square at the base and then round, o long-armed one; then a small square
and then another square, [2]
Then another small square, so that it appears like Mt. Meru. This is taught as the
bhadrapīṭha. The vyoman part is the third. [3]
This is declared as the characteristic of all bhadrapīṭhas. The square that is like a pillar is
proclaimed to be the middle part. [4]
On top of the bhadrapīṭha, one should render a lotus with eight beautiful petals. In its
center, up to the pericarp, is Divākara (the sun), [5]
And one should arrange the guardians of the directions in its petals according to the
quarters. Below the bhadrapīṭha, one should position the earth. [6]
And they know the lotus, the part above it, as the intermediary space. All the supreme
gods are present there. [7]
The vyoman consisting of all the gods has been taught to you, great-armed one. After
worshiping it, one obtains all desires. [8]54
53 BhavP 1.125.5–6ab:
varuṇasya yathā pāśo huṅkāro vedhaso yathā |
viṣṇoś cāpi yathā cakraṃ triśūlaṃ tryambakasya ca || 5||
indrasya ca yathā vajraṃ tathā vyoma raveḥ smṛtam |
54 VDhP 3.75.2–8:
caturasraṃ bhaven mūle tato vṛttaṃ mahābhuja |
tato ’lpacaturasraṃ ca caturasraṃ tato bhavet || 2||
tato ’lpacaturasraṃ ca meruvat saṃsthitaṃ tataḥ |
bhadrapīṭham idaṃ proktaṃ vyomabhāgaṃ tṛtīyakam || 3||
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While the description is terse and some of the details remain ambiguous,55 we
can make out that the bhadrapīṭha includes a square and a circular part (which
recall the square and circular parts worshiped respectively by Brahmā and
Śiva) and that it is topped by an eight-petalled lotus in which the guardians of
directions are positioned. There can be little doubt that the author of the
Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa had a similar object in mind.
In an article entitled “‘Saura-Pīṭha’ or the Solar Altar,” Shetti (1992) has col-
lected several examples of so-called “saurapīṭhas.”56 One beautiful example comes
from Gangaikondacholapuram in Tamil Nadu, “which shows Sūrya as a large
blossoming lotus at the top, the eight other grahas seated on the sides facing the
eight directions and a row of seven horses facing east” (Figure 2).57 Somewhat sim-
ilar is a slab from Andhra Pradesh, now in the Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu
Sangrahalaya, Mumbai (Figure 3).58 This shows the lotus on top, surrounded by
the signs of the zodiac, placed on a square base that includes the Dikpālas and
their consorts seated on their vāhanas, as well as the seven horses along with
Aruṇa. Shetti also draws attention to a slab, now in the Hyderabad Museum, that
sarveṣāṃ bhadrapīṭhānām etal lakṣaṇam ucyate |
stambhavac [corr.; stambhavaś Ed.] caturasraṃ tu madhyabhāgaṃ prakīrtitam || 4||
bhadrapīṭhaṃ tato bhāge tatra padmaṃ niveśayet |
śubhāṣṭapatraṃ tanmadhye karṇikāsyād divākaraḥ || 5||
patreṣu kalpayet tasya dikpālāṃś ca yathādiśam |
bhadrapīṭham adhastāt tu pṛthivīṃ prakalpayet || 6||
antarikṣaṃ tathā padmam ūrdhvabhāgaṃ tato viduḥ |
tataḥ saṃnihitāḥ sarve bhavanti tridaśottamāḥ || 7||
sarvadevamayaṃ vyoma kathitaṃ te mahābhuja |
tasya saṃpūjanaṃ kṛtvā sarvān kāmān avāpnuyāt || 8||
55 For a different translation accompanied by hypothetical drawing of what the vyoman described
in the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa might look like, see Dipak Chandra Bhattacharya, Pratimālakṣaṇa
of the Viṣṇudharmottara (New Delhi: Harman Pub. House, 1991), 178–181 and plate 77.
56 As Shetti observes, “The Āgamic texts specify the worship of Sūrya in the form of a lotus
altar. Evidently this is a representation of Saura pīṭha (solar altar), intended for daily wor-
ship”; see B. V. Shetti, “‘Saura Pīṭha’ or the Solar Altar,” in Indian Numismatics, History, Art,
and Culture: Essays in the Honour of Dr. P. L. Gupta, vol. 2, eds. D. W. Macdowall, Savita
Sharma, and Sanjay Garg (Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1992), 335. I have not been able to
identify the Āgamic texts in question, and unfortunately the author provides no specific tex-
tual reference. Some of the same objects are discussed in relation to Sūrya and the symbolism
of the lotus in C. Sivaramamurti, Approach to Nature in Indian Art and Thought. New Delhi:
Kanak Publications, 1980. For another comprehensive survey, see Krishna Deva, “Lotus-
Symbolism of the Graharāja-Maṇḍala,” Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art, n.s., 22–23
(1993–95): 107–113, where they are referred to as “sūryayantra” or “graharājamaṇḍala.”
57 Shetti, “‘Saura Pīṭha’ or the Solar Altar,” 337, fig. 2.
58 Shetti, “‘Saura Pīṭha’ or the Solar Altar,” 338–339, fig. 3a/b.
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shows the lotus surrounded by the Rāśis along with the Dikpālas below.59 Another
example, not mentioned by Shetti, is a slab at the Amriteshwara Temple at
Amritpura, near Shimoga in Karnataka (Figure 4).60 This again shows the lotus
on top surrounded by the signs of the zodiac at the edges. More important,
however, is the presence of a praṇāla, which indicates that the saurapīṭha
(or vyomapīṭha) received the rites of pūjā, which conforms to the ritual pre-
scriptions of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa.
From North India comes a ninth-century image, currently in the Gwalior
Museum, that more closely resembles the tiered structure described in the
Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa (Figure 5).61 Moreover, it has four prominent projections
Figure 2: Saurapīṭha. Gangaikondacolapuram. Source: C. Sivaramamurti, The Chola Temples.
Thañjāvūr, Gaṅgaikoṇḍachoḷapuram & Dārāsuram (New Delhi: Archaeological Survey of India, 1978).
59 Shetti, “‘Saura Pīṭha’ or the Solar Altar,” 337, fig. 1d.
60 Srikumar M. Menon, “From Megaliths to Temples: Astronomy in the Lithic Record of South
India,” in Growth and Development of Archaeology and Astrophysics in India and the Asia-Pacific
Region. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Oriental Astronomy, eds. W. Orchiston,
A. Sule, and M.N. Vahia (Mumbai: Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, 2018), 253–254, fig. 29.
61 Shetti, “‘Saura Pīṭha’ or the Solar Altar,” 337, fig. 1c. See also Anne Casile, “Temples et ex-
pansion d’une centre religieux en Inde centrale. Lectures du paysage archéologique de Badoh-
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on the corners, which recall the projections (śṛṅga) mentioned in the descrip-
tions of the vyoman. Placed on a rectangular tiered base, it has the lotus on top,
below which are represented the planets as well as a personified Sūrya in niches
on the sides of the base. A similar example from the same period comes from
Gaḍarmal, Madhya Pradesh (Figure 6).62 Casile (2009, 298), who has made
an extensive study of the temple complex, refers to it as a “balipīṭha or
saurapīṭha.” In addition to the lotus on top, the pīṭha displays the Navagrahas,
Daśāvatāras, Saptamātṛkās, and “11 divinités masculines assises,” which I suggest
represent the Ekādaśarudras. A sculpted set of the Dikpālas surrounding the lotus
completes the set. The pīṭha is still in situ at the temple complex of Gaḍarmal, di-
rectly in front of the Sūrya temple.
In view of the argument of this paper, it is noteworthy that the Sūrya temple
is the only one of the seven temples surrounding the main temple at Gaḍarmal
Figure 3: Saurapīṭha. Prince of Wales Museum, Mumbai. Photo: Elizabeth A. Cecil.
Paṭhāri du 5e au 10e siècle de notre ère” (PhD diss., Université Sorbonne Nouvelle–Paris 3,
2009), plate 70, fig. 5, from which I have taken the picture.
62 Casile, “Temples et expansion d’une centre religieux,” plate 117, fig. 4. See also Deva,
“Lotus-Symbolism of the Graharāja-Maṇḍala,” fig. 8 and 8A.
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that has such a pīṭha.63 This strongly suggests its intrinsic connection with Sūrya
worship. The siting of the object in front of the Sūrya temple conforms to the de-
scription of the vyoman’s location in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa, which stipulates sev-
eral times that the object should be in front of the deity or the temple:64
The vyoman, which is seen in front of Sūrya, o brahmin.65
The vyoman, with four corners and four projections, is in front of the temple.66
Figure 4: Saurapīṭha. Amriteshwara Temple at Amritpura, Karnataka. Source: Menon, “From
Megaliths to Temples.”
63 See Deva, “Lotus-Symbolism of the Graharāja-Maṇḍala,” plate 107 and 117, fig. 5.
64 Compare also the verse from the Pratiṣṭhālakṣaṇasārasamuccaya quoted above (n. 51).
65 BhavP 1.125.1ab:
yad etad dṛśyate vyoma sūryasya purato dvija |
66 BhavP 1.130.59ab:
caturasraṃ catuḥśṛṅgaṃ vyoma devagṛhāgrataḥ |
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The place of the vyoman should be prepared nearby in front of the deity.67
The saurapīṭha at Gaḍarmal thus provides a perfect match with the descriptions
of the vyoman in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa. Some further examples of such altars
from North India, adduced by Deva 1993–95, have either four, eight, or twelve
projections on the corners.68 One striking example, not discussed in any of the
Figure 5: Saurapīṭha. Gurjari Mahal Archaeological Museum, Gwalior. Source: Casile,
“Temples et expansion d’une centre religieux en Inde centrale.”
67 BhavP 1.130.62cd:
devasya purataḥ kāryaṃ vyomasthānaṃ samagrataḥ |
68 A remarkably early one is a terracotta piece from the Neolithic-Chalcolithic site of Chirand,
Bihar, which shows “an altar with a full blown lotus flower enclosed by eight plain petals” (Deva,
“Lotus-Symbolism of the Graharāja-Maṇḍala,” 109, fig. 1). According to Deva, this was found in
the Mauryan stratum. A seventh-century image from Mundesvari, Bihar (Deva, “Lotus-Symbolism
of the Graharāja-Maṇḍala,” 109, fig. 4), by contrast, shows the lotus surrounded by four projec-
tions, while a contemporary image from Kanauj (Deva, “Lotus-Symbolism of the Graharāja-Ma
ṇḍala,” 109, fig. 5) has twelve such projections, or “petals,” as Deva calls them.
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literature that I have seen, comes from the Kal Bhairava temple in Ujjain
(Figure 7).69 This has eight projections surrounding the eight petals of the cen-
tral lotus. On the base below are displayed the other Grahas.
Finally, I wish to draw attention to a peculiar iconographical feature
found in some Sūrya sculptures from ninth- to twelfth-century Northeast
India, described by Ślączka as follows: “On these images the two open-blown
lotuses held by the deity are often surmounted by more or less cubical ele-
ments resembling altars topped with a number of prongs.”70 This curious
Figure 6: Saurapīṭha. Gaḍarmal, Madhya Pradesh. Source: American Institute of Indian
Studies (Acc. No. 2674).
69 I am grateful to Michael Willis for drawing my attention to this image and providing me with a
photograph. It is now housed in a modern shrine, but may well come from an early sun temple in
Ujjain.
70 Ślączka, “The Iconography of the Hindu Deities in the Devyāmata,” 35.
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representation recalls the identification of the vyoman with Sūrya’s “lotus-
weapon” in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa passage quoted above. The iconography is
not restricted to Northeast India, however, for there is also a striking exam-
ple from Kanauj (ca. eighth to ninth century), now in the National Museum
in New Delhi (Figures 8a & 8b).71 It looks as if the artist has tried to integrate
the handheld lotuses that comprise a standard feature of Sūrya’s iconogra-
phy with the altarlike structure of the vyomapīṭha taught in the Bhaviṣya-
and Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa.72 In this way, the vyomapīṭha is represented
Figure 7: Saurapīṭha. Kal Bhairava Temple at Ujjain. Photo: Michael Willis.
71 See also Casile, “Temples et expansion d’une centre religieux en Inde centrale,” plate 70,
fig. 7, where the image is described as follows: “Relief sculpté de Sūrya arborant deux petits
balipīṭha au-dessus de chaque lotus tenu par la divinité.”
72 The term vyomapīṭha is found in BhavP 1.203.9:
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as the ritual counterpart of the lotuses held in his hands. The extended
shafts below the lotus motif on this particular image are curiously reminis-
cent of some of the fire altars depicted on the reverse of Sassanian coins.
These, just like the Kanauj image, display a ribbon tied around the shaft of
the altar (Figure 9).73 The parallelism is certainly striking and may be indica-
tive of Zoroastrian influence on the artist’s depiction of Sūrya.74
(a) (b)
Figure 8a and 8b: Sūrya. Kanauj, now in the National Museum, New Delhi. Photo: author.
namo ’stu sarvapāpebhyo vyomapīṭhaṃ sadārcayet |
te narāḥ satataṃ kāmān prāpnuvanti na saṃśayaḥ ||
73 These lower shafts are not present on the northeastern Sūrya examples adduced by
Ślączka, “The Iconography of the Hindu Deities in the Devyāmata,” plates 8 and 9 (along with
references to Susan L. Huntington, The “Pāla-Sena” Schools of Sculpture [Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1984], plates 66, 211, 217, and 218). On the typology of fire altars on Sassanian coins, see
Nikolaus Schindel, “Sasanian Coinage,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran, ed. Daniel
T. Potts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 815–840.
74 Xuanzang reports the existence of a sun temple in Kanauj, which indicates that the city
had become a center of sun worship by the seventh century; see Samuel Beal, Si-Yu-Ki.
Buddhist Records of the Western World. Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629)
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4 Concluding Remarks
The Vyomodbhava myth of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa has much to offer to the his-
torian of religion. The textual parallel with the Liṅgodbhava myth of the
Śivadharmaśāstra attests to the intensive nature of religious exchange in
early medieval India, in which one of the founding myths of Śiva and the liṅga
cult was reused and adapted to demonstrate the supremacy of Sūrya and his wor-
ship in the form of the vyoman instead. The parallel with the Liṅgodbhava myth
and the apparent lack of a corresponding icon in Sūrya worship may at first sight
give the impression that the vyoman at the heart of the myth represents a textual
innovation, motivated by the necessity to recast the Liṅgodbhava myth in the
context of Sūrya worship. A closer study of the text, however, shows that the
worship of an object called vyoman forms a core element of the teaching of
the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s Brāhmaparvan, which has been overlooked in existing
scholarship on the Saura religion.75 Moreover, the vyoman also appears as a
form of Sūrya in iconographical texts such as the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa,
the Devyāmata, and the Pratiṣṭhālakṣaṇasārasamuccaya. As I have argued in
this paper, the descriptions in these sources suggest a plausible connection
Figure 9: Gold Coin of Shapur (CE 383–388 CE). Source: Wikimedia Commons.
(1884; repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 223. See also Deva, “Lotus-Symbolism of the
Graharāja-Maṇḍala,” 109–110.
75 No mention of the vyoman is made, for example, in Lalata Prasada Pandeya, Sun-Worship
in Ancient India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971); V. C. Srivastava, Sun-Worship in Ancient
India (Allahabad: Indological Publications, 1960); or von Stietencron, Indische Sonnenpriester.
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with certain material objects from medieval India that have been identified as
saurapīṭhas in art-historical literature. The Bhaviṣyapurāṇa’s Vyomodbhava
myth may thus represent a doctrinal overlay of an existing material practice,
providing it with a powerful new explanation and ideology based on the
model of the Liṅgodbhava myth.
The present paper is meant as a first step toward bringing the various materi-
als into conversation with each other. More research is needed to put them into
context, which will also require looking into vyoman-related rituals and taking
into account other sources that could not be dealt with in the context of the pres-
ent study. To mention just one example of the former, the thirteenth-century
Dharmanibandha author Hemādri quotes a vyomaṣaṣṭhī and a vyomavrata
from the “Bhaviṣyapurāṇa” in the Vratakhaṇḍa of his Caturvargacintāmaṇi.76
Furthermore, for evaluating the materials of the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa, the descrip-
tions of the vyoman in the Sāmbapurāṇa, a text that has strong textual links
with the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa, should be taken into account as well.77 I plan to do
so in a future study.
Bibliography
Beal, Samuel. Si-Yu-Ki. Buddhist Records of the Western World. Translated from the Chinese of
Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629). 1884. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981.
Bhattacharya, Dipak Chandra. Pratimālakṣaṇa of the Viṣṇudharmottara. New Delhi: Harman
Pub. House, 1991.
Bisschop, Peter C. Universal Śaivism. The Appeasement of All Gods and Powers in the
Śāntyadhyāya of the Śivadharmaśāstra. Leiden: Brill, 2018.
Bisschop, Peter C. “Buddhist and Śaiva Interactions in the Kali Age. The Śivadharmaśāstra as
a Source of the Kāraṇḍavyūhasūtra.” Indo-Iranian Journal 61 (2018): 396–410.
Bisschop, Peter C. “Vyāsa’s Palimpsest. Tracking Processes of Transmission and Re-creation
in Anonymous Sanskrit Literature.” In Perspectives on Lived Religion: Practices –
Transmission – Landscape, edited by N. Starling, H. Twiston Davies, and L. Weiss,
165–172. Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2019.
Bisschop, Peter C. “Inclusivism Revisited. The Worship of Other Gods in the
Śivadharmaśāstra, the Skandapurāṇa and the Niśvāsamukha.” In Tantric Communities in
76 Hemādri, Caturvargacintāmaṇi of Śrī Hemādri. Vratakhaṇḍa, eds. Bhāratacandra Śiromaṇi,
Yajñeśvara Smṛtiratna, and Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa (Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica), 1.1:
616–617, 2:904–905. I have not been able to identify these two passages in the printed edition of
the Bhaviṣyapurāṇa. The first passage also quotes from the vyoman description in VDhP 3.75.
77 See R. C. Hazra, Studies in the Upapurāṇas, vol. 1, Saura and Vaiṣṇava Upapurāṇas
(Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1958), 39, 49, 50, and 52.
102 Peter C. Bisschop
Context, edited by Nina Mirnig, Marion Rastelli, and Vincent Eltschinger, 511–537. Vienna:
Österreichische Akademie für Wissenschaften, 2019.
Bisschop, Peter C. ed. Śivadharmaśāstra. Draft Edition of Chapter 3, Edited on the Basis of
Eight Manuscripts. [= ŚiDhŚ]
Bühnemann, Gudrun. The Hindu Pantheon in Nepalese Line Drawings. Two Manuscripts of the
Pratiṣṭhālakṣaṇasārasamuccaya. Varanasi: Indica Books, 2003.
Casile, Anne. “Temples et expansion d’une centre religieux en Inde centrale. Lectures du
paysage archéologique de Badoh-Paṭhāri du 5e au 10e siècle de notre ère.” PhD diss.,
Université Sorbonne Nouvelle–Paris 3, 2009.
Cecil, Elizabeth A. “The Medieval Temple as Material Archive. Historical Preservation and the
Production of Knowledge at Mount Harṣa.” Archive Journal (August 2017), https://www.
archivejournal.net/essays/the-medieval-temple-as-material-archive/.
Chenet, François. “Les Sauras de l’Inde: Le brilliant échec d’une identité religieuse
inclusiviste?” Journal Asiatique 281 (1993): 317–392.
Deva, Krishna. “Lotus-Symbolism of the Graharāja-Maṇḍala.” Journal of the Indian Society of
Oriental Art, n.s., 22–23 (1993–95): 107–113.
Gail, Adalbert J. “Der Sonnenkult im alten Indien – Eigenwächs oder Import?” Zeitschrift der
Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 128 (1978): 333–348.
Gillet, Valérie. La creation d’une iconographie śivaïte narrative. Incarnations du dieu dans les
temples pallava construits. Pondicherry: IFP/EFEO, 2010.
Hazra, R. C. Studies in the Upapurāṇas. Vol. 1, Saura and Vaiṣṇava Upapurāṇas. Calcutta:
Sanskrit College, 1958.
Hazra, R.C. Studies in the Purāṇic Records on Hindu Rites and Customs. 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1972.
Hemādri. Caturvargacintāmaṇi of Śrī Hemādri. Vratakhaṇḍa. Vols. 1 & 2, edited by
Bhāratacandra Śiromaṇi, Yajñeśvara Smṛtiratna, and Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa.
Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1878–79.
Humbach, H. “Mithra in India and the Hinduized Magi.” In Études Mithriaques. Actes de
Congrès 4, 229–253. Tehran: Bibliothèque Pahlavi, 1978.
Huntington, Susan L. The “Pāla-Sena” Schools of Sculpture. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984.
Kafle, Nirajan. “The Liṅgodbhava Myth in Early Śaiva Sources.” In Puṣpikā. Tracing Ancient
India Through Texts and Traditions. Contributions to Current Research in Indology I,
edited by Nina Mirnig, Péter-Dániel Szántó, and Michael Williams, 241–263. Oxford:
Oxbow, 2013.
Kalidos, Raju. “Liṅgodbhavamūrti in Early Medieval Art and Literature.” Acta Orientalia 64
(2003): 77–136.
Khemarāja Śrīkṛṣṇadāsa, ed. Bhaviṣya Mahāpurāṇa, saṭippaṇī mūlamātra. Bombay:
Venkatesvara Press, 1959. [= BhavP]
Menon, Srikumar M. “From Megaliths to Temples: Astronomy in the Lithic Record of South
India.” In Growth and Development of Archaeology and Astrophysics in India and the
Asia-Pacific Region. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Oriental
Astronomy, edited by W. Orchiston, A. Sule, and M.N. Vahia, 241–258. Mumbai: Tata
Institute of Fundamental Research, 2018.
Pandeya, Lalata Prasada. Sun-Worship in Ancient India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.
Schindel, Nikolaus. “Sasanian Coinage.” In The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran, edited by
Daniel T. Potts, 815–840. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
3 Vyoman: The Sky is the Limit 103
Shah, Priyabala. Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa. Third Khaṇḍa. Critically Edited with Introduction,
Notes, etc. 2 vols. Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1958/61. [= ViDhP]
Shetti, B. V. “‘Saura Pīṭha’ or the Solar Altar.” In Indian Numismatics, History, Art, and
Culture: Essays in the Honour of Dr. P. L. Gupta. Vol. 2, edited by D. W. Macdowall, Savita
Sharma, and Sanjay Garg, 335–340. Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1992.
Sivaramamurti, C. The Chola Temples. Thañjāvūr, Gaṅgaikoṇḍachoḷapuram & Dārāsuram.
New Delhi: Archaeological Survey of India, 1978.
Sivaramamurti, C. Approach to Nature in Indian Art and Thought. New Delhi: Kanak
Publications, 1980.
Ślączka, Anna. “The Iconography of the Hindu Deities in the Devyāmata, an Early Śaiva
Pratiṣṭhātantra.” In Interrelations of Indian Literature and Arts, edited by Lidia Sudyka,
181–261. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2011.
Srivastava, V. C. Sun-Worship in Ancient India. Allahabad: Indological Publications, 1960.
Stausberg, Michael. “Hinduism and Zoroastrianism.” In Brill’s Encyclopedia of
Hinduism. Vol. 4, edited by Knut Jacobsen et al., 605–616. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
von Stietencron, Heinrich. Indische Sonnenpriester. Sāmba und die Śākadvīpīya-Brāhmaṇa.
Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966.
von Stietencron, Heinrich, ed. Epic and Purāṇic Bibliography (up to 1985) Annotated and with
Indexes. 2 vols. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992.
Wagner-Hohenberger, Angela. “On the Composition of Parallel Versions of the Story ‘The
Appearance of the Liṅga (Liṅgodbhava)’ in the Purāṇas.” Asiatische Studien/Études
Asiatiques 68, no. 3 (2014): 831–848.
104 Peter C. Bisschop
Lewis Doney
4 Bronze Temple Bells from the Tibetan
Imperial Period: Buddhist Material
Culture in Context
1 Introduction
From at least the beginning of the Common Era, bells or gongs have formed a
part of daily ritual practice and rites of passage in the Buddhist temples and
monasteries of South Asia. Yet it is in the countries to which Buddhism spread
that we find the most evidence of large temple bells bearing epigraphy in both
an artistic and literary register.1 Chinese donors of both the Buddhist and
Daoist traditions commissioned or supported the casting of such bells, and the
technology spread to Inner Asia, Korea, and Japan from at least the seventh cen-
tury, to Tibet from about the eighth century, and to Southeast Asia from per-
haps the tenth century CE. Temple bells were used to mark time, raise alarm,
and, according to their written inscriptions, emit spiritual sounds into the uni-
verse. Such epigraphy, either inscribed or cast into the bells, may praise the
quality of their peal, record the sponsorship of the bell’s founding, or proclaim
the religion it represents. Later indigenous literature and folk stories in these
lands then creatively recast the bells to serve new narrative purposes. However,
early examples of this difficult, costly, and prestigious art form are now rare.
The undoubtedly many examples that once existed in the second half of the
first millennium have either broken, been destroyed, or been melted down at
some point over the intervening centuries. Thus, those we do possess provide
precious data regarding the early form, technology, and use of large temple
bells in Buddhist Asia.
In Tibet, a handful of bronze temple bells have been recorded whose epigraphy
suggests that they were created during Tibet’s imperial period (ca. 600–850 CE) –
their inscriptions either mentioning Tibetan emperors or being written in the Old
Note: This article was researched with funding from the European Research Council, while em-
ployed by the project “Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State” (ERC
Synergy Project 609823 ASIA).
1 A good general introduction to this theme is Percival Price, Bells and Man (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 9–13.
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Tibetan language of that period. This marks them out as among the earliest ex-
amples of cast temple bells from Asia and precious sources of knowledge re-
garding the movement of material culture across Buddhist Asia at this time.
However, the scholars who brought these bells to wider attention or worked on
deciphering their epigraphy – Giuseppe Tucci, Hugh Edward Richardson, and
Li Fang-Kuei and W. South Coblin – focused almost exclusively on the content of
the inscriptions as texts of historical interest. In brief opening remarks, these men
describe the bells as “shaped like the Chinese bells,” “of Chinese pattern,” and
“Chinese-style,” respectively.2 However, one may ask, what does that really mean?
Is there one “Chinese” type or design for bells? In what ways and to what extent
do the Tibetan exemplars adhere to this/these form(s)? This chapter focuses on
art-historical aspects of Tibetan imperial temple bells, attempting to answer these
questions by comparing the bells with the few examples extant in Buddhist Asia.
Over the course of this chapter, it will become clear that Chinese temple
bells of the late first millennium display a variety of designs rather than a ho-
mogeneity. Their artisans or patrons could choose a simpler or more ornate
style and whether or not to include epigraphy; these aesthetic trends spread to
surrounding states like Korea, Japan, and Tibet, which each followed their own
styles and could blend external influence with indigenous bell traditions at
will. It will be shown that the bronze temple bells of the Tibetan imperial period
resemble the simpler contemporaneous Chinese and later Japanese models
rather than the floral design of some other Chinese temple bells or the complex
religious and ritual imagery of Korean examples of a similar antiquity. Beyond
the design of the main bodies of Chinese temple bells, the form is split into two
types, the more typical flat-bottomed variety and the rarer sort with scalloped
bases (sometimes referred to as “lotus-petalled”). The flat-based bell predomi-
nates in Asia, but the scalloped model seems to have influenced other coun-
tries’ forms of bell to a limited extent. It will be seen that no extant antique
Tibetan temple bells are flat bottomed. Their scalloping is generally rounded,
but can also tend toward the more pointed nadirs found in eleventh-century
Chinese bells. This is in contrast to the flatter concave design of some important
early Korean Buddhist bells or the low relief convex scallops seen (with excep-
tions) in Japan. It is hoped that this discussion will inspire further dialogue be-
tween Tibetan studies and campanology for the benefit of both fields.
2 Giuseppe Tucci, The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings (Roma: Is.M.E.O, 1950), 69; Hugh Edward
Richardson, “A Ninth Century Inscription from Rkoṅ po,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
3–4 (1954): 166; Li Fang-Kuei and W. South Coblin, A Study of the Old Tibetan Inscriptions
(Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academica Sinica, 1987), 332.
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2 Main Types of Temple Bell
The “classic” Chinese temple bell design in the (mostly Korean) works on this
subject includes both flat-bottomed and “scallop-edged” forms.3 Figure 1 pro-
vides representations of four types of bell, using the following as models (clock-
wise from top right):
1. the earliest extant Chinese bell, cast in 575 CE, lacking measurements (but
39.1 cm high and 21 cm wide; see below);
2. an early Japanese temple bell, perhaps the Kanzeon-ji (観世音寺) Bell of
698;
3. a Chinese bell probably dating from the tenth century; and
4. the Korean Sangwŏnsa (상원사) Bell, founded in 725.
As Figure 1 makes clear, East Asian temple bells display certain family resem-
blances. For example, they share dragon-shaped supporting loops at the tops,
from which they are hung to be hit by a mallet or other object from outside.
This is in contrast to clapper bells of the European tradition and smaller Asian
bells, which contain a free-swinging object that hits the inside wall of the bell.
Another similarity between the pictured bells is the use of lotuses as design mo-
tifs. These are depicted either as open-faced whole lotuses used as the striking
points on the outside wall (in the center of bells 1 and 2, and displayed in pro-
file on the left and right of bell 4) or as petals on decorative bands (depicted in
bells 3 and 4, but also found in the others).
Despite such shared features, these bells also display their own distinctive
forms or characteristics. Three of the four bells are convex in aspect, less famil-
iar to people in the West than the concave European bell shape from which we
take the term “bell curve.” Bell 3, though, displays a lightly concave outline.
This bell, the second of the Chinese exemplars and the youngest bell depicted
in Figure 1, also lacks the flat bottom of the other bells. Instead, it exhibits an
undulating wave curvature, almost like a sine wave, traveling all around its
rim, resembling the convex “scalloped edge” of a piece of lace. From this small
sample, it is clear that Chinese temple bells evidently came in both a flat-
bottomed and scallop-rimmed form from an early period, around the second
half of the first millennium CE.4
3 Yŏm Yŏng-ha, Han’guk Ŭi Chong: Korean Bell (Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1991),
3–10.
4 In using the term “scalloped” to refer to the rim of this type of bell, I am following the usage
found in Price, Bells and Man.
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Figure 1: Diagram of four types of East Asian bell in Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, Sŏngdŏk
Taewang Sinjong (Gyeongju: Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, 1999), vol. 1, 211.
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The scallop-rimmed type of temple bell should be particularly interesting to
scholars of Tibetan studies, since it is the only form represented among the ex-
tant candidates for Tibetan imperial-period bells. These five candidates display
Old Tibetan epigraphy and other indications suggestive of being used in an im-
perial context. A heuristic distinction can be made between concave, convex,
and “undulating curve” scalloping on the base of Tibetan bells that each con-
nects them with only some of their East Asian contemporaries and antecedents.
The concave type links Tibetan temple bells with a few extant Korean exam-
ples; the convex type is found in an old Japanese temple bell; and the undulat-
ing wave lies somewhere in the middle. Other East Asian temple bells have flat
bottoms, a feature not found in any of the Tibetan examples discovered so far.
Given the scarcity of examples of early temple bells across Buddhist Asia, a
proper analysis of the bronze temple bells dating from the Tibetan imperial pe-
riod should not only help to illuminate the Tibetan empire’s relation to this as-
pect of wider East Asian material culture, but also shed light on the choices
made by artisans and patrons further afield who helped to uphold the tradition
of large bell casting in contemporaneous China, Japan, Korea, Japan, and even
perhaps northern Vietnam.
3 East Asia
As the above typology makes clear, the study of early Buddhist temple bells fo-
cuses on East Asia, specifically comparing Chinese, Korean, and Japanese ex-
amples. According to Claudine Salmon, an expert on Asian campanology,
Chinese bells seem to have the longest and most completely documented history.
Fanzhong appeared in China soon after Buddhism was introduced there during the Han
Dynasty. Since then these bells have been closely linked to temples and to the religious
life of the Chinese. Bells of small size, usually hung inside the prayer hall, were struck
when Buddhist monks chanted scripture or conducted other rituals. The large bell, like
the drum, was sheltered inside a small edifice located in the courtyard in front of the
prayer hall. Such bells, differing only slightly in their decoration, made their way into
Daoist temples. They also entered the court, where they served to announce various cere-
monies. Similar bells were used to mark urban time, especially to sound night watches
and to warn the population.5
5 Claudine Salmon, “Transnational Networks as Reflected in Epigraphy: The Case of Chinese
Buddhist Bells in Southeast Asia,” in Chinese Overseas: Migration, Research and Documentation,
eds. Tan Chee-Beng and Julia Zimmerman (Sha tin, N.T., Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2007), 23–24.
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The oldest dated Chinese Buddhist bell (founded in 575) is now kept in the
Museum of Nara in Japan. It is a plain, small bell in comparison with the others
described below, 39.1 cm high and 21 cm in diameter at the mouth, simply dec-
orated with vertical and horizontal ribs converging on a striking point that
takes the shape of an eight-petalled lotus.6 Its written epigraphy is inscribed on
the bell, rather than forming part of the original mould, and simply records the
date of its casting, those responsible, and the weight.7 The bell is flat mouthed
rather than scalloped, and so is of less importance to us here than other, later
examples.
Certain surrounding states and dependent regions soon emulated the Chinese
model of temple bells, and Salmon identifies one early example in modern-day
Vietnam. Southeast Asian Buddhists appear to have relied more on gongs, stone
chimes, and sonorous rocks for their timekeeping and rituals.8 They perhaps also
shared this practice with older Chinese cultural traditions, if they were not influ-
enced by them. However, Vietnam was more deeply Sinicized during the latter
part of the first millennium. The bell, founded in 798, possesses a striking point
(zhongyue) depicting a lotus with ten petals and epigraphy in Chinese.9 Salmon
states, “The text of the Sino-Vietnamese bell [inscription], in 41 characters,
merely commemorates the day of casting and donation while indicating the
weight, and so do the inscriptions on the oldest bell of 575 and that of 748
(except the weight).”10 Later bells of southern China and Southeast Asia, in-
cluding scalloped bells, are described in Salmon’s later work on the subject.11
She argues that this Sino-Vietnamese bell, “although probably not the first to
have been cast in the Protectorate of Annam, may be regarded as a marker of
Buddhism and Chineseness in an environment in which the bronze drum cul-
6 Claudine Salmon, “Tang-Viet Society as Reflected in a Buddhist Bell Inscription from the
Protectorate of Annam (798),” in Guangdong: Archaeology and Early Texts / Archäeologie und
frühe Texte (Zhou-Tang), eds. Shing Müller, Thomas O. Höllemann, and Putao Gui, South
China and Maritime Asia 13 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), 197. See also the journal Nihon
no bijutsu日本の美術 [Art of Japan] 355 (1995): plate 25.
7 Salmon, “Tang-Viet Society,” 197 and 199.
8 Salmon, “A Tentative Interpretation of the Chinese Inscription (1231) Engraved on a Bronze
Gong Recovered in Muara Jambi (Central Sumatra),” Archipel 66 (2003): 91–112. See also
Arsenio Nicolas, “Gongs, Bells and Cymbals: The Archaeological Record in Maritime Asia from
the Ninth to the Seventeenth Centuries,” Yearbook for Traditional Music 41 (2009): 62–93.
9 Salmon, “Tang-Viet Society,” 197.
10 Salmon, “Tang-Viet Society,” 199.
11 Salmon, “Tang-Viet Society,” especially 70–74.
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ture was still alive, even if at the end of the eighth century the casting of
drums had already declined in the Red River Delta, as compared to what it
was during the three first centuries A.D.”12
4 The Sŏngdŏk Bell, Korea
Korea, toward the end of the Silla period (ca. 57 BCE–935 CE), was another re-
gion bordering China to make bell casting their own. A 1976 work on Korean
temple bells estimates that 158 were already known to be extant, with the lion’s
share still present in Korea itself.13 Although most postdate the period that in-
terests us here, one of the earliest known examples, after the Sangwŏnsa Bell
cast in 725 CE,14 was cast with a shallowly scalloped bottom. This is the so-
called Sŏngdŏk Bell (성덕대왕신종), founded in 771 (Figure 2). A very large and
finely detailed bell, it was cast using the cire-perdue or lost-wax method and is
said to embody the last of several attempts at founding it.
The bell was housed for most of its life in the temple of Pongdŏk in Kyŏngju
(today’s Gyeongju), and so is also named the Kyŏngju Bell. In 1902, H.B. Hulbert
stated,
This is the monster bell that for centuries tolled for the opening and shutting of the gates
of Kyŏng-ju, or as it was then called, Sŭ-ya-bŭl, from which by contraction is probably
derived the modern word Seoul. [. . .] History says it was cast by King Hyo-jong
[=Hyegong (r. 765–780)], the thirty-sixth of the dynasty, 765, that it was originally in-
tended as a monastery bell and was placed at Pong-dŭk Monastery a short distance to the
east of the town but that King Chŭn-sun [=Gyeongsun (r. 927–935)?] in his fourth year
moved it to its present site.15
12 Salmon, “Tang-Viet Society,” 27–30.
13 Lee Ho-Kwan, “A Study on the Temple Bell Style in the Koryo Style,” in Koryŏ Sidae
Pŏmjong Yangsik Ŭi Yŏn’gu, ed. Yi Ho-gwan (Seoul: Tanguk Taehakkyo, 1976), 189.
14 See Yŏm Yŏng-ha and Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, Hanguk Chong Yŏngu
(Seongnam: Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, 1984), 8–49 for a complete study of this
bell, and Hanŭl Kkotŭro Naerinŭn Kkaedarŭmŭi Sori (Kimchun: Chikchi sŏngbo Pangmulgwan,
2003), 8–11 for rubbings of its detailing. It is 167 cm tall (133.5 cm, minus the supporting loop)
and 90.3 cm wide at its mouth (the rim is 4.7 cm thick), which is flat rather than scalloped. The
design contains a more protruding set of nine “nipples”/lotuses on the squarish “lotus field”
than the Sŏngdŏk Bell, but it is also decorated with celestial beings and lotus strike points.
15 Homer B. Hulbert, “The Great Bell,” The Korea Review, September 1902, 387; also quoted in
in E. M. Cable, “Old Korean Bells,” Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch 16, no. 1 (1925): 7.
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One of the main differences between Chinese and Korean bells is the way that
they were hung. Percival Price provides the following explanation, as well as
offering a little of the Sŏngdŏk Bell’s history:
The Chinese Buddhist bell was hung a storey above the ground, so that emanations
would come down on to a deity, exemplified by a statue, who would know how to distrib-
ute it. The Korean bell was hung close to the ground, only about thirty centimetres above
it in some cases, and the ground hollowed out underneath and kept clear of earth so as to
facilitate the entry of its emanations into the earth. [. . .]
As it was believed that the ringing of the bell sent these spiritual emanations out to the
ends of the world as well as down into the earth, so it was held that by making the bell
Figure 2: Photograph of the Sŏngdŏk Bell in Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, Sŏngdŏk
Taewang Sinjong (Gyeongju: Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, 1999), vol. 2, 13.
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larger, and thus increasing the power of its tone and the length of time it continued, the
spiritual emanations would be stronger at distant points. The most effective bell would be
the largest it would be possible to cast. Only a sovereign had the resources for this. In
the second half of the eighth century the Silla king, Kyŏngdŏk [r.742–765], planned to
offer such a bell to his deceased father, Sŏngdŏk [r.702–737], but he died before the bell
was cast, and his son, king Hyegong [r.765–780], completed it in AD 771.16
The completion of the Sŏngdŏk Bell in 771 CE makes it roughly contemporaneous
with the bSam yas Bell in Tibet, commissioned for Emperor Khri Srong lde brtsan
(r.756–c.800) after he had begotten at least one son (see below). However, it is
much larger than any of the Tibetan examples, 366.3 cm tall from its base to the
top of the ingenious hollow tube (umt’ong, umgwan) rising above its dragon-
shaped supporting loop (yongnyu; 303 cm excluding this) and 222.7 cm wide at its
mouth. The bell wall is on average 13 cm thick, but it gets thicker as it goes down
to the mouth rim, which is 20.3 cm thick.17 It is estimated to weigh 72,000 kg and
is one of only a handful of extremely large and heavy functioning bells in the
world.18 The bell body is rather barrel-shaped, unribbed, and decorated at the top
with three large square “fields” of nine lotuses (perhaps a throwback to the “nip-
ples” or rowed protuberances on Zhou and Han bells). Below these, four heavenly
apsaras or gandharvas make offerings on clouds interspersed with written epigra-
phy and two lotus-patterned striking points (tangjwa).19
The rim of the bell mouth (chonggu) is lightly scalloped to form a concave
rather than a flat base, though creating small points in a manner quite unlike
the Tibetan bells. The mouth’s decorative band (hadae) follows the contours
of the bell mouth’s scallops (Figure 3). The mouth’s decoration consists of ten-
drils reflecting the design of the shoulder edge (kyondae) above it, into which
are placed six lotuses at each lowest point, or nadir, of the concave scallops.
The circumference of the mouth is perhaps less strictly round than hexagonal
when seen in cross section (no diagram of the exact measurement of the cir-
cumference seems to have been published), with the six points at each angle
of the hexagon at regular intervals of 88.2 cm and protruding perhaps 5 or
6 cm downwards (again, the depth of the scallops has not apparently received
16 Price, Bells and Man, 36, col. i.
17 Yŏm and Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, Hanguk Chong Yŏngu, 3 and 55, fig. 3. The
hollow tube at the top means that the bell itself is open at both ends, yet it is unclear whether this
addition improves the sound quality of its peal, simplifies the casting process, neither, or both.
18 Price, Bells and Man, 36, col. i.
19 Hanŭl Kkotŭro Naerinŭn Kkaedarŭmŭi Sori, 8–11 contains rubbings of some of its major details.
All aspects of the bell are photographed in color in Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, Sŏngdŏk
Taewang Sinjong, vol. 2 (Gyeongju: Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, 1999), 7–30.
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detailed attention) (Figure 4).20 A photograph of the underside of the rim
shows that the nadirs of the concave scallops are indeed points, and that they
reach their nadir at the outer surface of the bell (Figure 5).
This division into six scallops does not seem to have a direct relation to the
number of petals on a lotus, at least when compared to the more obvious lotus
Figure 3: Photograph of the scalloping of the Sŏngdŏk Bell in Kungnip Munhwajae Yŏn’guso, and
Ko Sŭng-gwan, Chuch`ŏlchang: Chungyo Muhyŏng Munhwajae 112-ho, (Daejeon: P’ia, 2006), 20.
Figure 4: Drawing and measurements of the scalloping of the Sŏngdŏk Bell in Yŏm Yŏng-ha,
and Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, Hanguk Chong Yŏngu (Kyeonggi-do, Seongnam:
Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, 1984), 60, fig. 12.
20 Yŏm and Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, Hanguk Chong Yŏngu, 60, fig. 12.
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depictions on the body of same bell. The lotus design on the hood (chonp’an) of
the bell consists of thirteen inner and thirty-four outer petals. The nine lotuses
arranged in three rows of three in the squarish “lotus field” (yon’gwak, yolloe)
on the bell’s shoulder (sangdae) each possess eight petals. The lotuses serving
as striking points on the body of the bell possess eight inner and eight outer
petals. The lotuses on the mouth’s decorative band (hadae, showing tendrils re-
flecting the design of the shoulder edge [kyondae] above it) that follows the con-
tours of the rim’s scallops also possess eight petals. However, the hollow tube
at the top appears to be designed with six-petalled double lotuses.21 There
would be a fitting symmetry in a six-petalled lotus appearing at the top and bot-
tom of the bell, but this line of inquiry requires further comparison with the
tubes atop other Korean temple bells to corroborate or falsify it.
The scalloped bell is rare for Korean temple bells – thorough studies of con-
temporaneous and later Korean temple bells have found almost all of them to
be flat mouthed.22 Scalloped bases are found on only two later exemplars, one
of which dates to 1346, suggesting that the style did not completely die out after
Figure 5: Photograph of the inside of the Sŏngdŏk Bell in Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan,
Sŏngdŏk Taewang Sinjong, vol. 2, 30.
21 See photographs in Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, Sŏngdŏk Taewang Sinjong, 2: 28–29.
22 See Yŏm and Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, Hanguk Chong Yŏngu, 8–49 and 83ff.
For a study devoted to the later maturation of temple bells during the Koryŏ period (918–1392 CE),
see Yi Ho-gwan, Koryŏ Sidae Pŏmjong Yangsik Ŭi Yŏn’gu (Seoul: Tanguk Taehakkyo, 1976). A
side-by-side comparison between three typical bells of different periods of Korean history is
provided in Kungnip Munhwajae Yŏn’guso and Ko Sŭng-gwan, Chuch`ŏlchang: Chungyo
Muhyŏng Munhwajae 112-ho, (Daejeon: P’ia, 2006), 17.
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the Silla period.23 Nonetheless, the Sŏngdŏk Bell still stands as a key example of
the early art of scalloped bell casting and has thankfully been studied in great
depth.24 This should act as a standard of best practice in the study of temple bells,
to be emulated in the future with respect to Tibetan bells as well. At present, how-
ever, the quality of the data available on bells and bell-founding processes in
other countries does not really compare to Korean-language scholarship, with the
possible exception of Japanese literature on the subject.
5 Japanese Bells
Almost all extant Japanese temple bells are flat mouthed. However, the temple
bell from Kasagi Temple (笠置寺鐘), Kyoto, cast in 1196, appears to be one of a
small number of exceptions and a rare example of a very different form of scal-
loping (Figure 6).25 Its rim takes almost the opposite shape of that of the
Sŏngdŏk Bell. Instead of six points sticking out of a flat mouth and creating a
series of shallow concave lines from point to point, this bell has six grooves
“cut” into the rim, creating a series of convex lines (more similar in this respect
23 The 1346 bell is tall and narrow, measuring 324 cm (263.9 cm without the supporting loop;
240.3 cm from the shoulder down) by 188 cm (described in Yŏm, Han’guk Ŭi Chong, 276–77;
photographed in Hanŭl Kkotŭro Naerinŭn Kkaedarŭmŭi Sori, 212). Another, undated bell is
smaller but maintains more barrel-like proportions, at 110 cm (92 cm without the supporting
loop; 82 cm from the shoulder down) by 70 cm (described in Yŏng-ha Yŏm, Han’guk Ŭi Chong,
424–25; photographed in Hanŭl Kkotŭro Naerinŭn Kkaedarŭmŭi Sori, 216).
24 Especially in the two-volume work, Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, Sŏngdŏk Taewang
Sinjong. The study also includes detailed sound recordings and sonographic analyses of its peal
(Yŏm and Hanguk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏnguwŏn, Hanguk Chong Yŏngu, 69–80), drawings and
measurements of all its parts both inside and out, and even creating replicas of the bell itself in
order to imitate the process of its casting. This work (pp. 29; 32) describes how two replicas of
this bell were cast in 1983, one measuring 255 cm by 150 cm and the other measuring 167 cm by
90 cm. They are pictured in plates 40 and 43, respectively. A further replica was constructed in
1984, measuring 277.5 cm by 160 cm and weighing 7500 kg (p. 33; pictured in plate 46), just over
a tenth of the weight of the original. The same work (pp. 64–69) deals with the ancient method
of casting bells.
25 This image is taken from a special issue of Nihon no bijutsu on Buddhist bells (Nihon no
bijutsu日本の美術 [Art of Japan] 355: fig. 9). The description accompanying the figure states
that the cuts into the mouth are 1 cm deep and “form a six-petalled shape” (六葉形に作る).
Furthermore, it claims that this follows a Chinese model, and that a further example of a six-
petalled temple bell is housed at the Todaiji Great Exhibition Centre (東大寺大勧進所). See
also Hashizume Kinkichi (橋爪金吉) and Asano Kiichi (浅野喜市), Bonshō Junrei 梵鐘巡礼
(Tokyo: Bijinesukyōikushuppanshaビジネス敎育出版社, 1976), 185 and plate 138.
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to the scalloping of Korean tantric handbells).26 In all other respects, it appears
to be a classic Japanese-style temple bell, with its striking points and “nipples”
or rowed protuberances emulating earlier East Asian (predominantly Chinese)
models like the Sŏngdŏk Bell does in a different way.
A more standard scalloped bell, probably from the early part of the Muromachi
period (ca. 1336–1573), is found in the Jissō-ji temple (実相寺) in Nishio, Aichi
Figure 6: Photograph of the Kasagi Temple Bell in Nihon no bijutsu日本の美術 [Art of Japan]
355 (1995): fig. 9.
26 On the design of Korean tantric handbells, see for example Ch’oe Ŭng-ch’ŏn and Kim Yŏn-
su, Kŭmsok Kongye (Seoul: Sol, 2004), 180–90.
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prefecture (Figure 7).27 The rim of this bell is molded into eight scallops, con-
forming to the number of petals in classical lotuses or following a later stylis-
tic trait of bells, most likely cast in Japan in imitation of Chinese design.28
However, it lacks a striking point or lotuses in the rest of the design and in-
stead the body is split into three rows of four panels, separated by triple
bands and ornamented with twelve vertically elongated hexagons that are sit-
uated either in the middle of the panels (middle row) or at the panel change-
overs (top and bottom rows).29
6 The Jingyun Bell, China
Closer in space and time to imperial Tibet, the scalloped bronze Jingyun Bell
(景雲钟), cast in 711, was hung in the bell tower of a Daoist monastery in
Chang’an (modern-day Xi’an), but has resided in the Beilin “Forest of Stone
Steles” Museum since 1953 (Figure 8).30 The bell measures 247 cm in height,
27 The bell measures 138.7 cm high (112.3 cm without the loop; 106.5 cm from the shoulder),
80.4 cm wide at its rim (which is 9.2 cm thick). See Tsuboi Ryōhei (坪井良平), Bonshō No
Kenkyu ̄ 梵鐘の研究 [A study of the bell] (Tokyo: Bijinesu Kyōiku Shuppansha ビジネス教育出
版社, 1991), 108–11.
28 Tsuboi, Bonshō No Kenkyū, 108–109. On page 110, Tsuboi compares this exemplar with the
very similar diagram of the Chinese design that likely inspired this fine imitation.
29 Two other such plain, large, eight-scalloped Chinese temple bells dating from the early fif-
teenth century are associated with Beijing’s famous bell tower and the Yongle emperor
(1360–1424); an iron bell of 420 x 240 cm (25 tons) that was replaced by a larger bronze bell of
700 x 340 cm (46.5 tons) that produced a better peal (see Ben Nijhoff’s entry on the Beijing bell
tower: “Bell Tower Platform & Yongle Era Bronze Bell,” The China Report, www.drben.net,
last modified June 18, 2017, http://www.drben.net/ChinaReport/Beijing/Landmarks-Hotspots
/DongCheng/Zhong_Lou-Bell_Tower/Bell_Tower5-Bell_and_Platform1-South.html). Both lack
striking points and are patterned with two rows of oblongs separated by horizontal bands.
These stand in contrast to the contemporaneous Yongle Grand Bell housed in the Great Bell
Temple (Da Zhong Si) just outside Beijing, which weighs 50 metric tons and measures about
700 cm high (500 cm without the suspension loop) and roughly 450 cm in diameter (Price,
Bells and Man, 13, col. ii). That bell is also scalloped but is covered top to bottom with epigra-
phy in Chinese script. The first two exemplars therefore resemble the Japanese example more
closely but lack the elongated hexagonal design.
30 See Michael Yang’s entry on the Xi’an bell tower (“The Bell Tower,” Xi’an Travel Guide,
China Highlights, last modified October 4, 2017, http://www.chinahighlights.com/xian/attrac
tion/bell-tower.htm), where he also states: “The Xi’an Cultural Relics Bureau made a replica of
[the] Jingyun Bell and hung it in the north-west corner of the Bell Tower on January 30th,
1997, which is 2.45 meters (8 feet) tall and 6.5 tons (14,330 pounds) in weight, with an inscrip-
tion carved on it.” One can ring the replica for a fee, but the original apparently was deadened
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165 cm in width across the bottom, and weighs 6,500 kg.31 Price writes, “The
form is Korean and suggests Korean workmanship. Korean bellfounders are
Figure 7: Photograph of the Jissō-ji Bell in Tsuboi Ryōhei (坪井良平), Bonshō No Kenkyū梵鐘の
研究 [A Study of the Bell] (Tokyo: Bijinesu Kyōiku Shuppanshaビジネス教育出版社, 1991), 109.
during a move of the bell tower in 1582, during the Ming Dynasty (Marilyn Shea, “Forest of
Steles,” Xi’an in Pictures, China, last modified March 2010, http://hua.umf.maine.edu/China/
Xian/pages/205_Xian_Forest_of_Steles.html).
31 Dimensions given in “The Bell Tower,” Top China Travel, accessed November 22, 2019,
http://www.topchinatravel.com/china-attractions/the-bell-tower.htm.
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said to have cast the first very large bells in China, having cast large bells in
Korea earlier.”32 The bell was commissioned by the Tang dynasty (618–907) em-
peror Ruizong (662–716) and was cast in the second year of the Jingyun era.33
This bell evidently remains popular to this day, though undoubtedly some con-
fuse the replica for the original.34
Figure 8: The Jingyun Bell, Marilyn Shea copyright 2005.
32 Price, Bells and Man, 11, col. ii.
33 Shea, “Forest of Steles.”
34 Jumei Yang, in a blog on the Beilin Museum (though I suppose with reference to the replica;
see above on the deadened original), says, “its ring is so beautiful that it was recorded by CCTV
(A mainstream Chinese television station) and played on New Years’ eve to celebrate the coming
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Like the Sŏngdŏk Bell, the Jingyun Bell possesses a hexagonal rim because
of its six scallops. It is not possible to see the underside of the original bell, but
images of the replica now hanging in the Xi’an bell tower (Figure 9)35 suggest
that, unlike the Sŏngdŏk Bell, the concave arches of the Jingyun Bell’s scallops
end in edges rather than points, though the nadirs are still on the outer face of
the bell. Of course, the replica makers may not have followed every design trait
of the original.
The sixfold scallops are mirrored in three rows of six panels, separated by vertical
and horizontal bands containing tendrils and clouds respectively. Clouds, which
are incidentally a feature of the Sŏngdŏk Bell’s design too, also feature within
the nine illustrated panels, surrounding symbolic animals such as the dragon,
phoenix, lion, and ox. These illustrated panels are interspersed with a design
comprising two crossed diagonal lines intersecting at an eight-petalled lotus
striking point. From the middle of each of the triangles created by the crossed
lines blossoms a single lotus striking point, and around these are four “nipple”
protuberances, perhaps, like the Sŏngdŏk Bell, harking back to those of earlier
musical bells. On the bottom row, this interspersal is broken by the inclusion of
one panel bearing epigraphy in 293 characters. This inscription describes the
benefits and mysteries of Daoism, while also in part praising the bell.36
Figure 9: Scalloping on the Jingyun Bell, Wikimedia Commons copyright 2008.
of a new year. Moreover, the Bell was printed on the Chinese stamp in 2000 and was at the time
thought of as ‘the best bell in the world’ by local people.” Source accessed January 14, 2017,
http://www.guidewetravel.com/the-stele-forest-xian-beilin-museum/ (site discontinued).
35 “Jingyun Bell,” 2007, Xi’an, China, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jingyun_
Bell.JPG.
36 See Shea, “Forest of Steles.”
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Price states that the scallop-rimmed bell style continued to be popular in
northern China, whereas flat-mouthed bells were preferred in the south.37
Another six-scalloped temple bell, probably founded in the tenth century, was
given as the second type of Chinese temple bell (bell 3) in the diagram in
Figure 1, above.38 It was cast in Song-dynasty (960–1279) China, but is now ap-
parently held in Incheon, South Korea. It is 258 cm high (191 cm without the
loop; 157 cm from the shoulder), 158 cm wide at the mouth. The rim is 14 cm
thick, unlike the rest of the bell wall, which is on average 5 cm thick. It pos-
sesses two rows of three oblong panels, and a lower decorative band ornamen-
tation that resembles the Jingyun Bell’s lower decorative band in terms of its
pattern. A slightly later, but similar six-scalloped iron bell, measuring 164 cm x
100 cm and weighing 1 ton, is now also kept in Incheon, at the Jeondeungsa
Temple (전등사철종) on Ganghwa island (Figure 10). It was cast in 1097 in
Northern Song-dynasty China and shares the simpler design of the scalloped ex-
ample in Figure 1, above. However, it lacks that bell’s lower decoration, and its
scallops end in longer points.39 The continued popularity of the scallop-rimmed
temple bell up to the Manchu period is evidenced in the famous Nanking Bell,
from the Manchu Temple in Nanjing.
Reviewing the extant early East and Southeast Asian temple bells shows
their variety of size, form, and style across this part of Buddhist Asia. This is
due in part to the fruitful aesthetic dialogue that took place especially between
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese artisans and the borrowing of stylistic elements
across porous borders during this period. Furthermore, we have seen that even
within first-millennium China, which appears to be at the heart of this nexus,
there is a lack of homogeneity in temple-bell design, and so no single “Chinese
pattern” that Tibetans of this era could easily emulate.
7 Tibetan Bells
No doubt the eighth-century Tibetans who came to the Tang capital of Chang’an
(now Xi’an) heard or saw Buddhist or Daoist temple bells and perhaps the scal-
loped Jingyun Bell itself. One could even imagine such a bell being sounded in
37 Price, Bells and Man, 12.
38 The following description is based on Kungnip Kyŏngju Pangmulgwan, Sŏngdŏk Taewang
Sinjong, vol. 1, 211 and “강화 전등사 철종,” Wikipedia, last modified November 17, 2019,
https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/강화_전등사_철종.
39 Ch’oe and Kim, Kŭmsok Kongye, 90–91.
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warning as the Tibetan military attacked Chang’an to sack it in 763.40 In the
context of the westward spread of temple bells, Walther Heissig states that in-
scribed Chinese Buddhist bells were found “at sites of the seventh-century Kirghiz
Figure 10: Photograph in Ch’oe and Kim, Kŭmsok Kongye, 90.
40 On this brief conquest, see Christopher I. Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A
History of the Struggle for Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the
Early Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 146.
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kingdom in the region bordering the Yenisei river.”41 However, I have been unable
to find corroboration of this assertion elsewhere, including in the passage that he
cites from C. B. Kiselev.42 Notably, the Tibetan bronze exemplars appear to imitate
the simpler Chinese designs that were described at the end of the last section,
rather than the complex imagery and extensive epigraphy of Tang China’s Jingyun
Bell or Silla Korea’s Sŏngdŏk Bell (though see below on the iron bell recently dis-
covered in dPa’ ris, ).
Giuseppe Tucci was one of the first Western scholars to take an interest in
Tibetan temple bells seeming to date from the imperial period (ca. 600–850). In
his Tombs of the Tibetan Kings, Tucci identifies three bells from central Tibet –
the bSam yas ( ), Khra ’brug ( ), and Yer pa ( ) Bells – as candi-
dates for inclusion within such a group, because they all hung at sites impor-
tant to the imperial propagation of Buddhism as a state religion and, he
believed, included the name of a Tibetan emperor cast into the bell as part of
its epigraphy.43 Tucci also includes in this work a photograph of the bSam yas
Bell in situ at the entrance to the famous bSam yas Monastery, and a transcrip-
tion and translation of its inscription.44 Hugh Richardson has since revisited
and improved the readings and translations of the bSam yas, Khra ’brug, and
Yer pa Bell inscriptions.45 Further afield, Michael Aris has brought attention to
41 Walther Heissig (Geoffrey Samuel transl.), The Religions of Mongolia (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980), 4. In the original German, Heissig refers to “Buddhistische Templeglocken
mit chinesischen Aufschriften, die auf Fundstellen des Kirgisenreichs des 7. Jahrhunderts im
Jenisseigrenzgebiet zutage gefördert wurden, weisen darauf hin, daß buddhistische Einflüsse in
diesen Gebietenweiterhin andauerten” (Giuseppe Tucci and Walther Heissig, Die Religionen Tibets
und der Mongolei (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970), 302).
42 Footnote 16 on the same page of the German edition refers to page 615 of the 1951 work of
the C.B. Kiselev (Tucci and Heissig, Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei, 320, n. 16 (trans-
lated in an endnote in Heissig, The Religions of Mongolia, 114, n. 16). However, the correspond-
ing page of Kiselev’s work (and pages around it) do not appear to mention bells at all, but
rather a Chinese inscription on a bronze altar monument that Kiselev dates to the sixth century
(and its appearance near the Yenisei to the ninth century). Furthermore, Kiselev interprets the
monument as booty, rather than as showing the influence of Buddhism in the area. See С.В.
Киселев [Kiselev], Древняя история Южной Сибири [Drevniaia Istoriia Iuzhnoĭ Sibiri]
(Moscow: Изд-во Академии наук СССР [Izd-vo Akademii nauk USSR], 1951), 614–16.
43 Tucci, The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings, 69–71. Tucci believed that the Yer pa Bell had in-
cluded the name of a Tibetan emperor in the area of the bell inscription that had been lost
when the bell cracked (Tucci, The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings, 71). Hugh Edward Richardson
has since rightly disputed this (Richardson, “A Ninth Century Inscription”: 166).
44 Tucci, The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings, fig. 5; 108, Appendix VIII; 69.
45 See Richardson, “A Ninth Century Inscription”: 166–71; Hugh Edward Richardson, A Corpus
of Early Tibetan Inscriptions (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1985), 32–35, 82–83 and 144–47.
This has been followed by further discussion, transliteration and translation of all three bell
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an antique bell in Bumthang ( ), Bhutan, also bearing epigraphy indica-
tive of an imperial-period date.46 Finally, a bell made of iron (rather than
bronze) has recently surfaced in dPa’ ris near Xining in China, purportedly
founded during the Tibetan imperial period and showing more prominent orna-
mentation (Figure 11).47 However, here I shall deal with the bronze bells alone
and focus less on the inscriptions (except where those elements have a bearing
on the form of the bells) than on their design and the extent and shape of their
scalloping. Though there is some variation among the exemplars, it will be
seen that they tend to be rounded or pointedly concave at their bases, forming
scallops in higher relief than the Sŏngdŏk Bell or Japanese examples above
(Figures 2 to 7). In this way (as in their simpler design), they resemble the Song
Chinese bells discussed at the end of the last section, as well as the Jingyun
Bell to an extent (Figures 8 to 10).
inscriptions in Li and Coblin, A Study of the Old Tibetan Inscriptions, 332–39, 340–46 and 347–52.
More recent transliterations of the bell epigraphs are found in Iwao Kazushi (岩 尾 一 史) et al.,
Old Tibetan Inscriptions: Old Tibetan Documents Online Monograph Series II (Tokyo: Research
Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies,
2009), 70, 71 and 72.
46 Michael Aris, Bhutan: The Early History of a Himalayan Kingdom (Warminster: Aris &
Phillips, 1979), 33–36 and plate 6.
47 See lHa mchog skyabs (兰却加), “Btsan po khri lde btsug brtsan skabs kyi jag rog dga’ ldan
byin chen gtsug lag khang gi dril bu’i kha byang gi yi ger dpyad pa” [Remarks on the text of a
bell of the Jag rog dga’ ldan byin chen sanctuary from the time of Emperor Khri lDe btsug
brtsan]. Bod ljongs zhib ’jug/西藏研究/Tibetan Studies 1 (2001): 1–9. This relatively small and
squat 54 cm x 52 cm iron bell bears a Tibetan inscription prominently featuring Emperor Khri
lDe gtsug brtsan (r. 712–ca. 754) and stating that it was cast by a monk (dge slong). See also
Michael Willis’s blog: “Bell at dPa’ ris,” Indological Notes and Queries, last modified October 16,
2001, http://dogankoy.blogspot.com/2011/10/bell-at-dpa-ris.html. Mention of the emperor is not
proof that the bell dates to his reign, but if it does date that early, then it would be the earliest
extant example of both Tibetan temple bells and also imperial Tibetan epigraphy. The image in
figure 11 is taken from journalist bDe lHa mo’s Tibetan-language article online concerning the
discovery: last modified May 4, 2011, http://zw.tibetculture.org.cn/news_1/tplt/201105/
t20110504_1022719.htm. The six scallops are in high relief and undulating in quality, orna-
mented with what resemble the faces of the mythical kīrtimukha beast (my thanks to Amy Heller
for pointing out the similarity). The body of the bell lacks a striking point, like other Tibetan
temple bells (with the possible exception of the Bumthang Bell, below), but also lacks the rib-
bing present in Tibetan examples, and the epigraphy is not confined to panels or the top of the
bell, but covers the whole (admittedly smaller) surface area of the body. Lastly, the dPa’ ris
Bell’s cloud patterns resemble those on the Jingyun Bell (Figure 8), although other, more proxi-
mate sources for this design element exist in central Tibet.
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8 The bSam yas Bell
The Tibetan empire reached its greatest extent during the reign of the Tibetan
emperor (btsan po) who is the focus of the bSam yas Bell inscription, Khri Srong
lde brtsan (r. 756–ca. 800). In the northwest, the empire threatened the Caliphate
of Harun Al-Rashid on the banks of the Oxus; in the east, as mentioned above,
Tibetan armies even briefly sacked the Chinese capital Chang’an in 763 CE.48
This Tibetan emperor also presided over the growing institutionalization of
Buddhism in his realm, epitomized by his patronage of bSam yas Monastery.
From Tucci’s image, as well as other photographs taken since, we can see the
brightly colored beams and ceiling of the entrance hall leading to the main tem-
ple, into which spectacular location the bell is placed like a hanging jewel to
catch the eye of visitors entering the monastery’s central place of devotion.
These photographs, taken from below the bell looking up, also clearly
show the bSam yas Bell’s six scallops and the similarity of their design to the
Figure 11: The dPa’ ris Bell, China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan
Culture (CAPDTC) copyright 2011.
48 See Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire, 143–57.
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larger Jingyun Bell.49 Like the Sŏngdŏk Bell, however, the concave arches reach
points at their nadirs, which lie on the outer face of the bell. These points are
perhaps most rounded on the bSam yas Bell, which lacks the tendril design
that decorates the Jingyun Bell above the mouth’s decorative band and the
Sŏngdŏk Bell’s band itself. Instead, the bSam yas Bell is more plainly decorated
with vertical and horizontal ribs (the former positioned in line with the nadir of
each scallop). At the top, two lines of epigraphy are cast into the bell, split by
the ribs into twelve segments (six are visible in Figure 13). A few of the syllables
Figure 12: The bSam yas Bell in ’Jam dbyangs (甲央), and Wang Mingxing (王明星), Baozang寶藏
[Precious deposits: Historical relics of Tibet, China], vol. 1 (Beijing: Chaohua chubanshe 朝
華出版社 [Morning Glory Publishers], 2000), 164, plate 97.
49 See also Takeuchi Tsuguhito’s (武内 紹人) photograph, showing another side of the bell,
in Iwao et al., Old Tibetan Inscriptions, xv, plate 9.
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of the inscription, bsod, brtsan, and dbyal, even cross over the ribs (the syllable
“b- -rtsan” can be seen at the far left of Figure 13), perhaps suggesting that the
placement of these ribs took precedence over the epigraphy among the design
priorities of the bell founder. As can also be seen in Figure 13, the horizontal
ribs are less than completely horizontal, and the vertical ribs are broken up by
the joins of the slabs used to mold the inscription into the bell.
The inscription, whose raised letters display paleographic and orthographic
features of the ancient Old Tibetan writing style, dedicates the bell (cong <
zhong 鐘) to Emperor Khri Srong lde brtsan, on behalf of his queen, Jo mo rGyal
mo brtsan, and their son (sras), who both commissioned the bell’s construction.
Because of these references, Richardson dates the bSam yas Bell to between
780 and 790.50
Figure 13: Takeuchi Tsuguhito’s (武内紹人) photograph of part of the bSam yas Bell
Inscription in Iwao Kazushi (岩尾 一史) et al., Old Tibetan Inscriptions: Old Tibetan
Documents Online Monograph Series II (Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures
of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2009), xvi, plate 10.
50 Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, 33.
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A sense of the bell’s proportions is more easily discerned in a photograph
taken when it was lying in a courtyard or open area (Figure 14). Unfortunately,
no scholar appears to have published measurements of these bells. Although
Tucci refers to the bSam yas Bell as “huge,” we have no reason to think it was
much over 100 cm tall.51 However, the bell is still in the entrance to bSam yas
Monastery (where it was photographed in Figure 12), and so it may still be pos-
sible to discover its exact dimensions.
9 The Khra ’brug Bell
As Michael Walter points out, bSam yas is “not the oldest, but the most famous
early Tibetan monastery.”52 The Khra ’brug Monastery is considered another of
the oldest Tibetan monasteries or temple complexes in existence.53 It lies in the
Yar klung valley, home of the imperial dynasty.54 From the roof of its outer
gateway (leading onto a courtyard in front of the main temple) hung a large,
cracked bell whose whereabouts are unknown today,55 but which from the im-
ages available resembles the bSam yas Bell quite closely (Figures 15 and 16).
The Khra ’brug Bell also lacks measurements. However, roughly comparing
its size with the people in Figure 16 suggests that it measured about 100 cm in
51 Tucci, The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings, 69. Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan
Inscriptions, 82, states that it is smaller than the Khra ’brug Bell, which appears to measure
roughly 100 cm x 60+ cm (see below), giving some indication of the size of bSam yas Bell and
placing Tucci’s “huge” in context.
52 Michael L. Walter, Buddhism and Empire: The Political and Religious Culture of Early Tibet
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 187.
53 See especially Per K. Sørensen, Guntrum Hazod, and Tsering Gyalbo, Thundering Falcon:
An Inquiry into the History and Cult of Khra-’Brug, Tibet’s First Buddhist Temple (Vienna:
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005). The mention of a “bKra shis lha yul of
Khra ’brug” in the explanatory proclamation (bKa’ mchid) of Khri Srong lde brtsan
(Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, 26) suggests that it was in existence before
the reign of Khri lDe srong brtsan (mentioned in the Khra ’brug Bell inscription). Therefore,
while bSam yas Monastery contains a bell dedicated to the emperor who built it as a monas-
tery or complex of temples, this may not be the case with the Khra ’brug Monastery (unless he
turned a fledgling religious community into a full-blown monastery with ordained residents),
in contrast to the opinion of Tucci (The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings, 71).
54 The coordinates 29.1˚ N and 91.7˚ E are given in Iwao et al., Old Tibetan Inscriptions, 71.
55 The Khra ’brug Bell’s condition is still “lost” according to Iwao et al., Old Tibetan
Inscriptions, 71; Li and Coblin (A Study of the Old Tibetan Inscriptions, 340) report that it was
lost sometime between 1965 and 1987.
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height and over 60 cm in diameter. Until it was lost, the bell was evidently
hung up high, like the bSam yas Bell, and most scholars report that a ladder
was needed in order to read both their inscriptions. Here, the Khra ’brug and
bSam yas Bells stand in contrast to Korean temple bells, which are hung close
to the ground (see above). They were hung even higher than Chinese temple
bells, which are designed to be hit on their striking points and thus hung with
their middles at around chest height. Yet we cannot be sure about the original
Figure 14: A photograph of the bSam yas Bell in An Xu (安旭), “Xizang Sangyuan si zhudian
bihua lüekao 西藏桑鳶寺主殿壁畫略考 [“Notes on the Wall Paintings in the Main Hall of Sang
Yuan Temple Xizang (Tibet)”], Wenwu 文物 [Cultural Relics] 1982(8): 6, plate 10.
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hanging position of any of these bells (or, indeed, at what time and in what
context the Khra ’brug Bell gained that handprint visible in Figure 15 on its
bent scallop-point, opposite the missing one).
The bell possesses more ribs, both vertical and horizontal, than the bSam
yas Bell – making more of a geometric pattern than a mere paneling effect.
Richardson reports that it “is larger than that at Bsam-yas but less graceful,
and part of it has been broken off.”56 One of those six scallops is missing and
another is little bent, but they appear to splay out at the bottom, unlike the
bSam yas Bell. The epigraphy, though, is likewise high up on the body of the
bell and broken up by the ribbing into twelve segments that run in two lines
around the bell from left to right.
Again, like the bSam yas Bell, the inscription shows Old Tibetan characteris-
tics. Although it is slightly more damaged than the bSam yas Bell inscription, its
readings were almost all clear enough to Richardson, who states that both “are
votive offerings by royal persons in honour of Tibetan kings whose names are
Figure 15: The Khra ’brug Bell in the Tibet Album, 2001.59.13.48.1; http://web.prm.oxac.uk/
tibet/photo_2001.59.13.48.1.html.
56 Richardson, “A Ninth Century Inscription,” 166. See also Richardson, A Corpus of Early
Tibetan Inscriptions, 82–83.
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given in each case.”57 The Khra ’brug Bell refers to its support as a dril chen po, in
other words a “big bell,” donated by Jo mo Byang chub (“Queen Enlightenment”)
for the sake of Emperor Khri lDe srong brtsan (r. ca. 800–815), the son of Khri
Srong lde brtsan, as well as for gaining herself merit and encouraging all sentient
beings to be virtuous. The inscription also says that the queen intended the bell
to be “like the sound of the drum roll of the gods in the heavens” (lha’i rnga sgra
bar snang la grag pa dang ’dra bar). The bell is also said to have been cast (lit.
“poured,” blugs) by the abbot/preceptor (mkhen po = mkhan po), the Chinese
monk (rgya’i dge slong) named Rin cen (later rin chen; Skt. ratna; Ch. bao 寶).
Therefore, not only do the scalloping, the ribbing, and the general proportions of
Figure 16: Giuseppe Tucci inspecting the Khra ’brug Bell, 1948; Per K. Sørensen, Guntrum
Hazod, and Tsering Gyalbo, Thundering Falcon: An Inquiry into the History and Cult of Khra-
’Brug, Tibet’s First Buddhist Temple (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
2005), 161, fig. 92.
57 Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, 82.
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the Khra ’brug Bell suggest East Asian influence, but also the inscription identifies
the founder as a Chinese Buddhist monk. Furthermore, the epigraphy appears to
compare the bell (dril) with a drum (rnga), just as in China, the dharma bell (fanz-
hong) is sometimes called a dharma drum (fangu).58
The information given in this inscription has possible consequences for the
bSam yas Bell also. Given the overwhelming similarity between the bSam yas
and Khra brug Bells’ proportions, scalloping, ribbing, and epigraphy, it appears
that the Chinese-inspired term cong in the former is synonymous with the indig-
enous term dril chen po. Moreover, Jo mo Byang chub is thought to be none
other than the ordination name of Khri Srong lde brtsan’s queen, Jo mo rGyal
mo brtsan. However, it seems that Khri lDe srong brtsan was not her son (or the
son mentioned in the bSam yas Bell inscription?), but rather her stepson.59
There is an implication inherent in the identification of Queen Jo mo Byang
chub with Queen Jo mo rGyal mo brtsan that Tibetan temple bells may have
been getting bigger. If the queen of the bSam yas Bell inscription had been or-
dained by the time of the founding of the Khra ’brug Bell, and Richardson has
stated that the latter is larger, this suggests that the smaller bSam yas Bell pre-
dates the bigger Khra ’brug Bell. We may then add to that the possible evidence
of the dPa’ ris Bell: if it is genuinely older than both the bSam yas and Khra
’brug Bells, and of the smallest measurements, this would suggest that Tibetan
imperial temple bells were becoming successively larger in size (though keep-
ing roughly the same proportions) over the eighth century and into the ninth
century. Perhaps the very similar bSam yas Bell was “poured” by the same
monk, Rin c(h)en, or another Chinese mkhan po/dge slong, who may have
gained the ability to cast bigger bells and so not only create more religious
merit for the donors but also show off their cosmopolitanism by commissioning
examples of this marvelous East Asian technology. As Richardson suggests,
The making of such large bells was a considerable undertaking and although the
Tibetans had a reputation as metal workers there is no evidence that they had acquired
by that time the art of metal casting. According to later tradition Chinese craftsmen were
employed on the decoration of Bsam-yas. A Chinese monk supervised the casting of the
Khra-’brug bell at the beginning of the 9th century. Chinese monks had been invited to
Tibet in 781 A.D. according to the Tse (sic) Fu Yuan Kuei [the Song-dynasty encyclopaedia
titled Cefu Yuangui 冊府元龜] and it is possible that one of them, perhaps the same one
58 See Paul W. Kroll, Dharma Bell and Dhāraṇī Pillar: Li Po’s Buddhist Inscriptions (Kyoto:
Scuola Italiana di Studi sull’Asia Orientale/Italian School of East Asian Studies, 2001), 18.
59 Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, 32; Li and Coblin, A Study of the Old
Tibetan Inscriptions, 338, n. 1; 341; 346, n. 10. See also Sørensen, Hazod, and Tsering Gyalbo,
Thundering Falcon, 160–61, n. 5.
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who cast the Khra-’brug bell, was commissioned by the queen to make that at Bsam-yas
with its unmistakably Chinese shape.60
This Rin cen could be a monk of a Chinese Chan Buddhist school, if the queen’s
attributed links to this school are to be believed.61 It is uncertain whether the
bells were found in Tibet by an artisan who knew the art of bronze casting from
the east, or made elsewhere (in collaboration with someone who knew the
Tibetan script for the written epigraphy) and then brought to central Tibet.
Intriguingly, Per K. Sørensen, Guntrum Hazod, and Tsering Gyalbo identify a
place near Khra ’brug and in the Yar klung valley of the emperors that is today
named Cong (i.e. “bell”).62 Thus, as they suggest, the raw materials may have
been excavated from this place, whereas another possibility is that this was the
site of a Tibetan imperial bell foundry.
10 The Yer pa Bell
The Yer pa Bell was thought to be no longer extant, like the Khra ’brug Bell, but
has recently reappeared at the Dunhuang Academy in Gansu Province. Until
more research can be carried out on it, we must rely on the photographs of
Richardson (Figure 17) and Heinrich Harrer (Figure 18).63 These show its body
design to consist of vertical and horizontal ribs forming the inscription panels
and perhaps a lower horizontal band, most closely resembling the bSam yas
Bell. Its scallops seem quite solid and tend to bend inwards, like those of the
bSam yas Bell, rather than splay out like those of the Khra ’brug Bell. Yet the
scallops appear to be more pointed than either of the above two Tibetan bells.
Beading has been cast into the bell at the top, above the inscription panels, as
is also found in the Bumthang Bell (below) but not in the above Tibetan exam-
ples. There may be some ornamentation below the panels, but it is unclear
60 Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, 82.
61 See the discussion of slightly later sources on Jo mo Byang chub in Paul Demiéville, Le
Concile de Lhasa: Une controverse sur le quiétisme entre Bouddhistes de l’Inde et de la Chine au
VIIIe. siècle de l’ère chrétienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952), 25–33;
Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, 33; Li and Coblin, A Study of the Old
Tibetan Inscriptions, 338. Sørensen, Hazod, and Tsering Gyalbo, Thundering Falcon, 161, n. 6,
speculate on his possible identification with other Rin chens known as monks or monk-
artisans during the Tibetan imperial period.
62 Sørensen, Hazod, and Tsering Gyalbo, Thundering Falcon, 161, n. 7; 250; 114, sat-map 2.
63 The Yer pa Bell’s condition is also “lost” according to Iwao et al., Old Tibetan Inscriptions, 72.
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from the photographs. The inscriptions positioned at the top of the bell across
four panels comprise two prayers in an Indic and Tibetan script, respectively.
Unlike the bell inscriptions above, both prayers are ritual rather than commem-
orative and contain no reference to imperial people or places.64
The inscription is again written on the upper part of the bell, as in the above
examples. However, unlike the epigraphy on the bSam yas and Khra ’brug Bells,
the Yer pa Bell’s inscription is arranged in four panels rather than six that are to
be read from right to left. Although the actual content of the epigraphy is taken
from the prayer genre, and so offers no direct proof of an imperial date, the style
Figure 17: Photograph of the Yer pa Bell in the Tibet Album, 2001.59.2.44.1; http://web.prm.
ox.ac.uk/tibet/photo_2001.59.2.44.1.html.
64 Richardson, “A Ninth Century Inscription,” 166.
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of the bell itself is similar to the those above, and the paleography and orthogra-
phy of its inscription (which is molded into the bell) suggest that it was founded
in the eighth or ninth century.65 One of the collaborators would have had to have
known not only Tibetan script but also an Indic script and the prayer written in
that language, suggesting once again the close involvement of a monk or abbot.
11 The Bumthang Bell
Finally, mention should be made of a cong bell incorporating Tibetan epigra-
phy, housed in the small temple of dKon mchog gsum in Bumthang in Bhutan,
of which Michael Aris has published a photograph and short contextualization
Figure 18: The Yer pa Bell in Heinrich Harrer, and Heinz Woltereck, Meine Tibet-Bilder
(Seebruck am Chiemsee: Heering-Verlag, 1953), 65.
65 Richardson, A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, 144.
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(Figure 19).66 He states that the temple is small for Bhutanese religious edifices,
which along with other indicators may suggest its link to Buddhism during the
Tibetan imperial period. No other such ancient artifacts exist in this region, and
so Aris suggests, “The bell thus carries great potential significance for the early
history of the area: if the cong can be shown to belong to the temple where it is
Figure 19: The Bumthang Bell in Michael Aris, Bhutan: The Early History of a Himalayan
Kingdom (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1979), plate 6.
66 Aris, Bhutan, 33–38 and plate 6.
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now found it would be the single and indisputable relic of Tibetan missionary
activity south of the Himalayas in this early period.”67 As he freely admits,
though, even large temple bells are ultimately mobile and so this exemplar
could have been brought to Bhutan after the Tibetan empire fell.
The bell is broken, and only the largest part of it is extant. However, the
general outline is still recognizable, which Aris in his earlier PhD thesis de-
scribes as similar to the other imperial temple bells and a certain Chinese
model: “all the later temple bells of China belonging to this type preserve the
characteristic shape and features of these bells in Tibet: side panels divided by
vertical ribbing and an ‘undulating’ lower edge (most pronounced in our exam-
ple here).”68
As Aris rightly notes, the scalloping is markedly pronounced in this exam-
ple. The bell is scalloped in a concave way with sharp points at the nadirs, but
with fewer scallops than any of the bells above, perhaps only four. It also ap-
pears, from this image at least, to possess a much wider bottom than top (more
“A-shaped” than the bells above), though we again lack any measurements or
other indications of the proportions of this bell. Uniquely among the Tibetan
bells, it possesses a striking point consisting of an eight-petalled lotus and ban-
ner design. The striking point is too high up the bell to be a safe means of ring-
ing it, and so would presumably have been intended as a purely decorative
design feature. If it was used as a striking point, however, perhaps this was re-
sponsible for the cracking of the bell.
Like the Yer pa Bell, this Bumthang Bell is divided into large panels, delin-
eated by ribbing, but with one extra set of horizontal and vertical ribs forming
an enclosing frame around the panels. The shoulder of this bell above the writ-
ten epigraphy is lined with horizontal beading, also like the Yer pa Bell (but in
this case two rows of beading, one within the panel and one above the top hori-
zontal band). The Bumthang Bell also seems to include both an Indic and
Tibetan inscription. The Indic part at the top is in Tibetan transcription, how-
ever, and placed above the Tibetan, one that is molded much lower down the
bell than any of the above examples. The form of the bell is thus more complex
than that of the Yer pa Bell, and so may postdate it. Among the details of the
Tibetan inscription that Aris has recorded, including terms such as byang chub,
“enlightenment,” is the statement that the bell was cast by the bell founder
67 Aris, Bhutan, 36.
68 Michael Aris, “A Study on the Historical Foundations of Bhutan: With a Critical Edition
and Translation of Certain Texts in Tibetan” (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London, 1978), 79–80.
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(cong mkhan, lit. “one knowledgeable about congs”) named Li’u sTa(n)g (cong
mkhan li’u sta(n)g cong bya [. . .] blugs).69 This suggests that an expert or special-
ist in bell founding – with a Chinese ethnonym or patronym, but lacking a name
such as Rin chen, reminiscent of an ordained monk or abbot70– was brought to
Bhutan, if indeed this is where the bell was cast and not elsewhere (in central
Tibet and merely carried here). Thus, Aris is correct that the Bumthang Bell is
similar to some temple bells of China, and a Chinese artisan is apparently cred-
ited with its founding. However, the design, scalloping, and epigraphy of this
bell are quite dissimilar to the Tibetan imperial model of the bSam yas and Khra
’brug bells. The Yer pa Bell stands somewhere between these two types, whereas
the more rounded dPa’ ris Bell stands at the other extreme altogether. This may
conform to a possible chronological order of the Tibetan imperial bells that be-
gins with the small and squat dPa’ ris Bell (with its rounded scallops) and runs
through the taller bSam yas, Khra ’brug, and Yer pa Bells, ending with the more
A-shaped Bumthang Bell (with its pointed scalloping).
12 Conclusion
We unfortunately do not possess all of the exemplars of temple bells of Tibet or
the countries surrounding it. Far from it, in fact, given that each monastery
may have had its own bell and that new monasteries would have appeared in
many of the areas into which Buddhism spread – and so inscribed bells surely
spread with the religion. Nevertheless, those exemplars that remain allow us to
draw some conclusions about the early design(s) of temple bells in comparison
with examples from East and Southeast Asia. The extant Tibetan imperial tem-
ple bells are all convex, as opposed to bell 3 in Figure 1, above. Yet in all other
ways, they follow this simpler Chinese model most closely. All except the
Bumthang Bell lack complex ornamentation and a striking point. All except the
dPa’ ris Bell use horizontal and vertical ribbing in their designs. These ribs help
form panels into which the epigraphy is cast rather than inscribed (unlike the
earliest Chinese and Vietnamese examples above). Further, there is a marked
tendency (excluding the dPa’ ris Bell) to place the written epigraphy in the top
half of the bell (though inscriptions below can be made in addition) – in con-
trast to the Jingyun and Sŏngdŏk Bells. Including Tibetan script in the mold
must have been a difficult undertaking, but it is very well realized (again
69 Aris, Bhutan, 34.
70 See Aris, “A Study on the Historical Foundations of Bhutan,” 80–82; Aris, Bhutan, 36.
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excluding the supposedly early dPa’ ris Bell), even if this means that some syl-
lables are split across the panels, as in the bSam yas Bell.
With respect to the scalloping specifically, examples from China, Korea,
Vietnam, and Japan may all once again prove instructive. The scalloped bell
seems to be the only form of temple bell cast in imperial Tibet, but it is neither
the only option available nor a homogenous type either in China or elsewhere in
Buddhist Asia. Thus, a number of decisions appear to have been made during
the Tibetan imperial period with regard to the scalloping: first, whether to scallop
the bell; second, with how many “petals” or points; and third, to what extent.
The first question was seemingly always answered in the affirmative. The second
has led in all cases except the Bumthang Bell to a six-scalloped mouth, which
outside of Tibet is also the standard (excepting the later Japanese example in
Figure 7). This is despite the fact the most lotuses in other aspects of the bells’
design have eight petals. It is in answering the third question that we find the
most variety.
Perhaps a useful distinction can be made between concave, convex, and
“undulating curve” scalloping in all these Tibetan bells as well as in their East
Asian contemporaries and antecedents. The concave type is where, if the bell
were laid on its rim, it would rest on small points (and, in theory, be least
stable); the convex type would rest on the majority-flat rim (and be most
stable); and the undulating wave bell would rest on rounded scallops or
slightly flattened circular edges. Most of the bells surveyed above are of the
concave variety. The Japanese bell in Figure 6 is of the convex type. Of the
Tibetan examples, the Yer pa and Bumthang Bells definitely rest on their
points, with the latter being especially pointed. The others have undulating
scallops, perhaps even tending toward the convex in that they have more flat-
tened mouths; yet none reach the convex extreme of the Japanese exemplar
(Figure 6). This tentative typology may be worth expanding through future
research in order to incorporate Tibetan imperial temple bells into an East
(and Southeast) Asian typology. Comparing how the technology entered each
area, and how each region’s types of bell differ from each other in their rela-
tive rarity or divergent design, can illuminate the decisions taken by artisans
and patrons during the Tibetan imperial period.
This can help reframe the Tibetan temple bell as art rather than merely the
bearer of a text mined for its historical value alone. Contextualizing Tibetan im-
perial temple bells within a wider aesthetic context would also aid the wider
study of temple bells in Buddhist Asia, since the Tibetan examples reviewed
above seem to rank among the earliest extant exemplars of the form. Such a
comparative approach to temple bells could complement similar studies of
other examples of eighth- and ninth-century Tibetan imperial material culture,
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where the flows of technology may prove to be the same. That is why there are
still wide vistas opening up beyond the text in Buddhist Asia.
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Part II: Philosophy & Intellectual Spaces

Evgeniya Desnitskaya
5 Nonagonistic Discourse in the Early
History of Indian Philosophical Debates:
From Brahmodyas to theMahābhāṣya
1 Introduction
One of the main problems in the contemporary study of premodern Indian cul-
ture is the search for the appropriate conceptual means of interpretation. In the
case of textual studies, this problem may appear less acute since, in many in-
stances, traditional modes of interpretation are provided by the commentaries.
Still, it would certainly be naive, from a gnoseological perspective, to deny con-
ceptual means and modes of interpretation merely on account of their absence
in the commentaries. In the following passage, W. Halbfass underlines the inev-
itable difficulties a modern scholar confronts in studying an ancient culture:
[. . .] Understanding cannot amount to slipping into somebody else’s skin, as it were, and
to comprehend or experience the foreign, the other simply in its own identity, or by coin-
ciding with it. Understanding ancient Indian thought cannot mean “becoming like the an-
cient Indians,” thinking and seeing the world exactly like them. We are not capable of
such “objectivity,” and if we were, we would obviously not be “like the Indians.” The
goal of a radical “philosophical εποχη,” an unqualified abstention from one’s own back-
ground and presuppositions, is unrealistic and undesirable. We cannot and need not
“disregard” ourselves in the process of understanding.1
While recognizing the utility of emic (“insider”) concepts within Indian culture,
etic (“outsider”) concepts can be introduced for the sake of the comprehensive-
ness of inquiry. Etic concepts are needed especially when we study those as-
pects of Indian culture that were not categorized “from within,” i.e. by the
innate means of self-reflection elaborated in Indian culture. To undertake histo-
riographical work and philosophical analysis, scholars can productively make
use of conceptual tools from the contemporary humanities.
One relevant example of a concept of this kind is the central topic of this vol-
ume, i.e. confrontation as social interaction. Initially elaborated in social sciences
and anthropology, this concept has a long history in studies of premodern Indian
Note: This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (RSF) under grant
18–78–10001.
1 Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 164.
Open Access. ©2020 Evgeniya Desnitskaya, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110557176-006
culture. Confrontation or agonism can be traced back to Indo-Aryan mythology
and social practices; to the “potlatch festivals” depicted in Indian epics and else-
where; and to contests between Vedic poets (vivāda). The competitions between
priests in the Brāhmaṇas (brahmodya) that evolved from these contests were less
agonistic. Later, a different tradition of intellectual confrontation, namely rational
philosophical disputes (vāda), contributed a new layer to the Indian landscape of
argumentation. As the dynamics of vāda (elaborated in the Carakasaṃhitā or
Nyāyasūtras) were generally accepted in subsequent generations of intellectual
discourse, it may seem self-evident that a “normal” intellectual discussion in pre-
modern India exhibited the properties of confrontation: with participants striving
to justify their own respective viewpoints and disprove those of their rivals.
Perhaps surprisingly, there are also passages in early prephilosophical
texts that contradict this general statement. Ritualized brahmodyas, disputes in
the Upaniṣads, and discussions in grammatical works were structured as dia-
logues, but ones that did not fit the agonistic pattern that later became norma-
tive. The study of these nonagonistic intellectual practices in the early history
of Indian philosophy is promising, because it may shed light on possible dis-
crepancies between normative ideals and intellectual life as practiced. As the
early history of Indian debates is generally reconstructed through textual evi-
dence, the question may arise whether dialogues in these texts represent actual
communication practices, or merely serve as narrative devices adopted by the
authors for other reasons. To answer this question, I will analyze instances of
nonagonistic argumentation in Brāhmaṇic brahmodyas, the Upaniṣads, and the
Mahābhāṣya with the aim of revealing shared patterns and identifying possible
affinities between ritual debates, the philosophical strategies of the Upaniṣadic
thinkers, and those of the ancient grammarians. While it may be tempting to
consider textual debates to be reflections of the structure and dynamics of
human communication, my analysis of the pragmatic structure of the texts
shows that, in many cases, dialogic discourse was a textual strategy intended
to create a multivocal perspective. This strategy can be also designated as po-
lyphony, the plurality of voices in the text, with each voice expressing a single
aspect of reality.2 Instances of this strategy and its evolution can be traced over
a considerably extended period of Indian textual history.
2 The concept of polyphony in textual studies was introduced by Mikhail Bakhtin, who ap-
plied it in order to describe the poetics of Dostoevsky’s work: “A plurality of independent and
unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the
chief characteristic of Dostoevsky’s novels”; see Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s
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2 Classical Brahmodya: Agonistic or Ritualistic?
2.1 The Origin of Brahmodyas
Indo-Aryan culture is generally considered agonistic, since features of contest or
confrontation pervade both its ideology as well as its social life. The foundational
cosmological myth was agonistic: the battle of Indra with his enemies. Definitive
social practices such as chariot races, gambling, gift-giving, and word contests
were similarly agonistic. All these activities can be considered parts of the general
“potlatch festival,” the ceremonial contest of two parties,3 that constituted the
background of Aryan culture.4 Agonistic performances in Indo-Aryan society were
highly ritualized, generally being related to seasonal rituals. The intellectual com-
ponent of the potlatch – the ceremonial contests of poets (vivāc, vivāda) – was
carried out at the New Year feast as a part of a “ritual that aimed at a renewal of
life and the winning of the sun.”5 These contests constituted the part of reci-
procity relations in which poets were involved. The rules of these contests have
not been explicitly defined, as they belong to the “preclassical” period of Vedic
ritual as opposed to the classical ritual of the Brāhmanas and Śrautasūtras.6 They
can be only reconstructed on the basis of comparative analysis of Ṛgvedic pas-
sages and the textual evidence of other Indo-European societies.7
These agonistic practices of poetic contests gave birth to brahmodyas, the
earliest type of intellectual confrontation in India represented in textual form.
Brahmodya (literally “uttering Brahman”) is a formal exchange of riddles on rit-
ual or cosmogony performed by priests in the course of sacrifices (especially
royal ones, such as the Aśvamedha, Rājasūya, and Vājapeya).8 Examples of
Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 6. In
the Upaniṣads, however, a single voice expresses not an individual consciousness or personal-
ity, but rather a different standpoint on some aspect of reality.
3 The division of Aryan tribal society into rival phratries may account for the agonistic narratives
of Aryan mythology and in Indian epic; see Yaroslav Vasilkov, Mif, ritual iistoria v “Mahabharate”
(St. Petersburg: Evropeyskiye issledovaniya, 2010), 98–111.
4 Franciscus Kuiper, “The Ancient Aryan Verbal Contest,” Indo-Iranian Journal 4 (1960): 238,
264–274.
5 Kuiper, “The Ancient Aryan Verbal Contest,” 279.
6 Johannes Cornelis Heesterman, “Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die
Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 8 (1964): 1–31.
7 Calvert Watkins, How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo-European Poetics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 70.
8 Louis Renou, “Le Passage des Brahmaṇa aux Upaniṣad,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society 73, no. 3 (1953): 141.
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brahmodyas can be found in late sūktas of the Ṛgveda (ṚV) (e.g. I.168, X.129),
and there is a number of them in the Brāhmaṇas. In comparison with ancient
verbal contests, the classic riddle-type brahmodya is less agonistic: it is not a
real contest, but a formal exchange of riddles and answers with a fixed form
and contents. The participants of such a performance would have been priests,
but not necessarily poets.
A well-known example of brahmodya can be found in the Vājasaneyi
Saṃhitā (VS 23.9–10):
Who travels alone?
And who is born again?
What is the remedy for cold?
What is the big bowl?
The sun travels alone.
The moon is born again.
Fire is the remedy for cold.
The earth is the big bowl.9
Brahmodyas of this kind are tautological, as the question here is identical to its
answer.10 These riddles were evidently not intended for gaining new informa-
tion. Thompson has proposed they were probably connected with the Vedic
practice of secret names (gúhyā nā́māni), belonging to the poetic/esoteric lan-
guage of the ṛṣis and initially of the gods.11 The gods, in accordance with the
Brāhmaṇic saying, are fond of the hidden and dislike the obvious.12 In the po-
etic language of the Vedas, there are sets of synonyms to substitute words from
ordinary language. This diglossia of ordinary and poetic language was not un-
common even in other ancient Indo-European cultures. Generally characterized
9 kaḥ́ svid ekākī ́ carati ká u svij jāyate puńaḥ /
kiṃ́ svid dhimaśya bheṣajaṃ́ kíṃ u āvápanaṃ mahat́ //
sūŕya ekākī́ carati candraḿā jāyate puńaḥ /
agniŕ himaśya bheṣajaṃ́ bhūḿir āvaṕanaṃmahat́ //
Albrecht Weber, ed., The Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā in the Mādhyandina and Kānva-Śākhā with
the Commentary of Mahidhara (Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1972), 711. All the translations with
the Sanskrit text in the footnotes are mine. In other cases, the name of the author of the trans-
lation is provided.
10 Tatyana Elizarenkova and Vladimir Toporov, “O vediyskoy zagadke tipa brahmodya,” in
Paremiologicheskiye issledovaniya, ed. Grigiriy Permyakov (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 16–19.
11 George Thompson, “The Brahmodya and Vedic Discourse,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society 117 (1997), 15–16.
12 parokṣakāmā hi devāḥ; cf. Charles Malamoud, “The Gods Have No Shadows: Reflections
on the Secret Language of the Gods in Ancient India,” in Cooking the World: Ritual and
Thought in Ancient India, trans. David White (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 195–206.
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as the opposition of the “language of the gods” and the “language of men,” in
some cases it appears to be an elaborate hierarchy of languages belonging to
other types of beings.13 The use of secret names instead of ordinary ones may
indicate the transfer from ordinary reality to the sacral sphere of ritual. Thus
the abovementioned brahmodyas can be considered a kind of glossary for a se-
cret lexicon that might have looked something like this:
1. sun = [he who] travels alone;
2. moon = [he who] is born again;
3. fire = remedy for cold;
4. earth = big bowl.
The description introduced in the interrogative part of the brahmodya is the “se-
cret” counterpart of the word from ordinary language in the answer. Questions
in brahmodyas are intended to test whether the person questioned knows the
“secret speech.”14 At the same time, the agonistic nature of these dialogues must
not be overestimated: the examination was quite formal, because the partici-
pants knew the questions and answers in advance.15
2.2 Brahmodyas without Answers
The “classical” brahmodya is a question with an answer. In a broader sense,
however, this term is used with respect to questions without answers, and enig-
matic passages that concern secret knowledge that should not be articulated or
explained in an explicit manner. Over the course of time, the genre of brahmo-
dya changed significantly, with interpretation becoming even more problem-
atic. Some enigmatic passages cannot be interpreted unambiguously, either by
traditional commentators or by modern scholars.
A transitional type between the riddlelike brahmodyas and enigmatic pas-
sages are those brahmodyas containing questions without an explicit answer.
In these brahmodyas, the person questioned just pledges to know the answer
13 Tatyana Elizarenkova and Vladimir Toporov, “Drevneindiyskaya poetika i ee indoevrioey-
skiye istoki,” in Literatura i kultura drevney i srednevekovoy Indii, eds. Georgiy Zograf and
Vladimir Erman (Moscow, Nauka: 1979), 43–52; Watkins, How to Kill a Dragon, 38, 269.
14 Thompson, “The Brahmodya and Vedic Discourse,” 15–16.
15 Johannes Cornelis Heesterman, “On the Origin of the Nāstika,” Zeitschrift fűr die Kunde
Süd- und Ostasiens 12–13 (1968–69): 172–177.
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that most probably belongs to the realm of secret inexpressible knowledge.
This type is exemplified in this dialogue in VS 23.59–60:
Who knows the navel of this world?
Who [knows] heaven and earth and the intermediate space? [. . .]
I know the navel of the world.
I know heaven and earth and the intermediate space.16
Brahmodyas of this kind can be compared with the Vedic practice of satyakriyā,
i.e. acts of uttering truth, where the truthfulness of the speech act allows the
speaker to attain supernatural results.17 The accent on the personal power of the
speaker, rather than on the content of the answer, can be considered a premise to
the transfer from the “physical” ritual performed by different priests to the inter-
nalized “mental” ritual performed by a single priest in his own mind.18
This tendency to transfer the ritual performance from the physical realm to
the mental one can clearly be traced in later Vedic texts. For example, it influ-
enced the narrative structure of ṚV X.129 (the “Nāsadīyasūkta”). This hymn has
been composed as an answer to the ultimate question: what existed in the very
beginning, when there was nothing – when neither the nonexistent nor the ex-
istent existed?19 The verses of the hymn do not provide a single solution; in-
stead, different hypotheses are specified: were there waters (ṚV X.129.1)? Was
there breathing (ṚV X.129.2), heat (ṚV X.129.3), or desire (ṚV X.129.4)? The set
of questions concludes with the claim that the connection between existent and
nonexistent was discovered by wise men/poets in their own hearts by means of
intuition.20 Different options are reported to represent the variety of possible
explanations for the origin of the universe that existed at the time. None of
them is satisfactory; still, none of them is explicitly refuted. Taken all together,
they contribute to the polyphonic character of the Nāsadīyasūkta.
Brereton underlines the importance of the narrative structure of this hymn,
which, he claims, makes the audience understand that the true origin of the
universe is thought or the process of thinking:
By making its listeners reflect, the hymn causes them to recover the fundamental creative
principle, thought itself. It does not offer a detailed picture of the origin of things nor
16 kó asyá veda bhuv́anasya nā́bhiṃ kó dyāv́āpṛthivī́ antaŕikṣaṃ [. . .]
ved́āhaḿ asya bhuv́anasya nā́bhiṃ ved́a dyā́vāpṛthivī ́ antaŕikṣaṃ
(Weber, Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā, 730).
17 Thompson, “The Brahmodya and Vedic Discourse,” 19.
18 Heesterman, “On the Origin of the Nāstika,” 177.
19 nāśad āsīn nó sád āsīt tadā́nīm (ṚV X.129.1a).
20 hṛdi ́ pratīṣ́yā kavaýo manīṣā́ (ṚV X.129.4d).
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describe the nature or agent of primordial thought, because to do so would defeat its own
purposes. For if its function is to create thinking through questioning, then the poem
must avoid a final resolution which would bring an end to questioning and an end to
thought. Just as the poem begins with something between existent and non-existent, it
must leave its readers between knowledge and ignorance. Thus, the openness of the
poem points to the process of thinking as an approximate answer to the unanswerable
riddle about the origin of things.21
This open-endedness and the lack of an explicit answer in this hymn can be
considered an example of the shift from the externalized/objective to the inter-
nalized/subjective paradigm of thought and action.
Another interpretation was proposed by Thompson, who suggested that
enigmatic passages of the Ṛgveda avoid explicit answers and interrogative forms
due to “poetic, rather than hermeneutic, intent,” as the Ṛgveda, “unlike the
more hermeneutical Brāhmaṇas,” is “a highly poetic text.”22 It seems, however,
that the pragmatic aspect of Vedic passages must be taken into account. Even if
the interchange of questions without answers served poetic purposes, still the
very practice of their utterance remained a kind of communication intended for
information exchange. Compared to the verbal contests of the previous period,
these dialogues had lost their agonistic features but remained a form of interac-
tion, with a gradual shift from communication between different participants to
the internalized search for the secret knowledge hidden in one’s own heart.
2.3 “Enigmatic” Brahmodyas
To even less agonistic brahmodyas belong the enigmatic passages of the Vedas,
which do not contain explicit questions and as such cannot be designated as
riddles. Despite their neutral, nonagonistic form, brahmodyas of this type are
still challenging, since their meaning is quite incomprehensible. The most strik-
ing example of this type of brahmodya is the verses of ṚV I.164. This unusually
long sūkta (52 verses) is well-known as the “Riddle Hymn”, as it contains a se-
ries of enigmatic verses, the interpretation of which has baffled both traditional
commentators as well as modern scholars.23 In the first verse of the hymn,
21 Joel P. Brereton, “Edifying Puzzlement: Ṛgveda 10. 129 and the Uses of Enigma,” Journal of
the American Oriental Society 119, no. 2 (1999), 258.
22 Thompson, “The Brahmodya and Vedic Discourse,” 22.
23 For the survey of available interpretations, cf. Jan E. M. Houben, “The Ritual Pragmatics of
a Vedic Hymn: The ‘Riddle Hymn’ and the Pravargya Ritual,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society 120, no. 4 (2000): 499–536.
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three brothers are enumerated: the old hotṛ priest, his ravenous middle brother,
and the third brother, who has ghee on his back. This verse has been subject to
numerous interpretations. According to Sāyaṇa, the three brothers are the sun,
wind, and sacrificial fire; Haug has suggested they are the celestial fire (sun), fire
of the intermediate space (lightning), and terrestrial (sacrificial) fire; Geldner has
claimed that the verse speaks about three sacrificial fires (āhavanīya, dakṣiṇāgni,
gārhapatya).24 Some other verses are less problematic. For example, ṚV I.164.11
concerns the wheel of ṛta, with twelve spokes and 720 sons standing on it in pairs.
Most probably, the wheel can be interpreted as the sun, whose yearly cycle lasts
twelve months, whereas the 720 sons standing in pairs refer to the 360 days and
360 nights comprising a year.25 Disagreements also arise with respect to other
verses. The well-known passage ṚV I.164 20–22, which describes two birds sitting
on a tree and either eating or refraining from eating a fruit, has been interpreted in
radically different ways: ranging from Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the birds as souls
creating karma or releasing from it,26 to Johnson’s view of the birds as poets taking
part in poetic assemblies and being either allowed or not allowed to drink soma.27
Houben has proposed a completely different interpretation of the hymn
based on its ritual pragmatics. According to the Śrautasūtras, several verses of
the hymn are pronounced over the course of the Pravargya ritual. The action in
this ritual is generally focused around the pot (gharma), which is filled and
anointed with ghee and placed on the fire. A cow and a goat are milked, and
some of their milk is put into the boiling ghee in the gharma, making a pillar of
fire arise from it. This central episode of Pravargya, Houben claims, correlates
with the verses ṚV I.164.26–29:
The cow has lowed after the calf which blinks its eye. [. . .] This one is humming, by
which the cow is enveloped. She lows a lowing (when she is) placed on the sparkling
(fire). With her cracklings she has indeed put down the mortal. Transforming herself to
lightning (vidyut), she pushed back her covering.28
These verses can be considered another example of the use of secret language.
The cow enveloped by the calf, through metonymical transfer, may refer to the
24 Tatyana Elizarenkova, Rigveda: Mandaly I–IV (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 645; Houben, “The
Ritual Pragmatics of a Vedic Hymn,” 516.
25 Elizarenkova, Rigveda, 646.
26 Śaṅkara’s interpretation is indeed anachronistic, since the doctrine of karma belongs to a
more recent period.
27 Willard Johnson, “On the ṚG Vedic Riddle of the Two Birds in the Fig Tree (RV 1.164.
20–22), and the Discovery of the Vedic Speculative Symposium,” Journal of the American
Oriental Society 96, no. 2 (1976): 248–258.
28 Translated by Houben (Houben, “The Ritual Pragmatics of a Vedic Hymn,” 535).
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milk (cow) enclosed inside the pot (calf). It is the gharma pot, which is humming
while being heated. The milk (cow), after being put into the pot full of hot
ghee, crackles and “transforms to lightning.”29 Another important identifica-
tion in the figurative system of the hymn is that of the gharma and the sun:
the heated pot can be considered a substitute for the sun. Accordingly, the
three brothers from the first verse are the fires of the three worlds: the sun/old
hotṛ is the fire of celestial world; the third brother, with ghee on his back, is
the gharma, the fire of terrestrial world; and the ravenous middle brother is
probably the lightning, the fire of the intermediate space.30 The sun and the
gharma pot may also be inferred from the symbolism in ṚV I.168.20–22, where
the two birds embracing a tree – the world tree as a symbol of the unity of the
universe – correspond to the sun (at the top) and gharma (at the bottom). The
pot filled with ghee, a substitute for amṛta, is the bird that eats the fruit,
whereas the sun is the bird that watches without eating. Gharma is initially
inanimate, but when heated it comes to life, and as such can be compared
with the mortal person that partakes in the secret knowledge or attains the
immortality associated with the sun.31
All these interpretations are indeed hypothetical, being based on different
presuppositions. And we should not forget that they are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. From the tradition of the Brāhmanas onwards, three different
modes of interpretation of a Vedic passage have been accepted, depending
on the intention of the interpreter: adhyātma (referring to the self), adhiyajña
(referring to the sacrifice), and adhidaiva (referring to the deities or the cos-
mos).32 Thus, it can be assumed that one and the same passage could inten-
tionally be left open to different interpretations. From a semiotic perspective,
brahmodya is a practice of dealing with symbols that join together different lev-
els of description. A “tautological” brahmodya that sets up correspondences be-
tween the pairs of the utterances belonging to ordinary and secret speech can
be characterized as a structure of a single signified aspect (meaning) and two
signifiers. On the contrary, enigmatic brahmodyas, which have several different
modes of interpretation, are structures combining one utterance (signifier) with
several signified aspects.
29 Houben, “The Ritual Pragmatics of a Vedic Hymn,” 504–507.
30 Houben, “Ritual Pragmatics,” 516–518. The use of the epithet “ravenous” (áśna) with re-
spect to lightning remains problematic. Houben suggests a connection with the fierce and vo-
racious character of Indra, “the god of thunder.”
31 Houben, “Ritual Pragmatics,” 520–522.
32 Cf. Michael Witzel, On Magical Thought in the Veda (Inaugural Address, Leiden University)
(Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1979), 8, 18.
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Brahmodya can be considered an early stage in the development of a tradi-
tion of public communication. Derived from the agonistic poetic contests, it took
shape in the ritualized exchange of riddle-type questions and answers, as well
as in enigmatic passages in which the questions are always implicit. However,
even the latter type of brahmodyas was intended to transmit some information,
and as such can be considered a kind of communicative practice. Some brahmo-
dyas may very likely be interpreted in the context of ritual pragmatics, and
some may refer to cosmological doctrines or the secret knowledge of the self.
This understanding of the form and function of brahmodyas does not align with
Thompson’s argument, namely that enigmatic brahmodyas were motivated by
“poetic, rather than hermeneutic, intent.”33 Indeed, it can be assumed that Vedic
ṛṣis, like Vedic gods, “were fond of the hidden and disliked the obvious,”34 but it is
also plausible that they really wanted to convey information that for some reason
was not to be expressed in an unambiguous manner. The form of the brahmodya
challenged the audience, yet this challenge did not imply agonistic confrontation,
but rather something like a shift of paradigm.
Brahmodyas of the enigmatic type are also distinctive in that they do not
presuppose that there must be a single point of view. The admission of the di-
versity of interpretation, each being justified in a certain context, can originate
from the functional attitude of Vedic ritualism. In any case, brahmodyas can be
considered as an early example of nonagonistic – or not entirely agonistic –
communication practices in ancient Indian texts.
3 Intellectual Confrontation in the Early
Upaniṣads
3.1 Brahmodyas in the Upaniṣads
The early Upaniṣads are considered a part of the Vedic canon, and these texts
share common features with some earlier Vedic texts, particularly the Brāhmaṇas.
These shared features are clearly evident in the old prose Upaniṣads, containing
extensive intellectual debates – the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (BAU) and Chāndogya (ChU)
Upaniṣads. In this section I will not focus on the philosophical, ritual, or religious
ideas expressed in the dialogues of the early Upaniṣads; instead, I will consider
33 Thompson, “The Brahmodya and Vedic Discourse,” 22.
34 Cf. fn. 13.
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these dialogues as cases of intellectual confrontation, analyzing the rules and
shared presuppositions on which the communication of the different parties
is based. My analysis emphasizes the parallels between the dialogues of the
Upaniṣads and the earlier Vedic brahmodyas. In addition, I will outline the
features of their subsequent evolution: from formal, fixed brahmodyas to
looser agonistic debates, and from exchanges between anonymous interlocu-
tors to personified teacher-pupil relations.
The classic riddle type of brahmodya is not at all alien to the Upaniṣads.
BAU II.2 contains an example of an explicit brahmodya:
There is a cup turned upside down;
its mouth at the bottom,
its bottom on top.
In it is placed dazzling splendor;
On its rim the seven seers sit,
as also an eighth –
speech joined to brahman.35
Immediately after this verse comes the explanation: the bowl is the head, the
seven ṛṣis are the prāṇas, etc. Still, brahmodyas of this kind are not very common
at this stage. The typical brahmodyas of the Upaniṣads differ significantly from the
enigmatic and riddle-type brahmodyas of the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas. These are
vivid dialogues on ritual and philosophical matters held by participants, each pos-
sessing a name and an implicit or explicit personal history. The dialogues are of an
agonistic nature and as such are closer to ancient Indo-European verbal contests
than to the fixed brahmodyas of Brāhmaṇic ritual. At the same time, it would be
too straightforward to consider the Upaniṣadic brahmodyas to be the immediate
predecessors of the classical philosophical vāda. The agonistic and nonagonistic
features of these disputes in the Upaniṣads demand closer consideration.
The dialogues of the early prose Upaniṣads can be generally divided into
two types: debates and instructions. The agonistic nature of the debates is evi-
dent from the very exposition of the circumstances in which they take place.
For example, as we learn at the outset of the dispute between Yājñavalkya and
other priests (BAU III.1):
Janaka, the king of Videha, once set out to perform a sacrifice at which he intended to
give lavish gifts to the officiating priests. Brahmins from the Kuru and Pañcāla regions
had flocked there for the occasion, and Janaka of Videha wanted to find out which of
those Brahmins was the most learned in the Vedas.
35 Translated in Patrick Olivelle, The Early Upanishads: Annotated Text and Translation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 65.
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So he corralled a thousand cows; to the horns of each cow were tied ten pieces of gold.
He then addressed those Brahmins: “Distinguished Brahmins! Let the most learned man
among you drive away these cows.” But those Brahmins did not dare.
So Yājñavalkya called to his pupil: “Sāmaśravas! Son, drive these cows away.” And he
drove them away. The Brahmins were furious and murmured: “How dare he claim to be
the most learned?”36
In what follows, the adversaries ask Yājñavalkya various challenging ques-
tions; he gives answers, poses questions to each of his opponents in turn, and
eventually claims victory.
Generally, the participants of Upaniṣadic brahmodyas – wise men (and also
women), brahmins, and kṣatriyas – engage in verbal contests in order to prove
the superiority of their own knowledge and (in the case of the brahmins) to re-
ceive cows, gold, and other wealth as a prize for the winner. As a rule, the loser
becomes the pupil of the winner, and in some cases, he is also threatened with
losing his head. No wonder, as initially, brahmodya was a part of a ritual in
which a single mistake in performance – even an incorrect accent in a word of
a mantra – could have devastating consequences for the priest as well as for
the sacrificer.37 A formal way of acknowledging defeat was to fall silent.
3.2 The Structure of Upaniṣadic Brahmodyas
At the same time, the agonistic tendencies in Upaniṣadic debates should not be
overestimated. Agonistic disputes between brahmins and other wise people
might have been practiced in India in the middle of the first millenium BCE.
Still, the question may arise whether the early prose Upaniṣads depict this prac-
tice literally. This is not a question of whether “the Upanishadic brahmodyas
record real events,”38 but rather, of whether we may identify the practices de-
scribed in the texts with the actual practices of the debates that took place in
India at that time. Obviously, both have much in common, with the literary de-
scriptions following actual practice in a certain way. However, we should not
forget that the Upaniṣads were composed and edited over a long duration and,
as a result, were texts of deliberate composition.
36 Translated in Olivelle, The Early Upanishads, 75.
37 Cf. the well-known story from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (I.6.3.8, 10) about Tvaṣṭṛ mispro-
nouncing the accent in a word of a mantra.
38 Brian Black, The Character of the Self in Ancient India: Priests, Kings, and Women in the
Early Upanishads (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 60.
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This is especially true in the case of the BAU. Brereton has argued against
the widespread view that this Upaniṣad is “a loosely structured collection of as-
sertions, observations and aphorisms about the nature of things” that can be
interpreted as “gathering together the diffuse passages in which certain terms
or themes occur and then constructing out of them a synthesis or even a sys-
tem.”39 He has suggested interpreting the passage in BAU III as a highly struc-
tured textual unit, since its formal composition recalls the ring composition of
a typical Vedic sacrifice in which the end recapitulates the beginning. In BAU
III, this recapitulation is accomplished by means of a frame story. Moreover,
Brereton demonstrates that there are many cases of double narrative episodes
(two gandharva dialogues, two conversations with Gārgī) and of thematic dou-
ble repetitions (questions concerning one’s fate after death, the principles that
underlie the worlds, the nature of Brahman).40 This interpretation was sup-
ported by Hock, who suggested that the passage in BAU III can be viewed as
part of the larger ring composition of BAU II.1–4.5.41
Along with the general structure of the passages, it seems reasonable to
focus on the form and content of certain dialogues. Although according to the
frame story, these dialogues occur within an agonistic debate, they appear to
be scripted rather than spontaneous. For example, BAU II.1 recalls a dispute
between the brahmin Dṛpta-Bālāki Gārgya and the king Ajātaśatru. Dṛpta-
Bālāki articulates twelve propositions for the location of the puruṣa that he
venerates42 as Brahman: sun, moon, lightning, space, wind, fire, waters, mir-
ror, sound drifting behind the moving one (echo), directions, shadow, and the
Self (Ātman). Ajātaśatru refutes every proposition, in each case providing a dif-
ferent description for each location: he venerates the sun as preeminent, the
head and the king; the moon as the great king Soma in a white dress, etc.
Eventually, Dṛpta-Bālāki falls silent, recognizing his defeat, and asks permission
to become Ajātaśatru’s pupil. After, Ajātaśatru reveals the secret teaching of
prāṇa as the true basis of the puruṣa, which consists of cognition (vijñānamaya)
and as such is the basis of all cognitive functions.
39 Joel P. Brereton, “‘Why Is a Sleeping Dog Like the Vedic Sacrifice?’: The Structure of an
Upaniṣadic Brahmodya,” in Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of
the Vedas, ed. Michael Witzel (Cambridge: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies,
Harvard University, 1997), 3.
40 Brereton, “Sleeping Dog,” 3.
41 Hans Henrich Hock, “The Yājñavalkya Cycle in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,” Journal of
the American Oriental Society 122, no. 2 (2002): 278–286.
42 On the semantics of the verb upās (worship as a contemplation practice), cf. Vsevolod
Sementsov, Problemy interpretatsii brahmanicheskoy prozy (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 12.
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One can hardly consider the twelve options formulated by Dṛpta-Bālāki as
spontaneous arguments in an agonistic dispute. His statements are uniform and
monotonous, and the same can be said of Ajātaśatru’s objections. None of the
disputants rationally justifies his views, but only proposes different descriptions.
At the same time, Dṛpta-Bālāki’s arguments as a whole provide quite a compre-
hensive list of important natural phenomena. He enumerates the three sources
of light (sun, moon, lightning), five primary elements (space, wind, fire, waters,
direction), and some other natural phenomena (echo, reflection, shadow) that
may seem enigmatic. It can be assumed that this list is not arbitrary. On the con-
trary, it can be viewed as a deliberate enumeration of possible views on the nature
of puruṣa and/or of the constituent parts of the world. Indeed, Dṛpta-Bālāki’s
statements do not represent an elaborate nature-philosophical system, but they
do catalogue relevant elements of the universe.
The same may be true for certain other sets of statements or questions. In
BAU III.6, Gārgī Vācaknavī questions Yājñavalkya’s understanding of the basis
on which the world is “woven.” Each answer he provides prompts a further
question from her. From Yājñavalkya’s answers, we learn that the world is
woven on waters; the waters in turn on wind/air; wind/ air on the worlds of the
intermediate space; the worlds of the intermediate space on the worlds of gan-
dharvas, etc. With respect to this dialogue, Brereton notes, “These worlds
through which the dialogue progresses mark the path to heaven, as the descrip-
tion of the way to heaven in Kauśītaki Upaniṣad shows.”43
Moreover, in ChU V.11–17, the king Aśvapati instructs the householders,
asking them one by one what they venerate as the Self (Ātman). They give vari-
ous answers (sky, sun, wind, space, waters, and earth), and each time Aśvapati
objects that it is not Ātman, but only one of its aspects (eye, breath, body, blad-
der, and feet). Again, this dialogue is not a sequence of arbitrary standpoints.
On the contrary, it presents a systematic description of the universe on both the
macro- and microcosmic levels.
Each set of questions of this type is generally focused on a single theme,
with the traditional distinction between the adhyātma, adhiyajña, and adhi-
daiva levels being observed. For example, in BAU III.1, the brahmins question
Yājñavalkya about sacrificial issues (adhiyajña); BAU III.2 addresses cognitive
functions (grahas and atigrahas),44 an adhyātma topic (the same is true of
BAU IV.1); and BAU III.9 concerns adhidaiva.
43 Brereton, “Sleeping Dog,” 11.
44 On grahas and atigrahas, cf. Brereton, “‘Why Is a Sleeping Dog Like the Vedic Sacrifice?’” 7.
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The Upaniṣadic dialogues cannot be considered merely a depiction of an
exchange of arguments in an agonistic dispute. Given the deliberate structure
of the dialogues of the Upaniṣads, it can be supposed that dialogue is just a
textual form intentionally adopted as a means of narration. The structure of the
dialogue provides a comprehensive description of a certain topic, with each
statement corresponding to a certain aspect of the object described. The adop-
tion of this genre reflects the tendency of Brahmanic discourse to consider each
problem from different perspectives, polyphonically combining different views
in the frame of a single doctrine.
3.3 Means of Justification: Rational vs. Intuitive
Characteristically, the Upaniṣadic disputes illustrate no process of rational justi-
fication. The pattern of the classical brahmodya implies that for each question,
there must exist only one right answer. In accordance with this, in every
Upaniṣadic dialogue, there is a single participant who knows the right answers
(Ajātaśatru in BAU II.1, Yājñavalkya in BAU III, Aśvapati in ChU V.11–17).45 This
participant articulates his answers either through being questioned or objecting
to someone else’s statements. The latter type of discourse (BAU II.1 and ChU V.
11–17) can be considered the most agonistic; still, even there, the speaker gener-
ally does not justify his view and merely states it, somehow persuading the op-
ponent.46 In the rare cases of rational inquiry, the speaker supports his views by
means of analogy, as Yājñavalkya did in his well-known comparison of con-
sciousness with a lump of salt (BAU II.4; IV.5).47
The Upaniṣadic dialogues concern secret knowledge that cannot be justi-
fied through logical argument. It is the knowledge to which one appeals in the
45 In the Brāhmaṇas, however, participants usually exchange roles in asking questions and
giving proper answers, which corresponds to the archaic dualistic/cyclic pattern of exchang-
ing roles in an agonistic contest; see Yaroslav Vasilkov, “Did East and West Really Meet in
Milinda’s Questions?” Petersburg Journal of Cultural Studies 1 (1993): 66.
46 Cf. Black, The Character of the Self in Ancient India, 79: “Yājñavalkya, for example, does
not necessarily win because of his wisdom, but because he knows the rules of the game, and
how to break them. He knows how to convince people through his timing, humor, cryptic re-
marks, and as we shall see, intimidation and threats.”
47 On the meaning of the comparison, cf. Walter Slaje, “Water and Salt (I): Yājñavalkya’s
Saindhava Dṛṣtānta (BĀU II 4, 12),” Indo-Iranian Journal 44 (2001): 25–57.
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course of satyakriyā48 or in Brāhmaṇic brahmodyas that does not imply an ex-
plicit answer;49 the secret knowledge repeatedly referred to in the Brāhmaṇas by
the formula ya evaṃ veda (“he [who] knows this”).50 This knowledge may some-
how change the appearance of the person: after gaining such knowledge, both
Satyakāma and Upakosala started shining “as the one who knows Brahman”
(ChU IV.10, 14). But if someone’s claim to possessing this kind of knowledge is
ill-founded, the consequences will be devastating: his head will shatter in pieces
as happened to Śākalya, who was unable to answer Yājñavalkya’s question.51
Notably, even Yājñavalkya is threatened that his head will shatter in pieces
when he insists that he knows the answer without explicitly saying it (BAU III.7).
But again, this refers to providing the answer, not to justifying it.
At the same time, it is not unusual that a question should not be answered
aloud or explicitly. In BAU III.2, Yājñavalkya refuses to answer the most secret
question in public, and the only thing we know from the text is that he taught
about action (karma).52 In other cases, the explication of the knowledge itself can
be problematic, because it is evidently not the knowledge of linguistic formulas,
but some intuitive nondiscursive information that the speaker wishes to express.
This is true in the case of Yājñavalkya’s teaching of the Self (Ātman) as something
that cannot be categorized. Yājñavalkya’s intention is to make his interlocutors ex-
perience their own Self in a nondiscursive way. For this reason, he does not talk
about the Self in general, but tries to “show” the opponent his own Self (“your
Ātman”). He insists that the Self is the basis of all cognitive processes and blames
Śākalya for believing that Ātman is somewhere else, but not in him (BAU III.9.25).
48 Acts of uttering truth, in which the truthfulness of the speech acts allows the speaker to at-
tain supernatural results. For details, cf. Thompson, “The Brahmodya and Vedic Discourse,” 19.
49 Cf. section 1.2.
50 Sementsov, Problemy interpretatsii brahmanicheskoy prozy, 27–46.
51 On the phenomenon of the head splitting apart, cf. Black, The Character of the Self in
Ancient India, 65, 80, 185.
52 Black interprets Yājñavalkya’s refusal to speak in public as “a rather unusual method to si-
lence his opponent,” and supposes that Yājñavalkya’s opponent had caught him in a contradic-
tion (Black, Character of the Self, 76–77). Similarly, referring to conversations with gandharvas,
Black suggests that the actual participants in the talk were females, but the male interlocutors
totally denied their agency and attributed their words to gandharvas (Black, Character of the
Self, 171) A modern reader could indeed discredit the existence of secret knowledge and gandhar-
vas, but there is no doubt that the authors of ancient texts could have held another opinion. A
positive attitude towards the supernatural phenomena described in the Upaniṣads is justified if
we consider these texts a depiction of historical events. However, in a study of the worldview of
the people of premodern India, positive criticism may appear redundant.
160 Evgeniya Desnitskaya
This kind of argument may have been unusual for the prevalent scholastic
discourse at that time. For example, Uṣasta Cākrāyaṇa protests against the os-
tensive definitions (i.e. defining by pointing out examples) of Brahman and
Ātman, which, he claims, are similar to pointing and uttering, “This is the cow
and that is the horse.”53 Yājñavalkya objects that it is impossible to objectify
and define something that is the basis of all cognitive processes. It is impossible
to see the seer who sees, to hear the hearer who hears, to think of the thinker
who thinks, to cognize the cognizer who cognizes (BAU III.4).54
Thus, verbal agonism in Upaniṣadic disputes was not a competition in logi-
cal debate. Such disputes were rather based on secret intuitive knowledge,
which was the main criterion for the validity of verbal utterances. Participants
in these disputes could only demonstrate in some nondiscursive manner that
they possess this knowledge and win – or lose (and even lose their heads) if
their claims were invalid.
3.4 From Agonistic Dialogues to Teacher-Pupil Discourse
In the dialogues of the early prose Upaniṣads, two general types can be distin-
guished: agonistic disputes between brahmins, or brahmins and kṣatriyas, and
the instruction of a pupil by a teacher. Teacher-pupil relations were indeed im-
portant in the discourse of the Upaniṣads. Generally, in BAU, the majority of
the dialogues are of the agonistic type, whereas in ChU, instruction prevails.
However, in some cases, agonistic disputes end up as instruction, as the partic-
ipant who loses a dispute becomes the pupil of the winner. In BAU II.1 and
III.2, after their opponents recognize defeat, Ajātaśatru and Yājñavalkya take
their hands. This gesture is usually associated with upanayana, meaning that
they initiate their opponents as pupils.55 Only after that do they instruct their
former rivals in secret teachings (in the case of Yājñavalkya, this teaching is not
to be explicated in public). Similarly, in BAU VI.2, Gautama asks Jaivali
Pravāhaṇa to answer the questions that Jaivali had previously posed to
Gautama’s son, but Jaivali refuses to teach him unless Gautama declares him-
self his pupil.56
53 asau gaur-asāv-aśva iti.
54 na dṛṣṭer-draṣṭāraṃ paśyeḥ. na śruteḥ ṣrotāraṃ śṛṇuyāḥ. na mater-mantāraṃ manvīthāḥ.
na vijñāter-vijñātāraṃ vijānīyāḥ.
55 Black, The Character of the Self in Ancient India, 77.
56 Similarly, in theMilindapañha (a work far removed from Vedic tradition), the king Milinda,
after his defeat in the contest, moves to a deserted place together with Nāgasena, which might
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Secret knowledge can be requested as a boon by a pupil (BAU IV.3).
Alternatively, one may offer gifts to a teacher in order to become his pupil, as
in the case of Jānaśruti, who offered Raikva hundreds of cows, gold, a vehicle,
and, last but not least, his own daughter as a wife (ChU IV.2). But becoming a
pupil does not guarantee receiving instruction. Prajāpati tried to deceive his pu-
pils with false teachings (ChU VIII.7–12). Satyakāma Jābāla spent several years
looking after his teacher’s cows, and only once they numbered one thousand
was he instructed: at first, by animals and fire, and only after that, by the
teacher (ChU IV.4–9). Satyakāma, in turn, did not instruct his pupil Upakosala,
who spent twelve years after upanayana keeping the sacrificial fires burning;
only after Upakosala abstained from eating did he receive instruction from the
fires (ChU IV.10–14). Both stories probably refer to a kind of trial that a pupil
must pass through, becoming fit to receive knowledge. It was fitness of a super-
natural kind that enabled them to receive instruction from natural phenomena.
Notably, in the Upaniṣads, instruction is usually received when a pupil is in
some kind of stress.57 Examples of such distressed parties are unsuccessful dis-
putants whose views have been refuted; Maitreyī, whose husband is going to
leave her (BAU II.4; IV.5); Śvetaketu, who is unable to answer his father’s ques-
tion after twelve years of study (ChU VI.1); and Naciketas, cursed by his own fa-
ther and facing Yama, the god of death (Kaṭha Upaniṣad). It can be assumed
that irrational nondiscursive knowledge of the Upaniṣads is to be comprehended
by someone who suddenly becomes confused: whose former convictions and be-
liefs turn out to be invalid. In the narrative logic of the text, the agonistic dispute
becomes just a preliminary episode that precedes instruction. The outcome of a
real dispute is indeed unpredictable. But it is a written cliché in the Upaniṣads
and some other texts that a potential pupil engages in a dispute with his future
teacher and loses, giving the author of the text the opportunity to transmit his
teaching.58
In summary, the brahmodya dialogues of the Upaniṣads are very diverse, as
they represent different kinds of social interactions: from agonistic disputes to in-
structional tutorials. The participants of the dialogues possess names and personal
history, and (contrary to the Brāhmaṇic tradition of the ritualized, cyclic exchange
of questions) their contests end in victory or defeat. The validity of the statements
imply the practice of receiving instruction from the teacher. On the parallels between the struc-
ture of the archaic brahmodya and disputes in the Milindapañha, cf. Vasilkov 1993.
57 I thank Dr. Paribok for this observation.
58 This narrative device is quite common in Pali suttas. In the Payasi-sutta, at the end of the
dispute, Payasi admits that he was convinced by the very first parable of Kassapa, but contin-
ued to object, as he wanted to hear more of Kassapa’s answers.
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in Upaniṣadic contests is usually justified not by means of rational argument, but
through the charisma of the participant and his association with nondiscursive
knowledge. At the same time, the agonistic features of brahmodyas in the early
prose Upaniṣads should not be overestimated, as these texts are distinguished by
their deliberate composition, in the frames of which verbal contests can be consid-
ered a narrative device, adopted by anonymous authors in order to express certain
views and teachings.
4 Nonagonistic Discussions in the Mahābhāṣya
4.1 Dialogues in the Mahābhāṣya
Patañjali’sMahābhāṣya (2nd century BCE) is a work that occupies an intermedi-
ate spot between Vedic texts and Śāstric philosophical discourse. The Indian
grammatical tradition (vyākaraṇa) that this text belongs to was initially an aux-
iliary Vedic discipline (vedāṅga), intended to ensure correct linguistic usage in
the course of ritual. Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī (fifth to sixth century BCE), the funda-
mental text of this tradition, went far beyond this practical purpose by provid-
ing a comprehensive description of Sanskrit based on an elaborate technique of
linguistic analysis. The Mahābhāṣya (MBh), the foundational commentary on
the Aṣṭādhyāyī, is generally concerned with linguistic problems. Still, it reveals
certain affinities with Vedic ritualism as well as with later philosophical dis-
course.59 In this section, I will analyze the dialogues in the introductory chapter
of the MBh (the “Paspaśā”), aiming to reveal structural similarities with
Brāhmaṇic brahmodyas and Upaniṣadiс disputes.
The MBh is composed as a dialogue that echoes the discussion between a
teacher and his pupils. Later on, this narrative form becomes typical of the
commentary genre. The participants in a dialogue are generally anonymous,
but their competence varies from that of a beginner to a more experienced
speaker, and, finally, of an expert (Patañjali?), whose words are marked with
ity-āha (“he said”). Discussing different grammatical and philosophical prob-
lems, speakers apply processes of rational inquiry or support their statements
59 The relation of the MBh with Vedic ritualism is evident in the discussion of the aims of
grammar in the introductory chapter (the “Paspaśā”). Evidence of śāstric discourse in the MBh
has recently been discussed in Émilie Aussant, “Vyākaraṇic Texts and Śāstric Discourse,” The
Journal of Value Inquiry 49, no. 4 (2015): 551–566.
5 Nonagonistic Discourse in the Early History of Indian Philosophy 163
by relying on authoritative opinion (quotations from the Vedas, opinions of the
grammarians of the past). The dialogues are quite vivid. Speakers question why
should one study grammar rather than learning words and phrases of ordinary
language by heart. They also cite verses of uncertain origin and suspicious con-
tent.60 In this section, I will analyze the structure of the conversations in the two
passages of MBh: the definition of the word, and the discussion of Kātyāyana’s
vārttika: siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe (“word, referent, and relation [between
them] being permanent [. . .]”).61 My intention here is to demonstrate that the
discursive structure of these passages generally follows a pattern similar to that
found in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts discussed in the previous sections. The
use of the dialogue form is adopted here not as a literary depiction of an actual
act of communication, but rather as a means to illustrate different perspectives
on a problem.
4.2 Definition of the Word in the “Paspaśā”
The MBh begins with the claim that this text contains instruction concerning
words. After that, the expected question arises: what is a word?
“Now [I pronounce the word] ‘cow’; what is the word [here]?62 Is the word that which pos-
sesses a form endowed with dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, and horns?”
“No,” he said,63 “That is called material (dravya).”64
“Then, is the word that moving, stirring, twinkling?”
“No,” he said, “That is called action (kriyā).”
“Then, is the word that white, dark, black, red, or gray?”
“No,” he said, “That is called quality (guṇa).”
“Then, is the word that [which is] nondifferent in the differentiated, nondestroyable in
destroyable, something general?”
“No,” he said, “That is called universal shape (ākṛti).”
“What is the word, then?”
60 As in the case of the pramattagīta; see Franz Kielhorn, ed., The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of
Patañjali, vol. 1 (Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, 1880), 3.
61 This is a provisional translation. In section 3.3, the translation of the vārttika will be dis-
cussed in more detail.
62 This way of reasoning is indeed similar to Yājñavalkya’s ostensive definition of Ātman in
BAU III.4.
63 The words “ity-āha” mark the most authoritative opinion, probably that of Patañjali.
64 The meaning of the term dravya in different contexts varies from individual thing to the
material of which the thing is made (substance). Later, as we will see, Patañjali intentionally
plays with these meanings.
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“The word is that from which, being uttered, the image of the object possessing a dewlap,
tail, hump, hooves, and horns arises in mind. Or the word is the sound whose meaning is
well-known among people.”65
The definition of a word, as introduced in this passage, seems quite compre-
hensive, but the full dialogue leaves readers a bit confused. It is hard to assume
that someone would really suppose a word to be identical with the material ob-
ject it describes, or with certain actions, qualities, or a general/universal form.
For the same reason, it is also unlikely that these assumptions express the
views of some other school of grammar. Thus, most probably, these assump-
tions do not depict an actual conversation of the agonistic type or a dialogue
between a teacher and his pupils.
At the same time, the parallels between the concepts mentioned in this dia-
logue and the four padārthas of Vaiśeṣika – dravya, guṇa, karma, and sāmānya –
are quite obvious.66 In sum, the four concepts used in the dialogue provide a
framework for the description of the nonlinguistic reality the words refer to, as in
order to define the word, one should also define or describe its possible referents.
Thus it seems plausible that the dialogue in this passage of the MBh is a narrative
device by means of which this important information is conveyed. The same nar-
rative device was applied in the Upaniṣadic dialogues (cf. section 2.2) for the sake
of exhaustiveness of description. There is no point in supposing direct affinities
between early prose Upaniṣads and the MBh. This is likely an indication that the
65
– atra gaur-ity-atra kaḥ śabdaḥ? kiṃ yat-tat-sāsnā-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viṣāṇi-
artha-rūpaṃ sa śabdaḥ?
– nety-āha. dravyaṃ nāma tat.
– yat-tarhi tad-iṅgitaṃ ceṣṭitaṃ nimiṣitaṃ sa śabdaḥ?
– nety-āha. kriyā nāma sā.
– yat-tarhi tac-chuklo nīlaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ kapilaḥ kapota iti sa śabdaḥ?
– nety-āha. guṇo nāma saḥ.
– yat-tarhi bhinneṣv-abhinnaṃ chinneṣv-aсhinnaṃ sāmānyabhūtaṃ sa śabdaḥ?
– nety-āha. ākṛtir-nāma sā.
– kas-tarhi śabdaḥ?
– yenoccaritena sāsnā-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viṣāṇināṃ saṃpratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ.
athavā pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ity-ucyate (Kielhorn, The Vyākaraṇa-Mah
ābhāṣya of Patañjali, 1).
66 The MBh probably predates the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, though Patañjali might have been ac-
quainted with the proponents of some proto-Vaiśeṣika school (such as the “knowers of sub-
stances, qualities, and motions” (dravyaguṇakarmajña) referred to in the Mahābhārata); see
Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian
Ontology (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 75. In any case, this classifica-
tion of categories is to a certain extent linguistically stipulated.
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use of a dialogue not as a depiction of an agonistic dispute, but as a narrative
device intended to create a comprehensive worldview, was utilized in premodern
Indian literary tradition.
4.3 Discussion of Kātyāyana’s vārttika “siddhe
śabdārthasaṃbandhe”
Kātyāyana’s vārttikas are supplementary to Pāṇini’s sūtras. The vārttikas were
composed ca. third century BCE and exist only in the body of Patañjali’s com-
mentary. In this section, I will focus on Patañjali’s commentary on the vārttika
“siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe.” This vārttika is preceded in the “Paspaśā” by
the discussion of two questions:
(1) Is the referent of the word a dravya (material thing) or ākṛti (generic/univer-
sal form)?
(2) Is the word permanent (nitya) or to be produced [from the morphemes by
means of grammatical procedures]) (kārya)?
Patañjali proposes nonphilosophical (“grammatical”) answers for both ques-
tions. For the first question, he admits both possibilities, as each can be sup-
ported by Pāṇini’s sūtras. Regarding the second question, Patañjali relies on
Vyāḍī’s Saṃgraha,67 where this problem has been examined with the final con-
clusion that, irrespective of how one may answer this question, grammatical
rules should be elaborated.68
After that, the first part of the vārttika is introduced: “siddhe śabdārtha-
saṃbandhe [. . .]”69 I will discuss the exact translation and interpretation of the
vārttika in detail below, but it can be generally rendered as follows: “The word,
referent,70 and relation [between them] being permanent [. . .]”
67 An extensive grammatical work that predates Patañjali. It was lost in the period between
Patañjali and Bhartṛhari.
68 Kielhorn, The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, 6.
69 The following parts are discussed later in the “Paspaśā.” The complete vārttika is: siddhe
śabdārthasaṃbandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ yathā
laukikavaidikeṣu.
70 “Referent” seems to be the most neutral equivalent for Sanskrit artha. This term, in dif-
ferent contexts, means “thing,” “object,” “meaning,” “aim,” etc. In later linguistic philosophy,
the meaning of artha may vary between “meaning,” “thing meant,” and “(external) thing”; cf.
Jan E. M. Houben, The Saṃbandha-samuddeśa. Chapter on Relation and Bhartṛhari’s Philosophy
of Language (Groningen: Gonda Indological Studies, 1995), 35. Patañjali, as we will see, also
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In the extensive subsequent commentary, Patañjali proposes different ways
in which the compound in the vārttika can be analyzed and discusses their phil-
osophical implications. The passage is composed in the form of a dialogue, but
it remains uncertain whether different modes of interpretation, generally intro-
duced with the words athavā “or,” belong to different speakers or if they are
articulated by the author of the text. In any case, this passage is of a polyphonic
nature, as it comprises a number of mutually exclusive views without giving
priority to any one of them.
The different opinions expressed in the passage under consideration are
distinguished on the basis of the two criteria:
(a) The way in which the compound śabdārthasaṃbandhe is analyzed: either as
śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ca “the word, referent, and relation [between them]”
or as śabde ’rthasaṃbandhe, “the word and its relation with the referent”;
(b) The general view of the referent (whether it is dravya or ākṛti) and the way
in which the concepts of dravya and akṛti are interpreted: as permanent en-
tities (with the word siddha meaning “permanent”) or as produced entities
(with the word siddha meaning “accomplished”).
In sum, the number of opinions discussed may be said to be five:
(1) The vārttika is analyzed as siddhe śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ca “the word, ref-
erent, and relation [between them] being permanent.” The referent is be-
lieved to be ākṛti, not dravya, since the word siddha is understood here as a
synonym of nitya “permanent,” and it is the universal (ākṛti) that is perma-
nent, not the individual material object (dravya).71
(2) The vārttika is analyzed as siddhe śabde ’rthasaṃbandhe ca “the word and
its relation with the referent being permanent.” This reading does not
imply that the referent per se is permanent, so in this case, the referent can
be an impermanent dravya (individual material object).72
(3) The vārttika is analyzed as siddhe śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ca “the word, ref-
erent, and relation [between them] being permanent.” The referent is again
admitted different interpretations of artha, but in the context of the vārttika, it can be generally
rendered as “referent,” i.e. something to which a linguistic unit refers.
71 atha kaṃ punar padārthaṃmatvaiṣa vigrahaḥ kriyate siddhe śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ceti?
ākṛtim-ity-āha.
kuta etat?
ākṛtir-tarhi nityā dravyam-anityam (Kielhorn, The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, 7).
72 atha dravye padārthe kathaṃ vigrahaḥ kartavyaḥ?
siddhe śabde ’rthasaṃbandhe ceti. nityo hy-arthavatām-arthair-abhisaṃbandhaḥ (Kielhorn,
Patañjali, 7).
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dravya. But it is suggested that dravya is considered the permanent sub-
stance here. In this case, dravya is opposed to ākṛti as the impermanent
form this substance temporarily acquires.73
(4) The vārttikā is analyzed as siddhe śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ca “the word, ref-
erent, and relation [between them] being permanent.” The referent is again
ākṛti. Ākṛti here is understood as the form, previously considered to be im-
permanent. Now it is claimed that even the form can be considered perma-
nent, since having ceased to exist in one place, it still exists somewhere
else in some other material substrate (dravya).74
(5) The vārttika is analyzed as siddhe śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ca “the word, ref-
erent, and relation [between them] being permanent.” It is not important
what the referent is: it is enough to underline that it is permanent.75
Different attitudes are enumerated in this passage in order to demonstrate that
different views on the nature of the referent of the word can be supported by
alternative readings of the vārttika. The problem of whether words refer to uni-
versals or to individual objects has been discussed by grammarians before
Patañjali. In this passage, he evidently plays with different meanings of the
terms dravya and akṛti, aiming to demonstrate that each interpretation can be
justified. The fifth item on the list is probably intended to support the notion of
grammar as the universal discipline, compatible with different philosophical
doctrines. The same message is expressed in the prior discussion of whether
the word is permanent, or to be produced.76 Elsewhere, Patañjali claims that
grammar embraces all other traditions: sarvavedapāriṣadaṃ hīdaṃ śāstram.77
It should be mentioned that Patañjali does not specify which view is the
most convincing to him. It is probably his intention to discuss and justify mutu-
ally exclusive views in order to represent the full range of opinions. Different
views may complement each other, highlighting different aspects of reality.
73 athavā dravya eva padārtha eṣa vigrahaḥ nyāyyaḥ siddhe śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ceti.
dravyaṃ hi nityam-ākṛtir-anityā (Kielhorn, Patañjali,7).
74 ākṛtav-api padārtha eṣa vigraho nyāyyaḥ siddhe śabde ’rthe sambandhe ceti.
nanu coktam-ākṛtir-anityeti.
naitad-asti. nityākṛtiḥ.
katham?
na kvacid-uparateti kṛtvā sarvatroparatā bhavati dravyāntarasthā tūpalabhyate (Kielhorn,
Patañjali, 7).
75 athavā kiṃ na etenedaṃ nityam-idam-anityam-idam-iti. yan-nityaṃ taṃ padārthaṃ
matvaiṣa vigrahaḥ kriyate siddhe śabde ’rthe saṃbandhe ceti (Kielhorn, Patañjali, 7).
76 Kielhorn, Patañjali, 6.
77 Kielhorn, Patañjali, 400.
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Similar trends were noticed in Brāḥmaṇic texts with their distinction of differ-
ent levels of description (adhyātma, adhiyajña, adhidaiva), each being valid in
a certain context. Later on, a similar approach became the distinctive feature of
Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism.
Despite the general expectation that a commentary text must contain dia-
logues of an agonistic type, with the pūrvapakṣa refuted and uttarapakṣa es-
tablished, in these two passages from the “Paspaśā,” dialogues appear as
discursive devices. The dialogue form is employed for the sake of comprehensive-
ness because the utterances of different speakers complement each other, in sum
creating a multidimensional outlook.
5 Conclusion
Indian traditions of dialogue on ritualistic, philosophical, and scholastic topics
originated in the agonistic verbal contests of the Vedic poets and reached their
pinnacle in the agonistic classical vāda. Textual evidence from the period in be-
tween presents a vast variety of dialogues that were not agonistic, ranging from
the fixed, ritualized exchange of riddles to dialogue as a narrative device, and
from disputes on secret, nondiscursive matters to the instruction of a pupil by a
teacher. In many cases, the dialogues in the texts do not represent instances of
actual communication; rather, they appear as narrative devices. As a result, the
focus of my study has shifted gradually from matters of social interaction to tex-
tual practice. The dialogue form enables the authors to examine different view-
points in order to present a comprehensive perspective of the universe or other
issues under consideration. There would be no point in trying to trace the direct
continuity between different types of nonagonistic communication, as repre-
sented in the Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, and the MBh. But it was the general ten-
dency toward inclusivism and polyphony that stipulated the development of
textual practices of a nonagonistic character in premodern Indian culture. These
tendencies can and should be traced in the further history of Indian philosophy.
Abbreviations
Ṛgveda (ṚV)
Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā (VS)
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BAU)
Chāndogya Upaniṣad (ChU)
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6 The Legitimation of an Authoritative
Discourse in Jainism
Jain theories of authority (āptatva) can be productively read as reactions to a fun-
damental philosophical issue – namely, in the situation of the coexistence of two
contradictory discourses, both recognized as authoritative by different traditions,
what are the means available to distinguish between them? Some of the solutions
posed to address this problem of contradiction include consistency with practice,
the consensus of a community, the conformity of the discourse at stake with uni-
versal laws such as coherence, or appeal to faith or extramundane knowledge.
This paper analyzes the development of critical strategies employed by Jain
thinkers to establish the authority of the Jain corpus by refuting theses pro-
moted by competitors from outside of the community. To trace this develop-
ment, I focus on the Āptamīmāṃsā (Investigation on Authority; ĀMī), composed
by Samantabhadra (530–590). This text provides an illustrative case study for
my analysis because it marks a transition from a conception in which the reli-
ability criterion of an authoritative discourse is the authoritative character of
the speaker, to a conception in which the validity and soundness of the dis-
course itself are foremost. The text’s authorship is also significant, since
Samantabhadra is one of the first Jain authors to attempt to logically prove
the omniscience of the Jain teachers, and the first one to link this doctrine to
the celebrated Jain theory of “non-one-sidedness” (anekāntavāda).
1 Characteristics of Authoritative Discourse
in Jainism
1.1 Why Rely on Authoritative Discourse?
Phenomena that escape our ability to know them are either knowable by ordi-
nary cognition yet out of reach due to a given context, or unknowable by ordi-
nary cognition. Representatives of the first category are the fact that I cannot
know the color of Henry IV’s horse due to temporal remoteness, nor the trajectory
of a butterfly situated on another continent due to spatial remoteness. Likewise,
establishing the railway timetables lies beyond my current understanding and
knowledge of train traffic, because of an accidental lack of competence in this
Open Access. ©2020 Marie-Hélène Gorisse, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110557176-007
matter. Yet if a competent epistemic agent transfers his knowledge to me, it is
then possible for me to have correct knowledge concerning these phenomena.
Consenting to rely not only on one’s own experience, but on the experience of
others as well, is vital and we make constant use of this form of knowledge. To
accept that we rely on the knowledge of others does not lessen the importance of
personal experience, since indirect knowledge must be assimilated through per-
sonal experience. In this dynamic, even the Buddhists, who insist on the primacy
of self-knowledge, recognize the importance of reliable instruction.
Examples of the second category – namely, phenomena that transcend
human cognition in every context – include the nature of the soul, what happens
after death, or the conditions that will cause the end of the world. Knowledge of
these phenomena is essential, however, because this knowledge conditions our
spiritual progress and realization of a proper human life. Furthermore, unlike a
verifiable assertation, such as “quinine cures fever,” the assertion that “we gain
heaven by virtue”1 cannot be verified. Therefore, if such assertions are uttered by
more advanced epistemic agents, relying on those persons would require new
methods of legitimation.
The Jain tradition recognizes the necessity of relying on figures of authority
to verify assertations that require extraordinary cognition. Examples of this ne-
cessity are presented in the seminal works of Umāsvāti, the Tattvārthasūtra
(Treatise on What There Is; henceforth TS) and his commentary on the same
work, the Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya (TSBh), written between 150 CE and 350 CE. In
these works, Umāsvāti makes the following claims:
TSBh 1.20.15. But knowledge from testimony (śrutajñānaṃ) has the three times as its
range and perceives objects that have been produced, that have been destroyed, and that
have not [yet] been produced.2
TSBh 1.20.23. Knowledge from testimony, due to the quality of being conveyed by all-
knowing beings and due to the infinity of what is to be known, has a greater range than
knowledge by ordinary cognition.3
TSBh 1.20.26. It is also for the sake of easy understanding, discerning, reasoning, and the
operation of consciousness.4
1 These two examples are from Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2 (London:
Georges Allen & Unwin, 1923), 94.
2 śrutajñānaṃ tu trikālaviṣayam utpannavinaṣṭānutpannārthagrāhakam. The author wishes to
address her deepest thanks to Lucas Den Boer, who made available to her the draft of his edi-
tion and translation of the TSBh that will be part of his PhD dissertation. The translations of
the TSBh used in this article are modifications of Den Boer’s translation.
3 sarvajñapraṇītatvād ānantyāc ca jñeyasya śrutajñānaṃ matijñānān mahāviṣayam.
4 sukhagrahaṇavijñānāpohaprayogārthaṃ ca.
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These quotes can be interpreted as showing the usefulness of authoritative dis-
course in the cases of phenomena that are temporally remote, phenomena that
are unknowable by ordinary cognition, and phenomena on which a given episte-
mic agent is not competent, respectively. More importantly, these examples point
to a remarkable attitude on the part of Jain philosophers, who collapse the two
discrete categories of phenomena knowable by ordinary cognition and phenom-
ena beyond the reach of ordinary cognition into one overarching category. The ra-
tionale for this collapsing of categories is that every aspect of the world is, in
principle, knowable by human beings. There is no essential epistemic incom-
petence, but only a transitory, accidental one. Although metaphysical phe-
nomena may exist that elude comprehension through conventional epistemic
competencies and limits, human beings are in principle able to evolve and to
attain higher epistemic competencies that would allow them to comprehend
all phenomena. The aim of this paper is to investigate the consequences of
this Jain stance on the methods of validating an authoritative discourse.
1.2 The Different Types of Authoritative Discourse
The Tattvārthasūtra is considered the first work of classical, postcanonical
Jainism. Its inaugural characterization of an authoritative discourse exhibits a
primarily religious and doctrinal perspective. The author’s intent is to legitimize
the Jain doctrinal corpus, which describes correct faith and knowledge and pre-
scribes correct behavior; rather than an emphasis on the nature and function of
the means to gain new knowledge, as one might expect.
This emphasis on legitimizing doctrine has two main consequences for our
investigation. First, the kinds of cognition are “distinguished mainly on the
basis of the role they play in religious practice.”5 More specifically, “knowledge
by testimony” (śrutajñānaṃ), that is to say, knowledge acquired by relying on
the report of speakers endowed with authority, is distinguished from ordinary
knowledge because it has a deeper soteriological relevance. Indeed, as we have
already mentioned, knowledge by testimony is foremost in this dynamic, be-
cause phenomena that transcend ordinary human cognition, such as the soul,
are those that condition our spiritual progress toward the realization of a proper
human life.6 Second, the type of reliable discourses typically considered in Jain
5 Piotr Balcerowicz, “Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa: A Revolution in Jaina
Epistemology,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (2016): 1000.
6 The soteriological relevance of testimony is important insofar that, as remarked by Balcerowicz
(see n. 5), knowledge by testimony precedes ordinary knowledge in the classification enumerated
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epistemic treatises of this early stage are not discourses on phenomena know-
able by ordinary cognition, yet accidentally out of reach; rather, the focus is on
phenomena inaccessible by ordinary perception or reasoning. As a result, (i)
the text focuses on teachers who have experienced an epistemic transformation
that has granted them extraordinary knowledge; (ii) since it is impossible to
verify such statements, the validation of authoritative teaching depends upon
the faith one has in the authoritative teachers. For the testimony of such teach-
ers to be classified as valid knowledge requires that the status of the speaker
and not the content of the teaching is the condition for validity.
In the following verse from his Tattvārthasūtra, Umāsvāti characterizes tes-
timony as follows:
TS 1.20. Testimony (śruta) is preceded by ordinary cognition (mati). [It consists of] two
[varieties], the many [outer limbs], and the twelve [inner limbs].7
There are many classifications of the types of cognition in Jainism.8 In the
Agamic period (6th century BCE to ca. 4th century CE), five types are recognized:
ordinary cognition (mati), testimony (śruta), cosmic knowledge (avadhi), mental
knowledge (manaḥparyāya),9 and absolute knowledge (kevala). Then, attempts
are made to incorporate Naiyāyika conceptions, especially the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect cognition, as well as the classification into perception
(pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), and authoritative dis-
course (śabda). Umāsvāti, who rejects the influence of Nyāya, but neverthe-
less has to take their contribution to epistemology into account, succeeded
in maintaining the traditional fivefold Jain classification by incorporating percep-
tion, inference, and analogy into the Jain concept of “ordinary cognition.”10 As
expressed in TS 1.20, Umāsvāti’s definition of authoritative teaching as preceded
in canonical texts such as the Later Chapters, the Uttarādhyayanasūtra (UttS), written in the first
centuries CE. See UttS 28.4 in Herman Jacobi, Jain Sūtras, vol.2, Sacred Books of the East 45 (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1895), 152: knowledge is fivefold: testimony, ordinary cognition, cosmic
knowledge, mental knowledge, and absolute knowledge.
7 śrutaṃ matipūrvaṃ dvyanekadvādaśabhedam.
8 This is a specificity of Jainism. While other traditions admit one minimal and clearly defined
set of kinds of cognition, Jains admit many types of cognition, and different authors offer dif-
ferent classifications.
9 The traditional translation of “manaḥparyāya,” a perceptual-like awareness of mental phe-
nomena, is “telepathy” or “mind-reading.” Lucas Den Boer suggests translating it as “mental
perception.” In order to go further in the homogenization of the classification, I will adopt the
expression “mental knowledge.”
10 This is fully developed in Indra Chandra Shastri, Jaina Epistemology, Parshwanath Vidyapeeth
Research Series 50 (Varanasi: Parshwanath Vidyapeeth Research Institute, 1990), 196–213. On the
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by ordinary cognition means that acquiring knowledge through the instruction of
a reliable person involves first the hearing of a discourse or the perceiving of a
text. The knowledge content transmitted by the reliable speaker can in principle
come from any type of cognition, that is to say not only from ordinary knowledge,
visual or auditive perception, and reasoning, but also from extramundane knowl-
edge such as mental knowledge or absolute knowledge.
What Umāsvāti intended with this definition is not just any type of trustworthy
discourse, but rather, the Jain doctrinal corpus itself. The inner limbs he refers
to consist of the twelve canonical texts recognized by Śvetāmbara Jains. These
are explicitly enumerated by Umāsvāti in his commentary, at TSBh 1.20.10, and in-
clude Ācāra, Sūtrakṛta, Sthāna, Samavāya, Vyākhyāprajñapti, Jñātadharmakathāḥ,
Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ, Antakṛddaśāḥ, Anuttaropapātikadaśāḥ, Praśnavyakaraṇa,
Vipākasūtra, and Dṛṣṭipāta.11 As for the outer limbs, they consist of the many texts
of the Jain noncanonical corpus. Both types of teaching come from teachers versed
in Jain doctrines, although the first type of teaching is more closely related to omni-
scient “godlike” teachers. According to the tradition, the canonical texts have been
taught by the all-knowing Jinas and transmitted to humanity by their pupils, who
are the leaders of the respective Jain lineages (gaṇadhara) and who have supernatu-
ral properties.12
While Umāsvāti includes both kinds of teaching in his commentary, he
clearly puts an emphasis on the teaching of the Jinas. This emphasis is strong
enough for him to formulate the following equivalence:
TSBh 1.20.2. Testimony, the words of an authority, scriptural tradition, teaching, tradi-
tion, sacred tradition, sacred writings, and the words of the Jinas are synonyms.13
In order to better grasp the implications of this equivalence for the definition of
authoritative discourse, I now move to discuss the characteristics of these au-
thoritative teachers who are omniscient religious figures.
evolution of the classification of types of knowledge in Jainism, including the status of testimony
in them, see also Balcerowicz, “Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa.”
11 On this topic, the commentary of Pandit Sukhlalji on the Treatise on What There Is is an
almost word-for-word exposition, in the form of a discussion, of this part of Umāsvāti’s TSBh.
This commentary is translated in English in K. K. Dixit, Pandit Sukhlalji’s Commentary on
Tattvārthasūtra of Vācaka Umāsvāti, Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 44 (Ahmedabad: Lalbhai
Dalpatbhai Institute of Indology, 1974), 38.
12 TSBh 1.20.21–22.
13 śrutam āptavacanaṃ āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanaṃ jinavacanam ity
anarthāntaram.
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1.3 Characterizing the Authoritative Teacher
The Nyāyasūtra (Treatise on Logic; NS), a treatise on Naiyāyika obedience writ-
ten by Gautama around the second century CE, is the interdoctrinal reference
work for epistemological considerations in classical India. There, an authorita-
tive discourse is defined in the following terms:
NS 1.1.7. Authoritative discourse is the teaching of a reliable person.14
In this seminal definition, the focus on the speaker is evident. This focus will
remain in most later works of the pan-Indian epistemological paradigm. The
construction of the omniscient teacher as the irrefutable single source of a di-
verse textual tradition is an effective tool for the philosopher who wishes to es-
tablish the validity of his entire doctrinal corpus. Alongside the refutation of
selected conceptions of other traditions, Jain, Buddhist, and Naiyāyika philoso-
phers have composed texts that validate the omniscience of their respective
founders, and hence of the whole of their respective traditional corpora, the
teachings of such extraordinary beings.
Now, one consequence of the fact that authoritative teaching depends upon a
person is that it is embedded within the intention of this person, in the sense that
no mundane speaker express herself in a decontextualized, universal manner. Yet,
testimony is also presented as that which can properly function as an objective
means of knowledge (pramāṇa), that is to say, as knowledge of what exists and not
knowledge of a discourse on what exists. It is important to understand that both
characterizations, subjective teaching and objective means of knowledge, can co-
exist only if the teacher has no intention at all, as we will now see.
In the NS, the one teaching authoritative discourse is referred to as āpta,
the “one who is apt,” the “authoritative one.” Let us investigate more precisely
how this authoritative teacher is described in the Jain tradition. The first Jain to
have formally defined the authoritative teacher is Kundakunda. “Kundakunda”
is a name that stands for the collective authorship of a textual tradition to
which belongs the Niyamasāra (NSā; Essence of Restraints), probably written in
the third or fourth to fifth centuries. As Balcerowicz puts it, “traditionally be-
lieved by the Digambaras to have flourished in South India sometime before
the first and third centuries CE, or even in the first century BCE, Kundakunda is
14 āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ. Edited and translated into French in Michel Angot, Le Nyāyasūtra de
Gautama Akṣapāda. Le Nyāyabhāṣya d’Akṣapāda Pakṣilasvāmin (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2009),
286; translated into English in Gaṅgānāṭha Jhā, The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of
Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara, vol.1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 199.
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most probably a collective author to whom a number of works are ascribed.
These works, all in Prakrit, were composed, compiled, and expanded on over a
span of a few centuries between the late third, early fourth and eighth centu-
ries” and “Kundakunda represents a rare strand within Jainism that lays em-
phasis on reflection, meditation, and spirituality more than on asceticism and
penance.”15 In his Niyamasāra, Kundakunda characterizes the supreme author-
itative teacher in the following way:
NSā 5–8. He who is free from all defects and who is possessed of all pure attributes is the
supreme authority. The defects are hunger, thirst, fear, anger, attachment, delusion, anx-
iety, old age, disease, death, perspiration, fatigue, pride, indulgence, surprise, sleep,
birth, and restlessness. One free from all these defects and possessed of sublime grandeur
such as omniscience is called “the Perfect One.” Words proceeding from his mouth, pure
and free from the flaw of internal inconsistency, are called verbal testimony (āgama).16
A striking feature of this definition is that the authoritative speaker is presented
as a godlike entity who has moral aptitudes before he has intellectual ones.17
Henceforth, the source of reliable discourse, where “reliable discourse” stands
for the Jain corpus, is morally perfect.18 His omniscience is mentioned as one
15 Piotr Balcerowicz, “The Philosophy of Mind of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Indian Philosophy, ed. Jonardon Ganeri (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1.
16 vavagayaasesadoso sayalaguṇappā have atto. chuhataṇhabhīruroso rāgo moho cintā
jarā rujāmiccu; svedaṃ kheda mado rai viṇhiyaṇiddā jaṇuvvego. ṇissesadosarahio
kevalaṇāṇāiparamavibhavajudo; so paramappā uccai tavvivarīo ṇa paramappā. tassa
muhaggadavayaṇaṃ puvvāvaradosavirahiyaṃ suddhaṃ; āgamamidi parikahiyaṃ teṇa du
kahiyā havanti taccatthā. Translation from Nagin J. Shah, Akalaṅka’s Criticism of
Dharmakīrti Philosophy. A Study, Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 11 (Ahmedabad: Lalbhai
Dalpatbhai Institute of Indology, 1967), 35.
17 On the link between moral and intellectual aptitudes in the discourse on authority in
Jainism, as well as in the other traditions of India, see also Jayandra Soni, “The Notion of Āpta
in Jaina Philosophy,” in South Asian Studies Papers 17. Jain Doctrine and Practice: Academic
Perspectives, ed. Joseph T. O’Connell (Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 2000), 55 and 67.
18 This moral requirement, systematically present in Jain texts, can also be found in
the Naiyāyika and Buddhist traditions. For example, Candrakīrti (600–650), in his
Clarification [on Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Stances on the Way of the Middle], Prasannapadā
268.2, also requires “the removal of all faults” (prahīṇāśeṣadoṣa); see Louis de La Vallée
Poussin, Madhyamakavṛttiḥ. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā
Commentaire de Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 (Saint Petersburg: Académie Impériale
des Sciences, 1905–1913). For further discussion on the topic, see Vincent Eltschinger, Penser
l’autorité des Écritures. La polémique de Dharmakīrti contre la notion brahmanique
orthodoxe d’un Veda sans auteur. Autour de Pramāṇavarttika 1.213–268 et Svavṛtti, Beiträge
zur Kultur und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 56 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie
der Wissenschaften, 2007), 80 or Sarah McClintock, Omniscience and the Rhetoric of
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characteristic that appears as a consequence of his state of moral perfection.
Some Jain texts that describe the authoritative teacher do not even mention
his omniscient character, but focus entirely on the fact that he has annihilated
passions. This is the case of the Nyāyāvatāravivṛtti (Commentary to the Guide
of Logic; NAv),19 Siddharṣigaṇi’s tenth-century commentary on Siddhasena
Mahāmati’s Nyāyāvatāra (Guide of Logic; NA). We will investigate this later in
paragraph 2.2.
The notion that intellectual competency is a correlate of moral competency is
rooted in Jain conceptions of the world. More precisely, Jainism has developed
within a framework in which virtue is the quality of the one whose acts preserve
the best expression of the nature of everything.20 Hence, there is no need to pos-
tulate an external absolute principle discriminating good acts from bad ones, en-
suring that good actions are being pursued, because performing good acts is also
performing acts that will enable one to give full expression to her own nature
through acts that benefit the individual undertaking them.21 Jains also believe
that in every living being lies a self whose nature is that of unlimited conscious-
ness. Therefore, realizing the nature of this self by acting in a virtuous, moral
way is tantamount to reaching higher epistemic abilities. A metaphor will help to
explain this process in more concrete terms. Let’s conceive a windowpane
through which a landscape can be seen. The presence of a person in front of it
causes a reflection that distorts the viewer’s vision of the landscape. Karman22
Reason. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rationality, Argumentation and Religious Authority
(Boston: Wisdom, 2010), 16. The same holds for the Naiyāyika tradition, originating from the
Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (Commentary on the Verses on Logic; NSBh), composed by Vātsyāyana
(450–500). See NSBh 1.1.7. That person is called “reliable,” who possesses the direct and
right knowledge of things, who is moved by a desire to make known (to others) the things
as he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it (āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā
yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā). See Angot, Le Nyāyasūtra de
Gautama Akṣapāda, 286.
19 NAv 9.1–4 in Piotr Balcerowicz, Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001), 1:50.
20 Such a conception also regularly forms the background of philosophical conceptions in
Ancient Greece. The link between morality and the best expression of the nature of something
is furthermore present in the use of the term “virtue,” which originally comes from the Latin
root vir, male force, in the discourse on morality.
21 In a conception of the world in which there is a place for every living entity.
22 There are eight types of karman. Amongst them, only four harmful ones (ghātiyā) obstruct
one’s omniscience, namely delusory karman (mohanīya), which brings about attachment to
incorrect views; karman that obstructs knowledge (jñānāvaraṇīya); karman that obstructs per-
ception (darśanāvaraṇīya); and the obstacle karman (antarāya), which obstructs the innate en-
ergy of the soul.
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is the name of such reflections in Jain soteriology, a subtle form of matter that
manifests the states of the self and, in doing so, reduces its epistemic potency.
By means of ascetic practices aiming at detachment, as described in the Jain
canon, it is possible to release the self from this karmic bondage, from wrong
acts, acts that are not ultimately good for ourselves, nor for the order of the
world, and to become omniscient. In addition, since detachment is the path of
this release, moral perfections will be obtained on its course thanks to the re-
moval of passions.
With this in mind, we can understand in greater depth Umāsvāti’s charac-
terization of the Jain canonical corpus as what comes from the teaching of the
Jinas, the revered spiritual warriors who have reached omniscience. Since the
Jinas are liberated beings, they have no passions, which means that they do not
interact with human beings and have no intention. Therefore, their teaching
emanates from them as a drum emits sound.23 This explains why their teaching
(i) does not depend upon a given intention and (ii) still needs to be interpreted
and codified to be accessible to ordinary human beings.
By contrast, the noncanonical part of the Jain corpus – i.e. those teach-
ings derived from the leaders of Jain lineages who have supernatural proper-
ties and from honored Jain teachers – derives from the teaching of beings who
still have intentions and can still interact with the mundane world. Yet, as ad-
vanced Jain practitioners, they are already thoroughly detached from their
passions and, in principle, have no delusive intentions. The moral superiority
of the teachers also explains why Jain doctrinal texts are the only source of
authoritative discourse. Only Jain texts have authors who cannot be delusive.
A teacher who has enough knowledge to be an authoritative teacher has nec-
essarily removed many harmful karman; she is therefore beneficial to other
human beings by essence.24
23 In his Ratnakaraṇḍaśravakācāra (RŚĀ; Manual for the Behavior of Laymen That Is a Jewel
Casket), Samantabhadra introduces this eloquent metaphor when he claims that an authoritative
teacher who gives instructions does good for people without being motivated by passions, and
that he acts for the benefit of humanity on account of his very nature, like a drum emitting sound
at the touch of a drummer does not want anything for itself. See RŚĀ 1.8: anātmārthaṃ vinā rāgaiḥ
śāstā śāsti sato hitam. dhvanan śilpikarasparśān murajaḥ kiṃ apekṣate (“Un-egoistically and
dispassionately, a teacher instructs from truth what is suitable. What (else) does a muraja drum
require to sound but the touch of a skillful hand?”); translation from Willem Bollée, Acarya
Samantabhadra Ratnakaraṇḍaśravakācāra (Mumbai: Hindi Granth Karyalay, 2012), 15.
24 This can also explain in part the fact that “correct interpretation depends upon a teacher-
pupil lineage or upon one’s own seniority and wisdom”; see Mari Jyväsjärvi, “Retrieving the
Hidden Meaning: Jain Commentarial Techniques and the Art of Memory,” Journal of Indian
Philosophy 38 (2010): 135.
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As the Naiyāyikas remind us, for a discourse to be reliable, it does not
suffice for its teacher to be epistemically and morally competent; he also has
to be linguistically competent. Vātsyāyana (450–500) makes this assertion in
his Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (Commentary on the Verses on Logic; NSBh), in which
an authoritative person is described as possessing direct and correct knowl-
edge of things; as being moved by a desire to make known the things as he
knows them; and as being fully capable of transmitting this by means of lan-
guage. Another peculiar feature of Jainism is that in the case of omniscient
beings, this linguistic competency is transferred to other beings also en-
dowed with higher epistemic abilities. The intellectual and moral compe-
tency of the Jinas transcends human abilities, but linguistic competency is
the only one that human beings can access.25 This explains the importance
of theories of interpretation, and especially hermeneutics, in Jain philoso-
phy. As Jyväsjärvi puts it, “the commentaries are regularly more important
than the canon itself.”26
2 The Legitimation of Authoritative Discourse
2.1 Choosing Reliability Criteria
In the pan-Indian tradition, the importance of the authoritative teacher is such
that when attempting to establish the authoritative character of a discourse,
Jains, as well as Naiyāyikas and Buddhists, first seek to establish the authorita-
tive character of the speaker. We have seen that this is the case in the classical
tradition of Jain epistemology, with Umāsvāti and Kundakunda focusing on
the special qualities of the speaker. An interesting shift in Jain epistemology
occurs with Siddhasena Mahāmati (720–780). His Nyāyāvatāra (Guide of Logic;
NA), is the first Jain work to have a completely epistemic perspective, indepen-
dent of devotion and tradition. In his work, authoritative discourse is defined
as follows:
NA 9. An authoritative treatise is that which has been discerned by an authoritative per-
son, which is not negligible, which does not contradict what is accepted or what is
25 Incidentally, the sections on authority are usually the occasion for philosophers to develop
their theories of meaning (the relation between words and objects).
26 Jyväsjärvi, “Retrieving the Hidden Meaning,” 135.
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experienced, which gives the instruction about reality, which is for everybody and
which obliterates errant paths.27
The first part of the definition establishes an authoritative treatise as the prod-
uct of the knowledge of an authoritative person. This definition clearly aligns
Jain conceptions of authority with the Treatise on Logic’s tradition of
Naiyāyika obedience, in which the teacher with special powers is the keystone
of reliable discourse. Authoritative teaching is still defined in terms of a doc-
trinal corpus, a “treatise” (śāstra), and not an isolated, albeit correct claim
about an unknown phenomenon. The shift occurs in the second half of the
definition, when it is claimed that in order to be recognized as authoritative, a
teaching must satisfy a list of criteria of soundness. In other words, “it is not
tradition as such that becomes a distinct source of knowledge, but rather a
tradition that has been systematised as a result of reasoned enquiry.”28 To sum
it up, considerations on authoritative teaching in Jainism started at an early
stage as an attempt to present tradition as an efficient means to acquire
knowledge of the world. As such, authoritative teaching is distinct from ordi-
nary cognition because only special seers could evaluate its correctness.
Authoritative teaching then evolved as an attempt to validate a doctrinal cor-
pus that is the product of regulated reasoning as an efficient means to acquire
knowledge of the world. As such, it is not distinct from ordinary cognition,
because in this conception, testimony can be verified thanks to a competent
use of sense faculties and reason combined. In this conception, the means to
evaluate authoritative character do not principally rely on the characteriza-
tion of its speaker.
Of course, the requirement that an authoritative set of assertions must stand
the test of reason is not a novel claim by Siddhasena, but is found from in
Jainism a very early stage. In fact, Bhadrabāhu (ca. 1st and 5th century CE), in
his Daśavaikālikaniryukti (Considerations on the Ten Evening Devotions; DVN), is
the sole Jain author to claim that authoritative scriptures (āgama) stand in no
need of establishment by means of reasoning; they are infallible, and reasoning
is only necessary to elucidate their meaning.29 But besides this notable excep-
tion, already in Jain paracanonical texts of the early first centuries, contradiction
27 āptopajñam anullaṅghyam adṛṣṭeṣṭavirodhakam. tattvopadeśakṛt sārvaṃ śāstraṃ
kāpathaghaṭṭanam. Translation from Balcerowicz, Jaina Epistemology in Historical and
Comparative Perspective, 50. Also quoted in Eltschinger, Penser l’autorité des Écritures, 105.
28 Puruṣottama Bilimoria, Śabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge, Studies of Classical India 10
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 9; emphasis is mine.
29 Shah, Akalaṅka’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti Philosophy, 36.
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(vāhasya), the property of not being correct (ayukta), and contradiction with
one’s own doctrine (samaya-viruddha) are among the faults of a sacred text. The
fact that a sacred text possesses reason (hetu-yukta) is considered one of its
strong points.30 Likewise, classical authors focusing on the speaker also recog-
nize internal consistency and consistency with other types of cognition as a spe-
cial feature of the sacred text. See, for example, Kundakunda on his own
teachings in his Samayasāra31 (Essence of the Self; SSā):
SSā 5. I will try to reveal the nature of the Self as far as I can. Accept it if it satisfies the
conditions of truth of the types of knowledge (pramāṇa). But if I fail in my description,
you may reject it.32
But, as is most apparent in Kundakunda, standing the test of reason is second
to the authority of the speaker:
NSā 8. Words proceedings from his [i.e. the authoritative speaker, free from defects]
mouth, pure and free from the flaw of internal inconsistency, are called verbal testimony
(āgama).33
And this is only from Siddhasena that the sacred scriptures are not mainly estab-
lished thanks to the special properties of the speaker. A similar position is held by
Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (720–780), a younger contemporary of Siddhasena Mahāmati.34
Akalaṅka, as quoted by Prabhācandra (980–1065) in the Nyāyakumudacandra
(Moon on the Lotus of Logic; NKC), claims,
NKC 632: Reliable teaching is not opposed to other kinds of cognition and does not con-
tradict the doctrine.35
30 Nalini Balbir, “The Perfect Sūtra as Defined by the Jains,” Berliner Indologische Studien 3
(1987): 9.
31 In this work, from “conventional definition” to “correct definition [of the Self],” samaya came
to mean “the Self in its true nature.”
32 taṃ eyattavibhattaṃ dāyehaṃ appaṇo savihaveṇa. jadi dāyejja pamāṇaṃ cukkijja chalaṃ
ṇa ghettavvaṃ, edited in Appaswami Chakravarti, Ācārya Kundakunda’s Samayasāra (New
Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 1950), 189.
33 tassa muhaggadavayaṇaṃ puvvāvaradosavirahiyaṃ suddhaṃ. āgamamidi parikahiyaṃ
teṇa dukahiyāhavaṃti taccatthā, edited and translated in Uggar Sain, Niyamasāra (The Perfect
Law) by Sri Kundakunda Ācārya, Sacred Books of the Jainas 9 (Lucknow: Central Jaina
Publishing House, 1931), 4.
34 For the dating of these two authors, see Balcerowicz, “Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka
Bhaṭṭa,” 2.
35 śruteḥ pramāṇāntarābādhanaṃ pūrvāparāvirodhaś ca avisaṃvādaḥ, edited in Mahendra
Kumar Nyāyācārya, Prabhācandra’s Nyāyakumudacandra. A Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadeva’s
Laghīyastraya (Bombay: Manikacandra Digambara Jaina Grantha Mālā, 1941), 2: 632. Also edited
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After Akalaṅka, Jain philosophers built on the innovative work of the Buddhist
philosopher Dharmakīrti36 (550–610).37 In his Pramāṇavarttika (Verses on
Knowledge; PV) and Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PVsV), Dharmakīrti, himself
building on his contemporary Kumārila’s criticism of omniscience, insists that
neither perception nor inference can give us access to the mental properties of
other people. He concludes that a human being is unable to distinguish an au-
thoritative teacher from a nonauthoritative one.38 This, in turn, makes “being au-
thoritative” (āptatva) a useless quality when what is at stake is to evaluate the
reliability of a given set of assertions.
Confronted with this argument, thinkers from this major early Indian school of
thought attempted to identify a standard for reliability that did not depend on the
perfection of the speaker, but on the soundness of the corpora of authorita-
tive assertions (śāstra) themselves. Dharmakīrti, expanding on ideas found
in Pakṣilasvāmin, Dharmapāla, and Bhāvaviveka, provides a systematic ac-
count of these criteria in his PV 1.108–109. First of all, a treatise must be wor-
thy of evaluation, which means that it must be consistent, appropriate to the
result it strives to attain, and have one of humankind’s goals as its object. If a trea-
tise merits study, we can ask ourselves whether it is prudent to regard it as reliable.
As a test of reliability, one may strive to determine whether the propositions are
verifiable (i.e. respectively falsifiable) by means of mundane types of knowledge.
More concretely, (i) perception helps us to evaluate the textual passages concern-
ing perceptible objects by establishing whether statements from the evaluated trea-
tise are in accordance with what one experiences and sees; (ii) inference based on
states of affair helps us to evaluate the sections concerning nonperceptible objects
by establishing whether statements from the evaluated treatise are in accordance
with what the laws of rationality enable us to infer from what one experiences
and sees; and (iii) inference based on scriptures (āgamāpekṣānumāna) helps us
to evaluate sections concerning radically nonperceptible objects – that is to say,
in Akalaṅkagranthatraya (The Sum of Akalaṅka’s Three [Treatises]), in Mahendra Kumar Shastri,
Akalaṅkagranthatrayam of Sri Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadeva, Saraswati Oriental Series 8 (Ahmedabad:
Saraswati Pustak Bhandar, 1939).
36 See for example Eltschinger, Penser l’autorité des Écritures, 59 : “Pour le Mīmāṃsaka, le
Veda fait autorité parce qu’il n’a pas d’auteur; pour le naiyāyika, le jaïniste, le sivaïte ou la
plupart des bouddhistes eux-mêmes, l’Écriture fait autorité parce que son énonciateur possède
telles ou telles qualités. [. . .] la doctrine méta religieuse de Dharmakīrti invite au contraire à
rechercher le critère de l’autorité dans l’Écriture elle-même, l’autorité de son auteur n’étant au
mieux que dérivée.”
37 For this dating of Dharmakīrti, see Piotr Balcerowicz, “On the Relative Chronology between
Samantabhadra and Dharmakīrti,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (2016), 437–483.
38 PV 2.218–219.
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nonverifiable propositions – by establishing whether statements from the evalu-
ated treatise are in accordance with what authoritative teachers have said.39
Suggesting such a method, Dharmakīrti is also aware of another tradition, namely
the Naiyāyika one. Indeed, in his Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya, at NSBh 1.1.8, Vātsyāyana
employs a similar strategy to evaluate reliability. He claims that, since the asser-
tions of sages (ṛṣi) on mundane matters (dṛṣṭārtha) – their Ayurveda prescriptions
and Vedic mantras – were consistently deemed to be true, we should act from
the assumption that their assertions on extramundane matters (adṛṣṭārtha), like
parts of Veda concerning cosmic order (dharma), are also reliable.40
It is evident that Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka place their teachings
within this pan-Indian epistemological tradition, as evinced by their claims in
NA 9 and NKC 632 (quoted above) that an authoritative discourse is a traditional
text that has been systematized as a result of reasoned inquiry.
2.2 The Problem of a Speaker’s Intention
The fact that Jain philosophers of this period share this method to evaluate reli-
ability with the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas does not mean that they share all
the premises that support it. Akalaṅka, in particular, strives to prove that the
use of these rational criteria to evaluate the reliability of an authoritative dis-
course does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to infer the intention of
its speaker. In fact, the Jain tradition specifies that the intention of a speaker
can be inferred by means of reasoning from observation. More precisely, in his
Aṣṭaśatī (Eight Hundred Verses; AŚ), Akalaṅka defends the thesis that states “a
well-examined overt behaviour would always enable us to infer its cause, the
internal quality. It is a rule that a well-scrutinised effect would never frustrate
our efforts to infer its proper cause.”41
While it is hard to determine precisely the conception of Jain philosophers
concerning the nature of the states of the soul, it is clear that laws of causality
apply to these states. Furthermore, these states are expressed within a karmic
network, which is a type of subtle matter upon which physical laws apply. In
this conception, the apparent inaccessibility of the intention of a speaker is
merely due to the complexity of the situation to untangle, but mundane types
39 Eltschinger, Penser l’autorité des Écritures, 105 on PVsV 1.109.1–3.
40 This is developed for example in Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 2:94 and in Eltschinger,
Penser l’autorité des Écritures, 96.
41 AŚ 72 as quoted by Shah, Akalaṅka’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti Philosophy, 286: yatnataḥ
parīkṣitaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ nātivartata iti cet stutam prastutam.
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of knowledge can be used to track back the causal chains of these phenomena.
Of course, also extramundane types of knowledge, especially the direct percep-
tion of these subtle elements, are available to the advanced Jain. This last fact
is well documented both in theoretical treatises and in literary texts, as is made
apparent by the following description from Cort: “like any mendicant who is far
advanced on the Jain spiritual path, Sudharman42 had the ability to see the hid-
den karmic state of the soul of other living beings, and so could reveal to anyone
his or her true condition.”43 Here, we see that even mundane types of knowledge
can be used to evaluate a given karmic network and, in doing so, the equivalent
state of the soul.
3 Samantabhadra: A Specifically Jain Way
to Establish Authority
3.1 Between Different Reliability Criteria
Akalaṅka’s thesis on the knowability of intention can be found in a commen-
tary on the Āptamīmāṃsā (Investigation on Authority; ĀMī) of Samantabhadra
(530–590).44 Three important authors have commented on the ĀMī: namely,
Akalaṅka in the work just quoted, the Aṣṭaśatī, Eight Hundred Verses (AŚ);
Vidyānandin in the Aṣṭasahasrī (AS), Eight Thousand Verses, 940; and Yaśovijaya
in the Aṣṭasahasrīvivaraṇa (ASV), Explanation of the Eight Thousand Verses (1688).
There is also one commentary by a Vasunandi, namely the Āptamīmāṃsāvṛtti
(ĀMīV), the Commentary on the Investigation on Authority (8th c.). The
Āptamīmāṃsāvṛtti45 is an interesting case for the present study because
42 Sudharman, a follower of Mahāvīra, is a leader of a lineage (gaṇadhara) believed to have
supernatural powers, and he is considered a father of the community by Śvetāmbara Jains.
43 John Cort, “An Epitome of Medieval Śvetāmbara Jain Literary Culture. A Review and Study
of Jinaratnasūri’s Līlāvatīsāra,” International Journal of Jaina Studies 5, no. 1 (2009): 5.
44 Balcerowicz, “On the Relative Chronology between Samantabhadra and Dharmakīrti,” de-
velops a proof that Samantabhadra is after Dharmakīrti, which redefines Dharmakīrti’s dates.
45 The Investigation on Authority is traditionally considered to be the commentary on the
opening benediction (maṅgalācaraṇa) of Umāsvāti’s On What There Is, which is meant to sa-
lute the Jinas, by stating “I bow to him who is the guide on the path to liberation, the destroyer
of mountains of karman and the knower of the principles of the universe, so that I may attain
these qualities belonging to him” (mokṣamārgasya netāraṃ bhettāraṃ karmanbhūbhṛtām,
jñātāraṃ viśvatattvānāṃ vande tadguṇalabdhaye); see Saratchandra Ghoshal, Āptamīmāṃsā
of Ācārya Samantabhadra (New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 2002), 8.
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Samantabhadra’s conception is a combination of Jain elements present in pre-
Dharmakīrti, as well as in post-Dharmakīrti frameworks. In the rest of this paper,
I will focus on Samantabhadra’s work for three main reasons. First, because it
offers a relevant case study with which to investigate the transition from a con-
ception in which the reliability criterion of an authoritative discourse is the au-
thoritative character of the speaker, to a conception in which the criteria of
validity and soundness of the discourse itself are foremost; second, because
Samantabhadra is one of the first Jain authors to undertake to logically prove the
omniscience of the Jain teachers; and third, because he links these questions to
the celebrated Jain theory of non-one-sidedness (anekāntavāda).
The following verse could lead us to think that for Samantabhadra, the
soundness of a discourse is a criterion for validity:
ĀMī 1.6. Only you, whose words are unopposed to logic, perception, and scriptures, are
free from all faults, because what it is you desire is not opposed to proof.46
However, Samantabhadra does not claim in this verse that scriptures are authori-
tative because they are consistent with reason and perception. Rather, he claims
that consistency with reason and perception is the external sign of the presence
of an authoritative speaker. The authority of the speaker is, in turn, the effective
validating criterion of the authoritative character of a given discourse. In his
Aṣṭasahasrī, Vidyānandin comments on the above verse, arguing that it must
be understood in light of the latter’s devotion to the Jina Saṃbhava, the third
awakened Jain teacher who had become omniscient and freed of passions in
the current cosmic age.47 Samantabhadra has compared Saṃbhava to a physi-
cian: just as a physician helps people to be cured by a combination of reasoning
and knowledge of medical treatises, in the same way, an awakened Jain teacher
helps people to free themselves from the cycle of reincarnation by means of
teachings that are, by nature, in accordance with both reasoning and the scrip-
tures. In this conception, the internal (consistence of the discourse itself with rea-
son and perception) and external (authoritative character of the speaker) criteria
used to establish an authoritative discourse are intertwined.
In this framework, it becomes important to precisely enunciate the properties
that make a speaker an authority. In the ĀMī, this issue is tackled through
Samantabhadra’s attempts to enunciate the properties of the omniscient teacher.
First, Samantabhadra is careful to specify the properties that cannot be used to
46 sa tvam eva āsi nirdoṣo yuktiśāstrāvirodhivāc. avirodho yad iṣṭaṃ te prasiddhena na
bādhyate. In his commentary on this sentence in ĀMīV 6.18–19, Vasunandi analyzes yukti as
meaning “inference and perception.”
47 See Ghoshal, Āptamīmāṃsā of Ācārya Samantabhadra, 46.
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determine omniscience. These include extraordinary acts, extraordinary proper-
ties, and prophecy. These acts are not sufficient to prove the omniscient character
of a teacher, since extraordinary acts can be imitated by magicians48; some supe-
rior beings endowed with extraordinary external and internal properties do still
have passions, and harmful karman49; and non-Jain teachers such as Kapila and
the Buddha offer contradictory teachings, which is proof that they are not omni-
scient.50 It is in ĀMī 4 that Samantabhadra delineates the essential properties of an
omniscient teacher, namely the total destruction of karman.51 Claiming this, he de-
fends the traditional Jain thesis. What is interesting for us in this argument is the
metaphor Vasunandi uses to comment on this verse. He likens the removal of kar-
man to the act of “the purifying of a piece of metal of gold which might have exter-
nal impurities like mud, etc. attached to it and internal impurities like alloy mixed
with the same. By washing or scouring we can do away with the external impuri-
ties and by melting we can destroy the alloy bringing out the pure gold. In a soul
also karman internally obstruct right knowledge.”52 I claim that we can take this
literally enough to understand that the removal of karman follows physical
48 ĀMī 1. The miraculous attainments like an attendance offered by the celestial beings, a walk in
the sky, a fan service (worked by the celestial beings), and so on and so forth are found in the
possession of even jugglers; these (miraculous attainments, which you certainly possess) are (there-
fore) not what make you great in our eyes (devāgamanabhoyānacāmarādivibhūtayaḥ, māyāviṣvapi
dṛśyante nātastvamasi no mahān). Edited and translated by Nagin J. Shah, Samantabhadra’s
Āptamīmāṃsā. Critique of an Authority. Along with English Translation, Introduction, Notes and
Akalaṅka’s Sanskrit Commentary Aṣṭaśatī, Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā 7 (Ahmedabad: Jagruti
Dilip Sheth, 1999): 1.
49 ĀMī 2. The divine excellence of body, etc. – an excellence that might be of an internal or
external sort – is a genuine possession of even the denizens of heaven who are (by nature)
under the sway of the spiritual deficiencies like attachment, etc. (adhyātmaṃ bahirapyeṣa
vigrahādimahodayaḥ, divyaḥ satyo divaukassvapyasti rāgādimatsu saḥ); Shah, Samantabhadra’s
Āptamīmāṃsā, 2.
50 ĀMī 3. As for the preaching of the various sect founders, they cannot be all authentic be-
cause they are mutually contradictory; (hence) of these sect founders, someone at the most
can be worthy of reverence (tīrthakṛtsamayānāṃ ca parasparavirodhataḥ, sarveṣāmāptatā
nāsti kaścideva bhaved guruḥ). See Shah, Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā, 2.
51 ĀMī 4. The total destruction of faults and impediments [to perfect knowledge of the Self]
occurs because excellence [in this gradual process toward the completion of the Self’s own
nature occurs], just as the external and internal impurities of a thing are wiped out when the
appropriate methods are used (doṣâvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣā’sty atiśāyanāt, kvacid yathā sva-
hetubhyo bahir-antar-mala-kṣayaḥ). Edited in Shah, Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā, 3; my
translation.
52 Ghoshal, Āptamīmāṃsā of Ācārya Samantabhadra, 36; edited in Pandit Pannalal Jain Bakaliwal,
Śrīsamaṃtabhadrasvāmiviracitā Āptamīmāṃsā syādvādavidyāpatiśrīvidyānaṃdasvāmiviracitā
Pramāṇaparīkṣā ca, Sanātanajainagranthamālā 10 (Vārāṇasī: Jaina Grantha Mālā, 1914).
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laws and that a theory of the precise mechanism of this removal is possible.
Interestingly enough, the metaphor of the gold is also the one used in the
Buddhist tradition of the same period to refer to the (direct) criteria of the reliabil-
ity of a discourse. Indeed, the Buddhists Śāntarakṣita (725–788) and Kamalaśīla
(740–795) comment on Dharmakīrti’s three tests of the reliability of an authorita-
tive discourse by claiming that, just as we can determine whether something is
pure gold or not by means of calcination, abrasion, or rubbing it on a touchstone,
in the same manner, we can determine whether something is an authoritative
teaching by means of perception when the authoritative treatise deals with per-
ceptible objects, inference when it deals with contextually nonperceptible ob-
jects, and noncontradiction with what is already established when it deals with
essentially nonperceptible objects.
3.2 Proving the Existence of an Omniscient Jain Teacher
In his ĀMī, Samantabhadra not only characterizes the omniscient Jain teacher,
but also advances a proof of her existence.53 According to him:
ĀMī 5. The objects that are minute, concealed, or distant must be amenable to some-
body’s perception, because they are amenable to inferential knowledge, just like fire, etc.
It is this argument that establishes the existence of an omniscient personage.54
I summarize the argument as follows: the common way to establish inference
is to have recourse to a previously perceived situation that displays a paradig-
matic example analogous to the one under investigation. The traditional ex-
ample is that of the smoke and the fire, in which I am able to infer the
presence of an unperceived fire from the perception of a type of smoke, be-
cause there are former analogous paradigmatic situations in which smoke of
this type has been seen with a fire underneath it. In other words, inference is
accepted in situations of nonperception only if it is possible to draw a link to
53 He is usually presented as the first philosopher to do so. More on this topic in Olle
Qvarnström,“The Jain-Mīmāṃsā Debate on Omniscience,” in Studies in Jaina History and
Culture. Disputes and Dialogue, ed. Peter Flügel (London: Routledge Advances in Jain Studies,
2006), 89–106.
54 sūkṣmāntaritadūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā, anumeyatvato’gnyādiriti sarvajñasaṃsthitiḥ,
(Shah, Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā, 4). This argument is also translated and commented on in
Sin Fujinaga, “Determining Which Jaina Philosopher Was the Object of Dharmakīrti’s Criticisms,”
Philosophy East and West 50, no. 3 (2000): 378–384, and Fujinaga, “Why Must There Be an
Omniscient in Jainism?” in Studies in Jaina History and Culture. Disputes and Dialogue, ed. Peter
Flügel (London: Routledge Advances in Jain Studies, 2006), 107–116.
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another specific situation in which phenomena of each type involved were ac-
tually perceived.55 Therefore, every time an inference is justified, there exists
at least one situation in which objects of the same type as the objects involved
have actually been perceived by someone.
But this argument is not sufficient to conclude that inferences about objects that
are not perceivable by mundane faculties have necessarily been perceived in some
way or another, for example by means of extramundane perception like that of a
yogin. To explain, it is possible to acquire knowledge concerning phenomena that
are inaccessible to mundane perception through inference by analogy. With inference
by analogy, for example, it is sufficient to have already perceived a paradigmatic case
of relationship between an effect and its cause – e.g. the perception of the breaking
of a cup because of its falling on the ground can be sufficient – in order to be able to
deduce from this a list of the characteristics of the cause-effect relationship in general,
and to then infer the characteristic of a transcendental cause. From this, the only way
to understand Samantabhadra’s argument is to say that the range of legitimate infer-
ences on the nature of the world is so wide and all-pervasive that only the existence
of an omniscient teacher can guarantee that in any case the direct perception of one
instance of the related phenomena or of one instance of this type of relation is possi-
ble. As mentioned earlier, Jain philosophers believe that the two categories of
phenomena – knowable by ordinary cognition yet accidentally out of reach,
and unknowable by ordinary cognition – come down to one category, inasmuch
as every aspect of the world is, in principle, knowable by human beings.
3.3 Authoritativeness of the Jain Corpus and
the Non-one-sidedness of Things
Samantabhadra’s next step is to advance a third, and specifically Jain, method
of discriminating between reliable and nonreliable teachings. This method,
which retains Samantabhadra’s attention for the rest of the Āptamīmāṃsā, is
based on the following judgment:
ĀMī 7. Those who are alien to your nectarlike doctrine are the upholders of utterly extrem-
ist theses; they are the victims of their own vainglorious claims to be an authority (on the
55 This is, by the way, the key defense of Jain and Buddhist philosophers who try to refute the
Naiyāyika proof of the existence of God. More precisely, when the Naiyāyikas try to argue that
whenever there is an effect, there is a conscious cause involved at some point in the process of
production, the Jains and Buddhists will counterattack by pointing to the fact that no human
being has ever experienced a situation in which the growing of the grass was involving at
some point the activity of a consciousness.
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subject matter they deal with); they are persons who seek to establish something that is
contradicted by what is seen to be the case.56
Understanding this verse presupposes some knowledge of the Jain theory of
non-one-sidedness (anekāntavāda) and of viewpoints (nayavāda). According to
these theories, the object of knowledge is fundamentally complex and human
epistemic faculties tend to resolve this complexity by subsuming diversity
within a larger unity. Human knowledge functions by recognizing familiar fea-
tures or patterns. Without this, nothing would be intelligible, nor communica-
ble. In this process of subsuming diversity within unity, it is possible to create a
continuum ranging from specific to more general categories. For example, we
can describe something according to the general category “green,” the more
specific “olive green,” or even list a series of chemical components that create
the color. This plurality of possible valid and specific types of attention to the
knowable is also what explains the existence of different philosophical atti-
tudes, especially in consideration of the primary problem of the articulation of
the one and the many. In consequence, there is a favored type of attention that
is active during the construction of any body of knowledge and human beings
necessarily state their knowledge in dependence on a set of presuppositions of
which they are not aware, and that determine the very scope and meaning of
their knowledge statements. The Jain theory of viewpoints is precisely the spec-
ification of the main types of epistemic attention active in the elaboration of
these presuppositions. It is a metatheory of knowledge that offers a classifica-
tion of the great types of theories of knowledge, called “viewpoints” (naya).
With this theory, Jains are able to explain the specific aptitudes, as well as the
specific limits, of every historical philosophical tradition of India. For example,
the viewpoint called “collective viewpoint” (saṃgrahanaya) brings together all
the theorists who believe that the single robust reality, the one that is not sub-
jected to change, is a permanent reality that includes everything. Theorists of
Advaita-Vedānta, as well as theorists of Sāṃkhya, are representative of this
viewpoint because they excel at identifying the imperceptible connections and
unity underlying the diversity of objects of knowledge. They especially understand
how everything is a manifestation of the same spiritual substance. Moreover, they
believe it is only due to the structure of the human mind that we consider things
as being independent entities. Yet, at the same time, they fail to understand the
56 tvanmatāmṛtabāhyānāṃ sarvathaikāntavādinām, āptābhimānadagdhānāṃ sveṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭena
bādhyate; see Shah, Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā, 6.
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fundamental differences between the types of objects of knowledge. In oppo-
sition to this epistemic stance, the “direct viewpoint” (ṛjusūtranaya) brings to-
gether all the theorists who believe that the single robust reality is the less
possible inclusive reality, the one that persists neither in space nor in time.
Buddhist thinkers are representative of this viewpoint, because they excel at
identifying the transitory character of objects of knowledge as well as the epi-
stemic constructions active when operations of synthesis are performed dur-
ing the knowledge process. However, they fail to understand the fundamental
elements of permanence in these objects of knowledge.
Let us now return to the seventh verse of the Āptamīmāṃsā, namely “those
who are alien to your nectarlike doctrine are the upholders of utterly extremist
theses; they are the victims of their own vainglorious claims to be an authority (on
the subject matter they deal with); they are persons who seek to establish some-
thing that is contradicted by what is seen to be the case.” In this verse, “what is
seen to be the case” is non-one-sided objects. The argument is that, since a know-
able entity is always multifaceted, the Jain corpus, which recognizes the non-one-
sided essence of the knowable, is not opposed to perception, inference, or the
other types of knowledge. What I would like to stress here is that it was the need
to establish the authoritative character of a teacher that led Samantabhadra to the
theory of non-one-sidedness in this work. Samantabhadra’s method to establish
the validity of the Jain corpus was to systematically refute the assertions of non-
Jina teachers by means of showing that these are one-sided assertions. A large
part of the Āptamīmāṃsā is directed toward these refutations, which can be read
as a model that could be used to refute other seemingly absolute assertions.
Here, it seems that in order to establish the authority of the Jain corpus and
doctrine, Samantabhadra could have used Dharmakīrti’s direct method to prove
that the Jain corpus is taught by an authoritative person because it is in accor-
dance with perception and inference and it is coherent. Instead, Samantabhadra
aims to establish the authority of the teaching of the Jinas. This special teaching
calls for a special methodology because one has to refute the fact that a given
assertion can be established in an unconditioned way. Samantabhadra cannot
himself establish an assertion directly in an unconditioned way, otherwise it
would contradict this very thesis and no thesis is ultimately established. In this
situation, refuting everything that is opposed to the teaching of the Jinas is actu-
ally the only efficient strategy.57
57 The Buddhist Nāgārjuna is famous for having faced a similar situation when he aimed to
refute the fact that an ultimate assertion could be made without making such an ultimate
claim himself, and for having adopted a similar strategy when he undertook to refute any ulti-
mate assertion he encountered.
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4 Conclusion
In their efforts to define the nature, scope, and reliability of authoritative teach-
ing, Jain philosophers were building on pan-Indian conceptions of this matter
while also expressing their fundamental specificities of the Jain conception.
First, pan-Indian theories of authoritative teaching include (i) a primary focus on
sacred texts; (ii) a primary focus on the omniscient source that emits this nonfal-
sifiable body of teaching; (iii) a soteriology enabling the acquisition of extramun-
dane epistemic faculties; and (iv) an epistemological turn around the sixth
century promoting reasoned inquiry. In this framework, Jain philosophers go
further than philosophers from other systems concerning the recognition of
human epistemic abilities. Indeed, there is no essentially unknowable state of
affair in Jainism, not only because human beings are omniscient in principle
and some advanced Jains are omniscient in fact, but also because phenomena
that are seemingly inaccessible to mundane knowledge follow the laws of causal-
ity and karman is a concrete substance that follows the laws of physics. Second,
there is a multitude of omniscient Jinas and of teachers with extramundane epi-
stemic faculties. Third, when refuting the theses of other traditions, the Jain
Samantabhadra makes use of a specific type of refutation that consists in show-
ing the ultimate inadequacy of any one-sided view and, at the same time, es-
tablishes the Jain doctrine of non-one-sidedness. This strategy is not only
mandatory for the one avoiding the “contextually valid” labeling of his own
claims, but it is also an efficient strategy for survival in the case of a minority
tradition like Jainism. Indeed, this insistence on the contextual validity of
every claim not only resolves apparent contradictions between Jain concep-
tions and the conceptions of others, but also provides Jainism an intellectual
authority over other traditions.58
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Ana Bajželj
7 Clay Pots, Golden Rings, and Clean
Upper Garments: Causality in Jaina
Philosophy
1 The Jaina Doctrine of Causality as Sad-Asat-
Kārya-Vāda
In his Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, Karl H. Potter systematically
outlines and classifies various models of causality that have emerged in the
history of Indian philosophy.1 He describes the Jaina model of causality as an
attempt to steer the middle course between what are commonly referred to as
two principal competing Indian philosophical doctrines on the nature of causal
relations, namely, sat-kārya-vāda and asat-kārya-vāda. According to the first, an
effect is a continuation of its causal base, and thus preexistent (sat-kārya) in its
cause. According to the latter, an effect is a commencement of something radi-
cally new with regard to its cause, and hence not preexistent (asat-kārya) in it. A
typical representative of the sat-kārya-vāda position is the philosophical school
of Sāṃkhya. Potter uses the standard example of the causal relation between
milk and curds to explain its argument for the preexistence of the effect in its
cause:
Milk, it is maintained, is the cause of curds, which is the effect. But the milk is the same
stuff as the curds; it is merely transformed into a solid state, being the same material that
was previously in a liquid state. The effect is already existent in the cause – in fact, it is
1 Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991, reprint
1999), 106–116. Some other introductions to the doctrine of causality in Indian philosophies that
take Jaina philosophy into account are Mahesh Chandra Bhartiya, Causation in Indian Philosophy:
With Special Reference to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (Ghaziabad: Vimal Prakashan, 1973), 106–111;
Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975,
reprint 1997), 174–175; Bimal Krishna Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and
Contemporary Issues (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985, 2nd ed. 1990, reprint 2008), 284–294; Roy
W. Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016),
155–167; Vetury Ramakrishna Rao, Selected Doctrines from Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Mittal
Publications, 1987), 73–74; and Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1960, reprint 1964), 151. These introductions provide broad overviews
of the Jaina doctrine of causality rather than thorough analyses of how specific Jaina texts treat
the topic of causality.
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the very same stuff as the cause, being altered merely in what we should call its “second-
ary” qualities.2
Rather than being an entirely novel occurrence in relation to its cause, an effect
is thus a transformation (pariṇāma), and therefore a continuation, of its cause.3
A typical representative of the asat-kārya-vāda, on the other hand, is the
philosophical school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Potter explains its position in regard
to the nature of causal relations with the help of two standard examples:
Where the satkāryavādin tends to unify the ultimate stuff in the universe, the asatkāryavādin
multiplies the number of basic entities which enter as relata into the causal relation. [. . .]
The favorite examples offered by Naiyāyikas to illustrate the workings of causation are the
production of a pot from the combination of its two halves and the production of a piece of
cloth from the combination of some threads.4
2 Potter, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, 106. See also Bhartiya, Causation in Indian
Philosophy: With Special Reference to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 36–54; K. Chenchulakshmi, The
Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy: A Critical Study with Reference to Sāṃkhya-Yoga
(New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005); Indukala H. Jhaveri, The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Jain
Theories of Pariṇāma (Ahmedabad: Gujarat University, 1990); Gerald James Larson, Classical
Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969, 2nd
ed. 1979, reprint 1998), 164–167; Gerald James Larson, “Introduction to the Philosophy of
Sāṃkhya,” in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 4, Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in
Indian Philosophy, eds. Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1987), 65–73; and Roma Ray, “Is Pariṇāmavāda a Doctrine of Causality?” Journal
of Indian Philosophy 10, no. 4 (December 1982): 377–396.
3 Another philosophical tradition that is frequently described as a proponent of the sat-kārya-
vāda model is Advaita Vedānta. In contrast to Sāṃkhya, Advaita Vedānta understands the trans-
formation of a cause that brings about an effect to be an illusory rather than a real occurrence,
and therefore substitutes pariṇāma-vāda, the doctrine of transformation, with vivarta-vāda, the
doctrine of illusion. Due to this distinct view, according to which only the “cause” is real, while
the “effects” are illusory, the causal doctrine of Advaita Vedānta is often referred to as sat-kāraṇa-
vāda. See, for example, Bhartiya, Causation in Indian Philosophy: With Special Reference to Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika, 58–83; Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction (Honolulu:
East-West Center Press, University of Hawaii, 1969), 35–43; Nataliya Isayeva, Shankara and Indian
Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993), 161–162; Richard King, Early Advaita Vedānta and
Buddhism: The Mahāyāna Context of the Gauḍapādīya Kārikā (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995),
84–85; Potter, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, 157–182; Arvind Sharma, Advaita Vedānta:
An Introduction (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), 55–61; and J. G. Suthren Hirst, Śaṃkara’s
Advaita Vedānta: A Way of Teaching (London: Routledge, 2005), 89–115.
4 Potter, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, 111–112. See also Bhartiya, Causation in Indian
Philosophy: With Special Reference to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 119–275; Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and
What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
1992), 57–58; ShashiPrabha Kumar, Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy: On Knowing and
What Is to Be Known (London: Routledge, 2013), 34–35; Bimal Krishna Matilal, “Causality in the
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In accordance with the examples provided, an effect is not a continuation of its
cause, but rather a novel and therefore nonpreexistent event.5
Embracing continuity and novelty – the characteristic features of both
abovementioned doctrines on the nature of causal relations – in a distinctly all-
inclusive or, better, non-one-sided (anekānta) manner, Jainism, as noted, en-
deavors to mediate and pacify the tension between them.6 Potter explains:
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School,” Philosophy East and West 25, no. 1 (January 1975): 41–48; Bimal
Krishna Matilal, “Naïve Realism, Nyāya Realism and the Causal Theory,” in The Collected Essays
of Bimal Krishna Matilal: Mind, Language and World, ed. Jonardon Ganeri (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 97–113; Karl H. Potter, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Nyāya-Vai-
śeṣika,” in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 2, Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The
Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa, ed. Karl H. Potter (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977,
reprint 1995), 54–68.
5 Buddhism, which rejects the possibility of anything persisting through the causal operation,
is also commonly included in the group of the asat-kārya-vāda proponents, even though the
doctrines of causality of certain Buddhist schools have been described as either subscribing to
sat-kārya-vāda or evading both sat-kārya-vāda and asat-kārya-vāda. See Bhartiya, Causation in
Indian Philosophy: With Special Reference to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 29–30, 88–105; K. N. Jayatilleke,
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), 443–457; David
J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1976), 26–35; David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu:
The University Press of Hawaii, 1982); Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy
and Contemporary Issues, 318; and T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of
the Mādhyamika System (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955, 2nd ed. 1970, reprint 1980),
166–178.
6 Matilal describes the non-one-sided approach of Jainism as “a resolution of the paradox of
causality.” See Bimal Krishna Matilal, The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-Vāda)
(Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1981), 26. See also Johannes Bronkhorst, “Jainism’s
First Heretic and the Origin of Anekānta-vāda,” in Jainism and Early Buddhism: Essays in Honor
of Padmanabh S. Jaini, part 1, ed. Olle Qvarnström, 95–111 (Fremont, CA: Asian Humanities
Press, 2003); Johannes Bronkhorst, “Anekāntavāda, The Central Philosophy of Ājīvikism?”
International Journal of Jaina Studies 9, no. 1 (2013): 1–11; W. J. Johnson, “The Religious Function
of Jaina Philosophy: Anekāntavāda Reconsidered,” Religion 25 (1995): 41–50; Bimal Krishna
Matilal, “Anekānta: Both Yes and No?” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 8
(1991): 1–12; Satkari Mookerjee, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism: A Critical Study of
Anekāntavāda (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1944, 2nd ed. 1978); Y. J. Padmarajiah, A Comparative
Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge (Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963);
Tara Sethia, ed., Ahiṃsā, Anekānta, and Jainism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004); Nagin
J. Shah, ed., Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth (Anekāntavāda) (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass & Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology, 2000); Jayandra Soni, “Philosophical
Significance of the Jaina Theory of Manifoldness,” Philosophie aus interkultureller Sicht –
Philosophy from an Intercultural Perspective, ed. Notker Schneider et al., 277–287 (Amsterdam
and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1997); Jayandra Soni, “Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on Anekânta-vāda,”
in Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion, ed. Piotr Balcerowicz (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
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[T]he relation we are concerned to analyze has to do with the relation between a substance
at one moment having quality A and the same substance at the next moment lacking quality
A and having quality B. [. . .] Considering the relation of the substance at one moment to the
substance at the next, the satkāryavādin is right, the effect is contained in the cause, but
considering the relation of quality A to quality B, the asatkāryavādin is right, the effect is not
contained in the cause. But furthermore, why must the [. . .] views be mutually exclusive?
Cannot both be right, particularly if there is reason to believe that it will not do to separate
entities into substance and quality though one may distinguish those two aspects of any en-
tity – a different thing from separating them. This last is, in fact, what the Jain holds.7
Potter is referring to the Jaina understanding of causal relations with regard to a
substance as it exists in two different moments in time. According to Jaina meta-
physics, reality is constituted of an infinite number of substances (dravya), each of
which possesses certain essential attributes (guṇa). These attributes incessantly
and momentarily undergo modification in the form of arising and ceasing modes
(paryāya), which Potter refers to as qualities. Substances as such are eternal and
persist through these modal modifications. A substance in a particular moment in
time is, thus, a continuation of the numerically identical substance that existed in
the previous moment, since its substantial aspect has endured through both mo-
ments, as well as a novel event, since its modal aspect has changed from the previ-
ous to the present moment. If we take an example of a living substance (jīva) with
one of its essential attributes of consciousness (cetanā), the jīva as a substance per-
sists through the modal modification of its attribute of consciousness, whereas the
modes of this attribute – as the different degrees to which consciousness is mani-
fested – fluctuate momentarily. Furthermore, as Potter points out, a substance
with its qualifiers comprises a single entity, and the various facets of its config-
uration can never be separated. Every substance in a temporal perspective,
then, according to Jainism, embodies a compromise between sat-kārya-vāda
and asat-kārya-vāda, which some scholars have referred to as sad-asat-kārya-
vāda or sat-kāryāsat-kārya-vāda.8
2003), 25–35; and Himal Trikha, Perspektivismus und Kritik: Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell
der Jainas angesichts der Polemik gegen das Vaiśeşika in Vidyānandins Satyaśāsanaparīkşā,
Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 36 (Vienna: Institut für Südasien-, Tibet- und
Buddhismuskunde der Universität Wien, 2012).
7 Potter, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, 114–115.
8 See, for example: Bhartiya, Causation in Indian Philosophy, 30; Chenchulakshmi, The
Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy: A Critical Study with Reference to Sāṃkhya-Yoga,
33; Jhaveri, The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariṇāma, 172; Nancy McCagney,
Nāgārjuna and the Philosophy of Openness (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 67;
Mohan Lal Mehta, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy: The Essentials of Jaina Ontology, Epistemology
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Potter, however, concludes his introductory description of the Jaina causal
model with the following reservation regarding its persuasiveness: “The ques-
tion about Jainism, philosophically speaking, is whether or not it constitutes a
genuinely alternative position or merely an ad hoc eclecticism, and this once
again, depends on how successful an analysis of relations it can provide upon
close examination.”9 This paper will address the question Potter poses, an un-
equivocal answer to which he does not provide. Rather than evaluate the credi-
bility of the Jaina causal model as such, the intent is to thoroughly examine the
coherence of the strategies that Jainas employ in order to distinguish their un-
derstanding of causality from the more dominant rival approaches and estab-
lish their position as one that reconciles them. The paper will do so through a
close analysis of the Jaina accounts of the nature of causal relations, as sug-
gested by Potter, with a particular focus on the descriptions of continuity and
novelty and the relation between them.
The paper will mainly draw from Amṛtacandra Sūri’s Tattva-dīpikā (Light on
Reality), a tenth-century Digambara Sanskrit commentary on Kundakunda’s Pa-
vayaṇa-sāra (Essence of the Teaching),10 written in Prakrit (Jaina Śaurasenī).11
Despite the uncertainty regarding its dating,12 Kundakunda’s Pavayaṇa-sāra is
undoubtedly one of the most authoritative early Digambara philosophical texts,
and its systematic and comprehensive approach lays a foundation for the further
and Ethics (Bangalore: Jain Mission Society, 1954), 116; and Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian
Philosophy, 151.
9 Potter, Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, 115.
10 Pravacana-sāra in Sanskrit.
11 Amṛtacandra Sūri also wrote commentaries on the Paṃcatthiya-saṃgaha (Pañcāstikāya-
sāra in Sanskrit; Essence of the Five Extensive Existents) and the Samaya-sāra (Essence of the
Doctrine), two of Kundakunda’s other influential texts, called Tattva-pradīpikā-vṛtti (Exposition
of the Light on Reality) and Ātma-khyāti (Declaration on the Self), respectively. For a discussion
on the authorship of the texts that are ascribed to Kundakunda, see A. N. Upadhye, Śrī
Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra): A Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, The
Prakrit Text Critically Edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena and
a Hindī Commentary of Pāṇḍe Hemarāja, with an English Translation of the Text, a Topical
Index and the Text with Various Readings, and with an Exhaustive Essay on the Life, Date and
Works of Kundakunda and on the Linguistic and Philosophical Aspects of Pravacanasāra (Agas:
The Parama-Śruta-Prabhāvaka Mandal, Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama, 1984), 23–46.
12 The dates ascribed to Kundakunda vary from the first century BCE to the sixth century CE.
See Upadhye, Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra), 10–23; and F. W. Thomas,
“Introduction,” in The Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda Ācārya, Together with the Commentary,
Tattva-dīpikā, by Amṛtacandra Sūri, trans. Barend Faddegon, ed. with an introduction by
F. W. Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935, new ed. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), xii–xix.
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understanding and explication of Jaina metaphysics. Amṛtacandra Sūri’s Tattva-
dīpikā is the first known commentary that was written on it.13 The commentary
has received only scarce scholarly attention, but it is valuable for the purpose of
this paper since it reflects a mature period in the development of Jaina philoso-
phy, and thus provides a methodical and thorough treatment of Jaina metaphys-
ics at a time when the focus of Jaina philosophy had turned significantly toward
epistemology and logic. Its detailed treatment of the topic of causal relations
challenges the doubt regarding the deliberation and comprehensiveness of
the Jaina doctrine of causality. In the Tattva-dīpikā, Amṛtacandra Sūri organ-
izes the Pavayaṇa-sāra into three parts (śruta-skandha): 1. “Jñāna-tattva-
prajñāpana” (“Exposition of the Reality of Knowledge”), 2. “Jñeya-tattva-pra
jñāpana” (“Exposition of the Reality of the Knowable”), and 3. “Caraṇānusūcikā-
cūlikā” (“Appendix with Advice on Conduct”). Concerned with metaphysics, this
paper will mainly focus on the second part of the text.
2 Outlining the Jaina Understanding of Causal
Relations and Their Relata
The Jainas maintain that all events are causally generated and that every effect
(kārya) is a result of a multiplicity of causes (kāraṇa), rather than a result of a sin-
gle cause. Causes that operate in the production of an effect are categorized into
two basic types, namely, the internal (antar-aṅga) and the external (bahir-aṅga)
causes. These are also referred to as the material/substantial causes (upādāna-
kāraṇa) and the auxiliary/efficient/instrumental causes (nimitta-kāraṇa), respec-
tively.14 The various causes operate within the confines of the basic causal model,
the dynamics of which are characterized by both continuity and novelty, as noted
in the previous section. Similarly to the expositions of causality put forward by
the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika traditions, Amṛtacandra Sūri provides an
informative depiction of the Jaina understanding of the different aspects of causal
dynamics involved in the production of an effect through the familiar example of
the making of a clay pot:
So, just as, for example, when the completion (saṃskāra) [of the clay pot], effected
(āropyamāṇa) by the potter, the stick, the wheel, and the rag, is present (sannidhi), the
13 Upadhye, Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra), 94.
14 Jinendra Varṇī, ed., Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa, vol. 2 (Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 1971, 10th
ed. 2014), 51.
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moment of the production (janma-kṣaṇa) of the arising (vardhamāna) [clay pot] is the
[same as the] moment of the annihilation (nāśa-kṣaṇa) of the clod of clay (mṛtpiṇḍa), and
the [same as the] moment of the stability (sthiti-kṣaṇa) of the clayness (mṛttikātva), which
is engaged (adhirūḍha) in [both of] the two aspects (koṭi-dvaya), so too, when the comple-
tion [in general] effected by the internal (antar-aṅga) and the external (bahir-aṅga) causes
(sādhana) is present, is the moment of the production of the subsequent mode15 (uttara-
paryāya) [the same as] the moment of the annihilation of the preceding mode (prāktana-
paryāya), and [the same as] the moment of the stability of the substantiality (dravyatva),
which is engaged in [both of] the two aspects.16
The moment the effect, i.e., the finished clay pot, is arising, explains Amṛtacandra
Sūri, the clod that was the clay’s previous form is perishing. Jointly with the emerg-
ing of the pot and the perishing of the clod, there is further the clayness of the
clay. The moments of production, annihilation, and stability thus converge in
the event of the arising of the effect. The example draws a causal relation be-
tween the material substance of the clay in the time prior to the current mo-
ment, when it was still formless, and the material substance of the clay at the
moment when it is just being formed into a pot. Although with the arising of a
novel form, the clay suffers a change in its features, it also remains stable in
its clayness, that is, in its character of being clay, which is “engaged in [both
of] the two aspects,” i.e., in both the production of a novel feature of clay and
the annihilation of the previous one – neither of which, as Amṛtacandra Sūri
indicates, can take place without a certain aspect of the clay remaining stable
throughout the change. Applied to the general dynamics of substances, the
moment a new mode is arising, the prior mode is vanishing, yet the substanti-
ality of the substance persists throughout the change, engaging as a support
in both the production of the new and the destruction of the previous modal
character of the substance.
15 In TD II.3, Amṛtacandra Sūri defines attributes as crosswise particular properties (vistāra-vi-
śeṣa), and modes as lengthwise particular properties (āyata-viśeṣa), pointing to the temporal
character of the latter. In TD I.10, he describes attributes as coexistent particular properties
(sahabhāvi-viśeṣa), indicating that, temporally speaking, attributes are coexistent with the
substance they qualify. Modes, on the other hand, he describes as successive particular
properties (kramabhāva-viśeṣa); thus, as already indicated in the general introduction to
the Jaina doctrine of causality in the first part of this paper, modes are qualifiers that are
sequential, meaning that they are not coexistent with the substance, but rather arise and
pass away in succession.
16 TD II.10: tathā hi yathā kulāla-daṇḍa-cakra-cīvarāropyamāṇa-saṃskāra-sannidhau ya eva
vardhamānasya janma-kṣaṇaḥ sa eva mṛtpiṇḍasya nāśa-kṣaṇaḥ sa eva ca koṭi-dvayādhirū-
ḍhasya mṛttikātvasya sthiti-kṣaṇaḥ. tathā antar-aṅga-bahir-aṅga-sādhanāropyamāṇa-saṃskāra-
sannidhau ya evottara-paryāyasya janma-kṣaṇaḥ sa eva prāktana-paryāyasya nāśa-kṣaṇaḥ sa eva
ca koṭi-dvayādhirūḍhasya dravyatvasya sthiti-kṣaṇaḥ.
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The arising of an effect in the framework of such causal dynamics, as
noted, demands the collaboration of several different causes. In the case of a
substance, the above example, without specification, mentions that the arising
of a new mode of a substance involves the operation of internal and external
causes, whereas in the case of the clay pot, the example lists particular causes
that assist its production. Specifically mentioned are the potter, the stick, the
wheel, and the rag, which are all – as instruments that lie outside the substance
of the clay – external or instrumental causes of the effect that is the clay pot.
Commenting on Kundakunda’s definition of a substance as “that which is cou-
pled with origination, loss, and continuance (utpāda-vyaya-dhruvatva-saṃyukta)
without leaving its own-being (aparityakta-svabhāva), endowed with attributes
(guṇavat) and accompanied by modes (saparyāya),”17 Amṛtacandra Sūri provides
another example, which elaborates on the nature of causal relations indicated in
the example of the clay pot, both with regard to the variety and nature of causes
involved in the causal process as well as its features of novelty and continuity.
This is the example of the upper garment. Amṛtacandra Sūri says,
A substance (dravya) is that which is characterized by the diad of attributes and modes
(guṇa-paryāya-dvaya) and the triad of origination, loss, and continuity (utpāda-vyaya-
dhrauvya-traya), without commencing a change in its own-being (anārabdha-svabhāva-
bheda). Here the own-being (svabhāva) of substance means [its] connection to existence
in general (astitva-sāmānyānvaya).18 Existence will be described as twofold: existence of
a characteristic nature (svarūpāstitva) and existence of a common nature (sādṛśyāstitva).
Origination means appearance (prādurbhāva), loss means destruction (pracyavana), and
continuity means stability (avasthiti). Substance, being different from the origination,
etc., or attributes and modes just as that which is to be characterized [is different] from
that which characterizes (lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-bheda), does not undergo a change in its own-
nature (svarūpa-bheda), since in its own-nature (svarūpa), the substance is suchlike
(tathā-vidhatva), like an upper garment (uttarīya). Just as an upper garment that has
17 PS II.3: apariccatta-sahāveṇuppāda-vvaya-dhuvatta-saṃjuttaṃ / guṇavaṃ ca sapajjāyaṃ
jaṃ taṃ davvaṃ ti vuccaṃti //
18 As pointed out by the anonymous reviewer of this paper, Amṛtacandra Sūri might have
borrowed the term astitva from Vaiśeṣika and gave it a new meaning. In his Padārtha-dharma-
saṃgraha, Praśastapāda defines astitva as a property that, along with abhidheyatva (nameabil-
ity) and jñeyatva (cognizibility), belongs to all six ontological categories (padārtha). In the context
of Vaiśeṣika, Piotr Balcerowicz translates astitva as “existentiality,” discerning it from existence
as the highest universal, sattā, which is a property of the first three ontological categories (sub-
stance, quality, and action) only. See Piotr Balcerowicz, “What Exists for the Vaiśeṣika?” in Logic
and Belief in Indian Philosophy, ed. Piotr Balcerowicz (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010, 2nd rev.
ed., Warsaw: self-pub., 2016), 249–360. However, it should be pointed out that the term is already
used by Kundakunda as well. See, for example, PS II.52. This means that Amṛtacandra Sūri could
also have taken the term from the text he is commenting on.
204 Ana Bajželj
acquired (upātta) a dirty state (malināvasthā), when washed (prakṣālita), is originating
(utpadyamāna) with reference to the state of not being dirty (amalāvasthā), is character-
ized by this origination, and in connection with this does not undergo a change in its
own-nature, but by its own-nature adheres to being suchlike, so too does a substance
that has acquired (samupātta) a previous state (prāktanāvasthā) in the presence of proper
external effecting factors (samucita-bahir-aṅga-sādhana-sannidhi-sadbhāva) [acquire] a
state that is diverse or greater (vicitra-bahutarāvasthāna), and, supported (anugrahīta)19
by its own-being in its capacity as own-nature, agent, and cause (svarūpa-kartṛ-karaṇa-
sāmarthya) – which agrees (upāgata) with the internal efficacy (antar-aṅga-sādhanatā)
[of the substance] – is originating with reference to the later state (uttarāvasthā), is char-
acterized by this origination, and in connection with this does not undergo a change in
its own-nature, but by its own-nature adheres to being suchlike.20
Amṛtacandra Sūri here provides an interesting set of details regarding the dif-
ferent causes involved in the arising of an effect. While describing the variety of
causes required for a substance’s acquisition of a novel state, he first says that
proper external effecting factors (samucita-bahir-aṅga-sādhana) must be present
in order for the novel state to emerge. This means that the external causal fac-
tors have an indispensable role in bringing about the arising of every effect,
and that for a specific effect to arise, a set of the right external causes must be
in operation. Drawing parallels with various external or instrumental causes
that were mentioned as being involved in the production of a clay pot, we
might here imagine a washer, water, and soap as instruments that assist the
generation of the effect that is the clean upper garment.21
19 Faddegon suggests reading this as anugṛhīta. See The Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda Ācārya,
Together with the Commentary, Tattva-dīpikā, by Amṛtacandra Sūri, trans. Barend Faddegon, ed.
with an introduction by F. W. Thomas, 66, fn. 1.
20 TD II.3: iha khalu yad anārabdha-svabhāva-bhedam utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-trayeṇa
guṇa-paryāya-dvayeṇa ca yal lakṣyate tad dravyam. tatra hi dravyasya svabhāvo ’stitva-
sāmānyānvayaḥ, astitvaṃ hi vakṣyati dvividhaṃ, svarūpāstitvaṃ sādṛśyāstitvaṃ ceti. tatrotpādaḥ
prādurbhāvaḥ, vyayaḥ pracyavanaṃ, dhrauyvam avasthitiḥ. [. . .] na ca tair utpādādibhir guṇa-
paryāyair vā saha dravyaṃ lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-bhede ’pi svarūpa-bhedam upavrajati, svarūpata eva
dravyasya tathā-vidhatvād uttarīyavat. yathā khalūttarīyam upātta-malināvasthaṃ prakṣālitam
amalāvasthayotpadyamānaṃ tenotpādena lakṣyate. na ca tena saha svarūpa-bhedam upavrajati,
svarūpata eva tathā-vidhatvam avalambate. tathā dravyam api samupātta-prāktanāvasthaṃ
samucita-bahir-aṅga-sādhana-sannidhi-sadbhāve vicitra-bahutarāvasthānaṃ svarūpa-kartṛ-kara
ṇa-sāmarthya-svabhāvenāntar-aṅga-sādhanatām upāgatenānugrahītam uttarāvasthayotpadyamā-
naṃ tenotpādena lakṣyate. na ca tena saha svarūpa-bhedam upavrajati, svarūpata eva tathā-
vidhatvam avalambate.
21 The instrumental causes mentioned so far have been all specific objects or subjects. It
should be noted that in the Niyama-sāra (NS 30, 33) Kundakunda also speaks about substan-
ces as such acting as instrumental causes. He notes, for example, that the substances of the
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Even though a set of proper external causal factors is required for the aris-
ing of an effect, this alone is not sufficient for it, according to Amṛtacandra
Sūri. He says that in the arising of an effect, a substance is also charged with its
own internal efficacy (antar-aṅga-sādhanatā), pointing out that it is the combi-
nation of external causes and the internal causal power of the substance that
generates an effect. In connection with this, he describes a changing substance
not only as a cause (karaṇa), but also as an agent (kartṛ). A substance, then, is
not a passive element in the process of causation, being molded according to
the operation and directive of external causal factors, but is rather an agent, an
active force internally causing the arising of an effect. This means that in the
case of the upper garment, the operation of the washer, the soap, the water,
and any other external causes are not sufficient for the upper garment to be-
come clean. In order for it to change from being dirty to being clean, the mate-
rial substance of the upper garment itself must promote the arising of the novel
event from within.
In TD II.4, Amṛtacandra Sūri repeats the idea of a substance being an agent
and a cause, but he adds that a substance is also a substratum (adhikaraṇa) of
the dynamics of origination, loss, and continuity. He gives the example of gold
(kārtasvara), which functions as a substratum for the origination, loss, and conti-
nuity of a ring, a bracelet, yellowness, etc. (kuṇḍalāṅgada-pītatādi), respectively.
Apart from being a cause and an agent, then, a substance is, by providing a seat
for the causal process to occur, also its support. Needless to say, the implication
of substances being the seats of origination, loss, and continuity is that, in the
Jaina doctrine of causality, the discourse on novelty and continuity between a
cause and its effect refers to the relation between a substance as an internal
cause and its effect – that is, between a substantial cause and its effect, rather
than between an instrumental cause and its effect.22
medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma), space (ākāśa), and time (kāla)
function as the instrumental causes that assist motion (gamana), rest (sthiti), spatial immer-
sion (avagāhana), and alteration (parivartana), respectively.
22 Bhartiya points out that Indian philosophers have tended to focus on the material rather
than the instrumental/efficient cause: “We have seen that in western treatment of causation it is
mainly the efficient cause that has figured. They have, for the most part, neglected material
cause or the material cause has come into consideration there only secondarily, as when consid-
ering the whole cause preceding the effect, where actually the difference between the material
and the efficient cause has disappeared. But when we come to the Indian treatment of causa-
tion, we find an altogether different approach in this matter. Indian thinkers, though they
mostly accept the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) as one of the causes, have not bothered much
about it. Their main subject of treatment is the material cause, i.e., the matter, which, due to the
activity of the efficient cause, takes a new shape. This material cause has of course appeared in
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Returning to the example of the upper garment, Amṛtacandra Sūri adds that,
apart from having a capacity as an agent and a cause, a substance also has a
capacity as own-nature (svarūpa). He does not define svarūpa, so it is not clear
what the word means in this context, but the Jainas generally understand the
peculiar nature of a substance to be twofold: (1) atemporal, i.e., the specific sub-
stance-attributes-modes structure, and (2) temporal, i.e., the specific dynamics of
origination, loss, and continuity. A substance, then, undergoes a causal process
in its capacity of having this particular twofold character. Following this inter-
pretation, the factor of svarūpa would be connected with own-being (svabhāva),
another factor that Amṛtacandra Sūri, in the example above, mentions in relation
to the arising of the effect. He first emphasizes that a substance does not suffer a
change in its own-being (anārabdha-svabhāva-bheda) despite its specific struc-
ture and dynamics. He then continues by saying that a substance acquires a
novel state “supported by its own-being,” a characteristic he defines as the sub-
stance’s connection with existence in general (astitva-sāmānyānvaya), noting
that existence will be explained as being of two kinds – namely, existence of
a characteristic nature (svarūpāstitva) and existence of a common nature
(sādṛśyāstitva). As indicated in the commentary itself, these two kinds of exis-
tence are references to PS II.4 and PS II.5, where Kundakunda says that the
“being of existence (sadbhāva) is the own-being (svabhāva) of substance,
with qualities [and] its own various modes, with origination, loss, and contin-
uance at all times,”23 and that “one, omnipresent (sarva-gata) characteristic
(lakṣaṇa) ‘existing’ (sat) belongs [. . .] to those with manifold characteristics
(vividha-lakṣaṇa).”24 In reference to PS II.4, Barend Faddegon notes,
Whilst here existence is said to be the innate nature of the substance, it is taught in II.5
that existence is sarva-gata, omnipresent, or belonging to everything, and is a lakṣaṇaṃ
vividha-lakṣaṇānām, a common characteristic of that which for the rest shows the greatest
variety of characterization. This variation in expression has led the commentator to think
that the author distinguishes existence-in-reference-to-the-substance or existence-of-
characteristic-nature from existence-in-general.25
different shades in different systems of Indian philosophy”; see Bhartiya, Causation in Indian
Philosophy, 27. See also Padmanabh S. Jaini, “Amṛtacandra Sūri’s Exposition on Reality,” in
Collected Papers on Jaina Studies, ed. Padmanabh S. Jaini (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000, re-
issued 2010), 48–49.
23 PS II.4: sabbhāvo hi sahāvo guṇehiṃ saha pajjaehiṃ cittehiṃ / davvassa savva-kālaṃ uppā-
da-vvaya-dhuvattehiṃ //
24 PS II.5: [. . .] viviha-lakkhaṇāṇaṃ lakkhaṇam egaṃ sad iti savva-gayaṃ /
25 The Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda Ācārya, Together with the Commentary, Tattva-dīpikā, by
Amṛtacandra Sūri, trans. Barend Faddegon, ed. with an introduction by F. W. Thomas, 67, fn. 1.
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This is a very important observation. It seems to me, however, that Amṛtacandra
Sūri, rather than equating existence of a common nature with existence in gen-
eral as opposed to existence of a characteristic nature, as indicated by Faddegon,
draws a distinction between existence of a characteristic nature (existence of in-
dividual substances with their specific structure and dynamics) and existence of
a common nature (what he calls the asti, “it is,” of every substance), which he
understands as two kinds of existence in general. Following this, it would then be
the twofold existence in general that, according to Amṛtacandra Sūri, a substance –
by never undergoing a change in its own-being – maintains a connection with.
According to this interpretation, the first type of existence, namely, the existence
of a characteristic or peculiar nature, is the one connected with the own-nature
(svarūpa) of a substance. A substance never loses its peculiar structure and dynam-
ics, and, further, it employs the capacity of its very nature to propel and configure
the causal process. A substance, likewise, never loses its connection with
the second type of existence, that is, with existence of a common nature or the
basic “it is,” and this eternality holds despite and throughout its structure and
dynamics.
The example of the upper garment further underscores the eternality of a
substance with the description of the relationship between a substance on the
one hand and origination, loss, and continuity as well as attributes and modes
on the other. Amṛtacandra Sūri explains that this relationship is like that be-
tween the characterized (lakṣya) and the characterizing (lakṣaṇa). The idea that
a substance is characterized by origination, loss, and continuity, as well as at-
tributes and modes, first indicates that a substance, qualities, and modes as
well as origination, loss, and continuity do not exist separately, but rather in a
relationship of mutual dependence, since the characterized needs something
that characterizes it and the characterizing needs something to characterize.
They thus exist as an entity of one (the characterized) and many (the character-
izing).26 It also indicates that a substance, as that which is characterized,
26 In Tattva-pradīpikā, his commentary on the Paṃcatthiya-saṃgaha, Amṛtacandra Sūri ex-
plains the relationship between a substance and its attributes and modes: “A substance (dra-
vya) is not separated from [its] modes (paryāya) like cow’s milk (go-rasa) is [not] separated
from the milk [which has been milked out] (dudgha), curd (dadhi), butter (navanīta), ghee
(ghṛta), etc. The modes are not separated from the substance like the milk [which has been
milked out], curd, butter, ghee, etc. are [not] separated from cow’s milk. [. . .] Attributes
(guṇa) do not exist without a substance (dravya) like touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gan-
dha), and colour (varṇa) are [not] separated (pṛthagbhūta) from [the substance of] matter
(pudgala). The substance does not exist without attributes like [the substance of] matter is
[not] separated from touch, taste, smell, and color.” (TP 12–13: atra dravya-paryāyāṇām abhedo
nirdiṣṭaḥ. dugdha-dadhi-navanīta-ghṛtādi-viyuta-gorasavat paryāya-viyutaṃ dravyaṃ nāsti.
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cannot be something that characterizes at the same time. The characterizing
function is reserved for the qualifiers of a substance and the three features of
its dynamics. In the same way, the factors that characterize a substance can-
not perform the function of a substance as that which is characterized. The
specific functions of the characterizing and the characterized are thus fixed
and noninterchangeable.
The notion that a substance is characterized by origination, loss, and conti-
nuity, as well as attributes and modes, further indicates that despite undergoing
its particular dynamics and having a specific structure, a substance never radi-
cally commits to any of its individual features. Amṛtacandra Sūri says that a sub-
stance does not undergo a change in its own-nature (according to the above
interpretation, its particular structure and dynamics), because the manner of
the operation of its own-nature is being suchlike (tatthā-vidhatva). This term ex-
presses that a substance is never only origination, only loss, only continuity,
only an attribute, or only a mode, but is rather characterized by these individual
features without losing any other aspects of its own-nature. The above example
focuses on the feature of origination. In the rest of TD II.3, Amṛtacandra Sūri ap-
plies the same logic to loss and continuity, as well as attributes and modes. In
the specific case of the upper garment, he says that the upper garment is simul-
taneously (eka-kāla) originating with reference to being clean (amala), undergo-
ing loss with reference to being dirty (malina), and being continuous with
reference to the constant state of being a garment, that is, its garmentness
(uttarīyatva). It is also characterized by attributes and modes. It does not, how-
ever, experience a change in its own-nature as the upper garment, be it due to a
certain feature of its dynamics or to an aspect of its structure. Likewise, says
Amṛtacandra Sūri, a substance, simultaneously originating with reference to the
subsequent mode, undergoing loss with reference to the previous mode, and
being continuous with reference to the constant state of being a substance, that
is, its substantiality (dravyatva), as well as being qualified by attributes and
modes, does not experience a change in its own-nature because of any of these
individual features. A substance continues to exist eternally despite being char-
acterized by various qualifiers as well as the dynamics of origination, loss, and
continuity. It, further, never loses its specific structure and dynamics.
gorasa-viyukta-dugdha-dadhi-navanīta-ghṛtādivad dravya-viyuktāḥ paryāyā na santi. [. . .]
pudgala-pṛthagbhūta-sparśa-rasa-gandha-varṇavad dravyeṇa vinā na guṇāḥ saṃbhavanti.
sparśa-rasa-gaṃdha-varṇa-pṛthagbhūta-pudgalavad guṇair vinā dravyaṃ na saṃbhavati.)
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3 Novelty and Continuity in the Jaina Causal Model
The notion of the nonradical commitment of a substance to any of the features
that characterize it, as discussed above, emphasizes that with regard to both nov-
elty (origination and loss) and continuity, a substance can only be suchlike – that
is, like them or characterized by them, but never wholly any one of them. In regard
to the arising of an effect, this means that an effect can never be a wholly novel
product, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would have it. Amṛtacandra Sūri further elabo-
rates on this issue with reference to collections of substances as well as with
reference to substances as individual entities. With reference to collections of sub-
stances, he emphasizes that substances cannot produce another substance:
Substances (dravya) do not produce (ārambha) other substances (dravyāntara), because all
substances (sarva-dravya) are established through their own-being (svabhāva-siddhatva).
Their being established through their own-being is due to their having neither beginning
nor end (anādi-nidhanatva). Something with no beginning or end (anādi-nidhana) does not
require another cause (sādhanāntara). It is an existent with its establishment established
(siddha-siddhimad-bhūta) by itself (svayam), by means (upādāya) of the basic cause (mūla-
sādhana), the own-being of the self (ātman), which is the self of the attributes and modes.
That, however, which is produced by substances, is not another substance but a mode
(paryāya), because of its state of occurring occasionally (kādācitkatva), like a double atom
(dvyaṇuka), etc., and a human (manuṣya), etc. A substance, however, being interminable
(anavadhi) and constant in the three times (trisamayāvasthāyin), could not be such.27
Amṛtacandra Sūri here points out that a substance is always established by itself
(svayam) through the basic cause (mūla-sādhana) that is its own-being (svabhāva),
which was defined above as the substance’s connection with twofold existence in
general. A substance, then, is established through itself as an existent and, as
such, can never be established by another cause (sādhanāntara), such as, for ex-
ample, by other substances. Amṛtacandra Sūri explains that this is due to the fact
that a substance is without a beginning and without an end. Since it is eternal,
nothing could have produced it and nothing could ever make it cease to be.
Hcontinues by saying that while substances do not produce other substances, they
do produce modes (paryāya). He gives two examples of collections of substances to
illustrate this: first, a double atom, which represents a collection of two substances
27 TD II.6: na khalu dravyair dravyāntarāṇām ārambhaḥ, sarva-dravyāṇāṃ svabhāva-siddha
tvāt. svabhāva-siddhatvaṃ tu teṣām anādi-nidhanatvāt. anādi-nidhanaṃ hi na sādhanāntaram
apekṣate. guṇa-paryāyātmānam ātmanaḥ svabhāvam eva mūla-sādhanam upādāya svayam eva
siddha-siddhimad-bhūtaṃ vartate. yat tu dravyair ārabhyate na tad dravyāntaraṃ kādācitkatvāt
sa paryāyaḥ. dvyaṇukādivan-manuṣyādivac ca. dravyaṃ punar anavadhi trisamayāvasthāyi na
tathā syāt.
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of the same kind (material), and then a human, which represents a collection of
two substances of a different kind (material and nonmaterial). Amṛtacandra Sūri
says that such collections of substances ought not to be considered as new sub-
stances, but rather as modes, because they occur only occasionally, and thus exist
temporarily. In contrast to this, a substance as such, he emphasizes, never ceases
to be, its constancy pervading the three times of past, present, and future.
Amṛtacandra Sūri also expands on the claim that an effect can never be a
wholly novel product with reference to substances as individual entities either.
The notion that origination, loss, and continuity should never be thought of as
occurring with reference to substances as such was already indicated in the char-
acterizing-characterized distinction mentioned above. In the case of origination, it
is never the whole substance that originates; in the case of loss, it is never the
whole substance that undergoes loss; and in the case of continuity, it is never the
whole substance that is continuous. Following Kundakunda, Amṛtacandra Sūri
develops this idea further by saying that origination, loss, and continuity are all in
modes (paryāya). It should be pointed out that these are modes of a single sub-
stance, rather than modes as collections of substances discussed above. In reply
to Kundakunda’s assertation – “Origination, stability, and decay (utpāda-sthiti-bha
ṅga) are in modes (paryāya). Modes are always a substance (dravya). Therefore,
all is a substance”28– Amṛtacandra Sūri comments, “Origination, loss, and
continuity (utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya) rest on modes (paryāya), and these
modes rest on a substance. Therefore all (samasta) this is one substance (dra-
vya), and there is no other substance.”29 The idea that the triple dynamics of
origination, loss, and continuity rest on modes, and that these modes, in turn,
rest on a substance, recalls the passage from TD II.4 in which Amṛtacandra Sūri
describes a substance as a substratum of the dynamics of origination, loss, and
continuity. Because a substance is a substratum of modes, it is also a substratum
of the dynamics of these modes. A substance cannot, as a whole, be affected by
these dynamics, since the dynamics occur only in the modal aspect of a sub-
stance. Amṛtacandra Sūri further argues in support of this idea by systematically
listing the unacceptable consequences of origination, loss, and continuity occur-
ring with respect to substances rather than their modes. He says:
But if decay, origination, and continuity (bhaṅga-utpāda-dhrauvya) were maintained as
being of substance (dravya), then all (samgrama) would fall into confusion.
28 PS II.9: uppāda-ṭṭhidi-bhaṃgā vijjaṃte pajjaesu pajjāyā / davvaṃ hi saṃti ṇiyadaṃ tamhā
davvaṃ havadi savvam //
29 TD II.9: utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyāṇi hi paryāyān ālambante, te punaḥ paryāyā dravyam
ālambante. tataḥ samastam apy etad ekam eva dravyaṃ na punar dravyāntaram.
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In the case of decay, there would be the occurrence of the emptiness of all substan-
ces (dravya-śūnyatāvatāra), because of the dissolution (saṃharaṇa) of all substances
(sarva-dravya), leered at by momentary decay (kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-kaṭākṣita), in a single mo-
ment (eka-kṣaṇa), and [so] there would be utter destruction (samuccheda).
In the case of origination, there would be, for every single one (pratyeka), an infinity
(anantya) of substances, marked with origination in every moment (prati-samayotpāda-
mudrita), and [so] there would be the origination of a nonexistent (asad-utpāda).
In the case of continuity, there would be the nonexistence (abhāva) of substance be-
cause of the nonexistence of successively existing (krama-bhū) existences (bhāva), and
[so] there would be momentariness (kṣaṇikatva).30
First, Amṛtacandra Sūri states that if decay occurred with regard to substances as
such rather than their modes, all substances would be destroyed in a single mo-
ment. Since Jaina metaphysics considers modal decay to happen momentarily,
as was noted in the first part of this paper, these momentary dynamics would,
when applied to substances as wholes, result in an immediate decay of all sub-
stances. This means that there would be, as Amṛtacandra Sūri concludes in the
section on decay, “utter destruction (samuccheda),” namely, a destruction of all
there is, because all existence is, according to the Jainas, expressed through sub-
stances. Since the Jainas deem every substance to be eternal rather than momen-
tary and liable to complete destruction, this is an unacceptable consequence for
them, and so they cannot subscribe to the idea of decay occurring with regard to
substances as such rather than their modes.
Second, if origination happened with regard to substances as such rather
than their modes – that is, if origination were a completely novel event – every
single substance would be followed by another substance every single moment,
according to Amṛtacandra Sūri, since origination, in the Jaina metaphysical sys-
tem, is a momentary occurrence, like decay. The result would be an infinite
number of substances being produced with reference to every single substance.
This is again an unacceptable consequence for the Jainas, not only because
some substances in the Jaina metaphysical system (such as space and the
media of motion and rest) are singular in number, but primarily because, as
Amṛtacandra Sūri emphasizes in his conclusion to the section on origination,
“there would be an origination of a nonexistent (asad-utpāda).” As noted
30 TD II.9: yadi punar bhaṅgotpāda-dhrauvyāṇi dravyasyaiveṣyante tadā samagram eva vipla-
vate. tathāhi bhaṅge tāvat kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-kaṭākṣitānām eka-kṣaṇa eva sarva-dravyāṇāṃ saṃ-
haraṇād dravya-śūnyatāvatāraḥ samucchedo vā. utpāde tu pratisamayotpāda-mudritānāṃ pra-
tyekaṃ dravyāṇām anantyam asad-utpādo vā. dhrauvye tu krama-bhuvāṃ bhāvānām abhāvād
dravyasyābhāvaḥ kṣaṇikatvaṃ vā.
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above, all substances are understood to be eternal and self-established, which
means that a new substance cannot be produced. A nonexistent substance
cannot become existent. For that reason, the Jainas cannot subscribe to the
idea of origination occurring with regard to substances as such rather than
their modes.
Third, if continuity existed with regard to substances as such rather than
their modes, substances would not even exist, says Amṛtacandra Sūri. For
him, the concepts of continuity and eternality are clearly not the same, a no-
tion that was already implicit in his differentiation between substantiality
and substance, clayness and clay, yelowness and gold, and garmentness and
garment in the examples above.31 A substance that is solely eternal could be
considered to be unchanging, whereas a substance that is both eternal and
continuous could not be so. Amṛtacandra Sūri points out that for something
to exist as being characterized by continuity, it also needs to be characterized
by variance, through which only continuity can manifest itself. As noted in
the example of the clay pot discussed at the beginning of the second part of
this paper, this is true in the case of the continuously arising and decaying
modal modifications that qualify an eternal substance. Through the arising
and ceasing modes, the continuity of a substance (that is, its substantiality)
as persisting through the change is manifested. The case of substances that
are as such characterized by continuity is different, though, because they
cannot as such simultaneously be characterized by decay and origination,
the possibilities that Amṛtacandra Sūri just refuted. Their continuity can
therefore not be established. The result, says Amṛtacandra Sūri, is momentar-
iness (kṣaṇikatva), indicating a (Buddhist) notion of reality where momentary
events exist without a substantial substratum. A substance characterized as a
substance by continuity only would thus not exist, which is, as already
noted, an unacceptable consequence for the Jainas. This means that the
Jainas cannot subscribe to the idea of continuity occurring with regard to
substances as such rather than their modes.
In the example of the clay pot, Amṛtacandra Sūri highlighted that continu-
ity supports both origination and annihilation. In the last excerpt, he pointed
out that not only do origination and annihilation depend on continuity, but conti-
nuity too depends on origination and annihilation. In glossing Kundakunda’s dic-
tum, “There is no arising (bhava) deprived of decay (bhaṅga-vihīna), nor is there
31 Cf. Bimal Krishna Matilal, “Ontological Problems in Nyāya, Buddhism and Jainism: A
Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1977): 100–101.
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decay deprived of origination. Moreover, origination (utpāda) and decay are not
without a continuous object (dhrauvyārtha),”32 he further emphasizes the total in-
terconditionality of the triple dynamics of origination, loss, and continuity with the
following elaboration:
There is no creation (sarga) without dissolution (saṃhāra) and no dissolution without
creation, no creation nor dissolution (sṛṣṭi-saṃhāra) without stability (sthiti), and no sta-
bility without creation and dissolution. Creation is dissolution, dissolution is creation,
creation and dissolution are stability, and stability is creation and dissolution. For in-
stance, the creation of the pot (kumbha) is the dissolution of the clod of clay (mṛtpiṇḍa),
because being (bhāva) becomes manifest (avabhāsana) through the own-being of the
nonbeing of another being (bhāvāntarābhāva-svabhāva). And the dissolution of the clod
of clay is the origination of the pot, because nonbeing (abhāva) becomes manifest
through the own-being of the being of another being (bhāvāntara-bhāva-svabhāva). And
the creation and dissolution of the pot and the clod are the stability of the clay (mṛttikā),
because the constant (anvaya) manifests (prakāsana) through the divergences (vyatireka-
mukha). And the stability of the clay is the creation and dissolution of the pot and clod,
because the divergences do not surpass (anatikramaṇa) the constant.33
In several ways, this excerpt recalls the example of the clay pot. As in the clay
pot example, here too Amṛtacandra Sūri emphasizes that the arising of the effect
that is the clay pot is also the annihilation of the clod of clay, and that the stabil-
ity of the clay, that is, its clayness, pervades both. He expands on the previous
example by making the additional statements that the annihilation of the clod of
clay is the origination of the clay pot, and that the origination of the clay pot and
the annihilation of the clod of clay are both the stability of the clay. This high-
lights a relationship of complete interconditionality between the three aspects of
the causal process. It is not only that origination, annihilation, and stability coin-
cide by occurring in the same moment, as was demonstrated in the example of
the clay pot. No one of them could ever even occur without the others. This
32 PS II.8: ṇa bhavo bhaṃga-vihīṇo bhaṃgo vā ṇatthi saṃbhava-vihīṇo / uppādo vi ya
bhaṃgo ṇa viṇā dhovveṇa attheṇa //
33 TD II.8: na khalu sargaḥ saṃhāram antareṇa, na saṃhāro vā sargam antareṇa, na sṛṣṭi-sa
ṃhārau sthitim antareṇa, na sthitiḥ sarga-saṃhāram antareṇa. ya eva hi sargaḥ sa eva saṃhāraḥ,
ya eva saṃhāraḥ sa eva sargaḥ, yāv eva sarga-saṃhārau saiva sthitiḥ, yaiva sthitis tāv eva sarga-
saṃhārāv iti. tathāhi ya eva kumbhasya sargaḥ sa eva mṛtpiṇḍasya samhāraḥ bhāvasya
bhāvāntarābhāva-svabhāvenāvabhāsanāt. ya eva ca mṛtpiṇḍasya saṃhāraḥ, sa eva kumbhasya
sargaḥ, abhāvasya bhāvāntara-bhāva-svabhāvenāvabhāsanāt. yau ca kumbha-piṇḍayoḥ sarga-saṃ
hārau saiva mṛttikāyāḥ sthitiḥ, vyatireka-mukhenaivānvayasya prakāśanāt. yaiva ca mṛttikāyāḥ
sthitis tāv eva kumbha-piṇḍayoḥ sarga-saṃhārau, vyatirekāṇām anvayānatikramaṇāt.
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means that all the aspects of the causal process essentially support one another.
Without annihilation, there would be no origination; without origination, no an-
nihilation; without stability, no origination or annihilation; and without origi-
nation and annihilation, no stability. This is so, explains Amṛtacandra Sūri,
because being (bhāva) can become manifest only through the own-being of
the nonbeing of another being (bhāvāntarābhāva-svabhāva). It is only in the
passing away of an old mode that a new mode can arise. Similarly, nonbeing
(abhāva) can become manifest only through the own-being of the being of an-
other being (bhāvāntara-bhāva-svabhāva). An old mode can cease only in the
arising of a new mode. This exchange, says Amṛtacandra Sūri, supports stabil-
ity, because, as noted, something can become manifest as stable or continu-
ous only through divergences. While necessitating divergences, stability at
the same time supports these divergences, says Amṛtacandra Sūri, since they
do not surpass it; namely, they never go beyond it, but rather occur within the
limits of and in coordination with it.
Similarly to the excerpt above that discussed the notion of origination, an-
nihilation, and continuity occurring with regard to substances as such, here too
Amṛtacandra Sūri lists a series of unacceptable consequences of origination,
annihilation, and continuity being independent from one another rather than
being in a relationship of interconditionality. He says,
However, should this not be accepted in this way, it follows that creation is reduced to
being something different, dissolution to being something different, and stability to being
something different.
If it be so, since there is no cause for the originating (utpādana-kāraṇābhāva) of the pot
(kumbha), aiming at creation (sarga) only, there would be either no coming into being
(abhavani) or the origination of a nonexistent (asad-utpāda).
In the case of a pot not coming into being, there would be no coming into being of
anything.
In the case of the origination of a nonexistent, there would be the origination of sky
flowers (vyoma-prasava), etc.34
Focusing first on origination as an independent occurrence, Amṛtacandra Sūri
points out two unacceptable consequences. First, he says, there would be no com-
ing into being (abhavani) of anything at all, indicating that nothing can originate
34 TD II.8: yadi punar nedam evam iṣyeta tadānyaḥ sargo ’nyaḥ saṃhāraḥ anyā sthitir ity
āyāti. tathā sati hi kevalaṃ sargaṃ mṛgayamāṇasya kumbhasyotpādana-kāraṇābhāvād abha-
vanir eva bhavet asad-utpāda eva vā. tatra kumbhasyābhavanau sarveṣām eva bhāvānām a-
bhavanir eva bhavet. asad-utpādo vā vyoma-prasavādīnām apy utpādaḥ syāt.
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by itself. This follows his premise that it is only in being conditioned by the pass-
ing away of an old mode, on the one hand, and being conditioned by continuity
on the other that a new mode can originate. If this holds for one particular exis-
tent, like a pot, argues Amṛtacandra Sūri, it also holds for every other existent,
since the metaphysical structure of existence is universal according to the Jainas.
So if the pot does not come into being, then nothing comes into being. The other
unacceptable consequence is the origination of a nonexistent (asad-utpāda),
which is the same unacceptable consequence that was listed in the abovemen-
tioned scenario of origination occurring with regard to substances as such, i.e., as
substances. If one were to think of origination as something independent not in
terms of modes (which seems to be the aim of the first part of the argument here),
but in terms of substances, one would arrive at a paradoxical situation, because,
as noted, something that cannot be produced (i.e., a nonexistent) would be pro-
duced. Amṛtacandra Sūri says that this would be like the origination of sky flow-
ers, a common example Indian philosophers use to depict a nonexistent.
He continues his argument by focusing on annihilation as an independent
occurrence:
Likewise, since there is no cause for the dissolution (saṃhāra-kāraṇābhāva) of the clod of
clay (mṛtpiṇḍa), which is undergoing dissolution only, there would be either no dissolu-
tion (asaṃharaṇi) or a destruction of an existent (sad-uccheda).
In the case of the clod of clay not undergoing dissolution, there would be no dissolu-
tion of anything.
In the case of the destruction of an existent, there would be a destruction of con-
sciousness (saṃvid), etc.35
If annihilation were an independent occurrence, the first unacceptable conse-
quence, says Amṛtacandra Sūri, would be that there would be no dissolution
(asaṃharaṇi) of anything at all, by which he indicates, similarly as in the pre-
vious case of origination, that annihilation cannot happen by itself. This
again follows his premise that it is only being conditioned by the origination
of a new mode on the one hand, and by continuity on the other, that an old
mode can be annihilated. Again, if this holds for one particular existent, like a
clod of clay, argues Amṛtacandra Sūri, it also holds for every other existent,
since according to the Jainas – as noted above – all existents have the same
metaphysical structure. So, if the clod of clay does not undergo annihilation,
35 TD II.8: tathā kevalaṃ saṃharamāṇasya mṛtpiṇḍasya saṃhāra-kāraṇābhāvād asaṃharaṇir
eva bhavet sad-uccheda eva vā. tatra mṛtpiṇḍasyāsaṃharanau sarveṣām eva bhāvānām
asaṃharaṇir eva bhavet. sad ucchede vā saṃvid-ādīnām apy ucchedaḥ syāt.
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then nothing undergoes annihilation. The second unacceptable consequence
that Amṛtacandra Sūri cautions against is the destruction of an existent (sad-
uccheda), which matches the unacceptable consequence that he posits in the
case of the abovementioned idea of annihilation occurring with regard to sub-
stances as such, i.e., as substances. Similarly to the case of origination, if one
were to think of annihilation as something independent not in terms of
modes, but in terms of substances, one would arrive at a paradoxical situa-
tion, because, as noted, a substance as eternal cannot be annihilated. In fact, as
Amṛtacandra Sūri claims, the annihilation of a substance would be like the anni-
hilation of awareness (saṃvid), something that is utterly unacceptable to the
Jainas, as according to the Jaina metaphysics, no living being can ever
completely lose their essential attribute of awareness or consciousness. Despite
fluctuating in its degrees of manifestation, awareness as such is indestructible.
Amṛtacandra Sūri continues his list of unacceptable consequences by fo-
cusing on stability as an independent occurrence. He says,
Likewise, since there is no constant of stability, overspread with divergences
(vyatirekākrānta-sthity-anvayābhāva), of the clay, [in the case of] admitting stability
only, there would be either no stability (asthāni) or an eternity of the momentary
(kṣaṇika-nityatva).
In the case of no stability of the clay, there would be no stability of anything.
In the case of the eternity of the momentary, there would be eternity (nityatva) of the
moments of citta (citta-kṣaṇa).36
According to Amṛtacandra Sūri, if stability were an independent occurrence, the
first unacceptable consequence would be that there would be no stability (asthāni)
of anything at all. As in the previous two cases, he indicates that stability cannot
occur by itself. This accords with his premise that it is only through the variation
of the passing away of an old mode and the arising of a new mode that stability
can be manifested. Again, if this holds for one particular existent, like clay, as
Amṛtacandra Sūri argues, it also holds for every other existent, since, as noted in
the previous two cases, the metaphysical structure of existence is universal accord-
ing to the Jainas. So if the clay is not stable, then nothing is stable.
The second unacceptable consequence that Amṛtacandra Sūri lists is the
eternity of the momentary (kṣaṇika-nityatva). This formulation is similar to the
36 TD II.8: tathā kevalāṃ sthitim upagacchantyā mṛttikāyā vyatirekākrānta-sthity-anva
yābhāvād asthānir eva bhavet, kṣaṇika-nityatvam eva vā. tatra mṛttikāyā asthānau sarveṣām
eva bhāvānām asthānir eva bhavet. kṣaṇika-nityatve vā citta-kṣaṇānām api nityatvaṃ syāt.
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one that he used to express the unacceptable consequence of stability occurring
with regard to substances as such, i.e., as substances. There, he said that if sta-
bility were to occur with regard to substances as such, the result would be the
nonexistence of a substance and, therefore, momentariness. Here, he mentions
the second part of the previous formulation only, namely, existence as momen-
tary. He illustrates this consequence with an example of the eternality of the
moments of citta (citta-kṣaṇa), something that, as noted above, is completely
unacceptable to the Jainas, as according to the Jaina metaphysics, a cognitive
faculty is an essential attribute, and thus a stable aspect of every living being.
This means that it cannot as such be fragmented into moments, even though,
as an attribute, it continually undergoes momentary modal change.
Having shown that the idea of origination, annihilation, and loss occurring
independently of each other leads to unacceptable consequences and is there-
fore insupportable, Amṛtacandra Sūri concludes that the three are in an eternal
relationship of absolute interconditionality:
Consequently, it is necessarily to acknowledge that a substance (dravya) is marked by three
characteristics shining forth without interruption (uddyotamāna-nirvighna-trai-lakṣaṇya-
lāñchana), unseparated (avinābhūta) from a creation of posterior divergences (uttarottara-
vyatireka), from a dissolution of prior divergences (pūrva-pūrva-vyatireka), and a stability
(avasthāna) of the constant (anvaya).37
4 Credibility of the Jaina Causal Model:
Improvisation or Deliberation?
Having carefully studied the Jaina doctrine of the nature of causal relations in
Amṛtacandra Sūri’s Tattva-dīpikā, it is now possible to return to Potter’s ques-
tion of whether the conciliation offered by the Jaina causal model is a superfi-
cial and ad hoc or a methodical and cogent position. Following Kundakunda,
Amṛtacandra Sūri emphasizes that origination, loss, and continuity all belong
to the same ontological plane, that is, to the modal aspect of substances. This
is one way in which the idea that novelty is not subordinate to continuity nor
continuity to novelty was underlined. Another approach to coordinating the
two was through the notion that the modal plane is an inalienable aspect of
37 TD II.8: tata uttarottara-vyatirekāṇām sargeṇa pūrva-pūrva-vyatirekāṇām saṃhāreṇānvaya-
syāvasthānenāvinābhūtam uddyotamāna-nirvighna-trai-lakṣaṇya-lāñchanaṃ dravyam avaśyam
anumantavyam.
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substances. Substances need modes as much as modes need substances. This
gives a solid grounding to modal dynamics, meaning that origination, loss,
and continuity, as belonging to modes, are all necessary aspects of every sub-
stance. That they are equally so was indicated by the idea of the momentary
occurrence of origination and decay. Their momentariness ensures that novelty
is not secondary to continuity, but that every single moment of every existent
is a moment of the arising of an effect as a convergence of origination, loss,
and continuity. This results in a causal model that not only brings together
novelty and continuity, but brings them together every single moment.
Furthermore, origination, loss, and continuity were emphasized as eternally
being in a relationship of total interconditionality, each one of them present-
ing the essential condition for the arising of the other. Thus, according to the
Jaina causal model, novelty and continuity condition each other, without in-
terruption, momentarily, eternally, on the same ontological plane, which is
the modal aspect of every substance. These features clearly delineate the
Jaina view on causality from the rival approaches to the issue. Unlike the case
of an effect of prakṛti in Sāṃkhya, the novelty of an effect in the Jaina causal
model is not secondary but essential to the continuity itself; moreover, unlike
the case of an effect in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the novelty of an effect in the Jaina
causal model necessitates continuity in order to take place, with novelty at
the same time never overriding continuity. Reading Amṛtacandra Sūri’s de-
tailed exposition of the nature of causal relations and his systematic attempts
to draw a balanced model that coordinates the novelty and continuity of ef-
fects with regard to their substantial causes, it is clear that it is clear that the
explanations of the Jaina model of causality can certainly be deliberate, care-
fully articulated, and coherent.
Abbreviations
PS – Pavayaṇa-sāra (Pravacana-sāra)
TD – Tattva-dīpikā
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8 Charting the Geographies of ’Ju Mi pham
rnam rgyal rgya mtsho’s Perspectivist
Approach to the Two Truths
’Ju Mi pham rNam rgyal rGya mtsho1 is considered one of the greatest scholars of
the rNying ma tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. He is well known for his original
and somewhat innovative presentation of Madhyamaka, which integrates both
Candrakīrti’s tradition and Śāntarakṣita’s philosophical legacy.2 Two-thirds of
Mipham’s (1846–1912) works concern subjects related to philosophical topics
such as epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics.3 Although he did not shy
away from intellectual confrontation and debate on more than a few occasions,4
he is first and foremost known for his inclusivist5 interpretation of Buddhist doc-
trines.6 In this paper, I will focus on his interpretation of the two truths (bden
1 Hereafter Mipham, unless his name is transliterated in Wylie (i.e. ’Ju Mi pham rNam rgyal
rGya mtsho) or quoted from an author following a different transliteration of Mipham’s name
(e.g. Mi-pham, Mipam, etc.).
2 For biographical details on Mipham’s life, see Dieter Schuh, Tibetische Handschriften und
Blockdrucke sowie Tonbandaufnahmen tibetischer Erzählungen, vol. 11.5 (Wiesbaden: Franz
Steiner Verlag, 1973); Steven D. Goodman, “Mi-pham rGya-mtsho: An Account of his Life, the
Printing of his Works, and the Structure of his Treatise Entitled mkhas-pa’i tshul la ’jug pa’i
sgo,” in Wind Horse, ed. Ronald M. Davidson (Fremont: Jain Publishing Company, 1981),
59–78; John W. Pettit, Mi pham’s Beacon of Certainty: Illuminating the View of Dzogchen, the
Great Perfection (Boston: Wisdom, 1999), 1ff.; Gene E. Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, History &
Literature of the Himalayan Plateau (Boston: Wisdom, 2001), 230–231; Douglas S. Duckworth,
Jamgon̈ Mipam: His Life and Teachings (Boston: Shambhala, 2011).
3 See Karma Phuntsho, “Ju Mi pham rNam rgyal rGya mTsho. His Position in the Tibetan
Religious Hierarchy and a Synoptic Survey of his Contributions,” in The Pandita and the
Siddha, Tibetan Studies in Honour of E. Gene Smith, ed. Ramon N. Prats (Dharamsala: Amnye
Machen Institute, 2007), 191–209 for a presentation of Mipham’s main works.
4 See Markus Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism: A Late 19th-Century Debate
between ’Ju Mi pham and Dpa’ ris Rab gsal (Vienna: Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und
Buddhismuskunde, 2014).
5 This term refers to the work of Indologist Paul Hacker on the notion of “inclusivism”; see Paul
Hacker, “Inklusivismus,” in Inklusivismus: Eine indische Denkform, ed. Gerhardt Oberhammer
(Vienna: Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien, 1983), 11–28. Inclusivism denotes the ten-
dency to integrate central concepts and ideas from another religious tradition into one’s own
approach.
6 See for example Pettit, Mi pham’s Beacon of Certainty, 6; Karma Phuntsho, Mi pham’s
Dialectics and the Debate of Emptiness (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 8, 15, 207, 211.
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gnyis, satyadvaya),7 namely, the “concealing” (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti)8 and the “ulti-
mate” (don dam pa, paramārtha).9
In his monograph investigating the Tibetan hermeneutical debate on the
two truths, Sonam Thakchoe notes that Mipham’s treatment of the subject ap-
pears contradictory. He considers Mipham’s discourse as ambiguous, since
Mipham seems to both endorse and criticize Tsong kha pa’s (1357–1419) posi-
tion.10 More importantly, Thakchoe remarks that Mipham propounds contra-
dictory doctrines on the nature of the relationship between the two truths.11
Reading Thakchoe, one is left with the impression that Mipham’s position on
the matter is rather inconsistent. The fact that Mipham also describes the relation-
ship between the two truths in terms of “unity” (zung ’jug, yuganaddha) could
only, from Thakchoe’s point of view, aggravate the charge of philosophical incon-
sistency. Thakchoe’s reading of Mipham therefore raises an important question:
does Mipham’s position entail contradictions? And if not, how are we to make
sense of his discourse on the two truths?
Phuntsho was the first to identify Mipham’s various doctrinal positions in
his treatment of the relationship between the two truths.12 Duckworth has also
noted the presence and importance of various perspectives in Mipham’s writings.13
Finally, Wangchuk has stressed the centrality of the term zung ’jug (“unity”)
7 Technical terms are given in Tibetan and Sanskrit (when available).
8 I translate kun rdzob as “concealing” in accordance with the Sanskrit etymology of the word
saṃvṛti. For a detailed analysis of this term in Mipham’s presentation of the two truths, see
point 2 below.
9 The two truths represent a didactic model commonly found in Buddhist literature. This
model distinguishes two levels of truth in order to present the nature of our reality.
10 Sonam Thakchoe, The Two Truths Debate (Boston: Wisdom, 2007), 176, n. 58. Tsong kha pa
is the founder of the dGe lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism, one of the four schools of Tibetan
Buddhism. The numerous theoretical complexities induced by Mipham’s perspectivist interpre-
tation of the two truths has been the subject of fierce debate between Mipham and dGe lugs
scholars. On this occasion, dGe lugs scholars disputed several points, among which the insepa-
rability (zun ’jug) of the two truths as expounded by Mipham. For an analysis of the polemical
literature produced by these debates, see Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism.
11 See Thakchoe, The Two Truths Debate, 180. Thakchoe sees Mipham as accepting both that
the two truths are incompatible (i.e., gcig pa dkag pa’i tha dad, “different in the sense that
their identity is negated”), and that they have a single ontological identity but different con-
ceptual identities (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad, “different conceptual distinguishers with
regard to a single entity”).
12 See Phuntsho, Mi pham’s Dialectics and the Debate of Emptiness, 123.
13 See for example Duckworth,Mipam on Buddha Nature (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2008), 138.
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in Mipham’s discourse on the two truths.14 These excellent publications on
Mipham’s interpretation of Madhyamaka have not, however, systematically ad-
dressed the issues raised by Thakchoe in 2007. Phuntsho’s contribution was pub-
lished before Thakchoe even identified the issue, while Duckworth’s Mipam on
Buddha Nature was written at roughly the same time.
In this paper, I show that Mipham sees any informed knowledge on the na-
ture of reality as perspectival and expressed to address a specific soteriological
concern. According to his view, discourses on the relationship between the two
truths are soteriologically situated. Mipham’s presentation of Madhyamaka can
therefore be seen as perspectivist insofar as Mipham considers the validity of
doctrines on the two truths as dependent on the soteriological context within
which these doctrines are formulated. This inclusivist approach results in a
complex presentation of Madhyamaka in which several seemingly contradic-
tory positions are ranked according to an ascending scale of views. To answer
Thakchoe’s questions, it is therefore essential to examine in detail the cognitive
and epistemic standpoints from which Mipham expounds the two truths in his
writings on the subject.15
1 A Perspectivist Approach to the Two Truths
As noted by Tibetan and Western scholars alike, Mipham uses two distinct
definitions of the two truths to ascertain the view (lta ba, dṛṣṭi).16 The first
definition is based on the distinction between appearance (snang ba) and
emptiness (stong pa), whereas the second hinges on the concordance, or
14 See Dorji Wangchuk, “Was Mi-pham a Dialectical Monist? On a Recent Study of Mi-pham’s
Interpretation of the Buddha-Nature Theory,” Indo-Iranian Journal 55 (2012): 15–38.
15 Mipham’s view on the two truths, as found in his Collected Works (Mi pham gsung ’bum),
did not evolve through time. His doctrinal positions are remarkably stable from the moment
he started composing commentaries and original works. In addition to primary sources, I also
consulted the monographs and articles mentioned in the bibliography below. Key statements
drawn from Mipham’s works found in some of these publications were retranslated from the
Tibetan for the present article.
16 See for example Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha Nature, 6ff.; Duckworth, Jamgön Mipam:
His Life and Teachings, 13; Phuntsho, Mi pham’s Dialectics and the Debate of Emptiness, 114ff.;
Markus Viehbeck, “Fighting for the Truth – Satyadvaya and the Debates Provoked by Mi
pham’s Nor bu ke ta ka,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 34,
no. 1–2 (2011): 291–320; Wangchuk, “Was Mi-pham a Dialectical Monist?” 24; Viehbeck,
Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism, 151, n. 207.
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lack thereof, between the way things are (gnas lugs) and the way they appear
(snang lugs). In the dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, his commentary on
Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra, one of his most personal philosophical
works, Mipham declares17:
Moreover, in [all the Buddha’s] words (bka’) and treatises (bstan bcos, śāstra), there are two
ways to posit the two truths: (1) From the perspective of a valid cognition investigating the
ultimate, namely, the way [things] are (gnas lugs), the “ultimate” refers to emptiness (stong
pa) and the “concealing” to appearances (snang ba); (2) From the perspective of a conven-
tional (kun tu tha snyad) valid cognition investigating the mode of appearance [of things]
(snang tshul), the “ultimate” refers to the subject and object for which nature and appearance
(gnas snang) are in irrefutable accordance. The “concealing” refers to the opposite.18
According to Mipham, the first definition – termed snang stong – is usually en-
countered in Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka or in the sūtras of the Second Turning of
the Wheel that explicate the absence of “own-nature” (ngo bo nyid, svabhāva)
of phenomena. The second definition is prevalent in the Maitreya tradition and
the sūtras of the Third Turning of the Wheel. The latter is also referred to as the
mthun mi mthun (“accordance/discordance”) model, since the distinction be-
tween the two truths depends upon whether the way things appear is concor-
dant with the way things are. As a consequence, the first definition (snang
stong) could be considered to be apophatic, being based on the ultimate analy-
sis of appearances showing their absence of “own-nature.” The second defini-
tion (mthun mi mthun) implies a more cataphatic approach to the ultimate
through the distinction it establishes between the sphere of mind (sems) that
constitutes the concealing truth and gnosis (ye shes), the ultimate. In Mipham’s
system, this second definition is used to explain that the nature of a buddha
(tathāgatagarbha) is empty of adventitious afflictions (nyon mongs, kleśa), but
not empty of buddha qualities; in other words, to teach the difference between
the conditioned mind and gnosis, which cannot be reduced to a blank nothing-
ness. One should add that these two definitions of the truths are not mutually
17 For a summary of this point, see gZhan stong khas len seng ge’i nga ro in Pettit, Mi pham’s
Beacon of Certainty, 416, and Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha Nature, 6–20, about the use of
the second definition of the two truths in the context of Mipham’s interpretation of the
tathāgatagarbha theory; cf. Phuntsho,Mi pham’s Dialectics, 114–16.
18 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 30, 3: de’ang bka’ dang bstan bcos rnams na bden gnyis ’jog
tshul gnyis su gnas te/ gnas lugs don dam la dpyod pa’i tshad ma’i dbang du byas te/ stong pa
la don dam dang/ snang ba la kun rdzob ces bzhag pa dang/ snang tshul la dpyod pa kun tu tha
snyad pa’i tshad ma’i dbang du byas te/ gnas snang mthun pa mi bslu ba’i yul dang yul can la
don dam dang/ ldog phyogs la kun rdzob tu ’jog pa’i tshul gnyis las/
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exclusive, since gnosis is considered to be without an “own-nature,” although
it does possess qualities.
From the viewpoint of rDzogs chen, the highest teaching in Mipham’s tradi-
tion, the first definition of the two truths appears to be formulated from an on-
tological perspective, stressing the primordially pure (ka dag) aspect of reality,
whereas the second definition seems to be expressed from a cognitive perspec-
tive conducive to the realization of the spontaneously present (lhun grub) as-
pect of reality. The propaedeutic function of this perspectival approach plays a
central role in the way Mipham teaches Madhyamaka as a doctrine that facili-
tates the realization of rDzogs chen. In his introduction to the dBu ma rgyan gyi
rnam bshad, he thus clearly differentiates the context in which statements
about the ultimate are made and explains at length that there are no contradic-
tions between different views insofar as one understands that the multiplicity
of apparently divergent opinions on a given topic reflects the various contexts
in which these views are formulated.
This hermeneutic strategy based on the notion of standpoint and perspec-
tive is often used by Mipham to avoid contradictions, but it is also profoundly
reflective of his understanding that doctrines, as expressions of a truth, are re-
lated to a specific epistemic context. To illustrate this point, I would like to turn
to Mipham’s first definition of the two truths, in which the standard opposition
between appearance and emptiness is resolved in a way that is similar to Go
rams pa’s approach:19
With regard to those [two truths], the concealing truth represents all phenomena (chos,
dharma) in whatever way they appear: the ground comprised of the conditioned and the
unconditioned, [such as] the aggregates (phung po, skandha), the basic constituents
(khams, dhātu), and the sources of cognition (skye mched, āyatana); the path, [for exam-
ple,] the perfections, the factors conducive to awakening (byang chub kyi phyogs,
bodhipakṣa), etc.; and the fruit, [such as] the ten powers and so forth. In brief, [the con-
cealing truth includes] the innumerable phenomena, as many as they are (ji snyed pa), all
that is posited from the perspective of the incontrovertible (bslus med) mode of appear-
ance of cognitive objects.
With regard to the ultimate truth, the phenomena of the ground, path, and fruit abide
within the emptiness that is not established as anything at all. This [mode of abiding],
being posited from the perspective of the way things are (gnas lugs), is the profound phe-
nomenon (chos, dharma) as it is (ji lta ba).
19 See José Ignacio Cabezón and Geshe Lobsang Dargyay, trans., Freedom from Extremes,
Gorampa’s “Distinguishing the View” and the Polemics of Emptiness (Boston: Wisdom, 2007),
207–11.
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Realizing that these two [truths] are in the real sense in a state of unity (zung ’jug) or fun-
damental sameness (mnyam pa nyid) is the supreme object of realization, the ultimate
purpose.20
In this apparently basic definition of the two truths, a central point is made. Each
truth corresponds to an object that is dependent on an epistemic perspective. The
dividing line between those truths is, by way of consequence, not so much the con-
cealing and ultimate objects in themselves, but the way things are perceived. In
his Nor bu ke ta ka, while commenting on Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA
IX.2), Mipham thus quotes Candrakīrti’sMādhyamakāvatāra (Mav VI, 23):
By perceiving correctly or incorrectly all things,
The two natures of all things will be apprehended [. . .]21
2 The Concealing Truth as an Epistemic
Perspective
As explained by Mipham in the quote above, the concealing truth is “what is
posited from the perspective of the incontrovertible mode of appearance of all
cognitive objects.” Objects are mere experiences, appearances, manifestations
(snang ba). The concept of “truth” is clearly conceived here in epistemic terms
rather than as a purely ontological issue. In Mipham’s explanation, the conceal-
ing truth consists merely of mistaken experience. Mipham thus declares in his
Nor bu ke ta ka,
[. . .] although the concealing truth is devoid of arising and so on, in its nature, it is that
which appears as that (der snang), a mode of appearance similar to an illusion, a dream,
or a hair [appearing to someone suffering from myodesopsia].22
20 Mkhas pa’i tshul la ’jug pa’i sgo, Vol.II, 174: de la kun rdzob kyi bden pa ni ji ltar snang ba’i
chos gzhi ’dus byas dang ’dus ma byas kyis bsdus pa phung khams skye mched dang / lam phar
phyin dang byang phyogs sogs dang/ ’bras bu stobs bcu la sogs pa mdor na shes bya rnams kyi
snang tshul bslus med kyi ngos nas bzhag pa ji snyed pa rgya che ba’i chos so/ don dam bden pa
ni gzhi lam ’bras bu’i chos de dag rang bzhin cir yang ma grub pa’i stong pa nyid du gnas pa ni
gnas lugs kyi ngos nas bzhag pa ste ji lta ba zab mo’i chos so/ de gnyis yang dag pa’i don du
zung ’jug mnyam pa nyid du rtogs pa ni rtogs bya rnams kyi nang na mchog tu gyur pa mthar
thug gi don no/
21 For the Sanskrit, see Xuezhu Li, “Madhyamakāvatāra-kārikā,” China Tibetology 1 (2012): 5:
samyagmṛṣādarśanalabdhabhāvaṃ rūpadvayaṃ bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ.
22 Nor bu ke ta ka, 4: de la kun rdzob ni skye sogs kyi rang bzhin du med bzhin der snang sgyu
ma dang rmi lam skra shad lta bu’i snang tshul ’di yin la/
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A correct understanding of the compound lexeme der snang ba is required to
grasp Mipham’s understanding of concealing truth. As is characteristic of
Buddhist polysemic technical terms, snang ba is translated in various ways: it
is generally assumed to mean “appearance,” “perception,” “manifestation,” or
“experience.” I have chosen to translate it as “appearance” in the sense of the
manifestation as an experience. The notion of experience here conveys the idea
of subjectivity, while the idea of manifestation expresses the dynamic aspect of
snang ba. Unfortunately, these two aspects are somewhat missing when one
translates snang ba with “appearance.” An appearance is usually understood
as belonging to an external object and a perception as something purely subjec-
tive. The notion of appearance in the sense of a cognitive event supports a grad-
ual shift from the perspective of the concealing truth experienced by ordinary
beings up to the perspective of sublime beings (’phags pa rnams), a method
that is the whole point of Mipham’s propaedeutic approach to the two truths.
The term does not aim here at reinforcing any dualistic ontological identifica-
tion of the concealing in terms of subject/object, which is the mark of lower
substantialist systems. We can therefore safely understand der snang ba as
meaning “that which appears there” in the sense of “an appearance as this or
that in [one’s] mind.” With this expression, Mipham refers to a cognitive pro-
cess without implying that appearances exist ultimately as mind itself, that is
to say, without substantially (rdzas su, dravyatas) positing any existence, on
the side of the subject or the object. In his commentary to the dBu ma rgyan, he
explains,23
One fully knows how things are conventionally by accepting that the various appearances
are magical manifestations (rnam par ’phrul pa, vikurvāṇa), and [one thus] acquires confi-
dence in the way [one] enters in or turns away from saṃsāra. Further, from the perspec-
tive of the way things are, which is free from all objective supports (dmigs pa, ālambana),
marks, and mental proliferations, it is not even observed that “appearance is mind.”
However, this is the ultimate that is beyond conventional designations. [53] Within the
23 My preference would be to translate snang ba with “manifestation of an experience,”
which has the advantage of not committing oneself to either of the two alternatives of the sub-
ject/object dichotomy while maintaining the dynamic notion snang ba carries. However, I
have settled for “appearance,” which, being much shorter, leads to a more concise translation
of this term. In the context of rDzogs chen, this term facilitates the right understanding of the
expressive power (rtsal) of awareness (rig pa) or even of nyams, the temporary shifting experi-
ences during practice that belong to mind and not to rig pa. As Mipham has based his exposi-
tion of Madhyamaka on a gradual progression towards the view of rDzogs chen, I believe that
it is important to remain in the spirit of this tradition when translating these technical terms in
order to allow for a smooth transition between the different levels of Mipham’s ascending
scale of philosophical views.
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context of the appearance of conventional designations, the existence of external objects
is refuted by reasoning, while it is established through reasoning that this [appearance] is
nothing but mind.24 As a consequence, insofar as a conventional designation is accepted
without contradicting confined perception (tshur mthong), there is no better [account of
the concealing] than this. If one examines the phenomena that are merely posited
through the power of conceptuality, [one finds that] they are not established as anything
at all. However, these unceasing and incontrovertible appearances, which are experi-
enced from one’s point of view, are established by the power of the things themselves as
mental appearances or one’s own appearances.25
For Mipham, the concealing truth is thus nothing but this multiplicity of experi-
ences manifesting in the mind. He justifies this view by stressing that since
such a presentation is in accord with empirical perceptions, there is no better
way to define the concealing truth. However, these experiences are not mind, a
significant point made by Klong chen pa that Mipham undeniably accepts.26
24 Mipham does not mean hereby that things are mind, but only that they appear “there” (i.e.,
in the mind). They are information in the forms of ideas, notions, and various types of cogni-
tions. Their substance, however, is neither matter nor mind. His remark is purely epistemic. This
way of positing the concealing truth is reminiscent of the Maitreya chapter of the SNS (SNS 6).
Klong chen pa also understands snang ba in the same way: “Notons de plus que Klong chen pa
feint aussi souvent de tenir l’esprit pour le spectateur des apparences, celui qui en juge, tandis
qu’en même temps il est clair que les apparences ne sont rien de plus que ce fait pour lui de les
percevoir. On demandera pourquoi il prétend ainsi distinguer l’esprit des apparences; c’est qu’il
décrit une structure ’apparaître-à-l’esprit’, dont les moments sont indissociables, mais en même
temps ne sont possibles que pour autant qu’ils paraissent autonomes. Qu’est-ce-à dire? Le mot
‘snang ba’ doit, comme on l’a dit, s’interpréter comme le ‘paraître’ (comme processus) et
en même temps comme le contenu qualifié de cette apparition”; see Stéphane Arguillère, “Le
Repos de l’esprit, la question de voie graduée dans le rDzogs pa Chen po selon quelques oeuvres
de Klong chen Rab ’byams” (MA thesis, Paris: 1991), 40. As rightly remarked by Arguillère,
snang ba denotes both the process and its content.
25 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 52.5ff.: gsum pa snang ba sna tshogs pa sems kyi rnam ’phrul
du khas blangs pas tha snyad kyi yin lugs mthar thug pa shes shing ’khor bar ’jug ldog gi tshul la
yid ches thob ste/ de la dmigs mtshan spros pa thams cad dang bral ba’i gnas lugs kyi dbang du
na/ snang ba sems yin no zhes kyang mi dmigs mod/ de ni tha snyad las ’das pa’i don dam pa yin
la/ [53] tha snyad snang ba’i ngang tshul ’di la gnas ni/ phyi don yod pa la rigs pas gnod cing/
sems tsam yin pa la rigs pa’i sgrub byed yod pas tshur mthong gis las ma brgal bar tha snyad zhig
khas len na ’di las gong du gyur pa med de/ rtog pa’i dbang gis bzhag pa tsam gyi chos rnams
dpyad na gang du’ang ma grub kyang/ rang ngor myong tshul gyis bslu med du snang ba ’gog tu
med pa ’di sems kyi snang ba’am rang snang tsam du dngos po’i stobs kyis grub pa yin no/
26 In his presentation of Mañjuśrīmitra’s rDo la gser, Lipman shows that, in the Yid bzhin
mdzod, Klong chen pa insists that snang ba has no substratum: “Nowadays, ignoramuses say
that rDzogs chen claims that how things appear is merely our own mind. This is totally unac-
ceptable, for it leads to the absurd conclusion that mind can be divided into parts, colours, and
qualities you can get a hold on, since the way things appear seems to be so. [. . .] However, we
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As a consequence, these appearances are not declared to be mind in any onto-
logical sense. In a word, when Mipham defines the concealing truth as experi-
ences manifesting in the mind, he does not imply that the essence of
appearances is nothing but mind (cittamātra) in the way of an idealist reduc-
tionism. His view is not that mind has a higher ontological status than other
phenomena on the level of the concealing truth. In fact, Mipham’s presenta-
tion of the concealing simply describes an epistemic process that does not en-
tail any assertion of existence as such. Ascribing an ultimate substance to
illusion is not the point. Rather, the point is that delusion as a cognitive event
takes place from a purely epistemic perspective. These manifestations of vari-
ous experiences, these appearances, are seen as “the play of mind,” even at
the level of the sūtras, which, in the perspective of higher teachings such as
rDzogs chen, can subsequently facilitate a gradual transition from a lower
(i.e., provisional) understanding of the concealing to a more profound one, as
found in the context of the unity (zung ’jug) of the two truths:
Thus, when one knows that appearances are the play of mind, [one has] a way to find
certainty as to how one engages in or turns away from saṃsāra.27
Conditioned (’dus byas, saṃskṛta) phenomena are seen by Mipham as nothing
but experiences manifesting in the mind, and represent a dualistic cognitive
process.28 Mind is identified as delusion, not as the ultimate, from the perspec-
tive of ordinary beings, which echoes rDzogs chen’s distinction between dualis-
tic mind (sems) and nondual awareness (rig pa). Mipham’s approach allows
maintain that how things appear is without root or basis, occasioned by the intoxicant of the
deluding habituating tendencies making themselves felt in experience. Therefore, we are those
who say that there is no actuality to how things appear.” See Kennard Lipman and Namkhai
Norbu, Primordial Experience (Boston: Shambhala,1986), 21; further, “Since all the configura-
tions of events/meanings that present themselves to us as the five sense objects of visible form,
and so forth, as well as the whole outer world and the beings it contains, are present in mind,
they are not something apart from mind. Although they seem to be something other than mind,
since they are actually nonexistent, like a dream or conjurer’s illusion, they can’t be found as
something apart from mind. Also, for this reason, they can’t be identified with mind itself, as
illustrated by the eight similes of conjurer’s illusion, and so forth. Examining the ultimate com-
ponents, whether individual or composite, of material objects that, although they are nothing
at all, are clearly experienced, shows that either way they are just the same in that there is
nothing that makes them what they are” (Lipman, Primordial Experience, 22–23; I use “mind”
instead of Lipman’s “experience” for sems).
27 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 53.4ff.: de ltar snang ba sems nyid kyi rol par shes na ’khor
bar ’jug ldog gi tshul la nges pa rnyed tshul yang/
28 See Pettit, Mi pham’s Beacon of Certainty, 155.
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him to refer to this distinction through his second definition of the two truths,
corresponding to the concordance/discordance (mthun mi mthun) model.29
Putative objects are consequently reduced merely to the vast field of experi-
ences and appearances occurring in the mind as being real, although they are
not. As stated in Mipham’s commentary on the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga:
That which is designated as “phenomenon” in the immediately preceding explanation,
the character (mtshan nyid, lakṣaṇa) of saṃsāra itself, appears dualistically as an appre-
hending subject or an apprehended object. Then, inasmuch as this appearance is grasped
as this or that and designated by various expressions, this dualistic appearance of an ap-
prehended object and an apprehending subject, being an appearance, is not truly estab-
lished, just like the perspective of a drawing that appears to exist.30 Therefore, like the
appearance of strands of hair and so forth [for someone suffering of myodesopsia], it is
nothing but one’s own incorrect projection (kun tu rtog pa, parikalpa), since it appears in
[one’s] mind in the manner of a nonexistent object.31
According to Mipham, the concealing truth is a perspective that takes as an ex-
isting object that which does not exist. If this object is analyzed, nothing is
found. But since ordinary beings experience something, this level of ordinary
reality is etymologically termed “concealing” (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti). Mipham’s
explanations in the Nor bu ke ta ka and in the dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad
follow those of Prajñākāramati’s ad BCA 2a–b here32:
Because the so-called “concealing [truth]” appears as arising and so forth, emptiness is
hidden from the perspective of spiritually immature persons and must be exclusively un-
derstood as that which has become veiled (bsgribs pa).33
29 On the distinction between sems and ye shes in rDzogs chen, see David Higgins, The
Philosophical Foundations of Classical rDzogs chen in Tibet: Investigating the Distinction be-
tween Dualistic Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes) (Vienna: Wiener Studien zur
Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 2013).
30 Cf. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara, XIII, 17ab, where the same simile is found: yathaiva citre vidhi-
vad vicitrite natonnataṃ nāsti ca dṛśyate ’tha ca/
31 Ye shes snang ba, 615.3: bshad ma thag pa de la chos zhes brjod pa ’khor ba de nyid kyi
mtshan nyid ni/ gzung ’dzin gnyis su snang ba dang/ ji ltar snang ba de ’di dang de ltar zhen
cing ming sna tshogs kyis mngon par brjod par snang ba can ’di nyid de/ ’di ltar tshul bzhin bris
ba’i ri mo la ma thod man med kyang yod par snang ba ltar gzung ’dzin gnyis su snang ba de ni/
snang ba ltar don lam grub bas na dper na skra shad la sogs par snang ba bzhin du yang dag pa
ma yin pa’i rang gi kun tu rtog pa tsam/ yul med bzhin tu sems la snang ba’i phyir ro/
32 See P. L. Vaidya, Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of
Prajñākaramati (Dharbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), 176, lines 4–11.
33 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 30.6ff.: kun rdzob ces skye ba sogs su snang ba’i tshul gyis
byis pa rnams kyi ngor stong pa nyid spas shing bsgribs par gyur pa lta bu zhig kho na la go
dgos kyi/
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In this statement, Mipham does not present the concealing truth as intrinsically
different from the ultimate, but as that which has become concealed, obstructed,
covered, veiled (saṃvṛti) “from the perspective of spiritually immature beings.”
This latter remark might seem innocuous, but it is an essential point in Mipham’s
discernment of various perspectives in accordance with Śāntarakṣita’s approach,
particularly in the context of a discourse on the ultimate.
3 The Ultimate Truth . . . from the Perspectives
of the Concealing and the Ultimate Truths
In his commentary on BCA 2a–b, Mipham mentions two ultimates: the nominal
(rnam grangs pa’i don dam, *paryāyaparamārtha) or concordant ultimate
(mthun pa’i don dam) and the actual ultimate (rnam grangs min pa’i don dam,
*aparyāyaparamārtha). The nominal ultimate is defined as “the mere ultimate
nonexistence of all substantial things.” The actual ultimate is on its part de-
fined as “freedom from the four extremes.” According to Mipham (cf. Nor bu
ke ta ka ad BCA 2a–b), pretending that things exist conventionally but are ul-
timately nonexistent is acceptable from the perspective of beginners, but is
definitely limited from the perspective of sublime beings. Here again, the ulti-
mate is explained from the perspective of the essence, since, as explained by
Kapstein, this division prevents one from conflating the discourse about the
absolute with its realization.34 According to Mipham, the nominal ultimate is
therefore nothing more than a pedagogical device that is simply in accordance
with the actual ultimate:35
Likewise, at the beginning, conventional arising and ultimate nonarising [of phenomena],
as objects of language and conceptuality at the time of hearing and reflecting are estab-
lished together within a twofold system [i.e., the two truths]. As one member of this pair,
the nominal ultimate is [called] nominal because it is a conceptualization of the ultimate,
and it is derived from the opposite pair member with which it is associated (i.e., conceal-
ing [truth]). The nominal, the opposite of the concealing within the so-called two truths,
is the cause [of the understanding of the actual ultimate]. It is merely an entrance gate
leading to the consummate ultimate (don dam mthar thug).36
34 See Kapstein, Reason’s Traces (Boston: Wisdom, 2001), 329.
35 See Viehbeck, “Fighting for the Truth.”
36 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 34.5ff.: de ltar dang por thos bsam gyi sgra rtog gi yul du gyur
pa’i tha snyad du skye ba dang/ don dam par mi skye ba lta bu tshul gnyis zung du bzhag pa’i
ya gyal rnams grangs pa’i don dam ni/ kun rdzob yod pa’i zlas drangs pa’i phyir ram/ don dam
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If the ultimate beyond all mental proliferations is stated in the form of a non-
affirming negation, then some unfortunate consequences ensue. Mipham uses
a typical reductio ad absurdum here:
Without the two investigations of the ultimate,
The unity (zung ’jug) of the two truths would not be known.37
As the ultimate would fall into the extreme of mental proliferations,
It would namely, itself, destroy its own nature.38
Already in his dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, Mipham seems to be honestly
concerned that such a way of stating the ultimate might lead to the wrong
understanding:
If this alone, [namely that the ultimate truth means nonexistence], is taught as the ulti-
mate, some people of weak understanding would think, “Nonexistence only, which is the
negation of the negandum, is the [ultimate] nature [of phenomena].” Clinging to empti-
ness, they would become incurably attached to this view [of emptiness]. This clinging is
of two kinds: the clinging to emptiness as something substantial and the clinging [to
emptiness] as something insubstantial.39
In the following statement, Mipham shows that sheer nonexistence alone is
indeed nothing but conceptuality in disguise.40 It is not to be confused with
the freedom from extremes that corresponds to what could prosaically be termed
a mystical experience beyond the range of our ordinary cognitive processes:
Thus, owing to the clinging to substantial things (dngos po, bhāva) as being existent,
which has been a habit since beginningless time, [phenomena] are established as nonex-
istent and one is made familiar with [this]. If one does not understand that the nature of
[any seemingly] substantial thing is nonexistent, the certainty regarding the nature of
phenomena, which is beyond extremes, cannot arise. However, this pure nonexistence
alone (med pa nyid tsam kho na) is not the consummate nature of phenomena. At the
time when this substantial thing that is investigated and about which it is said “No sub-
stantial thing such as form and so forth exists” is conventionally not perceived as arising
pa’i grangs su gtogs pas na rnam grangs te/ bden pa gnyis zhes pa’i kun rdzob kyi zlar bgrang
rgyud de yin la/ de ni don dam mthar thug dang mthun pa’i sgo tsam mam/
37 The first verse refers to the nominal and the actual ultimates.
38 Shes rab ral gri, 804.3ff.: /don dam dpyod byed gnyis med na//bden gnyis zung ’jug mi shes
shing//don dam spros pa’i mthar lhung la//de yang rang gis rang nyid ’jig/
39 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 55.5ff.: de tsam zhig don dam du bstan na ni blo chung ba
gcig dgag bya bkag pa’i med pa tsam gnas lugs so snyam du stong pa nyid la zhen nas dsor mi
rung ba’i lta bar ’gyur la/ zhen tshul la’ang stong nyid la dngos por zhen pa dang dngos med du
zhen pa gnyis yod/
40 On the three types of conceptuality (sgra don ’dzes ’dzin gyi rtog pa, ngo bo nyid kyi rtog
pa, rtsing zhib kyi rtog pa), see Phuntsho,Mi pham’s Dialectics, 190ff.
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and so forth on the basis of its own essence, how could [this nonexistence of a substantial
thing] then be the intellect’s object of reference, since the very nonexistence of [any] sub-
stantial thing that depends on this [substantial thing] (de la brten) has no substantial thing
it can relate to? It is impossible, just like the death of the unborn son of a barren woman is
not perceived. Thus, nonexistence does not exist, as it is only posited in dependence upon
existence, namely, that which is established by its own essence as independent.
Some say, “Well, by negating existence, nonexistence is established. If in turn you
negate nonexistence as well, since it will go on and on with these two, then what will you
do?”41 It is certainly true that such conceptualizations (kun rtog), [made] in the way an
elephant bathes [in the mud], arise in those who, in reliance upon consciousness (rnam
shes, vijñāna), take a point of view [based on] the confined perception of dogmatic logi-
cians (tshur mthong rtog ge’i dbang du byas pa).42 As the inconceivable nature of phenom-
ena (chos nyid, dharmatā) is supreme among [all kinds of] greatness that frighten the
unfortunates, they do not understand its nature. When something is taught as the insub-
stantiality [of phenomena], they apprehend [it] as a nihilistic emptiness. When something
is taught as that which is endowed with appearance, they apprehend it as really estab-
lished. When something is termed “the unity [of appearance and emptiness],” they appre-
hend it as an object such as a rope [made of] of black and white braided strands. When
something is termed “inconceivable,” nothing dawns on them, aside from something like
the Hwa shang’s view of [mental] blankness. If everyone could easily understand this su-
preme and profound nature of phenomena (chos nyid, dharmatā), why is it said,43 “Being
completely beyond the world, the sphere of the sublime ones is difficult to perceive and
difficult to understand, inconceivable”?44
41 This represents the position of those for whom the principle of the excluded middle is valid
(namely the dGe lugs pa), also on the level of the ultimate. The very negation of nonexistence
establishes existence and vice versa. Hence the vicious circle mentioned here by the oppo-
nent’s objection.
42 Cf. Arguillère, L’Opalescent Joyau Nor-bu ke-ta-ka. Mi pham (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 88, n. 2:
“L’éléphant en se vautrant dans la boue se souille tout en se lavant. De même la notion de
vacuité, en tant que telle, n’est-elle pas une idée fictive au même titre que les conceptions implic-
ites du substantialisme naïf ou les constructions savantes du substantialisme philosophique?”
43 I could not identify the source of this quote: de dag ’jig rten mtha’ dag las ’das shing ’phags
pa’i spyod yul blta dka’ zhing shes par dka’ bsam gyis mi khyab.
44 Nor bu ke ta ka, 27, 1ff.: re zhig thog med nas goms pa’i dngos po yod pa nyid du zhen pa
de’i ngor byas nas med pa nyid du sgrub cing goms par byed de/ dngos po rang bzhin med par
ma shes na gnas lugs mtha’ bral la nges pa skye ba’i skabs gtan med pas so/ /’on kyang med pa
nyid de tsam kho na gnas lugs mthar thug ni ma yin te/ gang tshe gzugs sogs dngos po gang zhig
med do zhes brtag bya’i dngos po de tha snyad du rang gi ngo bos skye ba sogs su mi dmigs na/
de tshe de la rten pa’i dngos med kyang rten dngos po dang bral bas na/ blo yi mdun na dmigs
gtad kyi yul du ji ltar gnas te gnas mi srid de mog sham gyi bu skye ba med na de shi ba’ang mi
dmigs pa bzhin no/ des na med pa ni yod pa la brten nas bzhag pa tsam ltos med du ngo bos
grub pa ni med do/’on yod pa bkag nas med pa sgrub/ slar yang med pa’ang bkag nas yod pa
sgrub/ de gnyis res mos spel bas ci zhig bya zer na/ rnam shes la rton cing tshur mthong rtog ge’i
dbang du byas pa dag la glang chen gyi khrus dang ’dra ba’i kun rtog ’di lta bu ’byung ba ni shin
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Equipped with this approach of the twofold ultimate corresponding to two dif-
ferent perspectives, Mipham aims at conciliating views ranging from those of
the rDzogs chen to the dGe lugs pa tradition, as well as the classical Indian
Svātantrika and Mādhyamika interpretations. With this uniquely inclusivist at-
titude within Tibetan Buddhism, Mipham attempts to make thirteen centuries
of Buddhist Indo-Tibetan philosophical developments compatible with the
highest teaching of his tradition, rDzogs chen. By stressing that the actual ulti-
mate beyond all views is truly the nonconceptual ultimate, he echoes the rDzogs
chen essential teaching distinguishing between sems and rig pa in a move con-
firming rDzogs chen as the epitome of Buddhist views to protect it from sectarian
attacks. Yet, as far as the nominal ultimate is concerned, Mipham accepts a posi-
tion similar to that of the Svātantrikas and the dGe lugs pas for the sake of teach-
ing beings on the path. In this respect, he goes as far as to provisionally accept
Phya pa chos kyi seng ge’s (1109–1169) position: The two truths can be said to be
a single entity with different conceptual aspects (ldog pa tha dad pa’i ngo bo
gcig), a position also held by Tsong kha pa and that Klong chen pa had expressly
rejected in his Grub mtha’ mdzod.45 In spite of this concession, Mipham un-
questionably follows Go rams pa in his exposition of the two ultimates46: on the
level of the actual ultimate, the two truths are accepted to be in a state of unity
(zung ’jug), being indivisible (dbyer med). In Mipham’s systematic integration of
ascending perspectives on reality into a coherent vision, the propaedeutic func-
tion of the view is therefore a soteriological necessity as his approach clearly
aims at providing beginners on the spiritual path with a ladder linking both
tu bden te bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i chos nyid ni skal dman rnams skrag pa’i gnas che ba’i rab
yin pas de’i tshul ni mi shes shing/ dngos med du bstan na chad stong du bzung/ snang bcas su
bstan na bden grub tu bzung/ zung ’jug ces brjod na tha gu dkar nag bsgrel ba lta bu’i don du
bzung/ bsam gyis mi khyab ces brjod na cang med ci med hwa shang gi lta ba lta bu zhig las mi
’char yin te/ zab mo’i mthar thug pa’i chos ’di kun gyis bde blag tu shes nus na/ de dag ’jig rten
mtha’ dag las ’das shing ’phags pa’i spyod yul blta dka’ zhing shes par dka’ bsam gyis mi khyab
zhes ji ste gsung/
45 See Helmut Tauscher, “Phya pa Chos kyi Sen ge as a Svātantrika,” in The Svātantrika-Pr
āsaṅgika Distinction, ed. Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (Boston: Wisdom, 2003),
235: “Phya pa lays great emphasis on determining the two truths as ‘identical in nature and
different with regard to the characteristic distinction’ (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa).
Equally, in Tsoṅ kha pa’s Madhyamaka exegesis the same determination is of utmost impor-
tance, as it provides a basis for his interpretation of ‘neither existent nor nonexistent’ as mean-
ing ‘neither existent in an absolute sense nor nonexistent conventionally,’ which is
understood as referring to both truths and thus represents the essence of his ontology.” On
Klong chen pa’s view, see Butters, “The Doxographical Genius of Klong chen rab ’byams pa,”
(PhD diss., Columbia University, 2006), 398, 411.
46 See Cabezón and Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes, 211–17.
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the view and the practice of emptiness of lower approaches with that of higher
ones:47
The single entity corresponding to the single entity possessing different conceptual distin-
guishers (ldog pa tha dad pa’i ngo bo) of the two truths is the single entity of the indivisibility
of appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). This is established through the valid
modality of cognition that analyzes the two truths. Whatever appears is empty. If this empti-
ness existed as something different from appearance, since the essence of this phenomenon
would become nonempty, these two would not be different. This entity, established as an
indivisible entity, is the actual ultimate. This cannot be described as anything at all and is
the sphere of direct knowledge or experience (so sor rang rig). This is dharmadhātu, the line-
age (rigs, gotra) [of the buddhas], and so forth. Although it is the highest mode of being of all
phenomena, it is not conceptualized. If it were not so, it would be a phenomenal appearance
(mtshan ma, nimitta). From the perspective of the emptiness of the nominal ultimate, when
the four extremes are refuted, the extreme of existence must be refuted by the nonexistence
of [something] real, while the extreme of nonexistence [must be refuted] by conventional ex-
istence. Thus, from the perspective of the nature of things itself, the four extremes cannot be
eliminated. The mode of being that is a mere negation (med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha) has
the potency to eliminate the extreme of affirming real existence.48 However, since the elimi-
nation of nonexistence depends on the concealing [truth], the mode of being itself, from its
own perspective, would fall into the extreme [of nonexistence]. Therefore, this emptiness that
represents a fall into the extreme [of nonexistence] is not the nature of phenomena (chos
nyid, dharmatā).49
47 This is also confirmed by Mipham in his ’Od gsal snying po; see Dharmachakra Translation
Committee (trans.), Luminous Essence, A Guide to the Guhyagarbha Tantra, Jamgön Mipham
(Boston: SLp, 2009), 65.
48 I would like to thank Professor Matthew Kapstein for his suggestions regarding the transla-
tion of this sentence.
49 ’Jug ’grel, 576, 5ff.: bden gnyis ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa’i ngo bo gcig pa de/ snang
stong dbyer med ngo bo gcig yin la/ de ni bden gnyis dpyod pa’i tshad mas grub ste/ gang snang
’di stong/ stong pa de snang ba las tha dad du yod na/ chos de’i ngo bo mi stong bar ’gyur bas
de gnyis tha dad du med do/ ngo bo dbyer med med par grub pa’i ngo bo de ni rnam grangs min
pa’i don dam ste/ de la gang du’ang brjod mi shes te so sor rang gi yul lo/ de ni dbyings dang
rigs sogs yin te/ chos kun gyi gnas lugs mthar thug yin gyi/ rnam grangs pa ni min no/ de min
rtags/ rnam grangs pa’i stong pa’i dbang du byas na/ mtha’ bzhi ’gog tshe/ bden med kyi yod
mtha’ sel/ tha snyad du yod pas chad mtha’ sel dgos la/ de ltar na gnas lugs rang gi ngos nas
mtha’ bzhi sel mi nus te/ gnas lugs med dgag la yod mtha’ sel ba’i nus pa yod kyi/ med mtha’ sel
ba kun rdzob la ltos pa’i phyir/ gnas lugs kho rang gi ngos nas mthar lhung ba can du ’gyur bas/
de ’dra’i mthar lhung gi stong nyid de chos nyid ma yin no/
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4 Mipham’s Perspectivist Discourse
on the Inexpressible Ultimate
Perspectives play a central role in Mipham’s discourse on the ineffable. On the
one hand, some of his statements seem to indicate that the actual ultimate is a
cognitive object for sublime beings:
Realizing that these two [truths] are in the real sense in a state of unity (zung ’jug) or funda-
mental sameness (mnyam pa nyid) is the supreme object of realization, the ultimate purpose.50
These statements, made from the perspective of ordinary beings, present the ulti-
mate as an object that is to be realized by sublime beings and, in this respect, is
compatible with the dGe lugs pa position:
With regard to this, insofar as all cognitive objects are distinguished on account of being
correct or incorrect, they are completely included within the two truths.51
However, according to Mipham the ultimate, from the perspective of sublime
beings, abides clearly beyond all designations:
In the absolute sense, the ground of emptiness
And that which is empty do not exist as being different.
The indivisibility of appearance and emptiness is inexpressible,
You must realize it directly for yourself!52
In his Nor bu ke ta ka, Mipham comments on Śāntideva’s famous pādas (BCA
2c–d) on the impossibility of conceiving the ultimate.53 Various conflicting in-
terpretations of these verses have triggered fierce debates and polemics in
Tibet.54 About this fine point, Mipham declares in his Nor bu ke ta ka:
Moreover, it is also stated in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra:
In the real sense, [the ultimate] is free from all accumulations of mental prolifera-
tions. [MA 70cd]
[Nonexistence,] being also based on conceptuality, is concealing [and] not genuine.
[MA 72cd]
50 Mkhas pa’i tshul la ’jug pa’i sgo, 2:174: de gnyis yang dag pa’i don du zung ’jug mnyam pa
nyid du rtogs pa ni rtogs bya rnams kyi nang na mchog tu gyur pa mthar thug gi don no/
51 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 18.2: de la shes bya ’di dag yang dag pa yin min gnyis kyis
phye bas na bden pa gnyis su zad par ’du zhing/
52 Shes rab ral gri, 799, 2ff.: /gnas lugs don la stong gzhi dang//stong pa tha dad du med pas//
snang stong dbyer med brjod dang bral//so so rang gis rig bya’o/
53 See Vaidya, Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva, 170, line 27: buddher agocaras tattvaṃ buddhiḥ
saṃvṛtir ucyate//
54 See Viehbeck, Polemics in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism.
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Hence it is explained here that the nature of phenomena (chos nyid, dharmatā) is not an
object of cognition: inasmuch as the nature of phenomena is beyond all mental prolifera-
tions, it does not exist as an objective support for the intellect. As a consequence, how
could we correctly call “cognitive object” that which is neither subject/object, nor estab-
lished as any phenomenal appearance (mtshan ma, nimitta) at all?55
In his commentary on Candrakīrti’Mādhyamakāvatāra XI, 12–13, Mipham explains,
in agreement with the root text, that distinctions between objects and subjects are
simply made for the sake of communication, namely, from the perspective of ordi-
nary beings. Ultimately, subject and object are of a single essence. The core of the
problem here is that since the ultimate is beyond the dichotomy of subject/object,
it cannot be an object, or else it amounts to nothing but a thought:
The entity possessing an objective support (dmigs pa, ālambana),
Is a thought, which is the nature (rang bzhin) of the grasped object and the grasping
subject.56
Whatever is taken by this [thought] as a pseudo-objective support is falsehood
[Because this thought] does not actually come into contact with the nature of phenomena
(chos nyid, dharmatā).
It is said in the sūtras that
Taking the objective support to be something substantial or insubstantial,
Taking the objective support to be something dual or nondual,
No matter how one takes [something] as an objective support,
Whatever is grasped through this approach belongs to the domain of the demon
(bdud, māra).57
No refutation or proof at all
Can destroy what is taken as an objective support.
When one understands without eliminating or adding [anything], [this is] freedom.58
55 Nor bu ke ta ka, 8, 3ff.: rgyan las kyang/ yang dag tu spros pa yi/ tshogs rnams kun las de
grol yin/ /rnam par rtog la brten na yang/ /kun rdzob tu ’gyur yang dag min/ /zhes so/ /de la ’dir
chos nyid shes bya min par brjod pa ni/ chos nyid spros pa thams cad las ’das pas na/ de ni blos
dmigs par byar med pas yin te/ gang yul dang yul can du ma gyur cing mtshan gang du’ang ma
grub pa de la yang dag par na ji ltar shes bya zhes brjod de/
56 The subject/object division refers to duality.
57 Cf. Nāgārjuna, YṢ 36ab in Cristina A. Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti. Mélanges Chinois
et Boudhiques, vol. 25 (Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1991), 264:
“Aussi grande est l’agitation de l’esprit, aussi étendu est le domaine de Māra.”
58 Shes rab ral gri, 811, 3ff.: /dmigs pa can gyi bdag nyid ni//bzung dang ’dzin pa’i rang bzhin
sems//de des gang dmigs de ltar rdzun//chos nyid don la dngos mi reg//dngos por dmigs dang
dngos med dmigs//gnyis su dmigs dang gnyis min dmigs//ji ltar dmigs dang kyang dmigs pa
ste//dmigs pas gang bzung bdud kyi ni//spyod yul yin zhes mdo las gsungs//dgag dang sgrub pa
gang gis kyang//dmigs pa ’jig par mi nus la//bsal bzhag med par mthong na grol/
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5 The Two Truths from the Perspective
of the Actual Ultimate
Although Dreyfus seems to think that according to Mipham the actual ultimate
is accessible to thought, there is a rather long explanation in his mKhas pa’i
tshul la ’jug pa’i sgo presenting the ultimate as being beyond all extremes as the
indivisibility of the two truths – that is, as the unique truth.59 This passage
shows Mipham’s willingness to facilitate the understanding of the ultimate
based on conceptuality, but it also shows his reluctance to conflate the nominal
ultimate with the actual, which remains beyond the sphere of thought:
Depending on the individual’s intellectual capacity or acumen, emptiness exists as these
two kinds of ultimate or emptiness: the nominal and the actual. The first, being the mere
negation (med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha) that all phenomena (chos, dharma) are estab-
lished as truly [existent], is the object of a mode of perception (’dzin stangs), which has
partially eliminated mental proliferations (spros pa, prapañca). It is not the realization of
that which is completely free from mental proliferations. Inasmuch as this is merely an
imputation with regard to the ultimate and emptiness, since it depends also on the non-
existence of substantial things, one must [still] understand the authentic ultimate, empti-
ness. Therefore, this [nominal ultimate] is called the concordant ultimate (mthun pa’i
don dam). Further, the knowable phenomena that are the objects of an intellect endowed
with conceptuality (rnam par rtog pa, vikalpa) are only posited as existent by means
of dependent arising and dependent imputation. [265] The conditioned [phenomena] pro-
duced from causes and conditions exist on account of dependent arising. Although un-
conditioned [phenomena] do not arise out of causes, they exist by means of dependent
59 See Georges B. J. Dreyfus, “Would the True Prāsaṅgika Please Stand? The Case and View of
’Ju Mi pham,” in The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction, ed. Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara
L. McClintock (Boston: Wisdom, 2003), 335: “Go rams pa holds that this is the case, that the
actual ultimate is not accessible to thought and is thus utterly ineffable. Mi pham disagrees,
arguing that if this were so, ordinary beings would never understand such an ultimate since
they could never develop the causes that lead to the generation of primordial wisdom. Thus,
for Mi pham, the actual ultimate is accessible to thought, even though its access is different
from that of wisdom. Whereas the latter realizes the ultimate by refuting all four extremes si-
multaneously, thought proceeds in succession.” It seems to me that Dreyfus does not consider
the fact that, according to Mipham as well, as long as extremes and dualistic thoughts are in-
volved, the actual ultimate is not attained. Mipham’s quotes above make it clear that the ac-
tual ultimate is beyond all extremes. Therefore, a mere intellectual gradual process of
negation of the four extremes cannot, according to Mipham, involve the actual ultimate.
Arguillèr, L’Opalescent Joyau Nor-bu ke-ta-ka, 57, n. 1 concurs: “Dans la doctrine de Mi pham,
quand on dit que l’absolu n’est pas perçu par la connaissance principielle elle-même, ce n’est
pas au sens où elle l’ignorerait, mais au sens où il ne saurait être un objet dont elle serait le
sujet cognitif. Il s’agit d’une connaissance immédiate, tellement étrangère aux formes de con-
naissance qui nous sont familières que l’on peut aussi bien parler d’inconnaissance.”
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imputation. They and their conventional designations (tha snyad) are established insofar
as each of them eliminates its own antithesis (dgag bya), like space with regard to ob-
structive physical contact (thogs re), like the cessation [acquired by] discernment (brtags
’gog, pratisaṃkhyānirodha) in the case of the exhaustion of what is to be abandoned, like
the cessation [acquired by] nondiscernment (brtags min ’gog, apratisaṃkhyānirodha) in
the case of what is nonarisen anywhere, or like the definition of nonexistence [which is
established] in relation to the elimination of real existence.
On account of this, since unconditioned [phenomena] also are not beyond the dependent
arising of dependent imputation, it is said [MMK 24.19ab]:60
No phenomenon is existent
That does not arise in dependence.
Since such unconditioned [phenomena] are unconditioned and without any substantial-
ity, being only imputations projected by the intellect (blos phar brtags) and objects know-
able only by conceptuality, they are not the inconceivable nature of phenomena (chos
nyid, dharmatā). For this reason, when they are examined by the intellect, as not a single
one of them is not empty of an own-nature, they are ultimately nonexistent as [anything]
observable. It is said [MMK 24.19cd]:61
Therefore, no phenomenon exists
That is not emptiness.
Likewise, there is not a single phenomenon, substantial or insubstantial, that is not empty
of own-nature. However, the incontrovertible appearances of conventional designations
manifest although they have been empty from the beginning. As a consequence, the reali-
zation that appearance and emptiness free from contradiction are equivalent is thus ex-
pressed by the following statement [Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti on Vigrahavyāvartanī 70]62:
Being empty of anything and being dependently originated
Are equivalent according to the Way of the Middle.
Such is the supreme teaching.
60 apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate |; see L. de La Vallée Poussin,
Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire
de Candrakīrti (St. Petersburg: Imprimerie de l’Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1913). D3824,
f.15a: /de phyir stong pa ma yin pa’i/ /chos ’ga’ yod pa ma yin no/
61 yasmāt tasmād aśūnyo hi dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate ||; see La Vallée Poussin,
Mūlamadhyamakakārikās. D3824, f.15a: /de phyir stong pa ma yin pa’i/ /chos ’ga’ yod pa ma yin no/
62 bhavati cātra yaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamāṃ pratipadaṃ ca | ekārthāṃ
nijagāda; see E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst, “Vigrahavyāvartanī,” in The Dialectical Method of
Nāgārjuna, ed. Bhaṭṭacharya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978). D3828, f.29a: /de la ci yang mi
srid do/ /gang zhig stong dang rten ’byung dag /dbu ma’i lam du don gcig par/ /gsung mchog
mtshungs pa med pa.
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In their real condition, all imputations in terms of substantial (dngos) and insubstantial
things (dngos med) are bereft of [any] fixation grasping [them] as being distinctly different.
That which abides in the nature free from all mental proliferations, the nature of phenom-
ena (chos nyid, dharmatā), which is the undifferentiation of dependent arising and empti-
ness or appearance and emptiness, must be realized by gnosis, intuitive knowing, without
conceptualizing what is free from subject and object. This realization is the actual ultimate.
This [actual ultimate] is designated by means of various synonyms, such as the ultimate
truth, the limit of reality (yang dag pa’i mtha’), or true reality. It is not merely mentally im-
puted. The utterly natural (rang bzhin bab) mode of being of all phenomena is primordially
present, unchanging throughout the three times, and beyond the sphere of conceptuality
(rnam par rtog pa) or mental imputations. Since all phenomena are fundamental sameness in
their [original] condition, there is no other phenomenon at all apart from dharmadhātu. This
emptiness endowed with the supreme excellence of all aspects (rnam pa kun gyi mchog) is
the unexcelled ultimate among all kinds of realization of the Great Vehicle.
This unconditioned unity [of appearance and emptiness] is unlike an unconditioned
insubstantial thing (dngos med). It is the great unconditioned that does not abide in the
extremes of that which is a substantial or an insubstantial thing. Not only is this [uncondi-
tioned unity] not merely arisen owing to causes, but it is [in fact] the real unconditioned
since it is moreover beyond the conventions corresponding to the perceptions of what is
merely established by imputations made in dependence (ltos nas btags pa). Considering
this [real unconditioned], the learned (ācārya) Nāgārjuna thus declared [inMMK 25.13cd]:63
Substantial things and insubstantial things are conditioned,
Nirvāṇa is unconditioned. [267]
and [inMMK 18.7]:64
Objects of designation have ceased (ldog pa),
Since the sphere of mind’s objects has ceased.
Unborn and unceasing,
The nature of phenomena (chos nyid, dharmatā) is equal to nirvāṇa.
The Dharmarāja Kulika Mañjuśrīkīrti said65:
The aggregates, [when] examined, are emptiness,
Devoid of an essence like the plantain tree.
This is not like the emptiness
That is endowed with the supreme excellence of all aspects.
63 asaṃskṛtaṃ hi nirvāṇaṃ bhāvābhāvau ca saṃskṛtau || D3824, f.16b: /mya ngan ’das pa ’dus
ma byas/ / dngos dang dngos med ’dus byas yin/. Pādas c and d are inverted in Mipham’s
quotation.
64 nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṃ nivṛttaś cittagocaraḥ | anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā
|| D3824, f.11a: /brjod par bya ba ldog pa ste/ /sems kyi spyod yul ldog pas so/ /ma skyes pa dang
ma ’gags pa/ /chos nyid mya ngan ’das dang mtshungs/
65 Pradarśanānumatoddeśaparīkṣā (T2609); see Rolf Scheuermann, “Das gZhan stong dbu
ma’i rgyan des rJe btsun Tāranātha Kun dga’ snying po Tibetischer Text und Übersetzung”
(PhD diss., University of Vienna, 2010), 43, 78.
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Thus, there is no differentiation into two distinct truths from the perspective of those who
have realized [this]. It is realized that all phenomena are equivalent to dharmadhātu, fun-
damental sameness, the single sphere (thig le nyag gcig), or the center of the vajra space.
Therefore, it is said [in RGV I.154, AA V, 21, and elsewhere]66:
There is nothing to eliminate from this,
Not even the slightest thing to add.
The truth should be perceived as it is.
The one who perceives the truth is liberated.67
As stated here, you will have reached the heart of the subject of all that is explained in
Mahāyāna as fundamental sameness free from mental proliferations. Now, one may think,
“[In this case,] the distinction in terms of the two truths makes no sense! There is only one
truth.” The distinction into two truths makes sense because it is the method introducing
this single truth, the ultimate truth, the final limit (mthar thug pa), dharmadhātu, or funda-
mental sameness. [268] The Conqueror declared that the single absolute truth is the unborn
nirvāṇa, all phenomena being primordially pacified, namely fundamentally the same
(mnyam pa). The great charioteers have established [this] accordingly in [their] treatises
(bstan bcos, śāstra).68
66 See Jikidō Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra): Being a Treatise on
the Tathaḡatagarbha Theory of Mahāyan̄a Buddhism (Rome: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed
Estremo Oriente, 1966), 300.
67 nāpaneyam ataḥ kiṃcid upaneyaṃ na kiṃcana | draṣṭavyaṃ bhūtato bhūtaṃ bhūtadarśī vi-
mucyate. (See Johnston, Ratnagotravibhāga). D4024, f.61b: /’di la bsal bya ci yang med/ /gzhag
par bya ba cung zad med/ /yang dag nyid la yang dag lta/ /yang dag mthong na rnam par grol/
68 Mkhas pa’i tshul la ’jug pa’i sgo, 3:264ff.: stong nyid de la gang zag gi blo ’jug pa’i rim
pa’am/ rtogs tshul gyi dbang du byas na/ rnam grangs dang/ rnam grangs min pa’i don dam
mam stong nyid gnyis su yod de/ dang po chos kun la bden grub tsam khegs pa’i med dgag ste/
spros pa phyogs re bcad pa’i ’dzin stangs kyi yul spros bral mtha’ dag ma rtogs pa’o// ’di ni don
dam pa dang stong pa nyid btags pa tsam las/ dngos min yang ’di la bten nas don dam stong pa
nyid mtshan nyid pa rtogs dgos pas mthun pa’i don dam zhes bya’o// de la rnam par rtog pa
dang bcas pa’i blo’i yul du gyur pa’i shes bya’i chos ’di rnams brten nas skye ba dang/ brten nas
btags pa gnyis kyi sgo nas yod par bzhag pa kho na yin te/ rgyu rkyen las skyes pa ’dus byas
rnams ni/ brten nas skye ba’i sgo nas yod pa’o/ ’du ma byas rnams rgyu las skyes pa min yang/
brten nas btags pa tsam gyi sgo nas yod pa ste/ de dag rang rang gis dgag bya rnam par bcad
pa las de dang de’i tha snyad ’grub pa/ thogs reg med pa la nam mkha’ dang/ spang bya zad pa
la brtags ’gog dang/ gang na gang ma skyes pa la brtags min ’gog pa dang/ bden grub bsal ba’i
cha nas bden med du ’jog pa bzhin no// de’i phyir ’dus ma byas rnams kyang brten nas btags
pa’i rten ’byung las ma ’das pas na/ rten cing ’brel ’byung ma yin pa’i/ /chos ’ga’ yod pa ma yin
no// zhes gzungs la/ ’di ’dra’i ’dus ma byas ’di dag ni dngos med ’dus ma byas yin pas rnam rtog
kho nas shes par bya ba’i yul dang/ blos phar btags pa tsam ste chos nyid bsam gyis mi khyab
pa ma yin no// de’i phyir ’di dag la blos gzhig na rang gi ngo bos mi stong pa gang yang med pas
don dam par dmigs su med pa yin pas/ de phyir stong nyid ma yin pa’i/ chos ’ga’ yod pa ma yin
no/ zhes gsungs so// de ltar dngos dngos med kyi chos mtha’ dag rang gi ngo bos mi stong pa
med kyang/ tha snyad kyi snang ba bslu ba med pa rnams ye nas stong bzhin du snang ba yin
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6 Conclusion
Mipham’s inclusivist exposition of the relationship between the two truths is
thus clearly based on a set of ascending perspectives as explained in the follow-
ing passage of the Nges shes sgron me:
Whatever appears is pervaded by emptiness,
And whatever is empty is pervaded by appearance,
Since if something appears, it cannot be nonempty
And this emptiness is not established as something that does not appear.
Moreover, since both a substantial thing and an insubstantial thing,
Taken as the bases of emptiness, must be empty,
All appearances are nothing but something imputed
pas snang stong ’gal med don gcig tu rtogs pa ni/ gang gis stong dang rten ’byung dag// dbu
ma’i lam du don gcig par/ /gsung mchog zhes gzungs pa ltar/ gang dngos dngos med du btags
pa rnams kyang yang dag pa’i don du so sor rang sa na ma ’dres par tha dad pa’i tshul du ’dzin
pa’i zhen pa dang bral te/ snang dang stong pa’am stong dang rten ’byung tha mi dad pa’i chos
nyid spros pa mtha’ dag dang bral ba’i rang bzhin du gnas pa gang zhig gzung ’dzin med pa
rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes so rang rig pas rtogs par bya ba ni rnam grangs min pa’i don dam
yin te/ ’di la ni chos kyi dbyings dang/ don dam pa’i bden pa dang/ yang dag pa’i mtha’ dang/
de bzhin nyid la sogs pa’i rnam grangs sna tshogs su gdags par mdzad do// ’di ni blos btags pa
tsam ma yin te/ chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin bab kyi gnas lugs ye nas gnas shing dus gsum gyi
’gyur ba med pa/ blos btags dang rnam par rtog pa’i yul las ’das pa/ de’i ngang du chos thams
cad mnyam pa nyid du gyur pas chos kyi dbyings las ma gtogs pa’i chos gzhan ci yang med pa
rnam pa kun gyi mchog dang ldan pa’i stong pa nyid ’di ni theg pa chen po’i rtogs rigs thams cad
kyi nang na bla med pa’i mthar thug pa’o// zung ’jug ’dus ma byas pa ’di ni dngos med ’dus ma
byas dang mi ’dra zhing dngos dngos med gang gi mtha’ la’ang mi gnas pa’i ’dus ma byas chen
po yin te/ ’di rgyas ma bskyed pa tsam du ma zad/ ltos nas btags pas grub pa tsam kyis dmigs
pa’i tha snyad las kyang ’das pa’i phyir ’dus ma byas yang dag yin pa de la dgongs nas mgon po
klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas/ dngos dang dngos med ’dus byas yin/ mya ngan ’das pa ’dus ma
byas/ /zhes dang/ brjod par bya ba ldog pa ste/ sems kyi spyod yul ldog pas so/ ma skyes pa
dang ma ’gags pa/ /chos nyid mya ngan ’das dang mtshungs/ /zhes sogs gsungs shing/ chos kyi
rgyal po rigs ldan ’jam dpal grags pa’i zhal snga nas/ phung po rnam dpyad stong pa nyid/ chu
shing bzhin du snying po med/ rnam pa kun gyi mchog ldan pa’i/ stong nyid de dang ’dra ma
yin/ zhes gsungs pa’i don no// de ltar rtogs pa’i ngor bden pa gnyis su tha dad du phye ba med
de chos thams cad chos kyi dbyings mnam pa nyid thig le nyag gcig rdo rje nam mkha’i dkyil lta
bur rtogs pas na/ ’di la bsal bya ci yang med/ bzhag par bya ba cung zad med/ yang dag nyid la
yang dag lta/ yang dag mthong nas rnam par grol/ zhes gsungs pa ltar/ theg pa chen po na spros
bral mnyam pa nyid du gsungs pa thams cad kyi don gting sleb par ’gyur ro // ’o na bden pa
gnyis su phye ba don med cing bden pa gcig tu ’gyur ro snyam na/ bden pa gnyis su phye ba ni
bden pa gcig pu don dam bden pa mthar thug pa chos dbyings mnyam pa nyid ’di la ’jug pa’i
thabs yin pas don yod la/ mthar thug pa bden pa gcig pu chos thams cad gdod nas zhi zhing ma
skyes la mya ngan las ’das pa mnyam pa nyid yin par rgyal ba nyid kyis gsungs shing/ shing rta
chen po rnams kyis bstan bcos dag las kyang de ltar bsgrubs zin to//
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And even emptiness is merely imputed by the intellect.
With respect to the knowledge that is ascertained through rational analysis,
These two are the method and the result of the method.
Inasmuch as, if there is one, not having the other
Is impossible, they abide inseparably.
Therefore, also when appearance and emptiness
Are known individually,
In fact, they are never divisible.
Therefore, since the certainty that perceives the nature of things
Does not fall into any extreme,
They are said to be in unity (zung ’jug).
From the perspective of the insight which correctly analyzes, [97]
These two, appearance and emptiness,
Are considered to be a single entity with different conceptual aspects (ngo bo gcig ldog pa
tha dad),
As they exist or do not exist jointly.
Moreover, for beginners,
They appear as negandum and negation.
At that time, they are not mingled as a single [entity].
One day, one attains the certainty
That the nature of emptiness arises as appearance.
Inasmuch as that which is primordially empty and appearances are both empty,
This is the birth of the certainty that perceives
Appearances, although they are empty,
And emptiness, although it manifests as appearances.
This is the root of all profound paths
Of sūtra, tantra, and pith instructions.
This point, which cuts off superimpositions
With regard to study and reflection,
Is the correct, undeluded view.69
69 Pettit understands this sentence differently:
“This is the meaning of cutting off misconceptions
Through study and reflection;
It is the unmistaken, authentic view” (Pettit, Mi pham’s Beacon of Certainty, 216).
Since a direct criticism of a merely intellectual understanding of emptiness follows, I un-
derstand sgro ’dog chod pa’i don as the elimination of superimpositions related to study and
reflection; this is based on the different contexts in which this term is used, such as:
Shes rab ral gri, 800.3ff.:
“[The other one,] the vast cognition
Arising from the contemplation of the nature of phenomena, as it is,
Eliminating the superimpositions (sgro ’dogs) with regard to the inconceivable object,
Is endowed with the fruit of the knowledge of all there is.”
Nor bu ke ta ka, 6, 2: “Therefore, as long as this dharmadhātu that is the union of experi-
ence and emptiness, free from the thirty-two superimpositions, is not made manifest, the per-
fection of insight is not authentic.”
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By realizing this key point more and more profoundly,
The clinging to the characters
Of the appearances of the concealing truth as well
Will be abandoned.
Therefore, according to the progression of the tantric vehicles,
The appearances that are nothing but intellectual wishful thinking
And the appearances of the world and its beings as deities
That are the confidence in the view [arising] from certainty
Cannot possibly be the same.70
Determining through Madhyamaka
That phenomena (chos, dharma) are devoid of truth is a view.
When a Brahmin recites mantras for a sick person,
His wishful thinking that there is [in fact] no disease is not the view.
By realizing the ultimate nature of things,
The certainty that the concealing truth is the deity [will be attained].
Otherwise, grounded in the level of deceptive appearances,
How can one accomplish the deity?
Apart from the deceptive appearance of an apprehending subject and an apprehended
object,
That which is called saṃsāra does not exist.
The divisions of the path that bring an end to it,
Are not [made] from the perspective of the ultimate truth,
Since the ultimate, as it is, is oneness.71
70 Pettit understands this in a slightly different way:
“Intellectual wishful thinking and
The view of certainty that finds confidence in the
Divine experience of animate and inanimate phenomena
Cannot possibly be the same” (Pettit, Mi pham’s Beacon of Certainty, 217).
71 Nges shes sgron me, 96, 3ff.: gang snang stong pas khyab pa dang/ /gang stong snang bas
khyab pa ste/ /snang na mi stong mi srid cing/ /stong de’ang ma snang mi grub phyir/ /dngos
dang dngos med gnyis po yang/ /stong gzhir byas nas stong dgos phyir/ /snang kun btags pa
tsam zhig la/ /stong pa’ang blo yis btags pa tsam/ /rig pas dpyad pas nges shes la/ /’di gnyis
thabs dang thabs byung ste/ /gcig yod na ni gcig med pa/ /mi srid pa du ’bral med par gnas/ /de
phyir snang dang stong pa dag/ /so so’i char ni shes na yang/ /don du nam yang dbye ba med/ /
de phyir zung ’jug ces brjod do/ /gnas lugs mthong ba’i nges shes ni/ /gang mthar lhung ba med
phyir ro/ /yang dag dpyod pa’i shes [97] rab ngor/ /snang dang stong pa ’di gnyis po/ /yod
mnyam med mnyam ngo bo gcig/ /ldog pa tha dad dbye bar ’dod/ /de yang dang po’i las can
la/ /dgag bya ’gog byed lta bur snang/ /de tshe gcig tu ’dres pa med/ /nam zhig stong pa’i rang
bzhin/ /snang bar ’char la yid ches thob/ /de yang gdod nas stong pa dang/ /snang ba ’di dag
stong pa yis/ /stong bzhin snang la snang bzhin du/ /stong mthong nges shes skye ba nyid/ /’di
ni mdo rgyud man ngag gi/ /lam zab kun gyi rtsa ba ste/ /thos bsam sgro ’dogs chod pa’i don/ /
yang dag lta ba ’khrul med yin/ /gnad de je bas je zab tu/ /rtogs pas kun rdzob snang ba yang/ /
rang mtshan zhen pa rim spong bas/ /rgyud sde’i theg rim de ltar snang/ /yid kyis mos bskom
tsam zhig dang/ /snod bcud ltar snang nges shes kyis/ /lta ba gdengs su gyur pa gnyis/ /
mtshungs pa’i go skabs mi srid da/ /dbu mas chos rnams bden stong du/ / nges ba gang de lta
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In the abovementioned quote from the Nges shes sgron me as well as in
Mipham’s other Madhyamaka works, we frequently find the interesting formu-
laic phrase ngos nas or ngor. To illustrate this point, the last sentence in the
preceding quote thus reads: /don dam kho na’i ngos nas min/, with the view to
making explicit the standpoint from which a statement is made. This expres-
sion ngos nas/ngor is of considerable significance to understanding Mipham’s
presentation of the two truths. Mipham redefines the framework of valid cogni-
tions based on the perspective of ordinary beings on the one hand, and sublime
beings on the other. The expressions ngos nas and ngor are consistently used to
determine from which perspective Mipham speaks. According to Mipham, some
statements that are final from a deluded point of view are merely provisional
from the perspective of sublime beings. For instance, views pertaining to the
ultimate that are expressed in dualistic terms on the basis of affirmations and
negations still miss the mark from a higher point of view. Mipham’s presenta-
tion of the two truths thus hinges on the notion of perspectives, outlooks, and
cognitive modes of apprehension of our so-called reality since, according to
him, any discourse on this reality is in fine formulated from a specific epistemic
viewpoint. From this perspective (pun intended!), charges of inconsistency
become meaningless if Mipham’s statements are adequately contextualized.
With his perspectivist interpretation of Buddhist doctrines, Mipham teaches
Madhyamaka through a series of ascending views, the aim of which is to pro-
vide beings with a gradual path in their spiritual journey toward the realiza-
tion of the actual ultimate.
In Mipham’s view, any discourse on the two truths necessarily takes place
within the concealing truth and therefore only makes sense on account of its
propaedeutic function in a given context. Mipham accordingly uses various
models of the relationship between the two truths. These models correspond to
various stages of the path or circumstances: (1) from the perspective of a begin-
ner, the two truths can be seen as “different in the sense that their identity is
negated” (gcig pa dkag pa’i tha dad or ngo bo gnyis);72 (2) from the perspective
yin la/ /bram ze’i nad la sngags ’debs cho/ /nad med mos pa lta min bzhin/ / don dam gnas lugs
rtogs pa yis/ /kun rdzob lha ru yid ches kyi/ /gzhan du ’khrul pa’i snang tshul la/ /gnas nas lha
ru ji ltar ’grub/ /gzung ’dzin ’khrul snang ’di min pa’i/ /’khor ba zhes bya gzhan du med/ /de
spong lam gyi dbye ba rnams/ /don dam kho na’i ngos nas min/ /don dam [98] tshul gcig nyid
yin phyir/
72 In the aforementioned quote from Nges shes sgron me, all of the various interpretations of the
relationship between the two truths are listed. For an example of Mipham’s use of gcig pa dkag
pa’i tha dad, see his gZhan stong khas len seng ge’i nga ro in Pettit, Mi pham’s Beacon of Certainty,
417, in which Mipham notes that the two truths are mutually exclusive in the gzhan stong ap-
proach. On ngo bo gnyis, see Phuntsho,Mi pham’s Dialectics and the Debate of Emptiness, 151.
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of postmeditation, they are “different conceptual distinguishers with regard to a
single entity” (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad); (3) from the perspective of medi-
tative absorption, they are beyond extremes in an ineffable state of “unity”
(zung ’jug), as explained by Mipham in his dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad:73
In short, the ultimate condition as the focus object of the meditative absorption that is
beyond the sphere of conceptuality and language is indivisible within [two] truths. From
this perspective, one need not distinguish the two truths. Therefore, as there is no asser-
tion at all establishing or refuting that all phenomena appearing in this way exist or not,
are this or not, and so forth, this [ultimate condition] is like answering by not saying any-
thing.74 Since it is verily beyond conventional designations and since it is the inexpress-
ible fundamental sameness free from mental proliferations, it is established as being
without [any] assertion. However, from the perspective of postmeditation that is the
sphere of words and conceptuality, namely, the mode of appearance [of phenomena], one
reflects by oneself on the presentation of the ground, path, fruit, and so forth and when
one then needs to speak for the benefit of others, as one distinguishes the two valid mo-
dalities of cognition, it is impossible not to engage in the procedure of refuting and estab-
lishing [phenomena].75
In Mipham’s approach, these three types of perspectives would respectively
correspond to the view of: (1) beginners following any approach dichotomizing
nirvāṇa, the unconditioned, and saṃsāra, the conditioned; (2) Svātantrika
Madhyamaka; (3) Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka.76 On account of their propaedeutic
value, these three different approaches are used in different contexts: (1) to in-
troduce beginners to the two truths; (2) to explain the nominal ultimate, and (3)
to point at the actual ultimate.
To conclude, what appears contradictory on the level of a purely synchronic
exposition of the two truths corresponds, in fact, to a diachronic unveiling of the
nature of reality. This is why, for Mipham, an ascending scale of views aiming at
73 See Viehbeck, “Fighting for the Truth” for the contextualization of these perspectives in
the polemics between Mipham and dGe lugs pa scholars.
74 This statement refers to the Buddha’s silence and to the fact that one has no view from this
specific standpoint.
75 dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad, 29, 2ff.: mdor na mnyam gzhag sgra dang rtog pa’i yul las
’das pa’i gzhal don ltar mthar thug gi gnas tshul bden pa dbyer med kyi dbang du byas na ni
bden gnyis phye mi dgos pas ’di ltar snang ba’i chos thams cad ye nas yod med yin min sogs
dgag sgrub kyi khas len gang yang med pas ci’ang mi gsung ba’i tshul gyis lan btab pa dang ’dra
bar yang dag par na tha snyad thams cad las ’das shing brjod du med pa dang spros pa dang
bral ba dang mnyam pa nyid kyi phyir khas len med par grub kyang/ rjes thob sgra rtog gi yul du
gyur pa snang tshul gyi dbang du byas te gzhi lam bras bu sogs kyi rnam gzhag zhig rang gis
bsam zhing gzhan la’ang smra dgos na ni tshad ma gnyis phye ste dgag sgrub kyi tshul la ’jug pa
las ’da’ ba mi srid do/
76 See Duckworth,Mipam on Buddha Nature, 85.
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providing guidance to beings who are practicing this path has some merit, if this
process of disclosure has to take place in a gradual way. From such a soteriologi-
cal perspective, any presentation of these philosophical views by way of an ex-
clusivist approach would therefore be absurd. On account of its pragmatic
concern, Mipham’s integrative approach could therefore be seen as a form of hi-
erarchical soteriological inclusivism in which the validity of any discourse on the
inexpressible reality is measured through its propaedeutic value in a given situa-
tion. In other words, views on the relationship between the two truths that are
antidotes to delusion should not be evaluated independently of their soteriologi-
cal efficacy with regard to their specific underlying cognitive or epistemic con-
text. Paradoxically as it may sound, this does not, however, imply that these
views should be seen as being necessarily equal. Since they are formulated from
the perspective of an ascending scale of cognitive or epistemic contexts, they
constitute a de facto hierarchy of possible discourses on reality.
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